Renick v. Southwest Baptist Conference
Filed 5/11/06 Renick v. Southwest Baptist Conference CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
STEPHANIE RENICK, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SOUTHWEST BAPTIST CONFERENCE, Defendant and Respondent. | D046968 (Super. Ct. No. GIC835354) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, William R. Nevitt, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephanie Renick appeals a judgment in favor of Southwest Baptist Conference (Southwest) in her wrongful termination action against it. Renick contends that the trial court (1) erred in relying on this court's decision in American Computer Corp. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 664 (American Computer) as a basis for granting summary judgment in Southwest's favor and (2) abused its discretion in not considering the additional relevant authority she proffered at oral argument on the motion or in not continuing the hearing on the motion to permit consideration of the additional authorities and further briefing, if necessary. We reject Renick's arguments and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2002, Southwest, a nonprofit religious organization, hired Renick as its business manager. In August 2003, Renick reported to Southwest's board of trustees that the organization's executive minister, Bruce Sumner, had engaged in financial misdealings that could jeopardize the organization's tax-exempt status, including (1) his use of an organization credit card to pay for certain personal expenses, (2) his family members' use of organization cell phones, and (3) salary increases and increases in his business expense fund without board approval. The board conducted an informal fact-finding meeting regarding the alleged improprieties and, shortly thereafter, Southwest terminated Renick from her position.
Renick filed this action against Southwest, ultimately asserting claims for tortious termination in violation of public policy, breach of implied contract not to terminate without good cause and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Southwest moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication of Renick's causes of action, arguing that Renick was an at-will employee and that, in accordance with American Computer, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d 664, as a matter of law her termination did not violate public policy. Renick opposed the motion on the grounds that (1) Southwest did not submit any evidence refuting that Sumner committed financial improprieties, (2) her termination violated public policy because she was a whistleblower on a matter related to Southwest's tax exempt status, which affected all taxpayers, and (3) in any event, her termination violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The court issued a tentative ruling granting Southwest's motion and at the oral argument on the motion, Renick's counsel alluded to a number of authorities that were not cited in Renick's points and authorities. Counsel did not provide any explanation for why the cases had not been previously cited and the court declined to consider them.
The court thereafter issued a written order granting Southwest's motion; it concluded Renick's termination arose out of a private matter rather than an issue " that it inure[d] to the benefit of the public" and thus did not support a claim for termination in violation of public policy. It also held that because the evidence established that Renick was an at-will employee, she could not assert claims for breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Thereafter, it entered judgment in Southwest's favor. Renick appeals the judgment as to her cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
DISCUSSION
1. Failure to Consider Additional Authorities or to Continue the Hearing
As a preliminary matter, Renick argues that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider the additional authorities she attempted to rely on at oral argument or in failing to continue the hearing to permit a consideration of those authorities, upon additional briefing, if necessary. However, Renick provided no explanation in response to the court's inquiry as to why these authorities, all of which well predated the filing of her points and authorities in the trial court, were not cited in her papers. Notably, her appellate briefs do not direct us to any authority supporting a conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to consider the newly-cited materials or in not granting her a continuance even though she never specifically requested one. Under the circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion. Further, Renick has not suffered any prejudice from the trial court's refusal to consider her additional authorities because, after considering all of the authorities cited in her appellate brief, we find no merit in her arguments, as described hereafter.
2. Termination in Violation of Public Policy
California law permits a cause of action in at-will termination cases when the termination takes place under conditions violating public policy. (Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 172.) Thus, while an employer has broad authority to discharge its at-will employees, it may not do so for an unlawful reason, nor does it have the right to terminate such an employee in violation of fundamental public policy. (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1094, overruled on other grounds by Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 80, fn. 6.) To qualify as a public policy, " the policy in question must involve a matter that affects society at large rather than a purely personal or proprietary interest of the plaintiff or the employer . . . [and it] must be 'fundamental,' 'substantial' and 'well established' at the time of the discharge." (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1090, quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 669-670 (Foley).)
In Foley, the California Supreme Court held that an employer's termination of its employee for reporting to it that his immediate supervisor was being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation for embezzlement in a prior job did not violate a basic public policy. It stated:
" Whether or not there is a statutory duty requiring an employee to report information relevant to his employer's interest, we do not find a substantial public policy prohibiting an employer from discharging the employee for performing that duty. Past decisions recognizing a tort action for discharge in violation of public policy seek to protect the public, by protecting the employee who refuses to commit a crime [citations], who reports criminal activity to proper authorities [citations], or who discloses other illegal, unethical, or unsafe practices [citation]. . . . No equivalent public interest bars the discharge of the present plaintiff. When the duty of an employee to disclose information to his employer serves only the private interest of the employer, the rationale underlying the [wrongful termination in violation of public policy] cause of action is not implicated." (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 670-671, italics added, fns. omitted.)
In American Computer, the plaintiff was fired from his position as the defendant's director for marketing and sales after he questioned the validity of certain consulting fees paid to his predecessor. (American Computer, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 666.) Relying on Foley, this court concluded that the plaintiff's conduct served the interests of the employer rather than any public interest and thus the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (American Computer, supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at pp. 667-669.)
Renick argues that American Computer is distinguishable from this case because her reporting of Sumner's conduct (with its implications for Southwest's tax exempt status) served the broad public policy of protecting taxpayers and the public funds. She relies on Collier v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1117 (Collier) and Holmes v. General Dynamics Corp. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1418 (Holmes) in support of her argument.
In Collier, the plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his job as the regional manager for a record manufacturer after reporting to the company that certain of its vice presidents had been diverting large quantities of its products for their own personal benefit. He alleged that the officers' illegal conduct included bribery, kickbacks, tax evasion, antitrust violations and money laundering. The appellate court reversed a judgment in favor of the employer after the trial court sustained the employer's demurrer without leave to amend as to the plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The court concluded that the plaintiff's conduct served " not only the interests of his employer, but also the public interest in deterring crime and . . . the interests of innocent persons who stood to suffer specific harm from the suspected illegal conduct," specifically, the recording artists whose records were being distributed without the collection of royalties, the state and federal taxing authorities and the competing retailers who purchased the same recordings for sale to the public. (Collier, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 1123.)
In Holmes, this court held that the employer's termination of an employee in retaliation for reporting to his supervisors that the company's electronics division was violating the company's contracts with the government by submitting improper and excessive bills in violation of the federal False Statements Act (18 U.S.C. § 1001). There, we had no difficulty concluding that the reported illegal conduct implicated the public interest in controlling fraudulent claims against the government. (Holmes, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1426, fn. 7, 1432; see also Green v. Ralee Engineering Co., supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 85 [aircraft component manufacturer's termination of its quality control inspector for reporting to his supervisors that defective aircraft components were being shipped to the company's military and civilian commercial airline customers held to support a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy].)
Collier and Holmes do not provide support for Renick's argument that her conduct promoted a fundamental policy that affected the public at large. Each of those cases involved a direct injury to the public as a result of the reported misconduct, above and beyond the pecuniary interest of the particular employer involved (in Collier, the taxing authorities and recording artists and in Holmes, the government and air traffic safety). By contrast, the only direct injury from the alleged misconduct that Renick reported affected Southwest's own financial circumstances, resulting from the payment of items that were personal expenses attributable to Sumner. Although Renick's expert opined that Sumner's actions also had the " potential" to jeopardize Southwest's tax exempt status, this circumstance again raised a primary issue of private concern to Southwest alone (i.e., the loss of the organization's tax exemption and the resulting need for it to pay taxes on its income), rather than a matter that affected the broader interests of the public at large. (See Milton v. IIT Research Institute (4th Cir.1998) 138 F.3d 519, 521.)
Renick appears to contend that conduct having any effect on the public, regardless of how indirect or how insubstantial, implicates public policy. However, the California Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected such a proposition. (E.g., Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 668; Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1094.) The trial court correctly concluded that Sumner's alleged misconduct was primarily a matter of private concern and thus Renick's termination for reporting such conduct to Southwest was not a violation of public policy.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The respondent is to recover its costs of appeal.
McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P.J.
AARON, J.
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