SYNGENTA v. PAUL

Filed 4/25/06 Opinion on rehearing

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Dzintra I. Janavs and Gregory C. O'Brien, Judges. Affirmed in part as modified, and reversed in part with directions.

McKenna Long & Aldridge, Stanley W. Landfair, Joseph F. Butler, Robert S. Schuda, Shannon L. Fagan, Michael J. Stiles and Eric S.C. Lindstrom for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Tom Greene, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary E. Hackenbracht, Assistant Attorney General, William S. Abbey and Todd A. Valdes, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant.

Murchison & Cumming, Edmund G. Farrell III, Gina E. Och; Kessler & Collins, Gary S. Kessler and Daniel P. Callahan for Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

Continue from Part III …….

b. Counts Based on Other Laws

The Department offers no persuasive argument why the amendment of Food and Agricultural Code section 12811.5 would render moot the counts based on laws other than former section 12811.5 and has identified no language in the amended statute suggesting that it was intended to immunize prior violations of other laws. We therefore conclude the counts based on other laws are not moot.

4. Rules of Statutory Construction

Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo. (Barner v. Leeds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 676, 683.) Our task in construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent. (Hassan v. Mercy American River Hospital (2003) 31 Cal.4th 709, 715.) The statutory language ordinarily is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. (Ibid.) We give the words of the statute their ordinary and usual meaning and construe them in the context of the statute as a whole. (Ibid.) If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and does not involve an absurdity, the plain meaning governs. (People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1172; People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 95.) If the statute is ambiguous, we may consider a variety of extrinsic aids, including the apparent purpose of the statute. (Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 776.)

5. Syngenta and Dow Were Not Required to Exhaust Administrative

Remedies

A party ordinarily must exhaust the administrative remedies available before seeking judicial relief. (Campbell v. Regents of the University of Cal. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 321.) The exhaustion of administrative remedies requires a party to pursue and obtain a decision from the final administrative decisionmaker before suing in court. (Tahoe Vista Concerned Citizens v. County of Placer (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 577, 594.) The exhaustion requirement affords the administrative agency an opportunity to correct any deficiency and avoid costly litigation or reduce the scope of litigation. (Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 489, 501; Westlake Community Hosp. v Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465, 476.) The exhaustion requirement also facilitates the development of a complete factual record and allows the agency to apply its expertise, both of which can assist later judicial review, if necessary. (Campbell, supra, at p. 322; Sierra Club, supra, at p. 501.) The exhaustion requirement does not apply, however, if the Legislature indicates its intent to allow judicial relief notwithstanding the failure to exhaust administrative remedies by providing for a judicial proceeding as an alternative to the administrative remedy. (City of Susanville v. Lee C. Hess Co. (1955) 45 Cal.2d 684, 689.)

Food and Agricultural Code section 12825 states that the director of the Department, â€