P. v. Denard

Filed 9/11/07 P. v. Denard CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

Defendant Anthony Rashawn Denard was sentenced to 40 years to life in prison for the murder of Kevin Davis (Pen. Code,  187, subd. (a)) with use of a firearm (Pen. Code,  12022.53, subd. (d)). This was defendants second trial for the killing; we reversed an identical judgment following the prior trial for instructional error. (People v. Denard (Dec. 6, 2002, A097159) 2002 WL 31732690 [nonpub. opn.])

Instructional issues are again the primary focus in the current appeal. Defendant argues that the court should have instructed on the offense of involuntary manslaughter, and on the principle of unreasonable defense of another. He further contends that the imperfect self-defense instructions were flawed, and that the court erred in limiting his introduction of character evidence. We conclude that an involuntary manslaughter instruction should have been given, but hold that the error was harmless and that defendants other arguments lack merit. The judgment is therefore affirmed.

I. FACTS

It is undisputed that defendant shot and killed Kevin Davis in the early morning of May 12, 2000; the issues at trial were whether he committed murder, manslaughter by acting in unreasonable self-defense, or no crime by acting in reasonable self-defense.

On the night of May 11-12, 2000, Davis lost money to defendants friend Jordan Robinson in an Oakland establishment witnesses called the gambling shacka Senior Citizens Club with craps tables in the back room. Davis went to the gambling shack that night with his girlfriend, Lakeisha Parker, lost $1,000 playing dice, went to Parkers home to get an additional $2,500 she was keeping for him, and returned to the shack with Parker, Jazzlynn Samuel, and Valerie Long to continue gambling. Defendant and Robinson arrived later, allegedly with a third individual, Dameion Thomas; they were subsequently joined by defendants friend Lashanelle Garrett. Defendant and his friends had not met Davis and his friends before that night. The prosecution presented testimony from Parker, Samuel, Long, and Garrett; defendant, Robinson, and Thomas testified for the defense.

Parker could not be located to testify, and her testimony from the prior trial was read into the record. Parker said that Davis exchanged mean and aggressive words with Robinson and defendant while Davis and Robinson gambled one-on-one at the shack. Robinson testified that during the gambling, after he had won a substantial sum from Davis, Davis put a gun on the table and said he could take his money back any time hed like. Parker said that Davis had no weapon that night, and she, Samuel, and Long denied that Davis made any threats in the shack.

Robinson said that defendant left the shack with Garrett before Davis displayed the gun. Defendant testified that, as he was leaving, Davis stepped in front of him and said, [S]hould I let you leave? . . . I got something in the trunk of my car to make you limp for the rest of your life. Thomas corroborated defendants account of the threat, but Parker denied that Davis said anything when defendant left the shack. Samuel heard defendant tell Robinson, Ill be back as he was leaving; defendant denied saying this. Thomas testified that defendant said, Well talk to you later.

Defendant asked Garrett to drive him to his parents house; he said that he planned to change clothes and go to his girlfriends house, but Robinson telephoned him while he was changing and told him to come on up there. Defendant said it was a panic call, and he could tell from the tone of Robinsons voice that something was wrong. Robinson said he called defendant for help because he was afraid after Davis displayed the gun. Robinson said he did not tell defendant about Daviss gun, and there was no reason why defendant should have returned to the shack with a gun.

After the call from Robinson, defendant got a loaded gun from under his bed, and told Garrett to drive back to the shack. Garrett testified that defendant was calm as she drove the 30 blocks to the shack, and calm when he asked her to take the gun after they arrived there. He handed her the gun as they walked to the shack and she put it in her pants. Defendant was frisked at the door of the shack, where Davis ran into him as he was leaving with Parker, Samuel, and Long.

The ensuing altercation was described in the testimony as follows:

Parker said that defendant and Davis exchanged a few words and pushed and shoved each other briefly. Defendant ran to Garrett and Davis started arguing with Robinson, who had come out of the shack. Davis and Robinson argued for two or three seconds, standing close together. Defendant took the gun from Garrett, and Robinson told defendant, Stop, no, dont shoot. Defendant first shot Davis when Davis was facing Robinson, with his back to defendant. After he was shot, Davis turned and walked toward defendant and said, Are you going to shoot me? Defendant walked up to Davis and kept shooting until he was out of bullets. He fired at least three shots after Davis fell to the ground, and then beat Davis in the head with the gun before running away.

Samuel said that she got around the commotion at the entrance of the gambling shack, and started walking down the block toward Daviss car. When she looked back, she saw Davis and defendant arguing; she did not see any hitting or shoving. She ran when she saw defendant unzip Garretts coat and then heard gunshots. After one or two shots she heard Davis say, Are you going to shoot me? and then heard four or six more shots. At some point she heard a male voice say, No, dont do it.

Long said that Davis and defendant argued, but she kept walking to the car. She heard someone, likely Robinson, yell No before shots were fired. She heard the shots, but did not see who fired them. After she heard the shots, she ran down the street with Samuel.

Gabriela Cruz, who lived near the gambling shack, called 9-1-1 when she heard shots that morning. She looked outside and saw a man lying in the street. Before the shots, she heard several people saying, No, no, no.

Laron Caesar, an acquaintance of Daviss, was standing outside a club near the gambling shack around 4:00 a.m. when he heard a rapid burst of four or five shots and saw people running. Twenty seconds to one minute later he heard people saying, still being hit, and he saw a black male hitting a person on the sidewalk by the shack with what he presumed was a gun. The victim was curled up on the ground trying to block the blows; the victim was helpless and Caesar saw him being hit two to six times. When Caesar walked over two or three minutes later, he saw a woman turn the victim over onto his back, and recognized the victim as Davis.

Robinson said he heard a commotion at the front door of the gambling shack after Davis left the craps table, ran outside, and saw that defendant and Davis had bumped into each other. Robinson said that Davis immediately ran up in my face . . . basically saying it be the last time he could get his money back. Davis came within an arms length of him, but did not touch him, and had no weapon. When Robinson backed away, Davis turned his attention to defendant. By that point Robinson was in the street, walking to his car, saying, Come on, you all, lets go. Robinson saw Davis get in [defendants] face; they were trash talking, but had no weapons, and exchanged no blows or death threats. Robinson turned his back, went quickly to his car, and heard shots as he was getting into the car and driving away with Thomas.

Thomas said that when he came out of the shack he saw defendant run behind a car, and saw Davis run up to Robinson [l]ike he was going to beat him up. Davis had his back to the street when he argued with Robinson and talked about getting his money back; Davis was gesturing but had nothing in his hands. When Robinson moved to the side, Davis turned around and walked or ran to defendant, who was returning to the sidewalk. Davis poked defendant in the forehead, and defendant responded by shooting Davis in the chest. Thomas ran to Robinsons car and rode away with him.

Defendant said that after he was frisked at the door to the gambling shack Davis approached him and said, You went and got a gun, and he told him I didnt. Davis poked him in the forehead and pushed him in the chest backward into Garrett, saying he was going to whop my ass, punk bitch; he tried to avoid Davis and told him to get his hands out of his face. Davis poked him in the eye and defendant ran away, but stopped when he heard Davis and Robinson arguing. Davis was facing Robinson with his hands in Robinsons face telling Robinson that he would whop his ass. Defendant walked back and yelled Lets go, which got Daviss attention. Davis turned, repeated that he would whop my ass, dropped his hand like he was reaching, and charge[d] at him.

Defendant said he ran to Garrett, turning his back on Davis, and grabbed the gun from her. When he spun around, Davis was six to eight feet away, advancing toward him. He did not look at Daviss hands and did not know if Davis had a gun, but he thought that Davis was armed because of the gesture Davis made[l]ike he was going up under his shirt to grab somethingbefore charging him. He closed his eyes and, as he was backing away, shot six times in Daviss direction. He did not mean to kill Davis. He fired the shots because he feared for his life, and kept shooting because he did not know whether Davis had been hit. After the shots were fired, he ran to the car and drove away with Garrett.

Davis was alive when police reached the scene, but died later that day. Dr. Thomas Rogers performed the autopsy and identified the cause of death as multiple gunshot wounds. The autopsy showed that Davis was struck by six bullets: two in the left side of the abdomen, two in the upper left arm, one in the left calf, and one in the buttock. Ballistics expert Lansing Lee opined that one of the shots to Daviss arm was fired from less than an inch away.

Rogers testified that the shots to the abdomen and the arm entered in the front of the body; the shot to the leg, like that to the buttock, entered from behind. The shot to the leg entered near the calf muscle, traveled in an upward trajectory, and exited through the knee. The shot to the buttock also traveled upward and lodged in the lower part of the spinal cord. Rogers could not rule out the possibility that someone could have run after being shot in the leg like Davis, but said that the shot into the buttock and spinal cord would have incapacitated the victims legs. Defendant denied shooting Davis in the back. Rogers said that Davis could not have been running upright toward the shooter when he was shot in the leg and buttock, but Rogers did not know the sequence in which the shots were fired, and acknowledged that being struck by a bullet could cause the body to move.

Defendant said that he gave the gun to his cousin, who discarded it in the marina. When Oakland Police Officer Marcus Midyett talked to defendant on May 30, 2000, defendant falsely identified himself as Michael Denard. Defendant testified that he gave a false name because he had a warrant for a traffic offense. Defendant worked for the Oakland Boys and Girls Club at the time of the incident. He had been drafted to play professional baseball, and had signed a contract to play for a team in Evansville, Indiana, beginning in June 2000. Instead of reporting to the team, defendant and Garrett went to Oklahoma that month, where they stayed with defendants brother and his wife. Defendant testified that he went to Oklahoma at his parents request because his brother was having problems in school; at his first trial, defendant said that he did not go to Indiana to play baseball because he did not want to be pulled off the field in handcuffs. He was arrested at his parents house in July 2000, after returning from Oklahoma, for the murder of Davis.

Parker was taken to a patrol car at the scene on May 12, 2000, and agreed to be taken to the police station. When she was initially interviewed, she denied seeing who shot Davis, but after a break in the questioning she identified defendant as the shooter.

In his statements to the police after his arrest, defendant initially denied, but eventually admitted, shooting Davis. He did not mention in the statements that Thomas was with him at the gambling shack. He did not say in his taped statement that Davis blocked his path when he left the shack, or that Davis said he had something that would make him limp for the rest of his life. He did not initially tell police that he received a call from Robinson when he was at his parents house; he mentioned the call only after being told that his claim of self-defense was making no sense. When he recounted the call, he did not say that Robinson asked him to return to the shack; he said Robinson was, like, Im getting ready to leave. And I was like all right. And I was like Im going to come back up there. So I went. I went on my way back up there. He did not tell police that Davis reached under his shirt before he charged at him. He told police that he was looking right at Davis when he shot him. Before testifying at his second trial, he never said that he had his eyes closed when he fired the shots.

Parker had been convicted of selling a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,  11352), Robinson of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. 841).

Davis was 25 years old and defendant was 22 when the shooting occurred.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Unreasonable Defense of Others

Defendant contends that the court had a duty to instruct the jury sua sponte on the theory that he killed Davis in unreasonable defense of Robinson. [O]ne who kills in the actual but unreasonable belief that he must protect another person from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and not murder. (People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 990 (Randle); see also People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 199 [killing in unreasonable self-defense constitutes a form of voluntary manslaughter and is a lesser included offense of murder].) The court has a duty to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 (Breverman).) Substantial evidence in this context is evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude[] that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed. (Ibid.) We find no substantial evidence here that required an instruction on imperfect defense of another.

Defendant could have been found to have acted in defense of Robinson only if he actually believed (1) that Robinson was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury, and (2) that the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger. (CALCRIM No. 571.) For a number of reasons, it could not be reasonably inferred from the evidence in this case that defendant actually had either of these beliefs, as we now explain.

First, while we recognize that a lesser included offense instruction may be required even in the face of contrary defense evidence (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 163), it is at least relevant that defendant never claimed to have had either of these beliefs, or to have acted out of concern for Robinson. Indeed, he denied shooting Davis while Davis argued with Robinson.

Second, while we must, for purposes of defendants contention, credit Parkers testimony that defendant shot Davis once while Davis was confronting Robinson, all witnesses agreed that Davis and Robinson merely exchanged words, did not touch each other, and held no weapons. Insofar at it appears from the evidence, their argument was brief. These circumstances contrast sharply with those in the reported cases, where the victims had inflicted physical injury before they were killed. (See Randle, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 991-992 [imperfect defense of another instruction was justified where victim was beating defendants cousin]; People v. Anderson (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 430, 447 [instruction was warranted where victim had cut defendants friend with a crack pipe].) Defendant cites no authority suggesting that a brief verbal confrontation would support the instruction at issue.

Third, it is not apparent that Robinson needed defendants help to protect himself from Davis. Defendant did not see the gun Davis allegedly displayed in the shack, Robinson did not mention the gun when he called defendant, and, although Davis told defendant he had something that could make him limp for life, he said the implement was in his car, not on his person. Thus, defendant had no reason to think it likely that Davis was armed when he was arguing with Robinson. There is no evidence that Davis had cornered Robinson. To the contrary, Robinson and Thomas testified that Robinson was able to avoid Davis simply by moving away from him. Parker said that Robinson told defendant Stop, no, dont shoot before the shot was firedtestimony that was corroborated to some extent by Samuel, Long, and Cruz, and not refuted by any defense witness.

For these reasons, it would be entirely speculative to infer that defendant was trying to protect Robinson when he first shot Davis. Where, as here, it is doubtful that . . . defendant believed, reasonably or unreasonably, that any threatened danger to [the victim] was imminent, an instruction on unreasonable defense of another is not required. (People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 531.)

A further problem with defendants argument is that it addresses only one of his six shots into Davis. A lesser included offense instruction is necessary only when the evidence would support a finding that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162, italics added.) Since defendant shot Davis five more times after any need to protect Robinson ended, he was responsible for the consequences of those shots notwithstanding any intent he had to defend another. Thus, any partial justification for the first shot could have lessened defendants culpability only if that shot, alone, would have been fatal (the additional five shots were superfluous), or Davis would not have died but for that shot (the five shots were insufficient to cause Daviss death). However, the record supports neither of those conclusions. Dr. Rogers testified that one of the two shots to Daviss back, the one into the buttock that lodged in the spinal cord, would likely have incapacitated Daviss legs, but Davis apparently stayed on his feet after the first shot. It thus appears that the first shot was the one that passed through Daviss legthe one Rogers said would not necessarily have prevented him from runningand there is no evidence that that shot alone would likely have been fatal. Nor did Rogerss testimony suggest that the five additional shots would have been insufficient to kill Davis.

Accordingly, the court was not required to instruct sua sponte on unreasonable defense of Robinson.

Defendant maintains that, even if the court had no duty to give the instruction sua sponte, his counsel was incompetent for not requesting it. Since the record does not disclose the reasons why counsel failed to request the instruction, the judgment must be affirmed unless there could be no satisfactory explanation or rational tactical purpose for the omission. (People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 624 (Hart).) Counsel plainly had a valid tactical reason for declining to seek an instruction on imperfect defense of another because the scenario supporting that instructiona first shot fired during the argument with Robinsoncontradicted defendants account of what transpired, as well as the testimony of his key witnesses, Robinson and Thomas. Counsel could reasonably have decided to forego a theory that was contrary to the defense evidence. Defendant submits that it was incumbent upon the defense to provide some explanation for the physical evidence showing that Davis had been shot from behind, but counsel likely did the best he could do under the circumstances by securing an admission from Dr. Rogers that the impact of shots could cause a body to move, and by arguing to the jury that Davis may have staggered backwards after he was shot.

The ineffective assistance of counsel argument must also be rejected because it is not reasonably probable that a different result would have occurred if the instruction had been given. (Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 624.) As we have noted, defendant denied shooting Davis during the argument, Davis argued with Robinson without touching him or wielding any weapon, and the evidence did not establish that Robinson needed defendants help. Given those circumstances, the jury would likely have found that a shot to Davis during the argument with Robinson was intended simply to hurt Davis, not to help Robinson.

B. Self-Defense Instruction

The court instructed the jury on imperfect self-defense pursuant to CALJIC No. 5.17 as follows: A person who kills another person in the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury, kills unlawfully but does not harbor malice aforethought and is not guilty of murder. This would be so even though a reasonable person in the same situation seeing and knowing the same facts would not have had the same belief. Such an actual but unreasonable belief is not a defense to the crime of voluntary manslaughter. [] As used in this instruction, an imminent peril or danger means one that is apparent, present, immediate and must be instantly dealt with, or must so appear at the time to the slayer. [] However, this principle is not available, and malice aforethought is not negated, if the defendant by his conduct created the circumstances which legally justified his adversarys attack.

Defendant contends that the court erred by omitting the following bracketed language from the last paragraph of the instruction: However, this principle is not available, and malice aforethought is not negated, if the defendant by his [unlawful or wrongful] conduct created the circumstances which legally justified his adversarys [use of force, attack or pursuit].

Defendant reasons that the jury should have had the opportunity to consider whether he lawfully shot Davis in defense of Robinson before Davis turned around and charged at him, and thus potentially find that the principle of imperfect self-defense was not negated by wrongful provocation of Davis. However, the evidence did not support an instruction on lawful defense of another; as we have explained, the evidence did not even support an instruction on imperfect defense of another. As defendant himself concedes at one point in his briefing, [t]he fact that there was only a verbal confrontation between Davis and Robinson would probably disprove the right to shoot in complete defense of others. Moreover, as the People note, defendants possession, transportation, and concealment of the loaded .38 caliber pistol he used to shoot Davis was indisputably wrongful and/or unlawful. Accordingly, the court did not err in omitting the words unlawful or wrongful from CALJIC No. 5.17, and there is no prospect that defendant could have been prejudiced by the omission in any event.

Defendant contends that the court should have added the words or pursue to the last paragraph of CALJIC No. 5.17 because the jury could have been misled by the omission into thinking that he could not claim imperfect self-defense because he had not yet been physically attacked by Davis when he shot him. The record did not support a pursuit instruction because there is no evidence that defendant attempted to flee from Davis when Davis charged him. (See Blacks Law Dict. (8th ed. 2004) p. 1272, col. 1 [pursuit refers to the act of chasing to overtake or apprehend]; Merriam-Websters Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 2001) p. 947, col. 2 [pursue means to follow in order to overtake, capture, kill, or defeat].) The balance of CALJIC No. 5.17 made it clear in any event that unreasonable self-defense can be based on a belief in imminent peril before an actual attack. Thus, there is no reasonable possibility that the jury could have misunderstood the concept of imperfect self-defense in the manner defendant posits.

C. Involuntary Manslaughter Instruction

Under People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 85, 91 (Blakeley), an unintentional killing, with conscious disregard for life, in unreasonable self-defense, constitutes voluntary manslaughter, but this rule does not apply before June 2, 2000, when Blakeley was decided. Here, the killing occurred on May 12, 2000. Thus, defendants jury should have been instructed that unintentional killing in unreasonable self-defense is involuntary manslaughter. (People v. Johnson (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 566, 577.) Instead, the jury was instructed under CALJIC No. 8.40 that an unintentional killing, with implied malice, in unreasonable self-defense, is voluntary manslaughter.[1] CALJIC No. 8.40 stated in pertinent part: Every person who unlawfully kills another human being without malice aforethought but either with an intent to kill, or with conscious disregard for human life, is guilty of voluntary manslaughter in violation of Penal Code section 192, subdivision (a). [] There is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion or in the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend oneself against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury.

The error is of no avail to defendant, however, because the jury necessarily resolved the issue of imperfect self-defense against him under other properly given instructions. (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 646.) As we have indicated, defendants challenges to the self-defense instructions in this case, and his claim that defense of another instructions were required, lack merit. Under the other proper instructions here, if the jury concluded that defendant killed Davis in imperfect self-defense it would have returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant observes that the jury could have found that he did not intend to kill Davis, and acted only with implied malice. But such a finding would not have reduced the crime to involuntary manslaughter under pre-Blakeley law without the additional finding that he acted in unreasonable self-defensea finding the jury declined to make.

D. Character Evidence

Defendant argues that the court erred in cutting off his testimony concerning his accomplishments as a baseball player. Defendant testified that he was a skillful baseball player, and was asked by his counsel whether he played high school baseball. The prosecution made a relevance objection, defense counsel said that the evidence was foundational, and relate[d] to what he was about to do on May 11th of the year 2000, and the objection was sustained. Defendant went on to state that he had twice been drafted to play baseball, and had a contract to begin playing baseball for Evansville, Indiana beginning in June 2000. Over a relevance objection, defendant testified that he started working after he hurt his arm playing baseball at Laney Junior College. He said that, at the time of the shooting, he worked as a junior staff member at the Oakland Boys and Girls Club.

We hereby grant defendants request for judicial notice (Evid. Code,  452, subd. (d) [court records]) of the portion of his testimony from his first trial when he went into his baseball activities in greater detail. In addition to the matters to which defendant testified at the second trial, he testified at the first that: he received pitching awards in high school; played on a team representing the United States in a Goodwill Series League in Japan during high school; was drafted by the Minnesota Twins and the Arizona Diamondbacks; rehabilitated his arm through six to 10 months of physical therapy after injuring it at Laney; and was working out and was excited about going to Evansville around the time the shooting occurred.

Defendant contends that he should have been allowed to introduce character evidence of comparable scope in the second trial. However, the court in the second trial merely sustained one objection to a question asking whether defendant played on a high school baseball team, and defendant offered none of the other additional evidence he now cites. The single evidentiary ruling the court madeexcluding defendants high school baseball team membership as a foundation for his career plans at the time of the killingwas neither erroneous nor prejudicial. (Evid. Code,  352 [discretion to exclude evidence of marginal probative value]; 354 [error must cause miscarriage of justice].) Moreover, the jury learned the relevant fact that defendant had been signed to play, and was planning to play professional baseball, and thus had career prospects, when the killing occurred, and the jury would likely have inferred from that information that he had been a standout baseball player in high school.

Defendant submits that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial by failing to attempt to introduce more baseball related evidence to show his good sportsmanship as it bore on whether he was the aggressor in his confrontation with Davis. However, it is not reasonably probable that such additional evidence would have changed the outcome. (Hart, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 624.) We note in this regard that the character evidence defendant cites from the first trial was essentially cumulative of the evidence presented in the second trial. Defendant cites sentencing letters filed on his behalf by people involved in his baseball career as additional character evidence that might have been submitted on his behalf, but counsel could reasonably conclude that defendants deportment on the playing field had little to do with his actions on the night in question.

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________

Marchiano, P.J.

We concur:

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Swager, J.

______________________

Margulies, J.

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[1] Apart from CALJIC No. 8.40, the jury was given a panoply of correct standard instructions on murder and manslaughter, including CALJIC Nos. 8.00 (HomicideDefined), 8.10 (MurderDefined), 8.11 (Malice AforethoughtDefined), 8.30 (Unpremeditated Murder of the Second Degree), 8.31 (Second Degree MurderKilling Resulting From Unlawful Act Dangerous to Life), 8.37 (ManslaughterDefined), and 8.50 (Murder and Manslaughter Distinguished).