In re Aryanna C.

Filed 6/5/06 In re Aryanna C. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

Aryanna C.'s maternal grandmother and de facto parent objected to adoption as the permanent plan for Aryanna on the basis of the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights. We hold that grandmother lacks standing to appeal the order and dismiss the appeal.

Factual & Procedural Background

Aryanna C. (born in 1999) and her half-sister Jackie B. (born in 1992) were removed from their mother's care in October 2000. Mother received reunification services; Aryanna's father did not. Both Aryanna's maternal grandmother and her paternal great-grandmother cared for her in her first years and the record is clear that both women wanted to care for her and be involved in her life.

Aryanna lived with her paternal great-grandmother, Amelia Ann C., (Ms. C.) in Sacramento from sometime in 2001 until March 2002.[1] She was then placed with Jackie in the home of their maternal grandmother, Linda T. (Ms. T.), in San Jose. Ms. T. was granted de facto parent status.

Aryanna and Jackie briefly returned to their mother's care in March 2003, but were back with Ms. T. by August. In about October 2003, Aryanna moved to Ms. C.'s home in Sacramento. Ms. C. was also caring for another of Aryanna's half-sisters and Aryanna's cousin. Aryanna adjusted well to her new home. The court terminated reunification services for the mother and approved long-term foster care placement for Aryanna with Ms. C.

Because Aryanna has such close bonds with both Ms. C and with Ms. T., the agency considered it imperative that Aryanna maintain her relationship with her maternal relatives in San Jose. Aryanna periodically visited Ms. T. and her half-sisters. For the most part, the agency provided the transportation from Sacramento to San Jose for these visits. On one occasion in May 2005 the social worker allowed the grandmothers to work out transportation and they met halfway to transfer Aryanna.

Ms. C. was willing to adopt Aryanna. Ms. T. was not able to adopt Aryanna, but she was strongly committed to remaining involved in her life and feared she would lose visitation with her granddaughter if Ms. C. adopted her. The court twice ordered mediation regarding sibling visitation, but Ms. C. did not participate, citing difficulty traveling to the mediation sessions. Ms. T. proposed a postadoption contact agreement providing Aryanna would visit her during school breaks and on alternate holidays. (See § 366.29.) Despite assurances by Ms. T. that they could modify the agreement informally if it became inconvenient, Ms. C. refused to sign because it was legally binding and she would incur legal costs if she needed to change it. The social worker agreed that the proposed visitation agreement was too rigid because at that point in time the visits took an emotional toll on Aryanna.

Ms. C. consistently said she understood the importance of maintaining Aryanna's connections with her maternal relatives and that she would cooperate with visitation. Ms. T. was not confident visitation would continue. Ms. T.'s lawyer argued that Ms. C. never transported Aryanna to San Jose for a visit and she refused to participate in mediation or sign the postadoption agreement. Ms. T was painfully aware that if Ms. C. failed to cooperate with visitation, she would have no legal recourse.

Further, Ms. T., who worked full time, was concerned about maintaining her eligibility for public assistance for transportation and child care during Aryanna's visits. Once Aryanna was adopted, Ms. T. would lose this assistance. Without financial assistance, visitation would be even more difficult.

At Aryanna's permanency planning hearing in July 2005, the court terminated parental rights, freeing Aryanna for adoption by Ms. C. The court concluded that the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights did not apply. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E).)[2] The court stated that it could not find that adoption would create a substantial interference with Aryanna's relationship with her half-siblings in San Jose because the court was persuaded by Ms. C.'s assurances that she would cooperate with continued visitation and the agency's opinion that Ms. C. would honor that commitment. Balancing the benefit to Aryanna of a stable predictable home against the possibility of substantial interference with the sibling relationship, the court terminated parental rights.

Discussion

Ms. T. appeals from the order, arguing the sibling relationship exception applied. Only a party aggrieved by an appealable juvenile court order may appeal from that order. (§ 395; Code Civ. Proc., § 902; In re P.L. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1357, 1361.) A party is aggrieved if its own legal rights are affected. (In re P.L., at p. 1361.)[3] A party may not appeal based on an injury to someone else's rights or based on an injury to the minor's relationships with other people. (Ibid.; In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 950.) A de facto parent has only limited legal rights to participate in dependency hearings. (In re P.L., at p. 1361.) In certain circumstances, a relative has legally protected rights to preference in the placement of a minor. (In re Aaron R. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 697, 704-705.) Ms. T. did not assert any legally protected rights that might have barred the court order. She was not asserting her own interests but instead Aryanna's interest in maintaining her relationship with the half-siblings who lived with Ms. T. (See In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 54 [court may only consider detriment to the minor when applying sibling relationship exception, not detriment to the siblings].) A parent may appeal a trial court's decision not to apply the sibling relationship exception because reversal of such a decision would prevent termination of parental rights, an injury to the parent's legal rights. (In re L. Y. L., at p. 951.) In contrast, Ms. T. in her capacities as a de facto parent and relative did not suffer cognizable injury to her legally protected rights when the court decided not to apply the sibling relationship exception; therefore, she lacks standing to appeal on that ground. Ms. T. cannot appeal based on an injury to Aryanna's relationship with her siblings. (See In re Harmony B. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 831, 838 [grandmother lacks standing to appeal order terminating parental rights for adoption by foster parents, where grandmother wanted the minor placed with her]; In re P.L., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 1361-1362 [same]; In re Miguel E. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 521, 538-539 [same in appeal of order modifying minor's placement].)[4]

Disposition

The appeal is dismissed for lack of standing.

GEMELLO, J.

We concur.

SIMONS, J. Acting P. J.

REARDON, J.*

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[1] We use the name conventions employed by the parties.

[2] All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

[3] Arguably, In re Joel H. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1185 is inconsistent with the principle that a de facto parent or relative has standing to appeal only if an order infringes on a legally protected right. In Joel H., the minors were placed with their great-aunt, whom the appellate court determined was also the minors' de facto parent. (Id. at pp. 1189, 1193-1194.) The juvenile court subsequently removed the minors from the aunt's custody based on allegations of abuse. (Id. at pp. 1190-1192.) The appellate court held the aunt had standing to appeal the removal order because her â€