In re Caitlyn L.
Filed 10/24/07 In re Caitlyn L. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re CAITLYN L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. R.S. et al., Defendants and Appellants. | D050697 (Super. Ct. No. EJ2644) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Gary M. Bubis, Judge. Affirmed.
R.S. and Andrew L. (together the parents) appeal a judgment of the juvenile court terminating their parental rights to their minor daughter Caitlyn L. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.[1] The parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to preclude terminating parental rights. They also contend the court erred by denying R.S.'s request for a continuance to complete a bonding study. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2005 one-year-old Caitlyn became a dependent of the court under section 300, subdivision (b) and was removed from parental custody based on findings the parents abused drugs and R.S. was breastfeeding Caitlyn after using methamphetamine. Caitlyn tested positive for high levels of methamphetamine, exposing her to serious illness and possible death. The court ordered the parents to comply with their service plans, including participation in the Substance Abuse Recovery Management System (SARMS) program, and ordered supervised visits for Andrew and unsupervised visits for R.S.
By the six-month review, R.S. was complying with her service plan. Andrew was not complying with SARMS requirements. The court ordered six more months of services and overnight visits for R.S.
Three months later, the court reinstated supervised visits for R.S. after the police found Caitlyn unattended in a busy street. Caitlyn was in the care of R.S.'s boyfriend, who was then arrested on an outstanding felony warrant. The court ordered the home of a paternal aunt in Virginia to be evaluated for Caitlyn's placement.
By the 12-month review, Andrew had made some progress with services, but had no stable housing, was not compliant with SARMS and was not regularly visiting Caitlyn. R.S. recently tested positive for methamphetamine and her visits with Caitlyn had become inconsistent. R.S.'s drug treatment counselor recommended she enter a residential drug treatment program. The court found the parents' progress was minimal, terminated services and set a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.
The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) assessed Caitlyn as adoptable. Although the parents were appropriate and affectionate with Caitlyn during visits, Caitlyn easily separated from them, had no negative reaction to her lack of daily contact with them and did not ask about them between visits. The social worker believed Caitlyn would benefit more from a plan of adoption than from maintaining a relationship with the parents. The court authorized a bonding study between R.S. and Caitlyn.
R.S. filed a section 388 modification petition seeking to have the court vacate the selection and implementation hearing and place Caitlyn with her. The court denied the petition and also denied R.S.'s request to continue the matter for a bonding study, finding the study had been authorized more than a month ago.
At a contested selection and implementation hearing, the social worker testified she observed six visits between R.S. and Caitlyn and one visit between Andrew and Caitlyn. The social worker described the parents' relationship with Caitlyn as that of a friendly visitor. Caitlyn depended on others to meet her needs. The paternal aunt's home in Virginia had been approved for adoption and Caitlyn would benefit from the stability and consistency of an adoptive home.
After considering the evidence and hearing argument of counsel, the court found Caitlyn was adoptable and none of the exceptions of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) applied to warrant a permanent plan other than adoption.
DISCUSSION
I
The parents challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to preclude terminating their parental rights. They assert they regularly visited Caitlyn, who shared a close bond with them and would benefit from continuing the relationship.
A
We review the judgment for substantial evidence. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. We do not consider the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or weigh the evidence. Instead, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record favorably to the juvenile court's order and affirm the order even if there is substantial evidence supporting a contrary conclusion. (In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th at p. 610.) The parent has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
"Adoption, where possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 573.) If the court finds a child cannot be returned to his or her parent and is likely to be adopted if parental rights are terminated, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of six specified exceptions. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(F); In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 401.)
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) is an exception to the adoption preference if termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child because "[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." We have interpreted the phrase " 'benefit from continuing the relationship' " to refer to a "parent[-]child" relationship that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent[-]child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) However, if an adoptable child will not suffer great detriment by terminating parental rights, the court must select adoption as the permanent plan. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 229.)
To meet the burden of proof for this statutory exception, the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child or pleasant visits. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) "Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. . . . The relationship arises from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child's life, resulting in a substantial, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. (Ibid.; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.)
B
Although the parents regularly visited Caitlyn, they did not meet their burden of showing their relationship with her was sufficiently beneficial to outweigh the benefits of adoption. While Caitlyn lived with R.S. for the first 10 months of her life, the parents exposed her to their methamphetamine use. When R.S. had unsupervised visits with Caitlyn, she left her with a convicted felon who allowed her to wander into traffic. Caitlyn's interaction with the parents during visits was positive and loving, but she separated easily from them, did not seem to miss them between visits and looked to others to meet her needs. Their relationship with Caitlyn was not parental, but more like friendly visitors. There was no evidence of a "substantial, positive, emotional attachment" from Caitlyn to the parents such that terminating the parent-child relationship would result in great detriment to Caitlyn. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Rather, the evidence showed Caitlyn's need for stability and permanence through adoption outweighed any interest in preserving parental ties.
Where, as here, the biological parents do not fulfill a parental role, "the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an individual who will assume the role of a parent." (In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 854.) Although the parents would prefer guardianship rather than adoption as Caitlyn's permanent plan, the Legislature has decreed that a permanent plan other than adoption "is not in the best interests of children who cannot be returned to their parents. These children can be afforded the best possible opportunity to get on with the task of growing up by placing them in the most permanent and secure alternative that can be afforded them." (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1419.) Substantial evidence supports the court's finding the exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) did not apply to preclude terminating parental rights.
II
The parents contend the court erred by denying R.S.'s request for a continuance to obtain a bonding study. They assert the absence of a bonding study prevented the court from properly evaluating the benefit of continuing the mother-daughter relationship, and a brief delay in the proceedings would not have threatened Caitlyn's interest in security.
A
Under section 352, the juvenile court may grant a continuance of any hearing only on a showing of good cause and only if the continuance is not contrary to a minor's best interests. In considering the minor's interests, "the court shall give substantial weight to a minor's need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements." ( 352, subd. (a); In re Ninfa S. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 810.) Continuances in juvenile cases are discouraged. (Jeff M. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1242.) We reverse an order denying a continuance only on a showing of an abuse of discretion. (In re Gerald J. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1187.)
B
The court need not secure a bonding study before it may terminate parental rights. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.) Indeed, bonding studies after reunification services have been terminated are often unnecessary because "[t]he kind of parent-child bond the court may rely on to avoid termination of parental rights under the exception provided in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) does not arise in the short period between the termination of services" and the selection and implementation hearing. (In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1196.) By that time, "the parent and child have been in the dependency process for 12 months or longer, during which time the nature and extent of the particular relationship should be apparent." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; In re Richard C., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1196-1197.) "Bonding studies after the termination of reunification services would frequently require delays in permanency planning. Similar requests to acquire additional evidence in support of a parent's claim under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) could be asserted in nearly every dependency proceeding where the parent has maintained some contact with the child. The Legislature did not contemplate such last-minute efforts to put off permanent placement. [Citation.] While it is not beyond the juvenile court's discretion to order a bonding study late in the process under compelling circumstances, the denial of a belated request for such a study is fully consistent with the scheme of the dependency statutes, and with due process." (In re Richard C., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1197.)
Here, the court authorized a bonding study for R.S. at her request on February 8, 2007, even though reunification services had been terminated four months earlier. More than a month later, R.S. sought a continuance because she had not yet obtained the bonding study. She gave no explanation for the delay and thus, failed to show good cause as required by section 352. Further, a continuance of the selection and implementation hearing, regardless of how brief, was unnecessary to the court's findings under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) and would have impacted Caitlyn's need to have her custody status promptly resolved and her placement made permanent and secure. The court acted well within its discretion by denying R.S.'s request for a continuance.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McINTYRE, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
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[1] Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
