Jackson v. Pik
Filed 5/31/06 Jackson v. Pik CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
| ELEANOR JACKSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ROSA PIK et al., Defendants and Respondents. | B177535 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC 293693) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. Frances Rothschild, Judge. Affirmed.
Eleanor Jackson, in propria persona, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Wolf, Rifkin, Shapiro & Schulman and Mark J. Rosenbaum for Defendant and Respondent Rosa Pik.
Molfetta & Associates and Andrew Rappaport for Defendant and Respondent Simcha Ullman.
__________________________
SUMMARY
When an appellant representing herself fails to identify any reversible error, the trial court's judgment must be affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Rosa Pik is an elderly woman in her nineties, and Simcha Ullman holds a power of attorney to act on her behalf. Through A+ Personal Care, Ullman, on behalf of Pik, hired Eleanor Jackson, a certified nursing assistant, to work 15 hours a day (6:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m.) at Pik's home. Jackson was employed by Pik from February 3, 1999, until she was terminated on April 10, 2002.
On April 9, 2003, Jackson filed a complaint against Pik and Ullman. Her first amended complaint asserted claims of sexual harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination, intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, breach of contract, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and slander. Pik and Ullman demurred. The trial court sustained the demurrers, with leave to amend, as to Jackson's causes of action for failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime, and defamation. The demurrers to the other causes of action were sustained without leave to amend.[1]
Jackson filed a second amended complaint, to which Pik and Ullman again demurred. The trial court sustained Ullman's demurrer, as well as Pik's demurrer to the defamation cause of action, without leave to amend, and overruled Pik's demurrer to Jackson's wage claims. Specifically, the court concluded that:
· Ullman was not Jackson's employer, and therefore was not a proper party to the wage claims.
· The slander cause of action failed because Jackson's complaint disclosed on its face that the alleged slanderous statements were made to an employment agency, giving rise to a qualified privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (c), and Jackson's complaint did not plead truthful facts of malice necessary to negate the privilege.[2] The court explained that, in attempting to show malice, Jackson's second amended complaint alleged Ullman told Jackson she was being terminated because Pik wanted a younger nursing assistant, while telling the employment agency that Jackson abandoned Pik. These allegations were contrary to those in Jackson's first amended complaint, in which she alleged she was terminated because she complained about sexual harassment.
· The pleadings, while imperfect, stated causes of action against Pik for failure to pay minimum wages and failure to pay overtime.
Pik moved for summary judgment, submitting declarations showing the number of hours Jackson worked, the minimum wage, and the amounts paid to Jackson. As to the overtime claim, Pik contended that Jackson was a â€
