When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a court reviews the record to determine if there is evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value from which a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 139; Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573].) The evidence must be interpreted in the light most favorable to the judgment, whether direct or circumstantial evidence is involved. (Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 139.) Although it is the jurys duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be convinced of the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.)

Conviction of possession of narcotics for sale requires physical or constructive possession of an amount sufficient for sale, proof that the person knew of the presence and narcotic nature of the substance, and specific intent to sell it. (In re Christopher B. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 455, 466.) A person has constructive possession of contraband when he has the right to control the contraband; possession may be imputed when the contraband is found in a place which is immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his dominion and control, or to the joint dominion and control of the accused and another. (People v. Williams (1971) 5 Cal.3d 211, 215 (Williams).)

A. Knowledge of the Narcotic Nature of the Contraband

Defendant does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence that he had constructive possession of the cocaine base. He maintains, however, that there was insufficient proof that he knew of the narcotic nature of the substance.

Defendant relies mainly on Williams, in which the defendant was apprehended in the front passenger seat of a car that belonged to the driver. (Williams, supra, 5 Cal.3d at pp. 213-214.) At the passengers feet were two brown paper bags containing beer and a single white, double-scored tablet. Two bags filled with similar tablets were concealed beneath the drivers seat. (Id. at pp. 214-215.) The tablets turned out to be Benzedrine, an illegal narcotic. However, they were not particularly distinctive or identifiable. (Ibid.) Williams held that, while knowledge of the narcotic nature of a substance could be shown through actual possession, comments by the defendant, or acts or declarations of the accused which indicate consciousness of guilt, such knowledge could not be imputed merely from defendants constructive possession of an innocuous looking pill. (Id. at p. 216.)

Williams is distinguishable in that the white pills found in the car were not readily identifiable as a narcotic substance, nor were they found in a personal living space occupied by the defendant. By contrast, a 7-gram rock of cocaine in plain view cannot easily be mistaken for something else, such as an over-the-counter drug. Additionally, the cocaine was found in a room that the jury could find was exclusively occupied by defendant, since it contained defendants clothing and mail addressed to him, unlike the tablet in Williams which was located on the floor of someone elses car. We find substantial evidence to support the jurys implied finding that defendant knew the rock on his TV stand was cocaine. (See People v. White (1969) 71 Cal.2d 80, 83 [discovery of marijuana in the defendants bedroom was sufficient to show that he knew the narcotic nature of the substance].)

B. Intent to Sell

Defendant also asserts that there was insufficient evidence to prove intent to sell. He points out that, although the officers seized a large chunk of cocaine, they found none of the paraphernalia that would normally be associated with the sale of rock cocaine‑‑scales, plastic wrapping material, tools to bake or cut the rock, cell phones, or pay-owe sheets, items commonly associated with drug sales.

However, expert witness Detective Jason Oliver testified that an average dose of cocaine base is 0.2 grams. He added that about half of the rock cocaine sold is unpackaged and that dealers who are very proficient at splitting up rocks of cocaine do not use scales to measure the amount. Oliver also testified that a sophisticated dealer will often avoid carrying packaging and sale materials, because he knows the police will be looking for such items. Finally, he testified that dealers commonly carry large quantities of $20 bills.

This testimony was sufficient, in conjunction with the large quantity of rock cocaine and the $20 bills found in defendants possession, to support the jurys determination that defendant intended to sell cocaine.

II. Evidentiary Error

On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Officer Morgado about defendants occupancy of the house, prompting the following exchange:

Q: Is it fair to say that you had no reason to believe that there was an issue or question about whether this is his bedroom or house?

A: Thats correct.

Q: And, furthermore, whether its his dope?

A: Thats correct.

At this point, defense counsel objected on the ground of speculation. The court overruled the objection. Defendant now contends that the question whether its his dope invaded the province of the jury by addressing the ultimate question of whether defendant possessed the cocaine.

The argument is forfeited because trial counsels objection to the question did not preserve this issue for appeal. A speculation objection asserts that the witness has insufficient personal knowledge of the subject matter of his testimony. (Cf. Alvarez v. State of California (1999) 79 Cal.App.4th 720, 733.) Defendants present objection, however, is that the officers opinion was improper because it embraced the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. (See, e.g.,  29; Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 972.) The two objections are substantially different.

A defendants failure to make a timely and specific objection on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable. (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 434, italics added; see also Evid. Code,  353.)

III. Griffin^[4]Error

During his closing argument, defense counsel asked the jury rhetorically, Did we hear any testimony that [defendant is] an only son, that hes the only person who could have had a key to this residence? Have we heard any testimony from his mother, yes, that was his room? Any statements from anyone? A landlord? Any documentation showing that this was his residence? On rebuttal, the prosecutor responded by stating, [T]he indicia in [defendants] bedroom was clear. Theres no indication that anyone else lived there. His mothers in the other bedroom. Where is his mother? Where is anyone else for that matter? They could call the mother. [] . . . [] They can call a neighbor. They can call a friend to the stand and have somebody tell you that, oh, no, somebody else lives there. He doesnt live there.

Defendant argues that the comments by the prosecutor violated his Fifth Amendment rights as interpreted in Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106]. He argues that the comments filled an evidentiary gap in the prosecutions case by commenting indirectly on defendants failure to testify.

The doctrine of Griffin error bars the prosecutor from arguing that the jury should draw an inference adverse to the defendant because he did not testify at trial in legitimate reliance on his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. (Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 615 [14 L.Ed.2d at p. 110].) The California Supreme Court extended this principle in People v. Vargas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 470 (Vargas) by holding improper a prosecutors comment on the absence of evidence that could only be provided by the defendants testimony. (Id. at pp. 475-476.)

However, Griffin does not preclude a prosecutor from commenting on the state of the evidence or the defendants failure to call logical witnesses or introduce material evidence. (Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 475.) Additionally, a prosecutor is justified in making comments in rebuttal, perhaps otherwise improper, which are fairly responsive to argument of defense counsel and are based on the record. (People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 560.)

Here the prosecutor did not commit Griffin error. She made no reference to defendant not testifying, nor did she attempt to draw a negative inference from the failure of defendant to take the stand. She was simply responding in kind to the defense argument that no witness testified that the bedroom was occupied by defendant, by pointing out that the defense could have called its own witnesses to testify that the bedroom was not occupied by defendant. The prosecutors comment on the defenses failure to call certain witnesses was proper, and did not constitute Griffin error. (See People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 372-374.)

IV. Strike Offense

A. Conviction of Assault Under Section 245(a)(1)

Section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(31) states, in pertinent part: As used in this section, serious felony means any of the following: [] . . . [] (31) assault with a deadly weapon, firearm, machinegun, assault weapon, or semiautomatic firearm or assault on a peace officer or firefighter, in violation of Section 245. (Italics added.) The information initially charged that defendant suffered a strike by having been convicted in 1991 of assault with a firearm in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(2) (hereafter  245(a)(2)). However, before trial on the prior, the People were allowed to file an amendment alleging instead that the strike conviction was assault with a deadly weapon ( 245(a)(1)).

The documentary evidence introduced to the jury showed that in 1991 defendant was charged with assault with a firearm under section 245(a)(2), with a special allegation that he personally used a firearm ( 12022.5). He pleaded guilty to section 245(a)(2). However, at the time of sentencing, counsel stipulated to a reduction in the charge to section 245(a)(1), apparently to avoid a mandatory prison sentence.

Subsequent records incorrectly describe the 1991 conviction as one for assault with a handgun, and cite section 245(a)(2). The 1991 abstract of judgment correctly describes the conviction as being for section 245(a)(1), but contains the accompanying notation: assault with a handgun. The jury found that defendant had a 1991 felony conviction for assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245(a)(1). The trial judge then found the 1991 conviction qualified as a strike.

Defendant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury finding. Relying on section 667, subdivision (d)(1), he argues that the date of the plea was the date of conviction and therefore the later stipulation for purposes of sentencing did not change the crime from section 245(a)(2) (assault with a firearm) to section 245(a)(1).

Section 667, subdivision (d)(1) states, in relevant part: The determination of whether a prior conviction is a prior felony conviction for purposes of subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, shall be made upon the date of that prior conviction and is not affected by the sentence imposed unless the sentence automatically, upon the initial sentencing, converts the felony to a misdemeanor. This section merely provides that the determination of whether a prior offense is a felony occurs at the date of conviction. However, the question here was which felony defendant was convicted of, not whether the conviction was a felony. Thus section 667, subdivision (d)(1) does not aid defendants challenge.

At oral argument, defendant changed his strategy. Rather than insisting that he was convicted of section 245(a)(2), appellate counsel claimed the Peoples agreement in 1991 to strike the gun use allegation and to reduce the charge from section 245(a)(2) to section 245(a)(1) precluded the jury from finding that his section 245(a)(1) assault conviction involved use of a deadly weapon. Not so.

A conviction for aggravated assault in violation of section 245(a)(1) can occur in one of two ways: (1) by using a deadly weapon other than a firearm, or (2) by using force likely to produce great bodily injury. The first class of crimes automatically counts as a strike. ( 667, 1192.7, subd. (c)(31); People v. Banuelos (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 601, 605 (Banuelos).) Assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, however, does not count as a strike unless the defendant uses a deadly weapon or personally inflicts great bodily injury. (Ibid.) Thus, the critical issue for the jury was whether defendants section 245 conviction involved the use of a deadly weapon.

Deputy District Attorney William McCamy testified for the People on the truth of the prior. McCamy reviewed all of the documentary evidence relating to defendants criminal history. Based on this review, McCamy testified that defendant was convicted in 1991 of assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245(a)(1). The October 22, 1991 Minute Order & Order of Probation substantiates McCamys conclusion. The order states that (1) count 1 was modified by stipulation of counsel to a section 245(a)(1); and (2) that defendant pleaded guilty to violation of:  245(a)(1) of the Penal Code (Assault With Deadly Weapon With Likelyhood [sic] of Great Bodily Harm) as charged in Count 1 . . . . (Emphasis added.)

The October 22 minute order, informed by McCamys testimony, provided substantial evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendants section 245(a)(1) conviction was for assault with a deadly weapon. The erroneous descriptions of the crime appearing in later documents are immaterial and do not undermine the soundness of the jurys finding.

B. Strike Determination

As indicated, section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(31) lists as a serious felony assault with a deadly weapon, firearm, machinegun, assault weapon, or semiautomatic firearm . . . in violation of Section 245. (Italics added.) Thus, any section 245 conviction in which defendant used a deadly weapon or handgun counts as a strike.

Comparing his case to the facts of Banuelos, defendant argues that the trial judge lacked sufficient evidence to determine that his 1991 section 245(a)(1) conviction qualified as a strike because only the least adjudicated element of the crime, i.e., intent to cause great bodily harm, was admitted by his guilty plea. We disagree.

In Banuelos, the only evidence offered to prove the strike was abbreviated descriptions of the defendants conviction in an abstract of judgment and a fingerprint card.^[5] (Banuelos, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 605.) The court held that these cryptic administrative notations were ambiguous and not sufficient to prove that the defendant personally used a deadly weapon in the assault or had personally inflicted great bodily injury. (Id. at pp. 605-606.)

In determining whether a prior felony is a strike, the trial court may look to the entire record of conviction to determine the nature of the prior offense. (People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, 176-177.) Here, unlike the truncated clerk entries in Banuelos, the minute order of October 22, 1991, recites that defendant pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245(a)(1). Thus, the court had sufficient supporting evidence for its finding that defendants 1991 conviction was a strike.

C. Prior Prison Term

In a supplemental brief, defendant argues that the same reasoning he employed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he had a strike prior based upon his section 245 conviction should also result in our striking the finding that he had a prior prison term within the meaning of section 667.5.

The argument is unsound. Section 667.5 requires a one-year enhancement for any prior prison term served within five years of the commission of the charged offense. ( 667.5, subd. (b).) Defendant does not dispute that he was convicted of assault in violation of section 245, for which he served a prior prison term. Consequently, regardless of the means by which defendant violated section 245, imposition of the prior prison term enhancement was valid.

V. No Cumulative Error

Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors in his trial deprived him of due process and a fair trial. As we find no individual errors resulting in prejudice, there can be no cumulative prejudicial effect. (See People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 994.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

BUTZ , J.

We concur:

BLEASE , Acting P. J.

HULL, J.

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^[1] Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

^[2] The search was a parole search. Counsel agreed to stipulate that the search was valid so that the jury did not learn that defendant was on parole.

^[3] Mens clothing for a person larger than defendant was also found in the second bedroom.

^[4]Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106] (Griffin).

^[5] The Banuelos abstract of judgment listed the offense as ASSAULT GBI W/DEADLY WEAPON and the fingerprint card listed the offense as ASSLT GRT BDLY INJ W/DDLY WPN. (Banuelos, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 605.)