BENETTA BUELL-WILSON v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY

Filed 3/10/08; on remand from U.S. Supreme Court

OPINION ON REMAND FROM THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Story Continued From Part III ..

B. Compliance with Government Standards

Ford and amicus curiae the Chamber assert Ford is not subject to punitive damages as a matter of law because it complied with all applicable governmental regulatory standards. In particular, Ford asserts it complied with FMVSS (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard) 216, which sets the standard for crush resistance of automobile roofs. Ford also asserts it complied with a National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) regulation requiring all SUV's to display a warning concerning the risk of rollovers. (See 49 Fed.Reg. 20016 (May 11, 1984).) Ford's and the Chamber's contentions are unavailing for several reasons.

The law in California is that punitive damages are permitted in product liability actions precisely because "[g]overnmental safety standards and the criminal law have failed to provide adequate consumer protection against the manufacture and distribution of defective products. [Citations.] Punitive damages thus remain as the most effective remedy for consumer protection against defectively designed mass produced articles." (Grimshaw, supra,119 Cal.App.3d at p. 810.) Compliance with a law or safety regulation in itself does not establish that a product is not defective or that a defendant who sells or rents the product for use by the public has exercised due care. (See Campbell v. General Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 126-127; Amos v. Alpha Property Management (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 895, 901.)

The Chamber asks us to reject the rule stated above in Grimshaw, supra,119 Cal.App.3d 757, that compliance with industry standards does not bar punitive damages, because that decision predates amendments to Civil Code section 3294 that modified the definitions of "oppression, fraud [and] malice" and required proof by clear and convincing evidence. But Grimshaw did not base its conclusions on the standard of proof for punitive damages claims or the precise definitions of the terms "oppression, fraud and malice." The Chamber points to nothing in the 1987 amendments, or to any legislative history for those amendments, suggesting the Legislature intended to disapprove Grimshaw.

The Chamber relies on the extensive federal regulation of the automobile industry through the NHTSA and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 (Safety Act) (49 U.S.C.  30101 et seq.), which, in conjunction with NHTSA-promulgated standards, has declared the minimum safety standards for automobiles. However, a review of the Safety Act and its legislative history demonstrates the federal government did not intend to preclude punitive damages where an auto manufacturer has met minimum safety standards.

Title 49 United States Code section 30103(e) (section 30103(e)) of the Safety Act contains a savings clause that provides:

"Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law." (Italics added.)

Thus, section 30103(e) expressly provides that compliance with federal safety standards is not a defense to state common law products liability. Punitive damages have long been a part of the common law, originating in the 1763 English case Huckle v. Money (1763) 95 Eng.Rep. 768, and finding early acceptance in the United States when the United States Supreme Court upheld their constitutionality in Day v. Woodworth (1851) 54 U.S. 363, 370. Thus, in enacting this savings clause, Congress was aware that part of the common law to which it referred in section 30103(e) included liability for punitive damages and could have excluded such damages from its terms.

The Chamber asserts that Congress, in enacting the savings clause in section 30103(e), only sought to preserve common law liability in general and did not intend to address punitive damages. However, a review of the legislative history of the Safety Act further demonstrates that Congress intended through the savings clause to leave untouched all aspects of common law products liability actions, including awards of punitive damages.

The House Report for the Safety Act states that section 30103(e) "is intended, and this subsection specifically establishes, that compliance with safety standards is not to be a defense or otherwise to affect the rights of parties under common law particularly those related to warranty, contract, and tort liability." (H.R.Rep. No. 1776-89, 2d Sess., p. 24 (1966), italics added.) The Safety Act's Senate sponsor stated on the Senate floor that "[c]ompliance with Federal standards would not necessarily shield any person from broad liability at the common law. The common law on product liability still remains as it was." (Remarks of Sen. Magnuson, 89 Cong. Rec. 14230 (daily ed. June 24, 1966), italics added.) Its House sponsor, while arguing in floor debate against the need for criminal penalties in the Safety Act stated, "[W]e have preserved every single common law remedy that exists against a manufacturer for the benefit of a motor vehicle purchaser. This means that all of the warranties and all of the other devices of common law which are afforded to the purchaser, remain in the buyer and they can be exercised against the manufacturer." (Remarks of Rep. Staggers, 89 Cong. Rec. 19663 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1966), italics added.)

The fact that California does not follow this proposed rulethat compliance with federal minimum safety standards bars claims for punitive damagesis also demonstrated by the fact such a rule has been proposed through legislation in California on several occasions but has not been enacted. In 2000 the Legislature considered a bill that would have enacted the rule that Ford proposes. (Assem. Bill No. 2582 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.)  1.) However, the bill never made it out of committee. (Assem. Bill No. 2582, from committee without further action, 2 Assem. Final Hist. (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) p. 1865.) A similar bill did not secure passage in 1996. (Assem. Bill No. 2880, from committee without further action, 2 Assem. Final Hist. (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) p. 1711.) Another such bill did not pass in 2006. (Sen. Bill No. 1429 (2005-2006 Reg. Sess.)  2.) There would be no need for such legislation if compliance with government standards already provided a defense to punitive damages claims.

Ford and the Chamber's argument is also unavailing because there are no federal standards for stability of vehicles, one ground upon which Ford's liability for punitive damages is based. Ford points to an NHTSA regulation requiring all SUV's to display a warning concerning the risk of rollovers. (See 49 Fed.Reg. 20016 (May 11, 1984).) However, having a warning sticker is not the same as meeting a safety standard, and, in any event, it would not bar a state law claim alleging stability defects.

The Chamber asserts that NHTSA's failure to promulgate stability standards and to require only a warning sticker represents a "policy choice" based on difficulties in predicting rollover risk and that compliance with the warning requirement alone should bar punitive damages. However, this exact argument was rejected by the Eleventh Circuit in Watkins v. Ford Motor Co. (11th Cir. 1999) 190 F.3d 1213, 1216-1218, a Bronco II rollover case. (See also Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman (Ind.Ct.App. 1999) 705 N.E.2d 539, 555-556.) We conclude Ford's asserted compliance with federal safety regulations does not as a matter of law bar the punitive damages award.^[1]

C. Fair Notice of Exposure to Punitive Damages

Ford contends that if punitive damages can be awarded on this record, Civil Code section 3294 is unconstitutionally vague because it failed to give Ford fair notice that its conduct could subject it to punitive damages. This contention is also unavailing.

Ford made this same argument over 25 years ago in Grimshaw, supra,119 Cal.App.3d 757. The Court of Appeal rejected it, concluding that "punitive damages are recoverable in a nondeliberate or unintentional tort where the defendant's conduct constitutes a conscious disregard of the probability of injury to others." (Id. at p. 811.)

Additionally, Ford bases this contention on the fact that, at most, reasonable people could disagree with the decisions it made. However, we have already discussed and rejected this argument, ante.

D. Consideration of Ford's Overall Financial Condition

Ford asserts that the punitive damages award must be reversed because the jury was allowed to consider its overall financial worth (almost $13 billion) as opposed to its worth tied to sales of products in California. We reject this contention.

Where the defendant's oppression, fraud or malice has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, California law permits the recovery of punitive damages "for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." (Civ. Code,  3294, subd. (a).)

As our Supreme Court recently held in Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1185 (Simon): "[T]he defendant's financial condition is an essential factor in fixing an amount that is sufficient to serve these goals without exceeding the necessary level of punishment. '[O]bviously, the function of deterrence . . . will not be served if the wealth of the defendant allows him to absorb the award with little or no discomfort.' [Citation.] '[P]unitive damage awards should not be a routine cost of doing business that an industry can simply pass on to its customers through price increases, while continuing the conduct the law proscribes.' " (See also State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 428 [use of wealth as a factor not " 'unlawful or inappropriate' "].)

Despite this authority, however, Ford cites People ex rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1253 (R.J. Reynolds) for the proposition that in assessing punitive damages courts may only take into consideration the defendant's financial figures in the state where the wrong occurred.

In R.J. Reynolds,the State of California filed a complaint against the defendant tobacco company to enforce a consent decree entered into as part of a settlement agreement that prohibited targeting youth in advertising of tobacco products. The superior court found the defendant in violation of that agreement and entered summary judgment, permanently enjoining the company from continuing to violate the settlement. The court also awarded the state sanctions in the amount of $20 million. The defendant appealed, and this court reversed the award of sanctions, finding them to be excessive. Relying on recent United States Supreme Court precedent holding it was improper to impose punitive damages against a defendant for conduct in one state based on defendant's out-of-state conduct, we held the superior court in R.J. Reynolds erred when it based its sanctions award on the defendant's nationwide spending on advertising, as opposed to its advertising activities in California. (R.J. Reynolds, supra, 115 Cal.App.4that pp. 1289-1290.) This court found the sanctions award to be error because "the People's request for $20 million in sanctions was based on Reynolds's nationwide spending on print advertising and profitability without evidence of its advertising spending or profitability in California." (Id. at p. 1290.) As the court stated in R.J. Reynolds, "the award of sanctions for Reynolds's conduct in California could not properly be based on Reynolds's nationwide financial figures without violating Reynolds's due process rights." (Id. at p. 1289.)

Based on the above quoted language, Ford asserts that it was error to allow evidence of its overall financial condition, as opposed to its financial worth in California. This contention is unavailing.

Here, the trial court properly instructed the jury, at Ford's request, that it could not consider Ford's out-of-state conduct in imposing punitive damages:

"In determining the amount of punitive damages, if any, that is necessary to achieve the proper level of punishment and deterrence, you may consider only Ford's wrongful conduct, if any, that has had an adverse impact on the citizens of California. Accordingly, you may not award any punitive damages for the purpose of punishing Ford for the sale of vehicles in other states for any injuries that may have occurred in other states, or for the purpose of changing Ford's conduct in other states."

Consideration of Ford's overall financial condition was not to punish it for out-of-state conduct as in R.J. Reynolds, but for the broader concept of ensuring the amount of punitive damages was sufficient to act as a deterrent. Use of a defendant's financial condition in such a manner is proper because " 'the function of deterrence . . . will not be served if the wealth of the defendant allows [it] to absorb the award with little or no discomfort.' " (Simon, supra,35 Cal.4th at p. 1185.) Consideration of only a defendant's finances as they relate to the state in which they are sued would allow the defendant to make them " 'a routine cost of doing business that an industry can simply pass on to its customers through price increases, while continuing the conduct the law proscribes.' " (Ibid.)

E. Amount of Award

Ford argues that the amount of the punitive damages awarded to the Wilsons is excessive under the federal due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. We conclude that, after reducing the noneconomic damages award to Mrs. Wilson to $18 million, the award of punitive damages is excessive and is, therefore, reduced to $55 million, an approximate two-to-one ratio to the total compensatory damages award ($4.6 million in economic damages + $18 million in noneconomic damages + $5 million in loss of consortium damages = $27.6 million x 2 = $55.2 million).

1. Standard of review

"In deciding whether an award of punitive damages is constitutionally excessive . . . , we are to review the award de novo, making an independent assessment of the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the relationship between the award and the harm done to the plaintiff, and the relationship between the award and civil penalties authorized for comparable conduct. [Citations.] This '[e]xacting appellate review' is intended to ensure punitive damages are the product of the ' " 'application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice.' " ' [Citation.] [] On the other hand, findings of historical fact made in the trial court are still entitled to the ordinary measure of appellate deference." (Simon, supra,35 Cal.4th at p. 1172, fn. omitted.)

"To state a particular level beyond which punitive damages in a given case would be grossly excessive, and hence unconstitutionally arbitrary, ' "is not an enviable task. . . . In the last analysis, an appellate panel, convinced it must reduce an award of punitive damages, must rely on its combined experience and judgment." ' " (Simon, supra,35 Cal.4th at p. 1188.) Moreover, our "constitutional mission is only to find a level higher than which an award may not go; it is not to find the 'right' level in the court's own view." (Ibid.)

2. Analysis

The United States Supreme Court has determined that the federal due process clause places limits on state courts' awards of punitive damages, limits appellate courts are required to enforce in their review of jury awards. (State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 416-418.) The imposition of "grossly excessive or arbitrary" awards is constitutionally prohibited, for due process entitles a tortfeasor to " 'fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.' " (Id. at pp. 416, 417.)

In State Farm the United States Supreme Court concluded it was improper for juries, in awarding punitive damages, to punish a defendant for its dissimilar actions in other states affecting individuals other than the plaintiff. (State Farm, supra,538 U.S. at pp. 421-423.) However, the Supreme Court reiterated that, in determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's actions, juries could consider a defendant's similar repeated conduct that affected others. (Id. at p. 423.)

The United States Supreme Court and the California Supreme Court have stated there are three factors to consider in determining whether the amount of a punitive damages award comports with the federal due process clause: "(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the . . . harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages [and comparable civil penalties where available]." (State Farm, supra,538 U.S. at p. 418; Johnson v. Ford Motor Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1191 (Johnson).) We discuss these factors in order.

a. Reprehensibility of conduct

Courts utilize five factors to help determine the degree of reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct: (1) whether the harm was physical and not merely economic; (2) whether the conduct demonstrated an indifference or reckless disregard for the health or safety of others; (3) whether the target of the conduct was financially vulnerable; (4) whether the conduct was repeated or an isolated incident; and (5) whether the conduct was the result of intentional acts or mere accident. (State Farm, supra,538 U.S. at p. 419; Simon, supra,35 Cal.4th at p. 1180.) Further, the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct is the most important indicator of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award. (State Farm, supra,at p. 419; Simon, supra,at p. 1180.)

Based on our de novo review of the record, we conclude that the reprehensibility of Ford's conduct was high, given the catastrophic nature of Mrs. Wilson's injuries, Ford's reckless disregard for the safety of others, the repeated nature of Ford's conduct, and the fact that Ford's acts were intentional.

Focusing on the first factor, Ford's decision to release the defective Explorer resulted in catastrophic and permanent physical injuries to Mrs. Wilson, not merely economic loss. She is permanently paralyzed and in constant, debilitating pain. She is confined to a wheelchair, without sensation or muscular control of her lower body. She must rely on others to care for her. As Mrs. Wilson explained it:

"Me being dependent on other people . . . for me that is very difficult because I have always been an independent sort of person. . . . I have always been the one that has done things for other people. For me that is very hard to . . . have to be in that kind of position. . . . I am in a wheelchair, I am not going to ever be out of a wheelchair, that whole concept is very . . . difficult to . . . accept. . . . The things that I really love to do I can't do anymore. The list is just  goes on and on."

As discussed, ante, and as found by the jury, Ford's decision to release the defective Explorer without warning consumers of the risk of injury it posed evinced a reckless disregard for the safety of its customers. As the trial court noted in ruling on Ford's motion for new trial on the ground the punitive damage award was excessive, "the evidence showed Ford had a pattern of deficient design regarding safety in favor of increased financial returns and was the result of the conscious disregard of Ford executives." Our own independent review of the record compels the same conclusion. Thus, the second factor also supports a significant punitive damages award.

Addressing the third factor, the target of the conduct in this case was consumers, individuals who were vulnerable as they would not understand vehicle design, development and manufacture, and would rely on Ford to inform them of risks as they made purchasing decisions.

Conduct is more reprehensible where, as here, it is part of repeated corporate policy or practice rather than an isolated incident. (Johnson, supra,35 Cal.4th at p. 1196.) In this case the conduct was repeated and not an isolated incident. Ford had a pattern of deficient safety design that was ignored in favor of increased financial returns. As discussed in more detail, ante, that corporate policy or practice was evidenced by Ford's refusal to follow its engineers' recommendations to improve the stability of the Explorer. As the trial court noted, "[T]hat evidence was primarily adduced through Ford's own internal memoranda and correspondence." Thus, the fourth factor supports a large punitive damages award.

The evidence presented by the Wilsons in this case supports a finding that Ford's actions were the result of intentional conduct and deliberate decisions by Ford's management, knowing the unreasonable risk of harm posed to consumers, as opposed to a mere accident.

Moreover, the fifth factor, whether the conduct was the result of intentional acts or mere accident, "is of little value in assessing a California punitive damages award, as accidentally harmful conduct cannot provide the basis for punitive damages under our law. At a minimum, California law requires conduct done with 'willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others' or despicable conduct done 'in conscious disregard' of a person's rights." (Simon, supra,35 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) The jury's finding that Ford acted with "oppression, fraud or malice" demonstrates Ford's actions were intentional. In sum, the reprehensibility of Ford's conduct supports a significant award of punitive damages.

b. Ratio of punitive to compensatory damages

In State Farm, the United States Supreme Court, while still "declin[ing] . . . to impose a bright-line ratio which a punitive damages award cannot exceed," held that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process." (State Farm, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 425.) The high court "also explained that past decisions and statutory penalties approving ratios of 3 or 4 to 1 were 'instructive' as to the due process norm, and that while relatively high ratios could be justified when ' "a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages" [citation] . . . [t]he converse is also true[:] When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.' " (Simon, supra,35 Cal.4th at p. 1182.)

Our high court has interpreted this language from State Farm to mean that it established a "type of presumption: ratios between the punitive damages award and the plaintiff's actual or potential compensatory damages significantly greater than 9 or 10 to 1 are suspect and, absent special justification (by, for example, extreme reprehensibility or unusually small, hard-to-detect or hard-to-measure compensatory damages), cannot survive appellate scrutiny under the due process clause." (Simon, supra,35 Cal.4th at p. 1182.)

Here, after our reduction of the noneconomic damages awarded to Mrs. Wilson, the compensatory damages, while substantial, are within a reasonable range for the type of catastrophic, permanent and ongoing injuries suffered by Mrs. Wilson, and the loss of her society, comfort and companionship to Mr. Wilson. Mrs. Wilson's recovery for noneconomic damages is proportionate to the injuries she suffered. Similarly, Mr. Wilson's recovery on his loss of consortium claim is proportionate to his substantial injury. Moreover, as discussed, ante, there was a high degree of reprehensibility to Ford's conduct. Because the noneconomic damages award is substantial, a low single digit ratio is appropriate. We are mindful of the Supreme Court's statement in State Farm, supra,538 U.S. at page 425, that "[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee." In this case we conclude that a two-to-one ratio is warranted because the degree of Ford's reprehensibility is also high.

c. Comparable civil penalties

Ford does not address this factor in its opening brief. However, for the first time in its reply brief Ford asserts that there are comparable civil penalties to compare with the amount of the punitive damages claim. Ford cites title 49 United States Code section 30165(a), which it claims provides penalties for designing and selling defective vehicles, penalties that are $1,000 for each vehicle, up to a maximum of $800,000. Ford asserts that since the punitive damages award "dwarfs" the maximum penalties allowed under that federal statute, the punitive damage award is constitutionally infirm. This contention is unavailing.

First, we do not consider matters raised by appellants for the first time in their reply briefs. Because Ford did not address this factor in its opening brief, thus denying the Wilsons an opportunity to respond, it has waived the right to assert this issue on appeal. (Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 747, 761, fn. 4; Shade Foods, Inc. v. Innovative Products Sales & Marketing, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 847, 894, fn. 10.)

Second, title 49 United States Code section 30165(a) is part of that portion of the Safety Act which provides, as discussed, ante, only minimum safety standards.

Third, as also discussed in detail, ante, there is a savings clause that allows common law liability notwithstanding compliance with those standards, putting Ford on notice it may be subject to private state actions that result in substantially higher damage awards than civil penalties.

Fourth, the savings clause also evidences congressional intent that the maximum penalty allowed under title 49 United States Code section 30165(a) is not a sufficient penalty for all such violations because the varying degrees of plaintiffs' injuries and defendants' culpability dictate a greater flexibility in punishment. (See Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau (Ala. 1997) 708 So.2d 111, 122.)

Finally, the sanctions amounts in title 49 United States Code section 30165(a) were increased in 2000 to a range of $5,000 to $15 million, indicating Congress's belief that the original amounts were insufficient to deter vehicle manufacturers from placing defective automobiles on the road. The maximum penalty under the 2000 amendments is not "dwarfed" by the punitive damage award, as reduced.

d. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing factors, and using our combined experience and judgment, we conclude that a two-to-one ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages is sufficient to punish Ford and deter it from similar conduct in the future. This ratio is proportionate to the degree of harm suffered and the substantial award of compensatory damages. An award exceeding a two-to-one ratio would exceed the constitutional maximum that could be awarded under the facts of this case. (Simon, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1188 [an appellate court's "constitutional mission is only to find a level higher than which an award may not go; it is not to find the 'right' level in the court's own view"].) Accordingly, we reduce the punitive damage award to $55 million, approximately two times the total compensatory damage award to the Wilsons.

F. Application of Philip Morris to Reduced Punitive Damages Award

1. Introduction

The United States Supreme Court has remanded this matter with direction that we reconsider our award of punitive damages in light of the high court's decision in Philip Morris, supra,166 L.Ed.2d at pages 948-949, holding juries cannot use punitive damages to punish defendants for harm caused to third parties.

We have reconsidered our original decision in Buell‑Wilson I and have analyzed the application of Philip Morris to our holdings in that decision.We have also reviewed and analyzed the relevant trial court proceedings in this matter. Based on that reconsideration, review, and analysis, we conclude Philip Morris does not necessitate a change in our original decision in this matter because (1) Fordhas forfeited the right to raise the issue whether there is significant risk the jury, in determining the amount of punitive damages to award, punished Ford for harm it caused to third parties; (2) our previous reduction of the punitive damages award to two times the compensatory award eliminated any danger the jury punished Ford for harm to third parties; and (3) there was no evidence or argument at trial that created a significant risk the jury here punished Ford for harm to third parties.

2. Philip Morris

The family of Jesse Williams, a long-time smoker, sued Philip Morris USA (Philip Morris) for negligence and deceit. (Philip Morris, supra,166 L.Ed.2d at p. 946.) The jury concluded Williams's death was caused by smoking and found for the plaintiffs on their claims for negligence and deceit. On plaintiffs' claim for deceit, the jury awarded $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages. The trial judge determined the punitive damages award was excessive and reduced it to $32 million. Both parties appealed, and the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the full award of punitive damages. (Ibid.) The Oregon Supreme Court denied review.

Philip Morris appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and the case was remanded for further review in light of the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm, supra,538 U.S. 408, which held, as we have discussed, ante, that the due process clause of the United States Constitution imposes limits on the amount a jury may award for punitive damages. Philip Morris raised two arguments on remand: (1) The jury should not have been permitted to consider injuries to third parties not before the court when awarding punitive damages, and (2) the punitive damages award was excessive under State Farm. (Philip Morris, supra, 166 L.Ed.2d at p. 946.) The Oregon Supreme Court rejected both arguments, and Philip Morris again appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Story Continue As Part V ..

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^[1] Following oral argument in this matter, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. (2008) ___ U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. 999], holding the Food and Drug Administration's premarket approval process of a balloon catheter used in angioplasty established federal "requirements" under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) that preempted state common law claims for negligence, strict liability and implied warranty. That decision has no impact on our holding as the MDA had a preemption clause that affirmatively barred such claims. (Riegel, supra,at pp. 1003-1005.) As explained, ante, section 30103(e) of the Safety Act, by contrast, contains a savings clause that that explicitly allows such common law claims.