In re Favian R

Filed 5/10/06 In re Favian R. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

Daniel S. Lopez, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Favian R. (the minor) appeals from an order continuing wardship entered after the juvenile court found he committed the offense of misdemeanor battery by throwing a rock and hitting the victim in the neck (Pen. Code, § 242). The court set the maximum period of confinement at four years, six months, placed him in a six-month camp community placement program, and ordered him continued on probation subject to various terms and conditions. The minor contends that three of these conditions are unconstitutional. We affirm the order as modified.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At the time of disposition, the minor was currently on probation and subject to various terms and conditions, including those he now contests on appeal. The court ordered the existing terms and conditions to remain in full force and effect and imposed additional probation terms and conditions in this case. The conditions Favian R. is challenging are: that he is not to associate with anyone disapproved of by his parents or the probation officer (condition 15); that he is not to remain in the presence of any unlawfully armed person (condition 16); and that he is not to remain in a place where narcotics users congregate (condition 21). The minor failed to object to these conditions at any time in juvenile court.

The minor now contends these conditions are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and urges us either to strike the conditions or to modify them to include a knowledge requirement. The People argue the minor forfeited his challenge to these conditions by failing to object in the juvenile court and, in any event, the requirement of knowledge is implicit in the conditions as imposed.

Without reaching the issue of waiver or forfeiture, we agree, reasonably read, each of the conditions necessarily includes the requirement of knowledge. In other words, it is implied the minor must be aware of: the disapproval of his parents or probation officer of the prospective association (condition 15); the person(s) with whom he intends to associate are armed (condition 16); and the person(s) at a particular place are narcotics users (condition 21). We note that knowledge is particularly implied in condition 21, read in context with condition 22, which states: â€