In re Sophia V.
Filed 4/13/06 In re Sophia V. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re SOPHIA V. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BEATRICE P., Defendant and Appellant. | F048980
(Super. Ct. Nos. JD102327, JD102328, JD105175)
O P I N I O N |
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Peter A. Warmerdam, Juvenile Court Referee.
Maureen L. Keaney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
B.C. Barmann, Sr., County Counsel, and Jennifer L. Thurston, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Beatrice P. appeals from orders terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26) to her three daughters, S., N., and A.[1] Appellant contends the evidence warranted a finding by the court that termination would be detrimental to the children based on their relationship with her (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)) and/or their relationship with one another (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E)). On review, we disagree and will affirm.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
Five-year-old S. and four-month-old N. came to the attention of respondent Kern County Department of Human Services (the department) in November 2003. The children were at risk of serious physical harm or illness (§ 300, subd. (b)) because: appellant's home posed several safety hazards; appellant was mentally unstable by virtue of her depression and self-mutilation; and appellant failed to protect her children from domestic violence caused by her live-in boyfriend who was N.'s father.
In February 2004, the Kern County Superior Court adjudged S. and N. dependent children, removed them from parental custody, and ordered reunification services. Initially, appellant actively participated in services such that, in late July 2004, the court returned the children to her care subject to family maintenance services and a proviso that the boyfriend stay away from the family home.
Two months later, in September 2004, appellant gave birth to A. Within two weeks of the infant's birth, the department detained her and re-detained S. and N. Contrary to the stay-away condition, appellant left S. and N. in the care of the boyfriend. Appellant also resumed cutting herself and left her home in such disarray that it once again posed a health and safety risk for the children.
The court thereafter exercised dependency jurisdiction over the infant A. and removed her from parental custody. It also found a supplemental petition (§ 387) based on these latest events true as to S. and N. and once again formally removed them from parental custody.
Despite another six months of reunification services, there was no progress on appellant's part. Contrary to her active participation in early 2004, appellant did virtually nothing towards reunification after her children were re-detained. Consequently, in June 2005, the court terminated reunification efforts and set a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for each of the children.
In the meantime, the children had experienced considerable flux in their placements. While the department placed S. and N. together during the early stages of their dependency, as of the summer of 2005, S. was in her 10th placement and N. was in her 6th placement. S. achieved some stability after December 2004 when the department placed her with a paternal aunt. Over time, the paternal aunt became committed to adopting S. and the department identified the paternal aunt as S.'s prospective adoptive parent. Meanwhile, the department placed N. and the infant A. in the home of a maternal aunt who also wished to adopt. However, the maternal aunt's housing posed difficulties which prevented the department from identifying her as the prospective adoptive parent of N. and A.
In anticipation of the section 366.26 hearing, the department submitted a social study recommending that the court find each of the three children adoptable and terminate parental rights. In particular, the department's social workers observed it would not be detrimental to terminate parental rights because although appellant had visited with her children and their visits were appropriate, appellant largely stopped visiting her children after the court set the section 366.26 hearing. For instance, she missed so many scheduled visits with her children that the department lost track of the number. Also, the oldest child, S., in particular did not appear upset by her inability to see appellant. Further, although S. and N. did recognize appellant, they did not look to her as a parental figure. The youngest child, A., who had been detained since she was approximately two weeks of age, was too young to recognize appellant.
The department also reported that although N. and A. were too young to make any statements concerning their placement or adoption, an adoption social worker did speak with S. S., who was then six-and-a-half years old, stated she liked living with her current caregivers, she loved them and they were good to her. On the other hand, she also missed her mother and her first choice would be to live with appellant. She did not have an opinion about adoption.
The court conducted the section 366.26 hearing in September 2005. Appellant did not attend the hearing. Although her trial counsel had no evidence to present, she urged the court not to terminate appellant's parental rights. She argued that appellant was concerned that termination could sever the relationship between her three daughters because there was no way to assure they would continue to have contact if the younger two girls had to be removed from the maternal aunt's care.
Counsel for the children also had no evidence to present. However, she did offer the following argument.
Well, I have for a while been concerned about the placement of [N.] and [A.], making sure that it was stable. The [maternal aunt] is here today . . . and she tells me that she has worked with her landlord and that landlord, she cannot seem to get this house fixed up, so they have decided to move. And they will be relocating into a house that pleases the Department and she believes that will stabilize that situation. She seems pretty committed to doing that, so I'm hoping that when it goes into the adoption unit, that they just don't all of a sudden decide to remove these children. However, I did speak with her and asked her if there's another relative. And she believes that there is another relative that could take the child in their house with children and the house would pass inspection.
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