P. v. Williams

Filed 8/31/07 P. v. Williams CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, A113567

v. (San Francisco

Super. Ct. Nos. 189211,

VINCE WILLIAMS, 193986)

Defendant and Appellant.

_______________________________________/

Vince Williams appeals from a judgment entered after a jury convicted him on three counts of second degree burglary, (Pen. Code,  459)^[1]eight counts of receiving stolen property, ( 496, subd. (a)) one count of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, (Veh. Code,  10851, subd. (a)) and three counts of providing false information to a pawnbroker. ( 484.1, subd. (a).) He contends (1) the trial court erred when it revoked his right to represent himself at trial, (2) several of the counts are not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) the court erred when sentencing him. We agree the court committed a minor sentencing error and will order the appropriate modification. In all other respects, we will affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Roberta Economidis lived in an apartment on Pacific Avenue in San Francisco. She took a brief trip between May 14 and May 17, 2004. When Economidis returned, she noticed that things were out of place in her apartment. She checked her jewelry box and discovered that several pieces were gone. The estimated the value of the stolen jewelry was between $2,000 and $3,000.

Valerie Jahan lived on Granville Way in San Francisco. On May 17, 2004, she left for work around 8:00 a.m. When Jahan returned home that evening, she found that her jewelry box was nearly empty. Jahan notified the police.

Scott Weinstein lived in an apartment on Larkin Street in San Francisco. In late May 2004, he went on a business trip. When Weinstein returned, he found his dresser was in disarray. His class ring, a black leather jacket, and a watch were missing.

Hilary Ware and Wendy Kosanovich lived on Taraval Street in San Francisco. On May 20, 2004, they left for work around 8:00 a.m. When they returned home that evening, Ware noticed that things in her bedroom had been moved. Ware and Kosanovich checked their jewelry box and discovered that many gold rings, necklaces, and chains were missing. They called the police.

Helen Doyle lived next door to Ware and Kosanovich on Taraval Street. On May 20, 2004, Doyle went to work around 8:00 a.m. When she returned home that evening, she noticed her bedroom window was open. Doyle checked her jewelry box and discovered that two necklaces, a bracelet, and three rings were gone. She called the police.

Doris Kashevaroff and her husband lived on Merced Avenue in San Francisco. On the morning of May 20, 2004, Kashevaroff and her husband left on a trip to Lake Tahoe. They locked their house and left their 1998 Volvo sedan in the garage with the keys in the ignition. That evening, the Kashervaroffs received a call from their son who told them their Volvo had been stolen. When they returned home the following day, they found a window in the breakfast room was open and that several pieces of jewelry had been taken.

Around this same time, appellant was selling and pawning jewelry in San Francisco. On May 15, 2004, appellant sold eight pieces of jewelry at Maxferds Jewelry. Appellant received $400 in cash for the eight items.

On May 17, 2004 appellant pawned several pieces of jewelry at the Can-B-Loans pawn shop in San Francisco including a 1995 class ring from the University of Pennsylvania and a mans 14 carat gold ring. Appellant received $10 for each ring.

Later that same day, appellant returned to the Can-B-Loans and pawned more jewelry, including several rings and a 14 carat gold chain with charm.

On May 20, 2004, near 6:00 p.m., Timothy Ginn was driving a United Parcel Service truck when he came to the intersection of 15th and Kansas Streets in San Francisco. As Ginn entered the intersection, appellant, driving Kashevaroffs stolen Volvo, went through a stop sign and collided with Ginns truck, tipping it on its side. Appellant stopped the Volvo and fled into a nearby building. Police officers responding to the call found appellant in the stairway of the building. He was excited, breathing heavily, [and] sweating profusely. Officers searched appellants clothing and found seven necklaces and one bracelet. Other officers searched the Volvo and found necklaces, a watch and coins inside.

Inspector Daniel Yawczak of the San Francisco Police Department investigated the accident. He determined that the Volvo belonged to Doris Kashevaroff. Appellant told Yawczak that he had rented the Volvo from a crack addict named Brian Ford.

One of the items found in the Volvo was a college ring engraved with the name Hilary E. Ware. Yawczak checked recent police reports and learned that Wares home had been burglarized. He contacted Ware and learned that Doyles home had been burglarized too.

Knowing that multiple burglaries had been committed, Yawczak decided to check local pawn shop records. He discovered that appellant had pawned items at Maxferds and Can-B-Loans on May 15 and 17, 2004. Yawczak went to Maxferds and secured the items appellant had pawned.

While continuing his investigation, Inspector Yawczak received a call from Roberta Economidis. When she described some of the items that had been taken from her home, Yawczak realized he had seen some of them at Maxferds. Yawczak met Economidis at Maxferds. She identified several items as hers including a gold ring set with a ruby, an engagement ring, and several other rings.

Yawczak went with Scott Weinstein to Can-B-Loans to look at the items appellant had pawned. He identified two rings: his 1995 class ring from the University of Pennsylvania, and his bar mitzvah ring.

Yawczak also accompanied Valerie Jahan to Can-B-Loans to look at the items appellant had pawned. She identified several pieces of jewelry as hers including three rings and a watch.

Yawczak accompanied Hilary Ware to the Hall of Justice where she identified several items of jewelry that had been found in appellants clothing and in the stolen Volvo. Helen Doyle also examined items that were found in the Volvo and in appellants clothing. She identified several pieces of jewelry as hers including a gold chain with a pendant, a gold bracelet, and a ring.

Based on these facts, an information was filed charging appellant with five counts of first degree burglary, ( 459) three counts of second degree burglary, ( 459) eight counts of receiving stolen property, ( 496, subd. (a)) one count of unlawfully taking and driving a vehicle, (Veh. Code,  10851, subd. (a)) and three counts of providing false information to a pawnbroker. ( 484.1, subd. (a).) As is relevant here, the information also alleged appellant had seven prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), and had eight prior strikes within the meaning of the three strikes law. ( 667, subds. (d) & (e).)

Subsequently, two of the first degree burglary counts, and seven of the prior strike allegations were dismissed.

The case proceeded to trial. As part of the trial, the court considered a probation revocation petition that had been filed in a separate case. The jurors convicted appellant on three counts of second degree burglary, eight counts of receiving stolen property, one count of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle and three counts of providing false information to a pawn broker. The jurors also found the strike allegation to be true. They were unable to reach a verdict on the three first degree burglary counts. In a court trial that followed, the court found that appellant had violated his probation in the other case.

Appellant was sentenced on March 21, 2006. The court imposed a 12-year term in the probation revocation case, and a consecutive sentence of 10 years 8 months in this case. This appeal followed.^[2]

II. DISCUSSION

A. Whether the Court Erred by Revoking Appellants Right to Represent Himself

On October 31, 2005, appellant filed a motion to represent himself. The trial court denied the motion.

On November 17, 2005, appellant renewed his motion. The court granted appellants request.

Subsequently appellant filed several motions on his own behalf including a motion under the SLAPP statute, (Code Civ. Proc.,  425.16) a motion asking that sanctions be imposed on the prosecution, a motion under the Victims Bill of Rights (Cal. Const., art. I,  28), and a motion for the appointment of various experts. Most of appellants motions were denied.

On January 18, 2006, appellant appeared for a hearing on a suppression motion that he had filed. During the course of the hearing, the court discussed the fact that appellant had challenged every judge that had appeared in his case. Appellants stand-by counsel said he might be able to provide some insight on the issue. The court asked counsel to proceed. As counsel started to speak, appellant interrupted. The court admonished appellant as follows:

Mr. Williams, you have to understand something else, too. Very basic ground rules are, youre entitled to a fair trial, but you cant obstruct the proceedings, either.

You cant interrupt people, or were never going to get through any of this. If you become so obstructionistic so that the Court cant proceed in an orderly fashion, your right to represent yourself can be withdrawn.

So [Im just] telling you that now. I asked to hear from Mr. Coleman, and I want to hear from him. I dont want to hear from you.

After being so admonished, appellant continued to represent himself at hearings conducted over the next several days.

Then on February 1, 2006, appellant told the judge that he would not appear in court the following day because he needed to meet with his investigator. The court told appellant that was not acceptable:

Oh, just a minute, Mr. Williams. If you are not here at 10:30, then the Court will find that to be obstructionist conduct and you may be relieved of the privilege of representing yourself.

The following day, February, 2, 2006, appellant appeared in court for the morning session. However, as he left for lunch, he told his stand-by counsel that he would not return. Stand-by counsel suggested that appellant not do that. Appellant insisted that he was not coming back. He said he expected stand-by counsel to be appointed.

When the court called the afternoon session, appellant refused to leave the jails medical pod. The court then revoked appellants pro se status explaining its decision as follows:

Okay. The Court believes it has a situation before it that must be examined under various parameters.

The right to self-representation is not without certain restrictions and even under the Faretta . . . decision, the Court must examine the record to determine whether the defendant deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct such that his right to represent himself should be terminated. An examination must be made whether the defendant is not able and willing to abide by the rules of procedure and courtroom protocol.

And so therefore the Court examines this record to determine whether serious and obstructionist misconduct has occurred and the Court has determined and does determine that such misconduct has been committed.

. . . .

[Mr. Williams] made a motion to continue the trial which the Court denied yesterday. It was an untimely motion and bore no good cause for continuation of this trial, particularly since he had been his own counsel for some 75 days. Mr. Williams has engaged in a pattern of obstructionist conduct with every judge who has had anything to do with this case, Judge Morgan, Judge McBride, Judge Dekreon, Judge Yaggy[,] and Judge Stewart, with each of them being reported to Judicial Performance Commission by Mr. Williams.

Although the Court denied the trial motions presented by Mr. Williams, the Court assured him that his theory of defense would be put before the jury. But that did not satisfy Mr. Williams. He became increasing[ly] angry. This morning he came into court, although he had stated yesterday he would not appear, but he did appear at 10:30.

He did bring his list of witnesses, but he refused to further engage in the discussion of the Peoples motions in limine. Several times he stood mute instead of answering the Courts inquiry as to his positions on the Peoples motion regarding the fingerprint expert. At one point[,] he stood silent for 45 seconds, and when he did answer, he talked about something unrelated to the motion.

Its apparent that he wants to conduct this trial in the manner and the time frame that fits his wishes rather than obey the Courts orders and obey the procedure and decorum that is necessary and essential for the proper conduct of a jury trial.

. . . .

He repeatedly misrepresented the record, misrepresented the facts, misrepresented the Courts rulings, misrepresented the Peoples conduct and the Peoples arguments in this matter such that the record had to be repeatedly corrected and Mr. Williams needed to be admonished.

. . . .

As he was wheeled from court he stated, quote, I am not going to allow the Court to proceed. I am not ready. I am going to the medical pod, close quote. That was when he was wheeled out of the court for lunch. However, before that when the Court was ordering him to proceed with the argument regarding the Peoples motion in limine, at one pointhe is in a wheelchairat one point he wheeled himself and was headed toward the door until the Court and the bailiff both had to repeatedly admonish him to get back to the table and conduct himself appropriately for this trial and participate in this trial. And he by his actions and his words, he has refused to do so.

So the Court does find that this is deliberate conduct that is serious and obstructionist. Mr. Williams is not able and willing to abide by the rulings of procedure and courtroom protocol. This misconduct impairs the Courts integrity in the trial. It is intentional, it is deliberate, and it is sought to disrupt and delay the trial. He has been warned that if he failed to abide by the Courts rulings, if he failed to appear in court, that his right to represent himself would be taken away.

. . . .

There is no available or suitable alternative sanction in this regard. Contempt proceedings against Mr. Williams would not effect the speedy resolution of this trial. It would be futile. It would not be appropriate to keep Mr. Williams in the courtroom under restraints. That would not be an appropriate remedy in this case. The Court would not want to have Mr. Williams prejudice his case by being in restraints in front of a jury. It would not be an appropriate remedy.

So therefore the Court finds that he has voluntarily absented himself from trial. His right to his self representation is hereby terminated, and Mr. Quigley as stand-by counsel is appointed to represent him from this point forward.

Appellant now contends the trial court erred when it revoked his right to represent himself at trial.

A defendant in a criminal action has a right to represent himself. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 821.) Still, no trial judge is required to sit idly by while a defendant representing himself abuses the dignity of the courtroom, ignores the rules of procedural and substantive law, disparages the court or opposing counsel, or disrupts the orderly presentation of the trial. (Id. at pp. 834-835, fn. 46.) The trial court may terminate self-representation if a defendant deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct, (id. at p. 834, fn. 46) that threatens to subvert the core concept of a trial . . . or to compromise the courts ability to conduct a fair trial . . . . (People v. Carson(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 10.) In making its decision, a trial judge should consider several factors including whether alternative sanctions are available, whether the defendant has been warned that the particular misconduct will result in termination of self-representation, whether the defendant intentionally sought to disrupt or delay the trial, and whether the defendant is likely to undermine the fairness of the trial. (Ibid.) The decision to terminate is left to the trial courts discretion, but termination of self-representation is a severe sanction and must not be imposed lightly. (Id. at p. 7.)

Here, the trial court found that appellant had engaged in serious and obstructionist conduct that threatened the integrity of the trial. That finding is fully supported. Appellant interrupted stand-by counsel, obstructed the proceedings by challenging every judge who sat on his case, and refused to answer the courts questions concerning pending legal issues. Appellant misrepresented the record, the facts, and the Peoples arguments, making it necessary to halt the proceedings in order to correct the record. Finally, and most seriously, appellant refused to appear in court, making it impossible for the case to proceed. The court warned appellant not just once, but twice that if he failed to act appropriately, his right to self-representation could be revoked. On one of those occasions, the court told appellant specifically that if he failed to appear in court, he would not be allowed to represent himself. The court considered other alternatives such as contempt proceedings or shackling, but concluded, quite reasonably, that those alternatives would not be satisfactory. It is apparent that appellants actions were intentional. Indeed, appellant told his stand-by counsel that he would not appear in court.

On this record we do not hesitate to conclude the trial court correctly revoked appellants right to represent himself. The court did not abuse its discretion.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support some of his convictions.

The standard we apply when evaluating this argument is familiar. We must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence-that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578, 162.)

Here, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient in several respects. First, he maintains his receiving stolen property convictions are not supported by the evidence. Appellant notes, correctly, that one of the essential elements of such a conviction is knowledge that the items possessed had been stolen. (People v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 249.) Appellant contends the evidence here was insufficient because there was no evidence that he knew the jewelry he pawned or sold on May 15 and 17, 2004, that belonged to Scott Weinstein, Valerie Jahan, and Roberta Economidis, had been stolen. We disagree.

The knowing possession by a defendant of recently stolen property raises a strong inference of the other element of the crime: the defendants knowledge of the tainted nature of the property. This inference is so substantial that only slight additional corroborating evidence need to be adduced in order to permit a finding of guilty. (People v. Anderson (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 414, 421.)

Here, appellants knowledge can be inferred. Appellant lied to the clerks at Maxferds and Can-B-Loans telling them he owned or had permission to sell the jewelry that he sold. False answers to questions concerning ownership demonstrate guilty knowledge. (People v. Williams (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 952, 958.) In addition, appellant possessed many items stolen from many different sources. The possession of multiple items of stolen property is itself a circumstance from which knowledge can be inferred. (People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1020; People v. Taylor (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 979, 984.) The evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that appellant knew the items that he pawned or sold were stolen.

Next, appellant contends that the items of jewelry that were found in his clothing after his arrest, and that were found in the stolen Volvo, could not support receiving stolen property convictions. As for the former items, appellant maintains there was no evidence introduced to demonstrate that [he] knew that those items were stolen. While there was no direct evidence on this point, there was indirect evidence. Appellant fled after he collided with the delivery truck. Knowledge that an item possessed is stolen can be inferred from flight. (People v. Taylor, supra, 2 Cal.App.3d at p. 983.) With respect to the items found in the Volvo, appellant argues there is no evidence that [he] knew that the jewelry was in the car. However, the evidence showed appellant had other items of stolen property hidden in his clothing. If appellant had stolen jewelry in his clothing, the jurors reasonably could conclude he was aware of the stolen jewelry in the car.

Appellant also contends the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for unlawfully taking and driving a vehicle. The elements necessary to establish a violation of section 10851 of the Vehicle Code are the defendants driving or taking of a vehicle belonging to another person, without the owners consent, and with specific intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession. (People v. Windham (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1580, 1590.) Here, appellant contends the evidence was insufficient because there was no evidence from which the jury could conclude that [he] knew . . . the car was stolen. However, knowledge that the vehicle was stolen is not an element of the offense. Such knowledge is merely one of the various alternative factors evidencing an intent to deprive the owner of title and possession. (People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 180.) Appellant also contends the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion that he intended to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of possession. However, the evidence shows appellant fled the scene of the crash with the delivery truck. [F]light upon detection or apprehension is sufficient to show specific intent to deprive the owner of possession. (In re Robert V. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 815, 821.)

We conclude the evidence was sufficient.

C. Sentencing

The jurors convicted appellant on counts III, VII, and XI, charging second degree burglary, ( 459) based on his sale or pawn of stolen jewelry at Maxferds Jewelers and Can-B-Loans. The jurors also convicted appellant on counts IV, VIII, and XII, charging misdemeanor violations of providing false information to a pawnbroker. ( 484.1, subd. (a).)

Subsequently, the court imposed concurrent 16-month terms for each of appellants second degree burglary convictions, and concurrent terms of six months for each of the false information convictions.

Appellant now contends the court could not validly sentence him on both the second degree burglary and false information counts because both arose from the same course of conduct. According to appellant, the latter sentences must be stayed under section 654.^[3]

The People concede the error and we agree. We order the appropriate modification.

III. DISPOSITION

The trial court is ordered to prepare and to forward to the Department of Corrections an amended abstract of judgment showing that the six-month terms imposed on counts IV, VIII, and XII, for providing false information to a pawnbroker in violation of section 484.1, subdivision (a), are stayed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

_________________________

Jones, P.J.

We concur:

________________________

Simons, J.

________________________

Gemello, J.

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^[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all further section references will be to the Penal Code.

^[2] Appellant has not challenged any aspect of the probation revocation case on this appeal.

^[3] Section 654, subdivision (a) states in part, An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision.