P. v. Vega
Filed 10/23/07 P. v. Vega CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PEDRO LIZARRAGA VEGA, Defendant and Appellant. | H030959 (Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. F14003) |
An information filed October 3, 2006, charged defendant Pedro Lizarraga Vega, with Kristina Darlene Jeffery, with one count of possession for sale of a controlled substance (Health and Saf. Code, 11378) and one count of transportation of a controlled substance (Health and Saf. Code, 11379, subd. (a)). After bringing unsuccessful motions to suppress and to dismiss, defendant pleaded guilty to the possession charge. The trial court dismissed the second count and placed defendant on three years of probation. On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
On September 13, 2006, the Santa Cruz County Narcotics Enforcement Team (SCCNET) briefed Watsonville Police Officer John Espinosa about a confidential tip regarding the transportation of methamphetamine. Espinosa was told to watch for a green Pontiac Bonneville driving over Mt. Madonna, and was given defendants name and photograph for identification. At approximately 11:25 that morning, Espinosa observed a green Pontiac Bonneville. Because the vehicle did not have a front license plate, Espinosa conducted a stop.
Espinosa asked the driver, former codefendant Jeffery, for her drivers license, registration, and proof of insurance. He also asked the passenger in the front seat (defendant) and a third occupant of the vehicle (Anthony Martin) for identification. Espinosa returned to his car and relayed Jefferys and Martins information to dispatch. Espinosa was unable to read the last name defendant had provided. Dispatch informed Espinosa that Jeffrey had a valid license and no warrants, but that there was a possible warrant for Martins arrest in Merced County. Espinosa also learned that Martin was on probation in Santa Clara County, but dispatch was unable to confirm the search terms, if any.
While awaiting further word from dispatch, Espinosa returned to the car to confirm defendants identity. He thought that defendant matched the photograph provided during the SCCNET briefing, but defendant again provided a different, incorrect name.
About 15 minutes after Espinosa first called into dispatch, he received confirmation that the Merced warrant was for Martin. Espinosa asked Martin to step out of the car and informed him that he was being detained for the Merced County warrant.[1]
Espinosa also asked Jeffery to exit the car and informed her of Martins arrest. He told Jeffery that Martin was on probation and that they would be searching the area of where he had been seated[.] Espinosa asked consent to search the vehicle[,] and Jeffery agreed to the search.
Agent Ed Delfin of SCCNET, who had just arrived on the scene, was involved in the search of the vehicle.[2] As Delfin approached the car, he noticed defendants right hand inside a paper box that he was holding. Defendant, who was still sitting in the front passenger seat, appeared to be trying to grab something out of, or put something into, the box. During the search of the vehicle, the box was recovered from the floor in front of the front passenger seat. The top of the box was open and it contained two bindles of suspected methamphetamine. Methamphetamine also was found in the passenger-side sun visor, in a cup lodged under the drivers seat, and in Jefferys purse. The officers found indicia of possession for sale in Jefferys purse and a digital scale in the area where defendant had been sitting.
Both Jeffery and defendant were charged with possession and transportation of a controlled substance. Espinosa did not issue a citation to Jeffery for the missing front license plate that precipitated the stop.
B. Motion to Suppress
Jeffery and defendant each moved to suppress the methamphetamine recovered in the vehicle search. In defendants motion, he argued that he was unlawfully detained, that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that he was violating the law, and that the detention was a prolonged fishing expedition that exceeded the necessary duration for a traffic stop. In opposition, the prosecution contended, among other things, that defendant was not detained and that Jeffery consented to the search of the vehicle.
The court granted Jefferys motion to suppress. The court found that although the vehicle stop was lawful, the search of the vehicle was invalid because Jeffery was subject to a prolonged detention and her consent to search was involuntary. At the same time, the court denied defendants motion. The court observed that even if defendant was detained during the stop, any such detention was irrelevant to the validity of the vehicle search and to defendants ability to contest it. In response to defense counsels subsequent argument that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the box on his lap,[3] the court reiterated its finding that defendant ha[d] no control of the vehicle. The court summarized its ruling as follows: [Jeffery] has the benefit as the driver of the vehicle of the motion to suppress because she is the owner of the vehicle and did not consent to have it searched, but he has no right of privacy as it relates to what may have been in somebody elses car that he was the passenger in.
II. Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress, we review the evidence in a light favorable to the courts ruling and uphold those express or implied findings of fact by the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1140 (Carter).) We independently review the applicable law and its application to the established facts, and exercise independent judgment on the legal question of whether, on the facts found, the search was unreasonable within the meaning of the Constitution. (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596-597; Carter, at p. 1140.)
III. Discussion
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendments due process clause, guarantees the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961) 367 U.S. 643, 643-660; Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1140.) Evidence obtained through police conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary rule and must be suppressed. (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 760.) However, [a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third persons premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed. (Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 134.) A vehicle passenger with no possessory interest in the car therefore generally has no basis for a Fourth Amendment challenge to a search of the car. (United States v. Pulliam (9th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3d 782, 786 (Pulliam), internal quotation marks omitted.) Thus, defendants claim on appeal is predicated not on an unlawful search of the vehicle, but on the unlawful search of a container in the vehicle, the paper box.
An illegal search or seizure violates the federal constitutional rights only of those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place or seized thing. The legitimate expectation of privacy must exist in the particulararea searched or thing seized in order to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge. (People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171, internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) The burden is on the defendant to establish that a legitimate expectation of privacy [citation] was violated by government conduct. (Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1141.)
The trial court in this case appeared to understand the existing caselaw as establishing that a passenger has no privacy rights in any items placed in another persons vehicle. That is not the case. Although both drivers and passengers have reduced expectations of privacy with regard to the property that they transport in cars (Wyoming v. Houghton (1999) 526 U.S. 295, 303), a reduced expectation is not the same as no expectation at all. The California Supreme Courts decision in People v. Brendlin (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1107, which was discussed extensively at the suppression hearing, held only that when an officer conducts a lawful traffic stop of a vehicle, and gives no indication the passenger is the focus of the officers investigation or other show of authority toward the passenger, the passenger is not subjected to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Not only does this not address a passengers ability to contest an unlawful search or seizure that follows a lawful traffic stop, but the United States Supreme Court recently vacated the California Supreme Courts decision. (See Brendlin v. California (2007) __ U.S. __, __ [127 S.Ct. 2400, 2405].)The high court held that a traffic stop subjects the passenger, as well as the driver, to a Fourth Amendment seizure, and that the passenger may therefore challenge the constitutionality of the stop. (Id. at p. __ [127 S.Ct. at p. 2403].) In this appeal, defendant is not challenging the legality of the traffic stop, but the search of a container in the vehicle. We therefore must determine whether defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the paper box and its contents.[4]
We consider first defendants failure to claim ownership of the box at the time of the search. Delfin testified that defendant did not make any statements about the methamphetamine and did not claim ownership of anything in the car. In arguing that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the box, the People stress that this is an implicit disclaimer of ownership. We observe, however, that a claim of ownership is not dispositive of the defendants expectation of privacy. (United States v. Hawkins (11th Cir. 1982) 681 F.2d 1343, 1346 (Hawkins); Pulliam, supra, 405 F.3d 782, 786 [the mere fact that [the defendant] claimed ownership of the gun does not confer standing upon him to seek its suppression]; see also People v. Allen (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1222-1223 [quoting Hawkins and concluding that the lower court erred in finding no expectation of privacy based solely on the defendants single statement denying his home address when other admissible evidence indicated it was his residence].) Moreover, defendant did not affirmatively disavow ownership of the box. (See Hawkins, at p.1346 [finding no expectation of privacy in case involving an affirmative disavowal of ownership rather than a passive failure to claim incriminating evidence]; cf. People v. Stanislawski (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 748, 757 [the court held that the defendants disclaimer of any proprietary or possessory interest in the area searched and items seized terminated any legitimate expectation of privacy]; People v. Dasilva (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 43, 49 [driver, who claimed at time of search that some containers in vehicle were not his, lacked standing to contest search of those containers].) Defendants response to the search was, instead, a passive failure to claim incriminating evidence. Defendants failure to claim the box at the time of the search therefore carries little weight in our determination of defendants expectation of privacy.
We turn to the other available facts regarding the box. It is undisputed that defendant was holding the box prior to the search of the car. Delfin described the box as about eight and a half by 11 . . . and probably one-inch-and-a-half in depth, approximately. He thought that it had some kind of computerware logo, such as a webcam, but could not recall exactly. While in defendants hands, and at the time it was seized from the car, the box was open from the top. Delfin was unsure whether the box had a flap to close the top.
On these facts, we cannot conclude defendant has met his burden to prove a reasonable expectation of privacy in the box. Although the type of container is not dispositive of a right to privacy, the specific features of this box indicate that an expectation of privacy, if any, would have been unreasonable. (See generally United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 822 & fn. 30 [the type of container is not dispositive, but for containers like paper bags and cardboard boxes, the surrounding facts (such as whether the items are stapled shut and marked private or stacked on top of two pieces of heavy luggage) may be relevant in determining whether the items objectively manifest an individuals expectation of privacy].) The box was open on top and there is no evidence it was even capable of closing to conceal the items inside from view. (See id. at p. 822-823, italics added [reaffirming that the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view].) It was a shallow, paper container of the type that is usually disposed of after its initial use, and there is no evidence that anything in its appearance signaled to a third party that it contained private belongings. In this respect, the box differs materially from a purse or briefcase, which are typically found to be containers in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. (See, e.g., People v. Welch (9th Cir. 1993) 4 F.3d 761, 764 [concluding there was no question that [the defendant] had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of her purse found in a shared rental car].) Moreover, the only evidence of defendants ownership of the box is that he was holding it just prior to the searchi.e., when the other possible owners of the item had exited the car. In these circumstances, defendants physical possession of the box alone is insufficient to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.
We conclude that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cardboard box and its contents. Because defendants motion to suppress was appropriately denied on that basis, we need not consider the validity of Jefferys consent or whether there was probable cause to search the vehicle.
IV. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
_______________________________
Mihara, Acting P.J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
McAdams, J.
______________________________
Duffy, J.
Publication courtesy of California free legal advice.
Analysis and review provided by Carlsbad Property line Lawyers.
[1] Merced County requested that Martin be cited and released.
[2] Delfin testified at the preliminary hearing and not at the hearing on the motion to suppress. However, both parties referenced the preliminary hearing testimony during the motion to suppress hearing, and, as both parties agree on appeal, impliedly stipulated to the use of the transcript.
[3] Defense counsel argued that if defendant had been the driver and Jeffery the passenger, Jeffery would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her purse. Similarly, counsel argued, the box is being attributed to Mr. Vega and so the items inside the box are thus considered his for the purpose of this motion and it is a reasonable expectation of privacy in those items which are inside the box.
[4] The United States Supreme Court has long since abandoned the principle that a defendant prosecuted for criminal possession of a seized item has automatic standing to contest the search and seizure of the item. (See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci (1980) 448 U.S. 83, 85.)
