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P. v. Williams

P. v. Williams
09:16:2007



P. v. Williams









Filed 9/13/07 P. v. Williams CA4/1



NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS





California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION ONE



STATE OF CALIFORNIA



THE PEOPLE,



Plaintiff and Respondent,



v.



JOSEPH TODD WILLIAMS,



Defendant and Appellant.



D049281



(Super. Ct. No. SCD199422)



APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, John L. Davidson, Judge. Affirmed as modified.



Joseph Todd Williams was charged with grand theft (Pen. Code,  487, subd. (a)), burglary (Pen. Code,  459), defrauding an innkeeper by nonpayment of more than $400 (Pen. Code  537, subd. (a)(2)) and the unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code,  10851, subd. (a)). He pleaded guilty to all but the burglary charge in exchange for its dismissal. The court placed Williams on three years of formal probation, with a 365-day jail term (121 days total credits), required that he sign a Fourth Amendment waiver for warrantless searches of computers in his personal possession, and ordered him to pay restitution fines.



Williams challenges the restrictions placed on his computer use as impermissibly broad and vague. He also complains that the court's clarification of the restrictions was not placed in the probation order. As to the latter issue, the Attorney General agrees the probation order should be modified to reflect the court's clarification. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment.



FACTUAL BACKGROUND[1]



Defrauding an Innkeeper



At the relevant time, Williams, a computer specialist, worked for Lockheed Martin under the name "J.T. Morgan." The company transferred him from New Jersey to the San Diego area, and on January 25, 2006, he rented a hotel room in the name of J.T. Morgan. He last used the room on February 14, but he did not cancel his reservation. Rather, he e-mailed the hotel manager several times through April 17 making excuses for nonpayment of rent. After three months the hotel considered the room abandoned. Williams then owed $7,059 in rent.



Grand Theft



Lockheed Martin had fired Williams in March 2006 for the unauthorized use of credit cards. Williams's abandoned room contained various items that belonged to Lockheed Martin, including three laptop computers valued at $1,800, and an original software program named "Veritas" valued at $50,000. The room also contained cellular phones, wiring for computer networks, networking schematics, phone rosters and training manuals. The hotel notified the police, and Lockheed Martin reported that Williams lacked permission to have possession of the items.[2]



Unlawful Taking of Automobile



On December 16, 2005, Williams rented a 2006 Pontiac Grand Prix from a rental company, to be secured by a voucher from Lockheed Martin. It stopped payment in March 2006, however, when it fired Williams. Williams did not return the car, and on May 1, police found it outside the apartment of his girlfriend, where he had been staying since February. Police arrested him outside the apartment.



DISCUSSION



I



"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution assures no governmental search or seizure will occur that is unreasonable. [Citation.] A search conducted without a warrant is presumed to be unreasonable unless it falls within one of the 'specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' [Citations.] A probation search is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement as long as the decision to search is not arbitrary or intended to harass." (People v. Downing (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641, 1650.)



" 'A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. . . ." [Citation.] Conversely, a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if the conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.' " (People v. Harrisson (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 637, 641.)



"A probation condition is constitutionally overbroad when it substantially limits a person's rights and those limitations are not tailored to the purpose of the condition. [Citation.] It is not enough to show the government's ends are compelling; the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends. A state may restrict a constitutional right, but only when the restriction is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest." (People v. Harrisson, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 641.)



II



A



The probation report recommended that Williams's Fourth Amendment waiver conditions include, "Any location where my data is stored, including networks and off-site servers," and "That I must supply any password or pass phrase to unlock or unencrypt any file, system, computer, or data of any type."



The probation report also recommended the following computer use restrictions: "no use of pseudonmyms [sic] when opening accounts, registering on sites, or sending electronic communications"; "all user names and accounts must be opened with your given first and last names [and] all 'user names' should consist of your first and last name"; "no use of any tool, site, software, device, or procedure that will obscure your identity or [I]nternet or computer activity"; "no remote storage of any files or data"; report all e-mail accounts you hold and Web site[s] you maintain to probation"; report any new accounts or Web sites you opened on your behalf within 7 days of opening them"; "no cleaning or deleting of [I]nternet browsing activity"; "you must always keep a minimum of 4 weeks of browser history"; and "no possession or use of tools/software designed to be used for testing system security vulnerabilities." (Some capitalization omitted.)



During the hearing, Williams objected to the computer use restrictions, explaining he "is somebody whose livelihood is made working with computers and database systems and setting them up," and "[o]bviously a lot of the information that he would be working with is confidential to his clients, and should that information be opened to other people's inspection, it would basically put him out of work, making him unable to pay restitution and the various fines that he does owe."



The court responded that the Fourth Amendment waiver "will attach to any computers that he has in his personal residence, personal vehicle, on his person, not at his workplace. I mean, that's a Fourth Amendment although they could search him at his workplace. But searching the company's computer would be an improper thing to do, and that would not be within the scope of the Fourth[]Amendment waiver." The court adopted each of the conditions in the probation report as clarified to pertain to computers in Williams's personal possession.



B



Williams concedes that given the nature of his offenses, the court had discretion to reasonably limit his computer use. He asserts, however, that the conditions set forth in the Fourth Amendment waiver "are vague and inconsistent rendering them practically incomprehensible in light of the nature of computer work today." He submits that employees frequently take work computers home, "not only because of the ubiquity of laptop or notebook computers but also because of the expansion of broadband [I]nternet networks allowing real time business computing at home." He asserts the waiver provision as clarified by the court "would not protect business computers with highly confidential data on them if the computer was at [his] personal residence, in his car or being carried by him." He asserts "this does not appear to be what the court had in mind," and "it appears . . . the court wanted to distinguish between business computers . . . and [his] own personal computer."



The Fourth Amendment waiver, as clarified by the court, unambiguously applies to any computer in Williams's personal possession, including any computer owned by an employer. The use conditions are within the court's discretion because Williams's grand theft charge is based on his unauthorized possession of the computers and software of his employer, Lockheed Martin, in his hotel room. If Williams can preclude the inspection of computers in his personal possession by claiming they are work-related, similar crimes against other employers could go undetected. We agree with the Attorney General that the "reasonable interpretation of the probation conditions in light of the court's clarification would not permit [Williams] to designate his computers and data as 'personal' or 'business,' " and thus he cannot "escape the purpose of such conditions." The waiver conditions are reasonably related to the crime of which Williams was convicted or to future criminality. (People v. Harrison, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 641.) To protect employer and client confidentialities, Williams should not have work-related computers in his personal possession.



The court's clarification of the waiver conditions, however, is not included in the probation order. Rather, a copy of the probation report's recommendations is attached to the order. The Attorney General agrees the order should be modified to reflect the clarification.



DISPOSITION



The judgment is affirmed as modified to reflect the court's clarification of the computer use restrictions.





McCONNELL, P. J.



WE CONCUR:





HUFFMAN, J.





NARES, J.



Publication courtesy of California free legal advice.



Analysis and review provided by Carlsbad Property line Lawyers.







[1] The facts are taken from the probation officer's report.



[2] Documents in the room revealed that Williams was using a mailbox at a mailbox business. He gave the business the name "JT Williams," but listed an e-mail address for "jtmorgan." He had opened a business called "Scorpion IT Services," using his Lockheed Martin identity of "J. Todd Morgan" and a Pennsylvania driver's license in the name of "Joseph Todd Williams." The investigation showed he had two outstanding warrants in Pennsylvania issued in 2002 and 2003 for fraud and auto theft. The probation officer found Williams "has a significant prior record of criminal conduct including conduct relating to abusing credit cards, abandoning hotel rooms and keeping rental cars longer than he should."





Description Joseph Todd Williams was charged with grand theft (Pen. Code, 487, subd. (a)), burglary (Pen. Code, 459), defrauding an innkeeper by nonpayment of more than $400 (Pen. Code 537, subd. (a)(2)) and the unlawful taking and driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, 10851, subd. (a)). He pleaded guilty to all but the burglary charge in exchange for its dismissal. The court placed Williams on three years of formal probation, with a 365-day jail term (121 days total credits), required that he sign a Fourth Amendment waiver for warrantless searches of computers in his personal possession, and ordered him to pay restitution fines. Williams challenges the restrictions placed on his computer use as impermissibly broad and vague. He also complains that the court's clarification of the restrictions was not placed in the probation order. As to the latter issue, the Attorney General agrees the probation order modified to reflect the court's clarification.
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