In re Anna L.
Filed 10/31/07 In re Anna L. CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re ANNA L., a Person Coming Under
The Juvenile Court Law.
MARIN COUNTYHEALTH & HUMAN A116903
SERVICES,
(MarinCounty
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. JV 23388A)
v.
PATRICIA S. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
_______________________________________/
Patricia S. (Mother) and Albert L. (Father) appeal contending the juvenile court erred when it terminated their parental rights as to their daughter Anna L. The maternal grandmother, Marie T., also appeals contending that if the trial court erred, then Anna should be placed with her. We conclude the trial court did not commit any prejudicial errors and affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND[1]
In 1999, Mothers parental rights to her oldest son, Christopher, were terminated,
and, in 2003, Fathers parental rights to his two older children, Ashley and Albert, Jr., were terminated.
In January 2005, Mother began a voluntary child welfare service plan. Anna was removed from Parents on April 6, 2005. On April 11, the Department petitioned under [Welfare and Institutions Code][2]section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j) (failure to protect and abuse of a sibling) to establish Anna (then 13 months old), and her older siblings, Corey and Angel, as dependents of the juvenile court. The petition noted that while Mother was on the computer, Anna and her siblings were unsupervised, and three-year-old Angels neck became caught in a window blind, causing a neck abrasion. In another unsupervised incident, Anna, fully clothed, climbed into the tub of water in which Angel had been bathing. In addition, Mothers home had safety hazards. Counsel were appointed for Parents, and Anna was detained. The petition was sustained in May 2005, after which reunification services were ordered for Parents. A six-month review hearing was set for November 1, 2005.
A May 2005 neuropsychological evaluation of Mother, an epileptic, revealed evidence of significant psychological disturbance, including severe symptoms of depression, chronic personality disturbance and significant emotional distress. The report stated, While the history and record provided establish a pervasive pattern of parental neglect raising serious concern about her capacity to care independently for her children, the neuropsychological test findings reported here do not support a cognitive basis for these problems. Rather, it is more likely that chronic psychological and personality disturbance is contributing significantly to her repeated difficulties in providing and caring for her children.
An October 2005 developmental evaluation of Anna revealed her to be on target developmentally although slightly below average as to language processing. A November report by Annas foster caregiver noted that Anna was in good physical health, and was a precocious, energetic toddler. Because she was active and curious, she needed to be closely attended. It was anticipated that Anna would thrive in a safe and structured environment.
A March 2006 Department addendum report noted that return of Anna to Mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to Annas physical and/or emotional well being, reasonable services had been provided or offered to Mother, there was not a probability that Anna would be returned to Mothers physical custody within 18 months of her original removal, and Mother had not made substantial progress in complying with the case plan. The addendum report recommended that reunification services should be terminated, Anna should continue to be placed out of Parents custody and with her siblings, visitation with Mother should be at the Departments discretion and visits with Father should continue as arranged.
On May 15, 2006, Department social worker Jolie Clark filed a request to change court order, which noted that, in May 2005, the court ordered that Anna have supervised visits with Father once or twice per week. Clark stated that because Father had been complying with his case plan and visits with Anna had been very positive, Clark requested the Department be given discretion to increase Fathers visits up to four unsupervised visits per week, with one visit possibly being an overnight visit. Clark noted she anticipated recommending further reunification for Father at the upcoming June 19 hearing. The court granted the request.
June 12, 2006 Status Review Report
A June 2006 status review report by Clark recommended that reunification services be terminated for both parents. The report stated that Father was jailed on June 6, charged with burglary, parole violation, receiving stolen property and petty theft. He had apparently stolen computers and bicycles from the Full Circle facility where he worked. Since 1983, Father had numerous arrests, 15 misdemeanor and felony convictions, parole violations and multiple incarcerations. His parole officer stated that until his arrest, Father had been complying with the terms of his parole.
The report noted that Mother continued to maintain her housing through a program for clients with psychiatric needs, receive psychiatric care management and case management services, see a neurologist, and take seizure and antidepressant medication. She also graduated successfully from a parenting class. Mother visited Anna at daycare twice a week for two to three hours per visit and they attended counseling once per week. Clark noted that Mother should be commended for her commitment to visitation and having built a positive, affectionate, playful relationship with Anna. However, Mother had missed three individual therapy sessions in a row, and thereafter her attendance was inconsistent. She was also inconsistent in meeting with her psychiatrist, psychiatric case manager and her community mental health manager, and had been unresponsive to their attempts to contact her over several months.
Until Fathers recent arrest he was living in a nice home provided by the New Beginnings/Homeward Bound program, attended AA/NA meetings, volunteered at Homeward Bound, was employed as a home health aide and took on a variety of itinerant jobs. Father had largely positive supervised visits with Anna twice a week, and did well with her on the trial increased supervised visits.
Parents had resumed their prior romantic relationship and expressed an interest in couples counseling and co-parenting classes to help deal with marked unrest and turmoil in their relationship. The report lists nearly 40 services provided by the Department pursuant to the reunification plan.
Before his incarceration, Father had said he wanted Anna returned to his custody and believed he had the financial and emotional resources to be her full time parent. Mother also felt ready to resume parenting Anna.
Anna and her two siblings were in the same foster placement, and Anna had formed a strong attachment to her foster father and his teenage daughter. Anna underwent a psychological evaluation after showing signs of anxiety, irritability and stress. Anna was found to be adoptable and the proposed adoptive family for Annas two siblings was willing to adopt Anna.
The report noted that pursuant to section 361.5, in three and one-half months, by October 6, 2006, Anna had to be either reunified with parents or reunification services would be terminated. Clark concluded that she could not say unequivocally that Mother would be ready to resume care of Anna by that time. Although Mother had made some progress on her case plan and her visits with Anna had improved significantly, the improvement was quite slow, since she had been receiving services since January 2005. Mother was negligent in pursuing the parts of her case plan that promote her own personal growth and insight, and she continued to minimize the original allegations that she had jeopardized her childrens safety. Given that Anna is an extremely active, curious child prone to mishaps, she needs a parent who can maintain near constant focus on her to keep her out of harms way. Clark doubted Mother could provide the high level of supervision necessary given her long history of failing to provide that focus for her children. Further, in May 2006, the social worker had observed Mother failing to pay attention to oncoming traffic while placing Anna in a car seat.
Clark was also unable to state that Father would be able to be a full time parent to Anna within three and one-half months given his confession to the current charges and parole violations. Moreover, his long criminal history and recent behavior indicated his inability to resist criminal activity. Although Father had demonstrated that he possesses a genuine concern for Annas welfare and an ability to follow through on his commitments and demonstrate change, his recent arrest indicates his inability to put Annas needs above his own. Clark recommended terminating reunification services for both parents and the setting of a section 366.26 hearing.
July 15, 2006 Addendum Report
Clarks addendum report noted that on June 11, 2006, Fathers parole hold was dropped because no witnesses were available to testify. A preliminary hearing on the burglary and receiving stolen property charges was set for August 11, 2006. Mother had resumed contact with her case managers and planned to attend a scheduled psychiatric appointment. She had missed multiple visits with Anna over the last three weeks, and the quality of her visits with Anna had been diminishing for about a month. In addition, Father had contacted Clark reporting that he had filed charges against Mother for stealing his money while he was incarcerated. The report also noted that Mother was involved in Fathers theft of computers and bicycles from the Full Circle facility, and Mother acknowledged that the bikes were stolen.
August 17, 2006 Addendum Report
Clarks second addendum report noted that Father reported that on July 24, 2006, he and Mother had fought because Mother was on the computer 14 to 15 hours a day and was not working to get her other daughter back. During the incident Mother hit and scratched him. Father also said Mother does not clean the house, cannot manage her money and took his money and belongings while he was in jail. Mother confirmed the altercation and conceded she had resumed her frequent computer use while Father was in jail. She also conceded hitting Father in the face and pushing him hard into a wall. Mother missed a visit with Anna after the altercation. Father said he had recently hired her to work on a large demolition project with his company and felt the increased structure and activity was good for Mother.
At an August 11, 2006 preliminary hearing, sufficient cause was found that Father had committed two felonies, grand theft and receiving stolen property, and he was ordered arraigned.
Combined Six- and 12 -Month Review Hearing
A combined six- and 12-month review hearing commenced on June 19, 2006. Counsel for Mother and Father moved to disqualify Annas counsel, arguing that because Annas two siblings had a different father than Anna and Annas Father had been far more involved in Annas life, a conflict resulted from Annas counsel also representing the siblings. Annas counsel and the Departments counsel denied there was a conflict at the current stage of the proceedings, where termination of reunification services was at issue. The court denied the motion to disqualify.
Fathers counsel also moved for a very brief continuance of the hearing because Fathers June 6 arrest resulted in the Departments change in position on reunification services for Father. Fathers counsel had not anticipated having to prepare for a contested hearing on reunification services. Fathers counsel also argued that she had not had time to review the Departments recent, lengthy request for judicial notice and the untimely status review report. [Fn omitted.] Mothers counsel joined in the motion, asserting that because the Departments untimely report was a jurisdictional issue, prejudice did not have to be demonstrated and no good cause exception applied to the timely filing requirement. The Departments counsel and Clark both said that Clark had contacted Parents counsel after Fathers arrest and Clark and Parents counsel agreed to Clark rewriting the status report during the weekend to reflect Fathers recent arrest and counsel would not move for a continuance. Annas counsel argued that a continuance would be detrimental to Anna, and there was no good cause for a continuance because everyone had notice on June 7 of the changed circumstances resulting from Fathers arrest and incarceration. Fathers counsel said that Clark told her on June 8 or 9 that she would work on the review report all weekend if Fathers counsel would not request a continuance. Fathers counsel conceded that Clark informed her that the review report would not be timely, but counsel said she did not agree that the report did not have to be filed. Fathers counsel said she told Clark she would have to consult Father and was not promising anything. Mothers counsel said she had agreed not to seek a continuance, based on the assumption that she would receive the report on Monday, June 12, but that she did not get it until Thursday, four days before the June 19 hearing.
The court denied the motion to continue, finding that good cause justified the Departments late-filed report, and resulted in no prejudice to Parents because the circumstances regarding Fathers arrest were matters the Department and Parents counsel had had equal time to deal with. The court also granted the Departments request to judicially notice the record of the previous terminations of Fathers parental rights due to his incarceration.
Clark testified that aside from what was stated in her report, Mother had missed two additional visits with Anna during the review period. In addition, despite Clarks telling the parents numerous times that Fathers unsupervised visits with Anna could not include Mother, Father brought Anna to Mothers house for an overnight visit. Clark said that prior to Fathers June 2006 arrest, her intent was to recommend continued reunification services to Father. However, that recommendation changed for several reasons: Fathers arrest; Mothers information that Father had stolen things from Full Circle prior to his arrest, and he gave a stolen bicycle to a neighbors child; and Fathers visitation violation. Clark also said Fathers arrest so close to the review hearing suggested he was not ready for parenting. She opined that there were additional services Father could benefit from, but not within the reunification timeline. On cross-examination, Clark said she had observed Mother and Anna together about seven times. Clark said she had been assigned to this case on March 14, 2006, the day Mothers reunification services as to Corey and Angel were terminated.
When the hearing recommenced in July 2006, therapist Elizabeth Moffet testified she had been working with Mother and Anna since April, and had worked with Mother on and off for four years. She said Mother had done very, very well in the 14 hour-long parent/infant sessions. She opined there was an appropriate mother/daughter bond between Anna and Mother, Mother was now capable of appropriately parenting Anna and keeping her safe, and Anna would not be at risk for neglect. She also opined that by October 6 Anna would be able to be safely returned to Mothers care.
Rachelle Averbach testified she had been Mothers individual therapist since January 2005, and had also worked with her briefly within the prior 10 years. She opined that Mothers home was suitably clean and habitable and an appropriate place for children. When asked about Mothers recently missed visits with Anna, she said she could not express an opinion without talking with Mother to find out what was going on. She noted that Mother had had a couple of relationships in the past year that could have been problematic, but chose not to continue them. She opined that there was a lot of things to work out in Mother and Fathers relationship, but nothing about the relationship put Anna at risk. She also opined that Mother had the capacity to be an appropriate parent and provide for Annas needs, and supported Mothers reunification with Anna. She also opined that Mother had made significant progress in her individual therapy. On cross-examination, Averbach testified that if the parents were committing crimes, it might not be safe to place Anna with them.
Father testified he receives SSI and has a demolition business and other side jobs. He said the therapy he started on April 15, 2005, has helped him stay sober and enabled him to maintain housing. He complained he did not receive sufficient reunification services during the first six months of his case. He admitted he could benefit from behavior oriented therapy, but said he complied with his case plan. On cross-examination, Father admitted taking three computers, but not stealing them. He said he took the computers on the mistaken belief that he had a mechanics lien on the computers. He said that later that same day, he realized that taking the computers was a stupid thing to do and he should not have done it. He also said that Mother was not involved in taking the computers.
On rebuttal, Clark testified that Father told her he had been hired by Full Circle to do a variety of jobs. He told her he was angry because a Mr. VonWheel at Full Circle was disrespectful to him and he (Father) took the computers in response to feeling he had been mistreated by Full Circle. In his initial conversation with Clark, he did not mention a mechanics lien. Clark also said that Father told her that Mother was present when he took the computers and had encouraged him to take them because VonWheel mistreated him. Father also believed that Mother had made the anonymous tip to the police about the stolen computers.
On September 5, 2006, the court announced its ruling. In concluding that returning Anna to Mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to Anna, the court found that Mother had not demonstrated sufficient competence to effectively utilize her parent/infant therapy skills, had neglected her own mental health treatment and failed meaningfully to mitigate her propensity to be neglectful. Although there were periods of time when Mother had regular contact and visitation with Anna, there were also substantial breaches in visitation including several missed appointments Mother attributed to over-indulgent sunbathing. The court also found Mother had not demonstrated that she has or will have the capacity or ability to complete her treatment objectives or provide for Annas safety, physical and emotional well-being and special needs. It also found that, despite Mothers loving bond with Anna, she lacks the ability to focus sufficient attention on Anna and is too easily distracted by other interests, such as a telephone relationship with someone she met on the internet.
The court was impressed with Fathers extraordinary efforts to acquire needed parenting skills and his devotion to Anna and his notable progress in addressing the issues necessitating the childs removal from parental custody. However, the court found it not likely he would resolve his issues with another month of reunification services. The court found that on the eve of the first setting of the permanency hearing, Father used astonishingly poor judgment by yielding to an impulse to misappropriate his employers computers and bicycles and giving a bicycle to Mothers son as a birthday present. The court found that either Father had not fully abandoned his criminal inclinations, or had little control of his emotions, notably his anger. Given the pendency of felony charges, the possibility of Fathers conviction and incarceration could not be ruled out. The court also found that Fathers relationship with Mother was immature, conflictive, turbulent and not conducive to Annas emotional and physical well-being. Despite Fathers regular contact and visitation with Anna, given the circumstances, the court could not find that Father had made significant progress in resolving the issues leading to Annas removal or that Father had the ability to complete treatment objectives and provide for Annas safety, well-being and special needs. Thus, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that return of Anna to Parents would create a substantial risk of detriment to her physical and/or emotional well-being. The court also found that reasonable services had been provided to Parents and it terminated reunification services after finding that Parents had not made substantive progress in complying with their case plan or mitigating the causes of Annas out-of-home placement. (Patricia S. et al. v. Superior Court (Dec. 28, 2006, A115337, A115338) nonpub. opn.].)
Father and Mother each challenged the courts decision to terminate reunification services by filing a petition for a writ of mandate under former California Rules of Court, rule 38.1. This court denied the petitions in an unpublished opinion filed on December 28, 2006.
A hearing to determine whether Fathers and Mothers parental rights should be terminated was scheduled. The report for that hearing recommended termination because Father and Mother both continued to face significant impediments to parenting Anna effectively:
Anna only met her father for the first time when she was 14 months old, as he was incarcerated during much of her infancy. Although he has taken many steps toward dealing with his long-standing substance abuse issues and has worked to improve his parenting skills, [Father] continues to participate in both criminal and domestically violent behavior. His most recent arrest for criminal behavior occurred in June of this year. [Father] also participated in a violent altercation with [Mother] on July 24, 2006. Annas early environment of neglect and unpredictability have made it even more crucial that her permanent home be one of consistency, stability and nurturance. [Fathers] behavior makes it clear that he is unable to provide the safe and consistent home that Anna needs and deserves.
In the last four months, [Mother] has missed four visits with Anna and been late to five. During visitation, [Mother] is appropriate with Anna when she is able to focus on her. Unfortunately, [Mother] still shows difficulty in focusing on Anna during their visits. While Anna may move to another activity, it takes [Mother] some time before she recognizes that Anna has moved on and engages her in a new activity. This difficulty in focusing her attention on Anna was one of the main problems that initially brought Anna to the attention of the Department. As Anna is a very active and curious child, it is even more imperative that her caregiver be attentive and closely supervise her at all times.
No one would dispute that both of Annas parents love her very much. Unfortunately, their individual problems cause them to be unable to care for Anna on an everyday basis. Both [Fathers] criminal and violent behavior and [Mothers] inability to focus on Anna show that they are unable to put Annas needs and wants before their own. At such a young age, Anna [is] vulnerable and needs caregivers who can protect her and provide her with the consistent care that she needs.
The report also noted that Anna had been living with foster parents who wanted to adopt her and who were uniquely qualified to meet her needs:
Mark and Donna have previously completed an adoption homestudy as they have already adopted before. Anna has been placed with this family for over a year and during that time Donna and Mark have become very attached to her, as she has to them. Donna and Mark love Anna and want to become her legal parents. Donna and Mark wish to provide a stable, loving home for Anna to grow and thrive in. Anna is a very active, misch[i]evous child who needs firm boundaries and structure. Donna and Mark feel that their extensive parenting of special-needs children makes them uniquely qualified to provide the type of home that will help Anna meet her potential. They also have insight into the loss and attachment issues Anna continues to experience, as she heals from the trauma of her early childhood and the multiple placement moves she has experienced. They understand the importance of providing Anna with a predictable routine, considering how she is still just learning to trust adults.
At the termination hearing, Father and Mother both urged the court not to terminate their parental rights arguing the exception to termination set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) applied. The trial court declined to make that finding and terminated Father and Mothers parental rights.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Whether Section 366.26, Subdivision (c)(1)(A) Applied
Father and Mother both contend the trial court erred when it declined to find the exception to termination set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) applied.[3]
At a section 366.26 hearing, the court determines a permanent plan of care for a dependent child. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 50.) Adoption is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th
567, 573.) If the court finds that a child may not be returned to his or her parents and is likely to be adopted, the court must select adoption as the permanent plan, unless it finds that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of six exceptions that are set forth in section 366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(A) through (c)(1)(F). (See In re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.) The beneficial relationship exception applies where [t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).)
A parent has the burden of proving that the beneficial relationship exception applies. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826-827.) To do so, the parent must do more than demonstrate frequent and loving contact with the child, the existence of an emotional bond, or that parent and child find their visits pleasant. (Id. at p. 827.) The parent must show that her relationship with the child promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parents rights are not terminated. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.)
There must be a compelling reason for applying the parental benefit exception. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.) Determining whether the exception applies is a quintessentially discretionary determination. (Id. at p. 1351.) Thus, we review the juvenile courts determination for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.)[4]
Applying that standard, we find no abuse here. There is evidence in the record that Father and Mother visited Anna throughout the dependency, and that Anna enjoyed their visits. Furthermore, there was evidence that a bond between both parents and Anna existed. However, that was not enough. Father and Mother were obligated to show that their relationship with Anna promoted her well-being to such an extent as to outweigh the well-being [Anna] would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) This Father and Mother did not do.
Nearly two years after the dependency began, Father and Mother were still experiencing significant problems. Father, who had a more than 20-year history of serious criminal offenses including burglary, battery, arson, spousal abuse, and drug offenses, had become embroiled with the criminal justice system yet again. He apparently stole computers and bicycles from an employer. More critically, Father allegedly committed these offenses just as juvenile authorities were gaining confidence in him and increasing his visits with Anna. The fact that Father was unable to restrain his criminal impulses at such a critical stage of the dependency proceedings did not bode well for his future prospects. As for Mother, the record indicated that she and Father had engaged in a physical altercation only months before the termination hearing. Furthermore, the report for the termination hearing stated that Mother had still not learned how to focus on Anna in a way that was necessary to protect her from harm. Given that Anna was an extremely active and curious child who was prone to mishaps, this was a serious concern. The trial court considering these factors reasonably could conclude that it was unlikely Father and Mother would soon overcome the problems they were experiencing and that exposing Anna to parents who were facing such significant ongoing struggles would be a destabilizing influence on her young life. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to find applicable the exception to termination set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A).
Father contends the courts ruling must be reversed because the trial court applied the wrong standard when evaluating his section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) argument. He cites to portions of the record where the court characterized the issue before it as being whether termination of parental rights would be so detrimental to Annas welfare as to outweigh the benefits of stability and permanency in an adoptive home. At another point, the court stated, the question is, again, whether severing that relationship will be so detrimental so to outweigh the benefits of security and permanency in an adoptive home. Father contends the tests articulated by the court do not precisely track the statutory language.
While Father is correct, he fails to acknowledge that the court was simply paraphrasing the interpretation of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) that was adopted by the court in Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at page 575. That interpretation was adopted more than a decade ago and has become the accepted standard by which a section 366.26, subdivision (b)(1)(A) argument must be measured. We conclude the court did not err when it applied the well-settled Autumn H. standard.
Next, Father contends the trial court erred because it improperly delegated its authority to social workers, experts, the minors counsel when deciding whether the exception to termination should be found. However, the only evidence Father cites to support this argument is a comment the court made when it stated that some weight should be given to the experts who had testified at the termination hearing. Subsequently, the court made clear that it had not delegated its authority to anyone: my decision here isnt a deferential determination. Im not deciding this case because [a] majority favors one opinion and the minority favors another decision. That really isnt the basis of this decision. If I felt that something short of adoption would be more beneficial to Anna I wouldnt hesitate to deny the termination in this case and to select another permanent plan.
Next, Father and Mother both argue that the court abused its discretion when it rejected their section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) claims. Father cites to evidence that shows he was loving and affectionate with Anna, that he had made significant progress in learning how to parent, and that he had made large strides in overcoming his addiction to illegal drugs. Mother cites to evidence that shows she had missed very few of her visits with Anna, and that her therapist believed she behaved appropriately with the child. While the evidence cited does show that Father, and to a lesser extent Mother both had made some positive changes, those changes do not convince us the trial court erred. A trial courts section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) ruling is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court. [Citation.] (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319, quoting Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 272.) The evidence in this case, considered as a whole and in the required light, convinces us the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Fathers and Mothers section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) requests.
Mother also argues that the interpretation of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) that was articulated in Autumn H. and that was applied in this case may be too strict because no court has ever reversed on that issue. Mother is simply incorrect. (See, e.g., In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1207.) In addition, we decline to reconsider the by now well-established Autumn H. standard.
We conclude the court did not err when it denied Fathers and Mother section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) claim and that the court did not err when it terminated Fathers and Mothers parental rights.[5]
III. DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.
_________________________
Jones, P.J.
We concur:
________________________
Gemello, J.
________________________
Needham, J.
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[1] We take much of the background that follows from our prior unpublished decision in this case denying Fathers and Mothers petitions for writ of mandate under former California Rules of Court, rule 38.1.
[2] All further section references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
[3] Father and Mother have raised similar legal issues in their briefs, and Mother has joined the arguments Father has advanced. Therefore, we will address Fathers and Mothers legal argument together.
[4] Although appellate courts routinely have applied the substantial evidence standard when reviewing termination orders, Division Three of this court has ruled the appropriate standard is abuse of discretion. (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) We will apply the Jasmine D. standard recognizing, as it did, that the practical differences between the two standards are insignificant in the context of reviewing termination orders. (Ibid.)
[5] Having concluded the court did not err when it terminated Fathers and Mothers parental rights, we necessarily reject the argument made by Mothers mother, that if the court erred when terminating parental rights, Anna should be placed with her.
