WFS FINANCIAL v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY
Filed 6/15/06
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COPY
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
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WFS FINANCIAL, INC., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY, Respondent; JOSE F. DE LA CRUZ, Real Party in Interest. |
C051414
(Super. Ct. No. CV024031)
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ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Carter P. Holly, Judge. Petition granted.
Morrison & Foerster, Michael J. Agoglia, Jay Thomson for Petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.
Kemnitzer, Anderson, Barron & Ogilvie, Carol McLean Brewer, Andrew J. Ogilvie; Herum Crabtree Brown, James Belford Brown for real party in interest.
Petitioner, WFS Financial, Inc., a California corporation, (WFS) is an operating subsidiary of Western Financial Bank, a federal savings association, both of which operate under the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA).[1] (12 U.S.C. § 1461 et seq.) Real party in interest Jose De La Cruz (De La Cruz) is a purchaser of a motor vehicle, whose automobile loan was assigned to WFS by the automobile dealer. When De La Cruz defaulted on his loan, WFS repossessed the vehicle, gave notice of its intent to dispose of the vehicle by private sale, sold the vehicle, and filed suit against De La Cruz for the deficiency between the sale price and remaining balance due, including various costs and fees. De La Cruz answered the complaint alleging he was not liable for any deficiency as the notice of intent to dispose of the motor vehicle sent by WFS did not contain all the disclosures required by the Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act (Rees-Levering). (Civ. Code, § 2981 et seq.) De La Cruz also filed a class action cross-complaint against WFS alleging WFS's practice of collecting deficiency claims and judgments obtained as the result of giving defective notices was an unfair business practice within the meaning of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL). (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq; Code Civ. Proc, § 382.) WFS demurred to the cross-complaint, asserting the particular notice requirements imposed by Rees-Levering (Civ. Code, § 2983.2) do not apply to WFS because it operates exclusively under federal regulations, which preempt Civil Code section 2983.2. The trial court overruled the demurrer.
WFS seeks a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer of WFS to the cross-complaint of De La Cruz and to issue a new order sustaining the demurrer on the grounds of federal preemption. Agreeing with WFS's preemption claim, we shall issue the requested writ.
DISCUSSION
I.
Standard of Review
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