Filed 7/22/10
IN THE SUPREME
COURT OF CALIFORNIA
MOISES
GALINDO, )
)
Petitioner, )
) S170550
v. )
) Ct.App.
2/8 B208923
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS )
ANGELES
COUNTY, ) Los Angeles
County
) Super. Ct.
No. BA337159
Respondent; )
)
CITY
OF LOS ANGELES POLICE )
DEPARTMENT
et al., )
)
Real Parties in
Interest. )
__________________________________ )
STORY CONTINUE
FROM PART I….
After the
magistrate concluded that petitioner's purpose in bringing the Pitchess
at the preliminary hearing, that this objective could be realized only by
postponing the preliminary hearing, and that the possibility of discovering
evidence favorable to the defense did not justify delaying the preliminary
hearing, the magistrate denied petitioner's
the magistrate's discretion. The ruling
does not preclude petitioner from bringing a renewed
returns to the magistrate, for the purpose of obtaining evidence for use at
trial.
Although we agree with the District
Attorney, and with the Court of Appeal, that the magistrate did not err in
denying the Pitchess
District Attorney that the amendment of Penal Code section 866 by Proposition
115 has impliedly repealed what was,
until its passage, an informal practice of granting
permitting the fruits of such discovery to be used at the preliminary
hearing. Although one statute may
impliedly repeal another statute if the two statutes are entirely
irreconcilable and incapable of operating concurrently (Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control
Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 408, 419), no statute
has ever authorized Pitchess
hearing, and thus the rules concerning implied repeals are not helpful in this
context.
Disposition
Our previously ordered stay is
vacated, and the Court of Appeal's judgment denying the petition for writ of
mandate is affirmed.
KENNARD,
J.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
MORENO, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J.
Before his scheduled preliminary hearing, petitioner moved
for Pitchess
discovery, that is, discovery of information from the arresting police
officers' personnel files that might be relevant to the officers' respective
credibility. (
Code, §§ 1043-1045.) The magistrate
denied the motion without prejudice to its renewal before trial, explaining
that, before he would grant the motion, â€
| Description | Charged by felony complaint with threatening and resisting an arresting officer in the performance of his duties (Pen. Code, §§ 422, 69), petitioner Moises Galindo brought a Pitchess motion (see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531; Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1045) for disclosure of prior citizen complaints made against the arresting officer and four other officers involved in the incident. Pitchess motions are so named after this court's 1974 decision in Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, which afforded criminal defendants a judicially created right to discovery of prior citizen complaints alleging misconduct by California peace officers. In 1978, the Legislature codified the right and set forth which officer records are subject to Pitchess discovery. (Pen. Code, §§ 832.7, 832.8; Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1045.) As relevant here, these statutes permit a criminal defendant to †|
| Rating |
