Hawks v. U.S. Traffic Corp.
Filed 6/28/06 Hawks v. U.S. Traffic Corp. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
| DAVID HAWKS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. U.S. TRAFFIC CORPORATION MYERS POWER PRODUCTS, INC., et al., Defendants and Respondents. | B177485 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC297643) |
APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Robert Hess, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Mancini & Associates, Marcus A. Mancini and Adam Reisner; Benedon & Serlin, Gerald M. Serlin and Douglas G. Benedon for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Greenberg Traurig, Diana P. Scott, Michelle Lee Flores, and Tiffany S. Mitchell for Defendants and Respondents.
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Plaintiff David Hawks appeals from the summary judgment entered for his former employers, U.S. Traffic Corporation and Myers Power Products, Inc., in his action for termination in violation of public policy. As set forth below, we reverse with directions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In July 2002, David Hawks was hired by lighting manufacturer U.S. Traffic Corporation as a product designer.[1] Hawks was fired one month later, ostensibly because of excessive tardiness. Hawks claimed he was fired in retaliation for reporting to his managers certain concerns he had about the safety of a lamp he had been working on. He sued respondent on three theories: (1) under the whistleblower statute (Lab. Code, § 1102.5), which prohibits firing employees who report their employer's violation of state or federal laws to the government; (2) under Labor Code section 970, which prohibits inducing someone to move in order to take a job by false pretenses about the nature or conditions of the work; and (3) a cause of action under Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 (Tameny), for terminating him in violation of public policy.
Respondent brought a summary judgment motion. The trial court granted the motion as to the first cause of action because it was undisputed that Hawks had never complained to a government agency. It was granted as to the second cause of action because it was undisputed that Hawks had never moved to take his job at U.S. Traffic. Respondent contended that the Tameny cause of action, as pleaded, was based solely on violations of the public policies contained in Labor Code sections 970 and 1102.5, and necessarily failed along with the first two causes of action. The trial court agreed. On appeal, Hawks does not challenge the ruling as to his first two causes of action, but contends the trial court erred as to his Tameny claim. Specifically, Hawks contends that in opposition to the summary judgment motion, he properly identified the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1770)[2] as the statutory basis for his Tameny claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is granted when a moving party establishes the right to the entry of judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we must assume the role of the trial court and redetermine the merits of the motion. In doing so, we must strictly scrutinize the moving party's papers. The declarations of the party opposing summary judgment, however, are liberally construed to determine the existence of triable issues of fact. All doubts as to whether any material, triable issues of fact exist are to be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. While the appellate court must review a summary judgment motion by the same standards as the trial court, it must independently determine as a matter of law the construction and effect of the facts presented. (Barber v. Marina Sailing, Inc. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 558, 562.)
A defendant moving for summary judgment meets its burden of showing that there is no merit to a cause of action if that party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (o)(2), (p)(2).) If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of fact exists as to that cause of action or defense. In doing so, the plaintiff cannot rely on the mere allegations or denial of her pleadings, â€
