P. v. Dominguez
Filed 4/28/06 P. v. Dominguez CA1/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RENALDO DAVID DOMINGUEZ, Defendant and Respondent. | A109592 (Napa County Super. Ct. No. CR38485) |
The People appeal from dismissal of an information charging Renaldo David Dominguez with continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14 years. Dominguez moved to dismiss the information because he was not brought to trial within the time required by the speedy trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. We reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A complaint filed in June 1999 charged defendant Renaldo Dominguez with continuous sexual abuse of a child. He was released from custody before the preliminary hearing, and remained free on bail at all times. In July 1999, defendant executed a written waiver of his right to trial within 60 days of the filing of the information. The waiver was not withdrawn until December 30, 2004. Following a preliminary hearing, an information was filed on the same charge in September 1999. Defendant was arraigned the following day and entered a not guilty plea, and trial was set for November 29, 1999.
On October 8, 1999, the parties stipulated to continue the November 1999 trial date. It turned out to be the first of many continuances that span from October 8, 1999, until December 30, 2004, when the case was set for trial on February 28, 2005. Many of the continuances were requested to permit further discovery and investigation, particularly relating to an out-of-state prosecution witness. Other continuances were due to the defense's pursuit of certain administrative records. Only once was the case continued by the court, and only once does defendant claim he objected. In every other instance, the defense either requested, stipulated, or agreed not to oppose postponing a trial date. At various times during the more than five years the case was pending, the defense confirmed that its waiver of time remained effective.
On June 5, 2003, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that his right to speedy trial under the federal and state Constitutions was violated.[1] The court denied the motion to dismiss, and found the â€