Callahan & Blaine v. Tackaberry
Filed 6/30/06 Callahan & Blaine v. Tackaberry CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
CALLAHAN & BLAINE, APLC, et al., Petitioners and Appellants, v. CHARLENE TACKABERRY, Defendant and Respondent. | G036340 & G036488 (Super. Ct. No. 05CC01135) O P I N I O N |
Appeal from orders and a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Michael Brenner, Judge. Affirmed.
Callahan & Blaine and Jim P. Mahacek for Petitioners and Appellants.
Dabney B. Finch for Defendant and Respondent.
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Appellants Callahan & Blaine, Daniel J. Callahan, and David K. Ng challenge the trial court's orders denying their petition to compel a de novo arbitration hearing and confirming an arbitration award issued under the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act (MFAA), Business and Professions Code section 6200 et seq.,[1] and entry of judgment in favor of respondent Charlene Tackaberry. Appellants contend the MFAA award is void for lack of jurisdiction because the MFAA arbitration panel improperly awarded Tackaberry legal malpractice damages. Appellants further contend its predispute arbitration agreement with Tackaberry is fully enforceable, and requires any trial de novo[2] to proceed as a private arbitration. Finally, appellants contend the trial court erred when it determined they failed to timely request trial de novo, confirmed the MFAA award, and entered judgment thereon.
We conclude the MFAA award did not include malpractice damages, but provided Tackaberry only a refund of legal fees the panel concluded appellants had not earned. Although the retainer agreement's arbitration clause is otherwise enforceable, it is ineffective to compel arbitration of a de novo trial following an MFAA fee award. Finally, we conclude appellants' petition to compel arbitration did not commence an â€