In re Bryant C.

Filed 9/14/06 In re Bryant C. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, William McAdam and Carol Isackson, Judges. Affirmed.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Bryant Paul C. (Bryant) appeals from a true finding of misdemeanor failure to stop at the scene of an accident, in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a).[1] Bryant contends that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that he was involved in the single car accident because there was no physical contact between his car and the other car. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting findings that he knew or had constructive knowledge that he was involved in the accident and that the other driver had been injured in the accident. Finally, Bryant contends that section 20001 is unconstitutionally vague and/or that it improperly impedes his fundamental right to travel. We disagree with Bryant's contentions and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

II.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On June 8, 2005, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a petition to declare Bryant a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. The petition alleged that on November 22, 2004, Bryant violated section 20001, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor, by failing to stop at the scene of an accident. Following a contested adjudication hearing, the court entered a true finding and sustained the petition.

On October 24, 2005, the court adjudged appellant a ward of the court, placed him on probation in the custody of his parents, and ordered him to perform 50 hours of community service.

Bryant filed a notice of appeal on October 24, 2005.

B. Factual background

1. The prosecution's case

At approximately 3:00 p.m. on November 22, 2004, Bryant was driving a white Saturn station wagon in front of a Chevy Tahoe being driven by Derek New, in Mission Valley. Both cars proceeded to a stop sign on Camino Del Rio North. The drivers each attempted to get into a merging lane to get on Interstate 8. Another driver allowed Bryant's Saturn into the merging lane. New attempted to move into the same lane, but was prevented from doing so by a number of drivers, including a woman who gave him "the finger."

New was eventually able to merge into the appropriate lane, directly behind Bryant. New saw the passengers in Bryant's Saturn turn around and laugh. Just before he merged onto the freeway, Bryant applied a "brake-check," meaning that he put his foot on the brakes, for no apparent reason. To avoid hitting Bryant's car, New had to apply his brakes with such force that his tires locked up. After this incident, both cars proceeded to the freeway on-ramp.

New testified that Bryant appeared to be taking a long time getting on the freeway. The passengers inside the Saturn continued to turn around and look at New. According to New, they had looks of excitement on their faces.

After both cars merged onto the freeway, New moved one lane to the right in order to go around Bryant's Saturn. Bryant moved in front of New and continued to drive slowly. New changed lanes again, so that he was in a different lane from the Saturn, and behind it. New then increased his speed. When his front tire was near the driver's side door of the Saturn, Bryant veered into New's lane. The cars were only inches apart. New attempted to move out of the way of the Saturn. When he did so, his Tahoe went onto the gravel shoulder of the freeway and spun to the right. As he was spinning, New noticed a passenger inside the Saturn looking at him "with fish bowl eyes just looking like I'm going to die." On course to hit the Saturn, New veered again and lost control of his car. New's Tahoe went up onto the guardrail and wrapped around a signpost. The airbags deployed and smoke rose from the wreckage. When New got out of the Tahoe, he saw that it was facing oncoming traffic. Two drivers stopped to help New. Bryant did not stop.

The damage to New's vehicle was extensive. The engine compartment was forced into the cabin of the truck, causing New to sustain a broken ankle. New's face was bruised and cut. New was in a cast for six weeks, and had to undergo physical therapy for five months.

Melina Suarez saw the Tahoe and the Saturn driving on the freeway. She witnessed the Saturn cut off New's Tahoe twice as New attempted to change lanes. She also saw the Tahoe swerve in an attempt to avoid hitting the Saturn. The driver of the Tahoe then lost control of his vehicle and hit the side of the freeway. After witnessing the collision, Suarez stopped her car. She saw the Saturn continue down the freeway without stopping.

California Highway Patrol Officer Peter Manzanares arrived on the scene shortly after the accident. He found the Tahoe blocking the numbers two and three lanes of the transition roadway from Fairmount Avenue to westbound Interstate 8. The Tahoe had sustained major front-end damage. After speaking with New and at least one other witness, Officer Manzanares determined that the accident was a noncontact "hit-and-run" in which the driver of the Saturn had been involved.

New obtained Bryant's license plate number from a videotape taken by a camera at a nearby Taco Bell restaurant at which Bryant had stopped prior to the incident. New provided the license plate number to Officer Manzanares.

Some time during the next few days, Officer Manzanares interviewed Bryant. Bryant told Manzanares that the Tahoe had been traveling close behind him and that it was swerving from side to side. Early on in the encounter between the two drivers, Bryant brake-checked in an attempt to get the driver of the Tahoe to back off. Bryant told Manzanares that he left the scene when New lost control of the Tahoe because he did not believe he was involved the collision, and because he thought New looked like a gang member.

2. The defense

Andrew Dilloway, a passenger in Bryant's car on the day of the incident, testified that New had tried to run Bryant off the road. According to Dilloway, New followed close behind Bryant's car, swerved at Bryant's car, coming close to the car, and then veered in the opposite direction. At that point, New lost control and hit the guardrail. Dilloway described New's driving as completely erratic. In Dilloway's opinion, New was the sole cause of the accident.

Bryant's mother testified that Bryant called her on his cell phone just after the accident and asked her for advice as to what he should do. Bryant told his mother that he had witnessed the accident, that he had seen the driver get out of the Tahoe, and that two other cars had stopped to assist the driver. Bryant acknowledged that he had changed lanes in front of New at least once, and that the Tahoe changed lanes to get out from behind him. Bryant also told his mother that New had tried to run him off the road before the accident. Bryant's mother advised him not to stop.

Bryant testified that he did not recall cutting off New while they were driving on surface streets, but said that he had seen that about 20 cars would not allow New to merge onto the freeway onramp. Bryant refused to let New merge because he thought New was trying to cut in front of other cars. According to Bryant, New ran Bryant's Saturn off the road and onto the curb while they were both on the onramp. Bryant and New "flipped each other off" as they were driving on the freeway onramp. After New's car came within a couple of inches of Bryant's car, New swerved and hit the guardrail.

Bryant testified that he never swerved into another lane, but rather, that he had remained in his lane the entire time. Bryant did not believe he was involved in the accident in any way. Bryant said he thought the driver of the Tahoe "was dead until I saw him get out of the car." According to Bryant, it was a "very bad accident." Bryant was not sure whether he should stop after the accident. He was afraid of New and decided not to stop.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. The evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Bryant

violated section 20001

1. Sufficient evidence supports the trial court's implicit finding that Bryant was involved in New's collision

Bryant contends that there was insufficient evidence to establish that he was involved in New's accident. Specifically, he maintains that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that he was involved in the accident because "there was never any contact between the two cars," and because "all of the percipient witness testimony in this case is contradictory." He argues that "New's own driving caused his accident, without any 'involvement' from Bryant." We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Bryant was involved in the accident, within the meaning of section 20001, subdivision (a).

Section 20001, subdivision (a) provides: "The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to any person, other than himself or herself, or in the death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of Sections 20003 and 20004."[2] The term "involved" as used in section 20001 has been defined to mean "being connected with (an accident) in a natural or

logical manner." (People v. Sell (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 521, 523 (Sell).) "Involvement" under section 20001 does not require causation or fault. The crux of a section 20001 offense is not the accident itself, or who or what caused the accident, but rather, the behavior of individuals after an accident has occurred: "The gravamen of a section 20001 offense . . . is not the initial injury of the victim, but leaving the scene without presenting identification or rendering aid." (People v. Escobar (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1504, 1509.)

Bryant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he was "involved" in New's accident. He asserts that New's testimony contradicted the testimony of Bryant and his passenger that New had tried to force them off the road before he lost control of his own car. Bryant further claims that the percipient witness testimony is contradictory, and that since it is uncontradicted that there was never any contact between the two cars, there is no proof that Bryant was involved in the accident.

Contrary to Bryant's contention on appeal, apart from the testimony of Bryant and his passenger, the witness testimony was largely consistent that Bryant's Saturn moved in front of the Tahoe at least two times as the Tahoe attempted to pass the Saturn. New testified that he was attempting to avoid hitting Bryant's Saturn, which had veered into his lane as he was trying to pass it, when his Tahoe went onto the shoulder, causing him to lose control of his two left tires and spin to the right. This evidence is sufficient to establish that Bryant was "connected with [New's accident] in a natural or logical manner." (Sell, supra, 96 Cal.App.2d at p. 523.)

The fact that there was contradictory testimony regarding these events is of limited consequence for purposes of this appeal. It is the duty of the fact-finder to determine witness credibility and to decide how much weight to give to a particular witness's testimony. The trial court clearly discounted some witness testimony in favor of the testimony of other witnesses. There is no reason for us to second guess the trial court's credibility determinations. Suarez, a neutral witness, testified that she saw Bryant's Saturn cut off New's Tahoe twice as New attempted to change lanes. It was just after this occurred, and as New was attempting to change lanes the second time, that he lost control of his vehicle. The trial court was entitled to give Suarez's testimony great weight, and to conclude from the gamesmanship that occurred between New and Bryant prior to the accident that Bryant was involved in New's collision. There is certainly sufficient evidence to establish that Bryant was engaging with New by moving in front of New as New tried to pass. This evidence is sufficient to establish that Bryant's actions were connected with New's accident in a logical manner, in that if Bryant had not moved into New's lane, New would not have had to swerve to avoid hitting Bryant's car.

2. Sufficient evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Bryant knew

he had been involved in an accident that caused an injury

Bryant also contends that the government failed to prove that he knew he had been involved in an accident that caused an injury. Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2006), CALCRIM No. 2140 requires that the government prove that "[t]he defendant knew that (he/she) had been involved in an accident that injured another person [or knew from the nature of the accident that it was probable that another person had been injured]." Bryant challenges both the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that he knew he had been involved in an accident, and the evidence supporting the finding that he knew the accident involved an injury. We find neither argument persuasive.

a. There is sufficient evidence that Bryant was aware of his involvement

in the accident

Bryant relies on People v. Hamilton (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 124, 132, overruled in part by People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 481, to support his argument that he had no knowledge that he was involved in New's accident. In Hamilton, the appellate court reversed a conviction under section 20001 because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it had to find that the defendant knew he had been involved in an accident. Here, however, the court determined that Bryant did, in fact, know that he had been involved in an accident. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support this finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

Bryant argues that because there was no collision between his car and New's car, he did not believe he was involved in the accident. However, there was evidence to support a finding that Bryant knew all of the facts necessary to establish that he was involved in the accident. Bryant knew he had been engaged in a number of unsafe and antagonistic driving maneuvers with New, including brake checking, "flipping off" New, and driving slowly in front of New as New was attempting to merge onto the freeway. There was also sufficient evidence to establish that Bryant changed lanes in front of New, or as Suarez put it, had been "cutting off" New, just prior to New losing control of his vehicle. New testified that he was trying to avoid hitting Bryant's Saturn, which had veered into his lane as he was trying to pass it, when his Tahoe went into the gravel on the shoulder, causing him to lose control of his two left tires and spin to the right.

The trial court apparently rejected Bryant's testimony that he never changed lanes once he was on the freeway onramp. The court was free to reject this testimony, particularly considering the fact that Bryant's mother testified that Bryant told her he had changed lanes in front of New at least once while they were on the freeway onramp. In light of the evidence contradicting Bryant's testimony on this point, the court could infer that Bryant changed lanes in front of New, and that Bryant was aware that New was trying to avoid hitting him at the time New swerved out of control.

Further, Bryant called his mother to ask for her advice as to whether he should return to the scene of the accident. The fact that Bryant called his mother to seek her advice on this point indicates that Bryant was aware of the accident and also knew that there might be reason for him to stop at the scene. During the conversation with his mother, Bryant recounted the facts of the encounter between him and New, further suggesting that Bryant was aware of his involvement in the circumstances that led to New's accident. Based on this evidence, the court could infer that Bryant had the requisite knowledge of his involvement in New's accident.

b. There is sufficient evidence that Bryant had constructive knowledge that

someone had been injured in the accident

Bryant contends that the prosecution did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that New had been injured in the accident. Bryant claims he did not know New was injured, since he saw New emerge from the Tahoe and begin to walk around after the accident. Criminal liability under section 20001 attaches to a driver who knowingly leaves the scene of an accident if he actually knew the accident resulted in injury to another or if he knew the accident was of such nature that one would reasonably anticipate another's injury. (People v Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 80.) We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's implicit finding that Bryant knew the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that someone had been injured.

According to Bryant, there was evidence not only that Bryant was unaware of New's injuries (i.e., Bryant's testimony that he did not know New had been injured), but there was also insufficient proof that Bryant had constructive knowledge of New's injury because there was no testimony regarding whether this was the type of accident in which it was probable that another person had been injured. However, there was testimony regarding the extensive damage to New's car. Further, Bryant himself testified that the accident was of such a destructive nature that he thought New might be dead. Bryant acknowledged that the Tahoe was "totaled" and that the engine was "everywhere." At least two other drivers who were not involved in the accident stopped, also indicating that the accident was of such a nature that it was reasonable to believe that someone had been injured. This constitutes sufficient evidence from which the fact-finder could determine that Bryant was aware of the nature of the accident and that the accident was of such a nature that a reasonable person would have believed that someone had probably been injured.

The fact that Bryant saw New get out of his car and walk around after the accident does not alter our analysis. Bryant could not have been certain that New was not injured, particularly in light of the fact that he acknowledged that the Tahoe had suffered significant damage. Even if Bryant believed New was not injured, under the constructive knowledge prong, we look to determine whether such a belief was reasonable in light of the circumstances of the accident and the damage to the vehicle involved. If the accident was of such a nature that it was probable someone had been injured, then an actual belief on Bryant's part that the person was not injured would not be reasonable. All of the evidence regarding the nature of the accident indicates that it was of such severity that a reasonable person would have concluded that an injury was likely.

B. Section 20001 is not unconstitutionally vague and does not impede the

fundamental right to travel

1. Section 20001 is not unconstitutionally vague

Bryant contends that section 20001 must be deemed void for vagueness because it does not provide adequate notice as to when a driver has been "involved" in an accident and/or when an injury should be presumed. We disagree with this contention.

"[A] criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime . . . ." (Bouie v. City of Columbia (1964) 378 U.S. 347, 350.) "It is a well-settled principle of constitutional law that 'a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.' [Citation.]" (Cranston v. City of Richmond (1985) 40 Cal.3d 755, 763.) Thus, "[a] statute must '"be definite enough to provide . . . a standard of conduct for those whose activities are proscribed . . . .' [Citations.]" (Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 141.)

"'In determining whether a penal statute is sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what is required of them, the court must endeavor, if possible, to view the statute from the standpoint of a reasonable man who might be subject to its terms [citation]; and the requirement of reasonable certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate interpretation in common usage and understanding.' [Citation.]" (People v. Sorensen (1968) 68 Cal.2d 280, 285.)

"'Many, probably most, statutes are ambiguous in some respects and instances invariably arise under which the application of statutory language may be unclear. So long as a statute does not threaten to infringe on the exercise of First Amendment or other constitutional rights, however, such ambiguities, even if numerous, do not justify the invalidation of a statute on its face. In order to succeed on a facial vagueness challenge to a legislative measure that does not threaten constitutionally protected conduct ─ like the initiative measure at issue here [citation] ─ a party must do more than identify some instances in which the application of the statute may be uncertain or ambiguous; he must demonstrate that "the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." [Citations.]'" (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 533-534, quoting Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1201.) Bryant cannot make the required showing as to section 20001.

In People v. Bammes (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 626, 636, the court concluded that the phrase "involved in an accident" in section 20001 is not void for vagueness. The defendant in Bammes was convicted of violating section 20001 despite the fact that her car never made contact with two other cars that collided in an accident. (Ibid.) The defendant had turned onto a road from an intersection. A car in the oncoming traffic swerved to avoid hitting the defendant's vehicle, and was hit by a truck. (Id. at pp. 628-629.) A jury convicted the defendant of violating section 20001, implicitly concluding that the defendant was involved in the accident. (Id. at p. 628.) The defendant challenged the conviction on the grounds, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence that she knew she had been involved in the accident, and that the statute was impermissibly vague. The appellate court rejected both contentions.

With regard to the vagueness claim, the Bammes court stated, "The interpretation in People v. Sell, supra, 96 Cal.App.2d [at page] 523, that 'involved in an accident' means connected with that accident in a natural or logical manner is wholly reasonable and delineates anything but an unconstitutionally vague standard." (Bammes, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d at p. 636.) The court continued:

"It is inconceivable that a driver as a reasonable man, whose actions contributed to an immediately subsequent accident and who knew of that causal relationship, would conclude otherwise than that he was involved in that accident. . . . [¶] While there will be instances where a driver reasonably would not have concluded that he was probably involved and where even constructive knowledge of his involvement may not be charged to him, such possibilities do not make the statute vague. [¶] As said in In re Davis (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 645, 652-653 . . . , concerning the statute there being considered, 'the mere fact that different interpretations of the statute are possible does not make it unconstitutional. . . ."[The] law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree." [Citation.]'" (Id. at pp. 636-637.)

We agree with the reasoning in Bammes and conclude that section 20001 provides a reasonable person with sufficient notice of what the statute requires of him or her. Under the circumstances of this case, a reasonable person in Bryant's position would have concluded that he was involved in New's accident.

The statute is not impermissibly vague on the ground that it allows the fact finder to impute to the defendant constructive knowledge that the accident caused an injury. A defendant may be found guilty of section 20001 "if he knew that accident was of such nature that one would reasonably anticipate another's injury." (People v. Holford, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 80.) In order to establish that the constructive knowledge portion of section 20001 is vague, Bryant "' must demonstrate that "the law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." [Citations.]'" (Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 534.) However, a reasonable person who saw the damage to New's car, and who ─ like Bryant ─ initially believed New to be dead would have concluded that the accident in this case was one that would have caused some injury. The statute is not impermissibly vague in its application to Bryant. His claim that the statute is void for vagueness on this ground thus fails.[3]

2. Section 20001 does not impede the right to travel

Bryant argues that section 20001 unconstitutionally impedes his fundamental right to travel because it requires him "to stop and identify himself following his involvement in an accident." Although his argument is not entirely clear, it appears that Bryant may be attempting to use this claimed impairment of a fundamental right to suggest that the statute must meet a more exacting level of scrutiny in the context of his vagueness challenge. We are not convinced that this is so, and Bryant has offered no legal argument as to why this would be the case. We therefore address this argument on its own, and not in relation to Bryant's vagueness argument.

Preliminarily, we disagree with Bryant's assertion that the requirements of section 20001 actually impair the fundamental right to travel. It is clear that the fundamental right to travel does not include a right to use a particular mode of transportation, such as driving a motor vehicle: "[T]he right to travel cases concern themselves solely with the right of an individual to reach a given destination; they do not establish a constitutional right to travel by a particular mode of transportation." (McGue v. Sillas (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 799, 805.)

Requiring a motor vehicle driver to stop at the scene of an accident in which he or she was involved does not impair or impede that person's ability to reach a given destination. Rather, such a requirement temporarily delays that person's progress. We conclude that requiring a motor vehicle driver to stop at the scene of an accident in which he or she was involved does not burden that driver's fundamental right to travel.

IV.

DISPOSITION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

AARON, J.

WE CONCUR:

McDONALD, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

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[1] Further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise indicated.

[2] Section 20003 sets forth the information a driver involved in an accident must provide to a traffic officer or police officer at the scene of the accident. Section 20004 requires an involved driver to report the accident to a police authority and to submit the same information required by section 20003 in the event a death results from an accident.

[3] "Void for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. In determining the sufficiency of the notice a statute must of necessity be examined in the light of the conduct with which a defendant is charged." (United States v. National Dairy Products Corp. (1963) 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, rehg. den., 372 U.S. 961, citations omitted.) Therefore, a defendant "to whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness." (Parker v. Levy (1974) 417 U.S. 733, 756.)