In re A.B.
Filed 9/7/07 In re A.B. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
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In re A.B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | C055425 |
SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEPHANIE B., Defendant and Appellant. | (Super. Ct. No. JD224421) |
Stephanie B., mother of the minor A.B., appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, 366.26, 395.)[1]Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in finding the sibling exception ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E)) did not apply. We disagree and shall affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the minors birth, appellant tested positive for methamphetamine.
On May 30, 2006, the two-month-old minor was placed into protective custody after appellant continued to use methamphetamine and failed to participate in voluntary services. Thereafter, the minor lived with Lorenza B., the mother of the minors alleged father. Lorenza B. also had custody of the minors three-year-old brother.
On July 6, 2006, the juvenile court ordered appellant to participate in family reunification services.
On October 5, 2006, the juvenile court terminated appellants services because of her failure to participate and set a selection and implementation hearing.
On November 30, 2006, the minor was removed from Lorenza B.s home after the kinship unit learned she had three active warrants for her arrest and was driving the [minor] in the car without a valid drivers license. Approximately two weeks later, Lorenza B. phoned the social worker and asked when the minors sibling could see the minor. Lorenza B. reported that the sibling was all restless and that she did not know whats the matter with him. When she later was asked what she would like to see happen with the minor, she said that she was mainly concerned for [the siblings] heart because he was bonded with [the minor] and that she wanted the [minor] back in her care because of [the sibling].
On December 21, 2006, the minor was placed in a prospective adoptive home. According to the selection and implementation report, the prospective adoptive family had fallen in love with [the minor] and [were] totally committed to providing her with a loving, safe, nurturing and permanent home, and the minor was adjusting well to her placement and the family. The prospective adoptive family stated that they [would] consider the option for post adoption contact with the minors sibling.
At the selection and implementation hearing on March 26, 2007, appellant testified that when she visited the minor at Lorenza B.s home, the sibling was always playing with [the minor] and . . . running up to her, giving her a kiss. After the minor was removed from Lorenza B.s home, the sibling was always looking in her crib and crying and asking, wheres [the minor] . . . . She also said that the minor and her sibling had a bond.
The juvenile court found there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the relationship between . . . [the minor] and her sibling is of such a nature and benefit to the [minor] that it would be detrimental to terminate [appellants] parental rights. The court selected adoption as the permanent plan for the minor and terminated parental rights.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends [t]he juvenile court abused its discretion when it refused to find that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to [the minor] because it would cause substantial interference with her relationship with her brother. We disagree.
At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.] [Citation.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.) There are only limited circumstances that permit the court to find a compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) The party claiming the exception has the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstances that constitute an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re Cristella C. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1373; In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(e)(3); Evid. Code, 500.)
One circumstance under which termination of parental rights would be detrimental is when [t]here would be substantial interference with a childs sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the childs best interest, including the childs long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E).) The court must consider the interests of the adoptive child, not the sibling, in determining whether termination would be detrimental to the adoptive child. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 54; In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813.) To show a substantial interference with a sibling relationship the parent must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the child. Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on termination, there is no substantial interference with that relationship. (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952, fn. omitted.)
Appellant has not met her burden. The record reflects that the minor and her sibling lived in the same home for approximately six months and that the minors sibling was distressed when the minor was removed from that home. Even assuming that the minors sibling is strongly bonded to her, there is no evidence she is strongly bonded to him. And, given the minors young age, it cannot be said that any possible detriment to her would be so significant as to outweigh the benefits to her of a stable permanent home.
Accordingly, no basis exists to disturb the juvenile courts finding that the sibling exception was inapplicable and that parental rights should be terminated.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order terminating parental rights) is affirmed.
RAYE , J.
We concur:
DAVIS, Acting P.J.
CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.
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[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
