Marriage of Petersen

Filed 2/10/10 Marriage of Petersen CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John S. Somers, Judge.

Alexander Petersen, in pro. per., for Appellant.

Edward J. Thomas for Respondent.

-ooOoo-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant Alexander Petersen (Alexander) and respondent Greti Petersen (Greti) are natives of Romania who were married^[1]and had a son, A.A., born on June 30, 2000. In 2002, Greti petitioned for dissolution of marriage in Ventura County Superior Court. The court entered a partial judgment of dissolution on December 15, 2004. After the entry of judgment, Greti and A.A. moved to Kern County and Alexander moved to Los Angeles County. On October 31, 2007, the Ventura County Superior Court transferred the dissolution action to Kern County.

In the years following the judgment of dissolution, the parties had ongoing disputes concerning the requirements of the child custody and visitation orders arising from the dissolution of marriage. On January 22, 2009, the Kern County Superior Court filed findings and an order after hearing addressing the custody of A.A.; Alexanders right to reasonable visitation with A.A. (including weekend, summer, holiday, and school break visitation); visitation exchanges; daily and emergency health care for A.A.; parental travel plans with A.A.; and A.A.s schooling and extracurricular activities. In a separate order filed on January 22, 2009, the court ruled that A.A.s passport would be held in a safe place by the financial officer of the Kern County Superior Court pending further orders. On February 27, 2009, Alexander filed a timely notice of appeal from both orders of January 22, 2009. We affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On September 4, 2003, the Ventura County Superior Court filed an order after hearing awarding Alexander physical custody of A.A. every week from Monday at 7 PM until Thursday at 7 PM beginning August 11, 2003. On April 20, 2004, the Ventura Superior Court filed a partial judgment of dissolution on bifurcated issues. The partial judgment awarded joint legal and physical custody of A.A. to both parties, with Greti having primary physical custody of A.A. To ensure A.A.s frequent contact with both parents, the order awarded physical custody of A.A. to Alexander every Wednesday from 7:00 p.m. until Saturday at 1:00 p.m. with exchanges to take place in the community of Gorman, subject to certain exceptions. The order also addressed the physical custody of A.A. on recognized holidays, A.A.s attendance at kindergarten, planned travel and removal of A.A. from the State of California, and scheduling of activities for A.A.

On December 22, 2004, the Ventura Superior Court filed a judgment on reserved issues, including child support, spousal support, division of property, community debts, reimbursement, equalization payments, and attorney fees.

On July 13, 2005, the Ventura Superior Court filed an order regarding custody and visitation upon the mediation recommendation of Marcie B. Kraft, M.A., M.S., J.D. The court directed both parents to share in the right and responsibility of decision-making about the health, education, and welfare of A.A. The court ordered that joint physical custody be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure A.A.s continuing contact with both Greti and Alexander. The order set forth a specific physical time sharing plan contingent upon Greti and Alexander residing at least 25 miles apart. The court ordered that [a]ll exchanges of custody shall take place at the McDonalds restaurant in Gorman, CA, the residence of the relinquishing custodial parent, the school, or any other location of mutual agreement. Among many other things, the order addressed A.A.s extracurricular enrichment activities and stated:

The Parties acknowledge that the child will be involved in a broad range of extracurricular enrichment activities of which children are normally a part. Prior to participation in an organized extracurricular activity, the Parties shall confer, agree as to the details concerning participation, and provide their consent. Neither parent shall unreasonably withhold consent for the child to participate in these activities, provided that the activities do not unreasonably interfere with a substantial portion of a parents time with the child. Each parent is permitted to attend these activities, whether or not it is during the parents normally scheduled parenting time with the child.

On or about December 1, 2006, the Ventura Superior Court granted Alexanders motion and filed an order directing minor to participate in counseling with a mutually agreed upon licensed therapist or registered intern.

On June 27, 2008, the Kern County Superior Court filed findings an order after hearing to grant Gretis request to take A.A. on a trip to Romania from August 4 until August 17, 2008. The court noted that its Family Law Division was holding A.A.s expired passport and granted permission to Greti to obtain the expired passport and renew it for purposes of the trip to Romania. The court further directed Greti to return A.A.s renewed passport to the Family Law Division within 10 days after their return from the trip to Romania.

On June 30, 2008, Alexander filed an order to show cause requesting modification of the child custody and visitation orders that had been filed on April 20, 2004 and July 13, 2005, and setting forth a proposed parenting plan. Alexander applied for joint legal and physical custody of A.A., expanded visitation, and visitation exchanges at the recorded residences of A.A.s parents rather than a neutral site in Gorman, California, among many other things. On July 21, 2008, Alexander filed a declaration requesting the court to approve the parenting plan and requests set forth in his June 30, 2008, order to show cause.

On July 23, 2008, Greti filed a responsive declaration to Alexanders order to show cause. Greti proposed her own visitation schedule and requested that the court appoint counsel for A.A. to review our respective requests for visitation and give his or her input with regard to the respective visitation schedules we have proposed. Greti specifically requested that visitation exchanges should continue to take place at the McDonalds in Gorman where there are video cameras and other security in place. On August 6, 2008, Alexander filed a reply to Gretis response. On August 15, 2008, Alexander filed a request for sanctions against Greti and her counsel.

On September 10, 2008, the court conducted a hearing on the recommendations of minors counsel, Dawn Bittleston. On January 22, 2009, the court filed formal findings and order after hearing. Among other things, the court ordered that Alexander and Greti share joint legal and physical custody of A.A. with Greti providing the minors primary residence subject to Alexanders right to reasonable visitation on weekends, school breaks, the weekends of Mothers Day and Fathers Day, and certain recognized holidays. The court directed that [a]ll exchanges in connection with [Alexanders] visitations with Andrew shall take place at the McDonalds restaurant in Gorman, California. As to out-of-state travel, the court ruled that [n]either party shall remove [A.A.] from the State of California without prior written notification to, and the written consent of, the other party, or a court order, except for prearranged and planned travel or vacations. As to schooling and extracurricular enrichment activities, the court stated:

(w) [A.A.s] School. In the event of a disagreement between the parties with regard to what school [A.A.] will attend, [Greti] shall have the right to make the final decision regarding this issue. However, prior to her making any decision about [A.A.s] school, [Greti] shall first consult with and consider the views of [Alexander] regarding this issue.

(x) Extracurricular Enrichment Activities. The parties did acknowledge that [A.A] will be involved in a broad range of extracurricular enrichment activities of which children are normally a part. Prior to participation in an organized extracurricular activity, the parties shall confer, agree as to the details concerning participation, and provide their consent. Neither party shall unreasonably withhold his or her consent for [A.A] to participate in these activities, providing that the activities do not unreasonably interfere with a substantial portion of a parents time with him. Each parent is permitted to attend these activities, whether or not it is during the parents normally scheduled parenting time with [A.A.].

In a separate order filed January 22, 2009, the court addressed the issue of A.As passport, stating:

2. [A.A.s] Passport. At the hearing on this matter on September 10, 2008, [Greti] returned [A.A.s] passport to this court. That passport is currently being held by the financial officer for the Kern County Superior Court, who shall continue to maintain it in a safe place pending further order of this court. If the parties are in agreement, they may, on an ex parte basis, seek a stipulated order from this court releasing the passport to one of them for a specific trip. However, absent a further order by this court, the passport shall be returned to the financial officer of the Kern County Superior Court for safekeeping within 10 days after the party who receives the passport returns from his or her trip. If the parties cannot reach an agreement, either party may seek an appropriate order from this court releasing [A.A.s] passport, by filing an appropriately noticed motion.

On February 27, 2009, Alexander filed a timely notice of appeal from both orders of January 22, 2009.^[2]

DISCUSSION

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANTS REQUESTED MODIFICATIONS OF THE CUSTODY AND PASSPORT ORDERS?

In a lengthy, point-by-point analysis, Alexander asks this court to annul the superior court orders filed on January 22, 2009, to disqualify minors counsel Dawn Bittleston, to change the venue of this case to the Central Civil West Division of the Los Angeles Superior Court, and to direct a new custody modification order based on the evidence on file, considering Appellants proposed orders filed with the moving papers on 06/30/09. He submits Greti and the trial court excluded everything they did not like from our [existing] custodial judgment and order provisions, implanting mothers self serving provisions never rule on or clearly contravening to Honorable John S. Somers 09/10/08 oral announcement.

A self-represented litigant is not to be treated differently from a litigant represented by counsel. Thus, a court is not required to provide extra instruction nor is a court required to perform tasks normally relegated to counsel. (People v. Barnum (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1210, 1221.) To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and to facts in the record supporting the claim of error. When a point is asserted without argument and authority for the proposition, it is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion by the reviewing court. Thus, conclusory claims of error will fail. In addition, appellants brief must state each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point. This is not a mere technical requirement. Rather, it is designed to lighten the labors of appellate tribunals by requiring litigants to systematically present their cases. In that way, those having the duty to ascertain the applicable rule of law may be apprised of the exact question under consideration as they read the heading. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)

Nevertheless, it is the primary function of the courts to see that justice is done among litigants. (Estate of Noonan (1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 831, 838.) California appellate courts are especially mindful of the strong public policy in favor of hearing appeals on the merits. (Californians for Population Stabilization v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 273, 284, disapproved on another point in Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 175-178.) Alexander specifically challenges (1) the procedures employed in the preparation of the January 22, 2009, orders under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312; (2) the timing of the service of the orders; (3) the superior courts statements regarding minor in counseling therapy; (4) missed visitations between November 16 and December 12, 2008; (5) a purported violation of Rule 6.2 of the Kern Superior Court Family Law Rules; (6) changes in the April 20, 2004, and July 13, 2005, judgments regarding jurisdiction of the Kern Superior Court, residency of the minor, and joint legal and physical custody subject to mutual agreement of the parents; (7) sleeping arrangements for A.A. while visiting Alexanders home; (8) visitation exchanges in Gorman, California; (9) the trial courts failure to admit evidence refuting accusations of child abuse by father; (10) the trial courts failure to impose sanctions for Gretis alleged violation of rules of court; (11) alleged ineffective assistance of minors court-appointed counsel, Dawn Bittleston, Esquire; (12) imposition of fees for court-appointed minors counsel after the court granted Alexander a fee waiver; and (13) the trial courts retention of A.A.s renewed passport.

We briefly address each of the contentions.

A.     Preparation and Service of the January 22, 2009, Orders

Alexander contends the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 governing preparation of proposed orders, thereby excluding him from the process for preparing orders after hearing and shortening his time to file a motion for reconsideration.

With certain exceptions, California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 provides that the party prevailing on any motion must, within five days of the ruling, mail or deliver a proposed order to the other party for approval as conforming to the courts order. Within five days after the mailing or delivery, the other party must notify the prevailing party as to whether or not the proposed order is so approved and must state any reasons for disapproval. Failure to notify the prevailing party within the time required is deemed an approval. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a).) Upon expiration of the five-day period provided for approval, the prevailing party must promptly transmit the proposed order to the court together with a summary of any responses of the other parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(b).) If the prevailing party fails to prepare and submit a proposed order, any other party may do so. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(c).)

Judgments and orders are presumed correct on appeal and the appellant bears the burden of overcoming that presumption by affirmatively demonstrating reversible error. The appellant must provide an adequate record to demonstrate that error. (Forrest v. Department of Corporations (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 183, 194.) All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support the judgment on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. Under California law, the party challenging a matter must provide an adequate record to assess error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141.)

The record in the instant case contains no documentation between the date of the September 10, 2008, hearing and the filing of the January 22, 2009, orders. Absent an adequate record to assess alleged error arising from the preparation and service of the proposed and final orders, the orders filed January 22, 2009, must be presumed correct on appeal.

B.    The Superior Courts Statements Regarding Minor in Counseling Therapy

The trial court stated at the September 10, 2008, hearing:

Finally, as far as the issue hasnt been specifically stated in minors counsel recommendation as for physician therapy treatments, Im going to order the parents to consult on that matter and try to work together in resolving the decision. I really think that the decision as to specific individuals as to conducting therapy is falling to the issue that quite frankly is primarily a control struggle. That needs to end. That needs to be made in the best interest of the child, whether or not that will happen is beyond the perview [sic] of the Court. Its up to the parties to cooperate as to the appropriate matter and follow those. I know they have the best interest of the child at heart. I will urge for them to keep that in mind as they act in that manner and to try to reduce the conflict between them. Because whether it is in Court or out of Court, ongoing conflict and ongoing friction between the parents is something that impacts the minor. If anybody thinks the child is unaware of what is going on, they are fooling themselves.

After the court spoke, Gretis counsel suggested that in the event, they cannot agree on the therapist, both of them should submit their names to minors counsel and the child will go to a therapist selected by minors counsel. The court then broached this possibility to A.A.s parents, but Alexander objected and promised he would find a therapist for A.A. The court then declined to adopt the suggestion of Gretis counsel, stating: If thats the case, I will not make that order. However, Im not going order that either parent has a right to make a decision over the objection of the others. You can come back to court and decide if thats what it comes to. The formal findings and order filed January 22, 2009, made no specific reference to therapy or counseling for minor.

When, as here, a ruling appears to have been made in favor of an appellant, the appellant may not challenge such ruling on appeal. (Marich v. MGM/UA Telecommunications, Inc. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 415, 431.) No further discussion of this point is required.

C.    Safety of Child and Visitations^[3]

Family Code section 3020 states in relevant part:

(b) The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to assure that children have frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage, or ended their relationship, and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy, except where the contact would not be in the best interest of the child, as provided in Section 3011.

Alexander contends the custodial schedule designed by minors attorney, Dawn Bittleston, and adopted by the trial court meant that:

[S]ince 11/16/08, until 12/12/08, our son was not allowed to see his father at all, could not be tutored like I used to do, could not attend his Saturday Karate training, his Sunday Church service, his piano lessons, could not see his Valley friends, missed two purple belt karate testing, and missed the LA Ski Dazzle and LA Car Show which he attended with father since he was five years old.

Following the 2008 Thanksgiving uninterrupted month with mother, instead of alternating, the 01/22/09 order requested 12/14/08 to 12/26/08, again with mother.

The trial court stated at the September 10, 2008 hearing:

I think the minor child is getting to the point where both to reduce the amount of conflict that takes place with regard to transfers and visitation scheduling and also to promote the ability to have longer blocks of time with each parent because he is getting older and can engage in long term activities, it is appropriate to modify the visitation schedule in the manner suggested by minors counsel.

The formal findings and order provided that Alexander would have the right to have A.A. with him during the second, fourth, and (when applicable) fifth weekends of each month, beginning Friday at 7:00 p.m. and concluding on Sunday at 5:00 p.m. The findings and order further provided that Greti would have the right to have A.A. with her during Thanksgiving and Christmas vacations in all even numbered years and that Alexander would have that same right in odd numbered years. Alexander suggests this approach is insufficient to preserve the father-son bond.

Appellate review of a custody decision by a trial court employs an abuse of discretion standard. The issue is whether the family law court could reasonably have concluded the order advanced the best interests of the child or children. (In re Marriage of Heath (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 444, 448.) In the instant case, minors counsel made her recommendations to expand the amount of time with the minor child and the father while reducing the frequency of minors travel each month. She explained, I think the parties and the child will find that to be better -- less travel and they get to spend more time with one parent at a time.

The trial court expressly stated his decision was based upon what I think is in the best interest of the child. The court specifically ruled that minor child is getting to the point where both to reduce the amount of conflict that takes place with regard to transfers and visitation scheduling and also to promote the ability to have longer blocks of time with each parent because he is getting older and can engage in long term activities, it is appropriate to modify the visitation schedule in the manner as suggested by minors counsel.

The trial court reasonably concluded that the recommended visitation schedule advanced the best interests of A.A. and no abuse of discretion occurred.

D.    Purported Violation of Kern County Family Law Rules

Without citing to case authority or to the record on appeal, Alexander contends he is entitled to an order in his favor based solely upon his pleadings.

Rule 6.2 of the Kern County Superior Court Family Law Rules states in relevant part:

Failure of a party or parties to comply with these rules may result in one or more of the following on the request by the other party or on the courts own motion: [] . . . [] (d) An order based solely upon the pleadings properly before the court.

Alexander summarily contends the January 22, 2009, orders contain rulings that abuse judicial discretion, are not supported by the evidence, are detrimental to A.A., violate many standards, maliciously exclude critical provisions from prior the custodial judgment and order, and contain a a collection of mother[s] self-serving provisions. He implies his pleadings are properly before the court and that custody and visitation rulings should be based on those pleadings.

When a contention is not supported by argument, discussion, analysis, or citation to the record, the issue must be deemed waived. (EnPalm, LLC v. Teitler (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 770, 775.) Alexanders summary contention comes within this rule and must be deemed waived on appeal.

E.     Changes to the April 20, 2004, and July 13, 2005, Judgments

Alexander contends the trial courts orders of January 22, 2009, adversely changed provisions in the April 20, 2004, and July 13, 2005, judgments relating to the jurisdiction of the superior court, mutual agreement of A.A.s parents, equal custody rights of the parents, and the provision of a separate bedroom for A.A. in Alexanders home.^[4]

In framing this argument, Alexander asserts he filed a motion for modification of the courts orders on June 30, 2009. Such motion occurred subsequently to the trial courts orders of January 22, 2009, and the notice of appeal filed February 27, 2009. To the extent Alexander is relying on the content of such motion, we cannot find a copy of it in the record on appeal. Alexander challenges specific provisions of the January 22, 2009, custody and visitation order, maintaining the formal order included provisions that were not addressed at the September 10, 2008, hearing and further maintaining that the trial court signed the January 22, 2009, order without allowing Alexander to see it.

Once again, the appellant must provide an adequate record to demonstrate that error. (Forrest v. Department of Corporations, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 194.) All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support the judgment on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. Under California law, the party challenging a matter must provide an adequate record to assess error. (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1140-1141.)

The record in the instant case contains no documentation between the date of the September 10, 2008, hearing and the filing of the January 22, 2009, orders. Absent an adequate record to assess alleged error arising from the preparation of the proposed and final orders, the orders filed January 22, 2009, must be presumed correct on appeal.

F.     Visitation Exchanges in Gorman

The order of July 13, 2005, stated in relevant part:

Location of Exchanges: All exchanges of custody shall take place at the McDonalds restaurant in Gorman, CA, the residence of the relinquishing custodial parent, the school, or any other location of mutual agreement.

At the September 10, 2008, hearing, Alexander objected to exchanges of custody in Gorman for the following reasons:

Its 4,000 feet elevation. Really its a freeway stop. That is not much of a McDonalds. They dont even have a playground. And just taking the child out of one car and moving him through the parking lot, bringing inside the McDonalds, taking him back to the other car, and he has to wait if one of the parents gets there earlier than the seven oclock or five oclock. He has to wait if the other parent is late. [] I already said that it is much more fluent [sic] if he goes all the way to the residence of the other parent. Theres absolutely no justifiable reason in not bringing [A.A.] to the other parent or picking him up from the residence.

The court stated at that same hearing:

 .I sympathize with Mr. Petersens objections -- I will order that the exchanges will continue to be curb side exchanges at the McDonalds in Gorman. It is the fairest exchange point. It is a midpoint granted. There isnt a perfect midpoint between the locations where the parties live. That is the most appropriate midpoint certainly while the elevation is a big concern. 4,000 foot elevation is not that damaging. It is the recommendation of minors counsel. And I would note finally, that minimizes the childs transit time in the car. And I think that is important as well particularly when you are dealing with a child who is still relatively young.

The formal order of January 22, 2009, provided that: All exchanges in connection with Respondents visitations with [A.A.] shall take place at the McDonalds restaurant in Gorman, California. The standard of appellate review of custody and visitation orders is the deferential abuse of discretion test. (Gudelj v. Gudelj (1953) 41 Cal.2d 202, 208.) The precise measure is whether the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the order in question advanced the best interest of the child. We are required to uphold the ruling if it is correct on any basis, regardless of whether such basis was actually invoked. (Davey v. Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329.)

No abuse of discretion appears in connection with the order regarding visitation exchanges. After extensive discussion in the superior court, the trial judge reasonably concluded that Gorman was the fairest exchange point. While it was not a perfect midpoint between Greti and Alexanders residences, it was an appropriate exchange point and minimized A.As travel time in the car. We may reasonably conclude the courts order was in the best interest of the minor child under all of the circumstances and reversal is not required.

G.   Allegations of Child Abuse Against Alexander

Alexander contends the trial court committed reversible error by precluding him from calling Child Protective Services Officer Jason Montez to refute earlier allegations of child abuse against Alexander.

The trial court stated at the September 10, 2008, hearing:

First of all, Im accepting the conclusion itself is true. That it was unfounded. Theres no evidence of any child neglect or abuse on your part -- number one, Ive already accepted his conclusion. That being the case. Theres very little point in calling him to testify to the detail of the investigation he conducted.

The court emphasized it was accepting Montezs conclusion that no child abuse/neglect occurred and was not considering the unfounded allegations in making orders at the September 10, 2008, hearing.

A party is not aggrieved by a judgment or order rendered in his favor. (Jones & Matson v. Hall (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1611.) Alexanders challenge to the trial courts evidentiary ruling regarding the testimony of Officer Montez must be rejected.

H.    Failure to Impose Sanctions

Alexander summarily contends the trial court should have imposed monetary sanctions against Greti for her alleged violations of the rules of court.

Alexander specifically states:

With all Appellants 7/23/08 objections and Appeal Respondents nine page moving papers at their 07/28/08 Reconsideration Motion Judge Somers recorded the morning trailing for the afternoon session, but did not allow the recording anything of his 4:37 P.M. ruling, as stated in reporter Cary Blue-Stewarts Affidavit, and no reference was entered in the court Minute[s] .

Alexanders challenge to the trial courts denial of sanctions is unpersuasive. One cannot simply assert the trial court erred and then leave it up to the appellate court to figure out why. An appellate court need not furnish argument or search the record to ascertain whether there is support for appellants contentions. (Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368.) Alexanders contention is rejected.^[5]

I.       Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Minors Counsel

Alexander contends minors counsel, Dawn Bittleston, was ineffective by recommending Gorman as the continuing visitation exchange point, by failing to recommend minor in counseling therapy for A.A., by failing to interview A.A. at his school rather than her office, by failing to actively participate in the representation of A.A., and by failing to notify Alexander she would be three hours late for the September 10, 2008, hearing.

As to the last point, the reporters transcript of September 10, 2008, indicates the hearing commenced at 8:30 a.m. and the clerks transcript indicates it commenced at 11:37 a.m. Whether recitals in the clerks minutes should prevail against contrary statements in the reporters transcript, must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. (People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599.) References to a 40-minute hearing and a lunch recess in the reporters transcript suggest that the clerks transcript bore the accurate starting time. Even so, appellant fails to explain how the late-morning start of the proceedings worked to his detriment. Kern County Superior Court Family Law Rule 6.3.5, as cited by Alexander, does provide a telephone call-in protocol for counsel to notify the court of unforeseen late court appearances. Nothing in the instant record suggests that attorney Bittleston failed to avail herself of such protocol. An appealed judgment or order is presumed to be correct and all intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)

Alexanders remaining challenges to Bittlestons conduct as minors counsel are intertwined with his opposition to Gorman as the visitation exchange point, to his repeated denials of child abuse/neglect (denials fully accepted by the trial court), and the selection of Bittlestons office, rather than A.A.s school, as the site for her interview with the minor. Where an appellant asserts a point but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785.) Here, appellant summarily insists that Bittleston failed to fulfill her responsibilities as counsel for A.A. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.242(j), (k)) but does not offer adequate argument and authority upon which we can make a determination. This contention must be deemed waived.

J.      Compensation of Minors Counsel

On July 23, 2008, the court appointed Dawn Bittleston as counsel for A.A., noted there was a $600 initial retainer fee, and split that equally between the parties to be paid $300 a piece. On appeal, Alexander contends the court failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 5.241 by determining the respective parties ability to pay, considering Alexanders June 30, 2008, fee waiver in making a determination of ability to pay, and requiring Greti to file a current income and expense declaration (Judicial Council Form FL-150) or simplified financial statement (Judicial Council Form FL-155).

The register of actions included in the clerks transcript on appeal does reflect an order on Alexanders application for waiver of fees. However, the record does not include a copy of the actual application and order. Therefore, we cannot ascertain the nature and scope of the waiver granted by the court. Moreover, we cannot determine from the record on appeal whether or not Greti had a current income and expense declaration or financial statement on file with the court. An appellant has an affirmative obligation to provide an adequate record so that the reviewing court can assess error. (Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259.) Alexander has failed to do so as to this contention and he has forfeited this argument on appeal.

K.    The Superior Courts Retention of A.A.s Passport

In the second order filed January 22, 2009, the court ruled:

At the hearing on this matter on September 10, 2008, Petitioner [Greti] returned [A.A.s] passport to this court. That passport is currently being held by the financial officer for the Kern County Superior Court, who shall continue to maintain it in a safe place pending further order of this court. If the parties are in agreement, they may, on an ex parte basis, seek a stipulated order from this court releasing the passport to one of them for a specific trip. However, absent a further order by this court, the passport shall be returned to the financial officer of the Kern County Superior Court for safekeeping within 10 days after the party who receives the passport returns from his or her trip. If the parties cannot reach an agreement, either party may seek an appropriate order from this court releasing [A.A.s] passport, by filing an appropriately noticed motion.

In the conclusion of his opening brief on appeal, Alexander requests the annulment of the child passport order as it brings nothing new other than eliminating the critical provisions of Judge Somers 6/27/08 passport order of retaining the case jurisdiction in the United States and prior orders full force and effect preservationclause.

At the September 10, 2008, hearing, the court explained its reasoning for the order:

Ill order that the passport be continued to be held on an in depth basis as long as any proceedings are held in this matter to the purpose it may be needed. It will require a court order either party may request a court order. But a court order will be required to release the passport for any necessary travel and is being held in this case because of security concerns of both parties that the minor may be taken out of the country and kept away from the other parent in violation of any custody orders. So Ill order the passport held for that reason.

Generally, where a trial court has discretionary power to decide an issue, an appellate court is not authorized to substitute its judgment of the proper decision for that of the trial judge. The trial courts exercise of discretion will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse, resulting in injury sufficiently grave as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice. (In re Marriage of Rosevear (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 673, 682.) The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court. (Brawley v. J.C. Interiors, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1137-1138.) The burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse of discretion. Unless a clear case of abuse is shown and unless there has been a miscarriage of justice, a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion and thereby divest the trial court of its discretionary power. (Denham v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 566.)

In the instant case, the trial court acted reasonably and in the best interests of the child by requiring A.A.s passport to be held by the chief financial officer of the superior court pending future travel plans of the parents. The passport order imposed a relatively minimal administrative burden on the parents and, at the same time, safeguarded A.A.s rights under the custody order. No abuse of discretion occurred.

DISPOSITION

The findings and orders of January 22, 2009, are affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent.

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Poochigian, J.

WE CONCUR:

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Vartabedian, Acting P.J.

_____________________

Gomes, J.

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^[1]Curiously, the record on appeal never specifies the date of the marriage. Greti maintains Mr. Petersen and I were married only a short time, and [A.A.] is our only child. In a declaration signed November 6, 2007, Greti stated: Mr. Petersen and I were only married for just under three years.

^[2]An appeal may be taken from an order made appealable by the provisions of the Family Code. (Code Civ. Proc.,  904.1, subd. (a)(10)). The Family Code does not contain an express provision governing appeals of child custody orders, except for those enforcing an order for the return of a child under the Hague Convention (Fam. Code,  3454). Thus the right to appeal a child custody determination is generally limited to final judgments and--as here--an order made after final judgment. (Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1377.)

^[3]Alexander raises this point at least twice in his opening brief on appeal, once under the authority of Family Code section 3020, subdivision (a) and again under the authority of Family Code section 3020, subdivision (b). We will address this contention but once.

^[4]As to accommodations at Alexanders home, the court observed at the September 10, 2008, hearing: I will reiterate the previous order that the minor is to have his own bedroom at the fathers residence. I believe from what youve said thats been dealt with and taken care of. That is good. I will respect that. I will reiterate the previous order.

^[5]We do note that the trial court denied Alexanders request for sanctions because he made the request in a responsive pleading or orally rather than by a noticed written motion.