COMMUNITIES FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT v. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

Filed 12/18/07 Modified and Certified for Partial Publication 1/16/08 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

Story continued from Part II .

b. Substantial evidence supported a fair argument that the ULSD project may have significant impacts in terms of NOx emissions.

On appellants claim that an EIR rather than a negative declaration should have been prepared, we look to see if there was substantial evidence to support the agencys conclusion it could not be fairly argued the project would have a significant environmental impact. [Citation.] If there is no substantial evidence to support the agencys conclusion a fair argument cannot be made that the project will have a significant environmental impact, then the agencys action in adopting a negative declaration amounts to an abuse of discretion by the agency and a failure to proceed in a manner required by law. [Citation.] (Christward Ministry v. Superior Court, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 187.)

Above, we concluded that substantial evidence did not support the SCAQMDs position that appellants failed to make a fair argument that the NOx emissions from the ULSD project may be significant because emissions from existing equipment should not be considered part of the baseline. We similarly conclude that substantial evidence did not support the SCAQMDs alternative position that NOx emissions would be insignificant because, even absent their inclusion in the projects baseline, they would remain below the significance threshold allowed by a combination of the RECLAIM permit and the CEQA significance threshold.

The Guidelines provide: Each public agency is encouraged to develop and publish thresholds of significance that the agency uses in the determination of the significance of environmental effects. A threshold of significance is an identifiable quantitative, qualitative or performance level of a particular environmental effect, non-compliance with which means the effect will normally be determined to be significant by the agency and compliance with which means the effect normally will be determined to be less than significant. (Guidelines, 15064.7, subd. (a).) Stated another way, [a] threshold of significance for a given environmental effect is simply that level at which the lead agency finds the effects of the project to be significant; the term may be defined as a quantitative or qualitative standard, or set of criteria, pursuant to which the significance ofa given environmental effect may be determined. Adopting thresholds of significance promotes consistency, efficiency, and predictability in deciding whether to prepare an EIR. (Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 110111, fns. omitted (Communities for a Better Environment).) Nonetheless, an agency may not apply a threshold of significance in a manner that precludes consideration of other substantial evidence demonstrating that there may be a significant effect on the environment. (Mejia, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 342; Communities for a Better Environment, supra, at p. 114.)

Pursuant to Guidelines section 15064.7, the SCAQMD has adopted a significance threshold of 55 pdd for NOx emissions. In its responses to appellants comments in the FND, the SCAQMD explained why it calculated the NOx significance threshold for the ULSD project differently from what the Handbook provides: Air quality impacts for a RECLAIM facility are considered to be significant if the incremental mass daily emissions of NOx or SOx from sources regulated under the RECLAIM permit, when added to the allocation for the year in which the project will commence operations, will be greater than the facilitys initial 1994 allocation (including non-tradable credits) plus the increase established in the SCAQMD Air Quality Handbook for that pollutant (55 pounds per day (lbs/day) for NOx and 150 lbs/day for SOx). Applying this formula, the SCAQMD calculated that NOx emissions falling below 8,373 ppd would be insignificant. The 8,373 ppd figure was comprised of the Refinerys 1994 RECLAIM allocation (8,318 ppd) and the CEQA significance threshold (55 ppd).

We cannot countenance the SCAQMDs construction of this significance threshold for a RECLAIM facility. The SCAQMD itself demonstrated the dramatic impact of this calculation taken to its logical conclusion. When it applied its 2003/2004 allocations for NOx emissions of 2,343 ppd, the SCAQMD conceded that under its RECLAIM CEQA significance thresholds emission increases up to 6,000 lbs/day of NOx . . . would be less than significant. Effectively, the SCAQMDs construing the RECLAIM permit level as the significance threshold would amount to a RECLAIM facility having a categorical exemption from CEQA. But given that the Legislature has already specified the types of projects and actions which are exempt from CEQA (Pub. Resources Code, 21080, 21084), we are not at liberty to provide an additional exception for RECLAIM facilities. (Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1215, 1230 [relying on the principle of statutory construction that if exemptions are specified in a statute, we may not imply additional exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary, court rejected assertion that timber harvesting was exempt from CEQA, as the Legislature had not included that activity within any of CEQAs statutory exemptions]; see also San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. San Francisco Classroom Teachers Assn. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 146, 149 [[A] court engaged in statutory construction cannot create exceptions, contravene plain meaning, insert what is omitted, omit what is inserted, or rewrite the statute].)

Rather, we are guided by the reasonable approach to applying CEQA significance thresholds discussed in County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. County of Kern (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1544 (County Sanitation Dist. No. 2). There, the court questioned whether under the fair argument test there was a reasonable likelihood that the implementation of a projects reasonably foreseeable disposal alternatives created a reasonable possibility of a significant effect on the environment. (Id. at p. 1587.) The evidence showed that hauling biosolid waste to an acceptable remote location approximately 45 miles from the project would generate 63 ppd of NOx emissions. (Id. at p. 1588.) Because that level of emissions exceeded the significance threshold of 55 ppd established by the San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution District, the court concluded that the fair argument test supported the preparation of an EIR because the evidence showed that NOx emissions would have a significant adverse impact on air quality. (Ibid.)

In this case, the SCAQMD conceded that the ULSD project would generate a best case of 237 ppd of additional NOx emissions and a worst case of 456 ppd of NOx emissionsfigures ranging from approximately 400 to 900 percent of the CEQA significance threshold of 55 ppd. Guided by the holding in County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 that emissions exceeding the public agencys significance threshold by less than 15 percent supported a reasonable inference of a significant adverse impact on the environment, we must conclude that the record here supported fair argument that the ULSD projects NOx emissions may have a significant effect on air quality. Consequently, the SCAQMD abused its discretion in preparing a negative declaration instead of an EIR for the ULSD project. (Mejia, supra 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 332; Pocket Protectors, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 928; Christward Ministry v. Superior Court, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 197.)

4. The SCAQMD abused its discretion by failing to consider whether the ULSD projects NOx emission levels were cumulatively considerable.

The SCAQMD concluded in the FND that the ULSD project had no potential for cumulative adverse environmental impacts on air quality. It reached this conclusion on the ground that the individual emissions from the ULSD project fell below the CEQA significance thresholds. But because the SCAQMDs emissions calculations erroneously failed to account for increases from existing equipment, the SCAQMD likewise inadequately examined the cumulative effect of the projects emissions on air quality.

The CEQA Guidelines define cumulative impacts as two or more individual effects which, when considered together, are considerable or which compound or increase other environmental impacts. (Guidelines, 15355.) When assessing whether a cumulative effect requires an EIR, the lead agency shall consider whether the cumulative impact is significant and whether the effects of the project are cumulatively considerable. An EIR must be prepared if the cumulative impact may be significant and the projects incremental effect, though individually limited, is cumulatively considerable.Cumulatively considerable means that the incremental effects of an individual project are significant when viewed in connection with the effects of past projects, the effects of other current projects, and the effects of probable future projects. (Guidelines, 15064, subd. (h)(1); see Pub. Resources Code, 21083, subd. (b)(2).)

The need to consider the environmental impact of a project in conjunction with probable future projects stems from the fact that consideration of the effects of a project or projects as if no others existed would encourage the piecemeal approval of several projects that, taken together, could overwhelm the natural environment and disastrously overburden the man-made infrastructure and vital community services. This would effectively defeat CEQAs mandate to review the actual effect of the projects upon the environment. (Las Virgenes Homeowners Federation, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 300, 306.) For this reason, appellate courts have established that the relevant question in a cumulative impacts analysis is not how the effect of the project at issue compares to the preexisting cumulative effect, but whether any additional amount of effect should be considered significant in the context of the existing cumulative effect. (Communities for a Better Environment, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 120, fn. omitted; see also Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. City of Los Angeles (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1019, 1025; Kings County Farm Bureau v. City of Hanford (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 692, 718.)

Here, appellants proffered substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the ULSD project may have a significant cumulative effect on air quality. Dr. Fox calculated that the operational NOx emissions from past, present and future projects in the vicinity of the ULSD project totaled 8,559 ppda figure well over the 55 ppd CEQA significance threshold and one exceeding even the SCAQMDs combined RECLAIM and CEQA significance threshold of 8,383 ppd. Notably, the projects that Dr. Fox listedwhich included projects at the Refinerywere those that SCAQMD identified in its cumulative impacts analysis in a December 2003 draft environmental impact report for the Paramount Refinerys Clean Fuels Project. In contrast to the report prepared for the Paramount project, the FND contained no cumulative impacts analysis. Where an EIR similarly failed to address whether any additional amount of traffic noise should be considered significant in light of the serious nature of the traffic noise problem already existing around the schools, the court in Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at page 1025 found the document patently inadequate. Likewise, by failing to conduct any cumulative impacts analysis, the SCAQMD failed to proceed in the manner required by law and abused its discretion. (See JoyRoadAreaForest & Watershed Assn. v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 656, 676.)

In response to appellants comments to the FND, the SCAQMD offered several reasons why it was not required to prepare a cumulative impacts analysis, none of which we find persuasive. First, relying its calculation of 8.9 ppd of NOx emissions resulting from the ULSD project, the SCAQMD asserted that no cumulative impacts analysis was required because the project, alone, did not have any significant environmental effect. It buttressed this argument with figures from the SND showing that the project would actually result in a net decrease of NOx emissions when considered together with the development of SCR technology at the Carson plant. This argument failed to consider emissions from existing equipment at either the Wilmington or the Carson plant. While we are mindful of the admonition in Communities for a Better Environment, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at page 120, that the law does not provide that any additional effect in a nonattainment area for that effect necessarily creates a significant cumulative impact, we note that even with the addition of SCR technology potential NOx emissions from the ULSD project exceeded 400 ppd. (Compare Leonoff v. Monterey County Bd. of Supervisors (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1337, 1358 [lack of cumulative impacts analysis proper where zero environmental effects were expected from the project under study].)

The SCAQMD also criticized the geographic range of the projects identified in Dr. Foxs cumulative impacts analysis, noting that the Paramount Refinery was 13 miles from the Wilmington plant and that other projects in the Paramount area were also sufficiently distant from the ULSD project to avoid cumulative impacts. But the SCAQMDs comments failed to indicate what geographic area it did consider in finding no cumulative impacts and also failed to explain why the Refinerys projects fell within the relevant geographic area for the Paramount Refinerys cumulative impacts analysis but the converse was not true. (See Guidelines, 15130, subd. (b)(3) [in connection with the preparation of an EIR [l]ead agencies should define the geographic scope of the area affected by the cumulative effect and provide a reasonable explanation for the geographic limitation used].)

Finally, the SCAQMD asserted that the Guidelines did not require the preparation of a cumulative impacts analysis. It quoted a portion of section 15064, subdivision (h)(3) of the Guidelines, which states: A lead agency may determine that a projects incremental contribution to a cumulative effect is not cumulatively considerable if the project will comply with the requirements in a previously approved plan or mitigation program which provides specific requirements that will avoid or substantially lessen the cumulative problem (e.g., water quality control plan, air quality plan, integrated waste management plan) within the geographic area in which the project is located. Such plans or programs must be specified in law or adopted by the public agency with jurisdiction over the affected resources through a public review process to implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by the public agency.

While the ULSD project was designed to comport with the control measures identified in the AQMP that would facilitate compliance with state and federal diesel fuel requirements, the evidence nonetheless showed that the ULSD project may have a significant cumulative effect on air quality. Under these circumstances, we must apply the unquoted balance of the relevant Guidelines section, which provides: If there is substantial evidence that the possible effects of a particular project are still cumulatively considerable notwithstanding that the project complies with the specified plan or mitigation program addressing the cumulative problem, an EIR must be prepared for the project. (Guidelines, 15064, subd. (h)(3).) Because the issue here, however, involves the SCAQMDs failure to conduct any cumulative impacts analysis, the concluding, mandatory provision of Guidelines section 15064, subdivision (h)(3) does not yet come into play. In a comparable situation, where an agency failed to consider the cumulative effects of an improperly-defined project, the court in Citizens Assn. for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 151, 167, explained that a court may not independently assess omitted material by determining whether its consideration would have affected the lead agencys decision. Thus we cannot exercise our independent judgment on whether the ultimate decision of the lead agency would have been different had CEQA been properly implemented because such a decision is for the discretion of the agency. [Citations.] (Id. at pp. 167168.) The ultimate decision of whether the ULSD projects cumulative NOx emissions impacts necessitate an EIR rests first with the SCAQMD, following an adequate analysis of such potential cumulative impacts.

C. There Was No Substantial Evidence of Other Significant Impacts.

Appellants contend that they presented substantial evidence supporting a fair argument that the ULSD project would have other, significant impacts resulting from the hazards associated with soil contamination and ammonia. We disagree.

1. Substantial evidence did not support a fair argument that soil contamination constituted a significant impact.

Both the draft negative declaration and the FND cautioned that [c]onstruction activities could uncover contaminated soils, given the heavily industrialized nature of the Wilmington Plant and the fact that refining activities, petroleum storage, and distribution have been conducted at the site for a number of years. In their comments to the draft negative declaration, appellants experts opined that the ULSD project site was contaminated with high levels of benzene and that any grading, subsurface excavation or trenching in that area could have a significant impact on worker safety. In the FND, the SCAQMD concluded to the contrary that there was currently no evidence that contaminated soil was located in the ULSD project area. In reaching this conclusion, it relied on geotechnical core samples from the two locations where ULSD project construction was expected to occur, which did not detect soil contamination. The FND further noted, however, that [c]ontaminated soils or water may require remediation (cleanup and safe removal and disposal) if detected above certain concentrations during construction activities. Responding to appellants experts comments, the SCAQMD elaborated on the FNDs conclusion that no significant impact would result from the excavation of contaminated soil: Excavated soil which may be contaminated will be characterized, treated, and disposed of offsite in accordance with applicable regulations. . . . Based on these considerations, in particular the fact that any contaminated soil will be analyzed and reused or disposed of appropriately, no significant hazard or hazardous waste impacts are anticipated from the proposed project.

The applicable regulations referenced in the FND included OSHA regulations, the SCAQMDs Rule 1166 and the Refinerys internal industrial hygiene management plan. Pursuant to Rule 1166, upon the discovery of soil impacted by petroleum hydrocarbons, the Refinery must have the soil analyzed by a State-certified laboratory to determine the concentration and type of contamination, must subject the soil to periodic organic vapor analyzer sampling and must use covers and odor suppressants as appropriate. The Refinerys internal policies further required that excavation cease upon the discovery of contaminated soil exceeding a specified concentration, and provided for advance notice relating to potentially impacted soil, training for those involved with soils excavation work and air monitoring procedures and equipment.

Following issuance of the FND, the Refinery discovered soil contamination at the site of the new cooling tower when it conducted a soil reading in compliance with Rule 1166. An inspection report prepared by the SCAQMD indicated that the benzene contamination level exceeded 50 parts per million, which is the threshold level for application of Rule 1166 and the Refinerys internal policies. The Refinery removed the contaminated soil in accordance with the applicable Rule 1166 and internal procedures. In the September 2004 Addendum, the SCAQMD determined that the Refinerys compliance with the applicable regulations rendered the contamination insignificant. It acknowledged that although the Refinery had violated certain record keeping and other requirements of Rule 1166, the Refinerys implementation of Rule 1166 and its internal policies proved effective in that no workers were injured or adversely impacted during the soil excavation activities. The SCAQMD summarized: ConocoPhillips had properly notified SCAQMD, taken soil readings, in accordance with Rule 1166 and removed the soil to covered bins. About 250 cubic yards of soil were placed in sealed bins and hauled off-site within the 30-day compliance requirement of the SCAQMD Rule 1166 Plan. The refinery was in compliance with all provisions of the rule and mitigation plan at the last inspection by the SCAQMD in August 2004.

On the basis of this evidence, appellants contend that they presented a fair argument establishing that contaminated soil at the ULSD project site constituted a significant impact requiring the preparation of an EIR. They argue that the Refinerys compliance with Rule 1166 was insufficient to obviate CEQA review, particularly in view of evidence that contaminated soil was discovered at the site and that the Refinery violated Rule 1166 in certain respects. The record does not support appellants contentions.

Appellants initial comments to the draft negative declaration failed to account for existing policies governing the Refinerys handling contaminated soil. In particular, Dr. Foxs comments inaccurately stated that there would be no way for the Refinery to detect contamination either prior to or during construction, and that there were no assurances that contamination would be monitored and remediated if found. Her comments failed to acknowledge any of the Refinerys obligations under Rule 1166 and its internal policies. The only implicit acknowledgement of those requirements was her comment criticizing their omission as part of a mitigation monitoring plan.

After the SCAQMD responded to these comments in the FND by outlining the OSHA, Rule 1166 and internal policies governing the Refinerys handling of soil contamination, Dr. Fox again inaccurately stated that the FND did not describe how contaminated soils would be discovered, handled and remediated. Mr. Hagemanns comments likewise avoided any discussion of the existing procedures governing the Refinerys handling of soil contamination. Because appellants experts comments did not address any of the specific provisions of Rule 1166 or the Refinerys internal procedures, they could not and did not explain why those provisions were inadequate. Their comments are no different than those in Pala Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 556, 580, where the court concluded that a comment letter did not constitute substantial evidence under the applicable fair argument standard because it consists almost exclusively of mere argument and unsubstantiated opinion, which are excluded from the definition of substantial evidence under CEQA. (Guidelines, 15384, subd. (a).)

Nor does the fact that certain soil was found to contain levels of benzene demonstrate that soil contamination constituted a significant impact. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence established that the Refinerys handling the contamination in accordance with existing procedures adequately protected the safety of all workers. (See Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1331, 13611362 [finding no substantial evidence of a significant environmental impact from application of herbicides used in accordance with existing labeled precautions].) Appellants cite two cases in support of their broad proposition that soil contamination constitutes a significant impact necessitating CEQA review, but neither case stands for that principle. Rather, in Association for a Cleaner Environment v. Yosemite Community College Dist. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 629, 639640, the court ruled that a community colleges relocating a firing range should have been deemed a project subject to an initial environmental study under CEQA because the evidence showed that the relocation had the potential to spread lead contamination. The initial study would reveal whether the potential for lead contamination could be or already had been avoided by completing abatement procedures. (Id. at p. 640.) Similarly, in McQueen v. Board of Directors (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1136, 11481149, disapproved on another point in Western States Petroleum Assn. v. Superior Court (1995) 9 Cal.4th 559, 576 and footnote 6, the court found that the acquisition of property containing hazardous waste was not categorically exempt from CEQA and that an initial study should have been prepared. In contrast to this authority, the SCAQMD thoroughly analyzed the prospect for and effect of soil contamination and determined that it did not constitute a significant impact requiring preparation of an EIR or supplemental EIR.

Finally, that the Refinery violated some of the Rule 1166 provisions did not constitute substantial evidence supporting a fair argument of a significant impact from soil contamination. In July and August 2004, the SCAQMD engineering and compliance division reported its inspections revealed that the Refinery had not prepared all excavation monitoring reports in the required format and that several tarps covering bins in the hazardous waste storage area contained at least one tear. On September 8, 2004, the SCAQMD re-inspected the site and found no Rule 1166 violations. There was no indication in the record that these violations were anything more than an isolated occurrence; more importantly, there was no evidence that these violations had any negative impact on worker safety. For these reasons, the Addendum was the appropriate CEQA document to address the Refinerys response to soil contamination. (See Mani Brothers Real Estate Group v. City of Los Angeles(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1398; Guidelines, 15164, subd. (b).)

2. Substantial evidence did not support a fair argument that any potential hazard from ammonia storage, use and transport constituted a significant impact.

In October 2005, the SCAQMD certified an SND to evaluate the installation and operation of SCR technology in connection with the ULSD project. It concluded that the SCR unit would not result in any adverse environmental impact requiring the preparation of an EIR and, in particular, determined that the potential hazards associated with the storage, use and transport of both aqueous and anhydrous ammonia were less than significant. There was no substantial evidence to support appellants arguments to the contrary.

Aqueous ammonia is a solution of ammonia blended with water, while anhydrous ammonia is 100 percent ammonia stored and transported under pressure. The proposed SCR unit evaluated by the SND required the use of aqueous ammonia at a concentration of 30 percent ammonia and 70 percent water, which would then react with the NOx emissions in the exhaust gases in order to reduce the NOx levels. As a backup in the event of an aqueous ammonia failure, the Refinery also proposed to install two 150-pound cylinders of anhydrous ammonia.

The Refinery calculated that approximately 1,525 gallons per year (or four gallons per day) of aqueous ammonia would be required to operate the SCR unit. The SND explained that the SCR unit did not require any modifications to the aqueous ammonia storage tank, as the existing storage tank would be adequate to handle the necessary supply. Given this, the SCAQMD concluded there would be no increase in on-site risks from the storage and use of aqueous ammonia: The consequences related to an accidental release of aqueous ammonia would remain unchanged because the same amount of ammonia would be stored on-site regardless of the new SCR Unit. Addressing the risks associated with transporting aqueous ammonia, the SND explained that the Refinery currently received its aqueous ammonia supply via truck transport on public highways and that the aqueous ammonia needed for the SCR unit would increase the supply by approximately one additional truck trip every four years. On the basis of an EPA study evaluating the risks associated with hazardous material spills during transport, coupled with data from Los Angeles County regarding truck accident rates, the SCAQMD stated in the SND that the estimated accident rate associated with transporting aqueous ammonia for this project is 0.000014, or about one accident every 71,427 years. Even if an accident occurred, the SCAQMD further explained that the aqueous ammonia would need to pool and spread out over a flat surface in order to create sufficient evaporation to form a vapor cloud, and indicated that this scenario was unlikely given that roads are generally channeled and graded to prevent such fluid accumulation.

With respect to the storage and use of anhydrous ammonia, the Refinerys Wilmington plant already had two existing anhydrous ammonia storage tanks and used anhydrous ammonia cylinders as a backup for another SCR unit. To evaluate the impacts caused by an accidental release from the two additional anhydrous ammonia cylinders, the SCAQMD retained Quest Consultants to perform a worst case analysis whereby both cylinders would be discharged into atmospheric conditions that would minimize dissipation. The SCAQMD measured the results of Quests analysis against the Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG-2) levels developed by the American Industrial Hygiene Association, which it had selected as its significance threshold. The ERPG-2 level is 200 parts per million of ammonia and represents the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their ability to take protective action. The Quest analysis showed that in the worst case the scope of the ERPG-2 level would be limited to 80 feet beyond the point of release and the duration would be only seconds; the ERPG-2 level would be reached in 14 seconds but would dissipate to the ERPG-1 level (25 parts per million) within 38 seconds. On the basis of this analysis, the SCAQMD concluded that the risk of exposure to anhydrous ammonia was less than significant.

It similarly concluded that the risks associated with transporting anhydrous ammonia were less than significant, given that the cylinders could be delivered during an existing weekly trip from a supplier and would not generate any new delivery trips. The SCAQMD also noted that any deliveries would necessarily comply with the United States Department of Transportations rigid requirements for the storage and transport of anhydrous ammonia, which included specifications for cylinder manufacturing, material, wall thickness and pressure testing. Moreover, if not used for backup purposes, the cylinders would be replaced only once every ten years per the Department of Transportation requirements.^[1]

Story continues as Part IV .

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^[1] The SNDs responses to comments indicated that since the installation of a filter system, the reliability of the aqueous ammonia system in an existing SCR unit had been high, resulting in system interruptions twice in 2004 and once in 2005, each lasting only 15 to 30 minutes. Since each 150-pound cylinder would hold approximately a 16-day supply of anhydrous ammonia, the SCAQMD opined that the cylinders would not need to be replaced more frequently than once every ten years.