P. v. Jones

Filed 6/28/06 P. v. Jones CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Charles G. Rogers, Judge. Affirmed.

Vincent Jonathan Jones pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine and driving under the influence (DUI) of drugs with a prior DUI (alcohol) conviction within the previous 10 years. He was sentenced to three years' probation subject to various conditions including 150 days in jail, that he abstain from using alcohol, take Antabuse (causes nausea, vomiting, headache etc. if alcohol is used) if directed by his probation officer, submit to any blood alcohol testing requested, and not be present in any place where alcohol is the chief product sold unless it is in the course of his employment. Jones contends that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the alcohol-related probation conditions. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

On June 19, 2005, Jones was stopped by the San Diego Harbor Police after failing to stop his car at a red light and almost colliding with a police cruiser. Jones, who did not have his driver's license with him and was not the registered owner of the vehicle, consented to a search of the vehicle. Several knives, burglary tools, 1.32 grams of methamphetamine, one MDMA tablet, 14 Hydromorphone pills, 15 tablets of Lamotrizine, and 14 tablets of Escitalaprone Oxalate were found in the car. Jones explained that the pills (other than the MDMA) were prescribed to him for depression several months earlier, but that he had stopped taking the pills because the methamphetamine "worked better." Jones was given a field sobriety test and, after displaying signs of intoxication, told police that he had snorted methamphetamine earlier that day. He stated that he did not believe his judgment or reactions were impaired by his drug use, that he had failed the field sobriety test because of an existing eye injury, and that he failed to stop because he was concerned about how the car would react if he pressed hard on the brakes. Jones, who has a previous DUI conviction involving alcohol, was charged with four felonies and five misdemeanors. He pleaded guilty to felony possession of methamphetamine and misdemeanor DUI with a prior DUI conviction within the last 10 years and the other counts were dropped.

DISCUSSION

Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (a) provides that a sentencing court may suspend the imposition or execution of a sentence and grant probation "upon those terms and conditions as it shall determine." The court has broad discretion in determining whether a defendant is given probation and under what conditions. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.) This court reviews such decisions under an abuse of discretion standard, which the sentencing court violates only if the decision is "arbitrary or capricious" or "exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered." (Id. at p. 1121.) Jones bears the burden of "clearly show[ing] that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary." (People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 63.) Jones cannot meet this burden here.

A condition of probation imposed by a sentencing court will not be held invalid unless it "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . ." (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, quoting People v. Dominguez (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 623. 627.) All of these criteria must be satisfied for a probation condition to be considered invalid. Here, there is a relationship to the crimes for which Jones pleaded guilty and the alcohol-related probation conditions. Further, the conditions relating to alcohol are also reasonably related to future criminality; as such, the probation conditions are valid.

This court rejected an almost identical claim as Jones makes in People v. Beal (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 84. In Beal the defendant pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine for sale and was granted probation subject to similar alcohol-related conditions. (Id. at p. 86.) This court stated "empirical evidence shows that there is a nexus between drug use and alcohol consumption. It is well documented that the use of alcohol lessens self-control and thus may create a situation where the user has reduced ability to stay away from drugs." (Id. at p. 87.) We went on to hold "that substance abuse is reasonably related to the underlying crime and that alcohol use may lead to future criminality where the defendant has a history of substance abuse and is convicted of a drug-related offense." (Ibid.) Given the facts and holding of Beal, and considering his personal history of both alcohol and drug abuse, we reject Jones's contention that the alcohol-related conditions of his parole are unreasonable, or even imprudent.

Here there are stronger reasons for prohibiting Jones's use of alcohol than were present in Beal. Jones has a prior conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, establishing that the use of alcohol has been a major element in his past criminal behavior. The fact that this is his second conviction for driving under the influence is adequate evidence to support a reasonable concern that drugs or alcohol are likely to be part of any future criminality. Jones admitted to using methamphetamine prior to driving, but insisted that it did not impair his judgment. This is evidence that Jones has difficulty discerning when he is impaired and to what degree; couple this with his "poly-chemical dependency" and it is indisputable that prohibiting him from using alcohol is justified and sensible. For all these reasons the alcohol related probation conditions are justified as they are both related to the underlying offense and a potential element of future criminality.

Jones relies heavily on the reasoning of People v. Kiddoo (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 922, 927, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237, in that it held alcohol and drug use were not reasonably related. We reject this notion and strongly affirm the rational behind the holding in Beal where "we disagree[d] with the fundamental assumptions in Kiddoo that alcohol and drug abuse are not reasonably related and that alcohol use is unrelated to future criminality where the defendant has a history of substance abuse." (People v. Beal, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 87.) It should also be noted that if Jones considered the alcohol related conditions of his parole more onerous than the sentence the court would otherwise have imposed he was free to refuse probation and suffer the sentence. (Ibid.)

Jones nonetheless contends that the probation condition requiring him to avoid places where the chief item sold is alcohol is invalid because it restricts his freedom of association and "probation conditions that restrict constitutional rights must be carefully tailored and 'reasonably related to the compelling state interest' in reforming and rehabilitating the defendant." (People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698, 703-704.) This argument is without merit in that the limits on his ability to associate is carefully tailored only to places where alcohol is the chief item being sold and inapplicable to places where he is working. Under this condition Jones may be present in the myriad locations where alcohol sales occur incidental to other activities, while he is only barred from locations dedicated chiefly to the sale of alcohol (i.e., bars, liquor stores). Thus, this condition is narrowly tailored and meets the test set forth in Jungers.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

McINTYRE, J.

WE CONCUR:

NARES, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

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