GERALD v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE
Filed 6/9/06; pub. order 7/5/06 (see end of opn.)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
GERALD ANTHONY RHABURN, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. | E038503 (Super.Ct.No. RIF115325) The County of Riverside OPINION |
NOEL BAEZ, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. | E038620 (Super.Ct.No. RIF112459) The County of Riverside |
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petitions for writs of mandate. Robert J. McIntyre, Judge in Case No. E038503 and W. Charles Morgan, Judge in Case No. E038620. Petitions granted in part, denied in part.
Jeffrey Van Wagenen for petitioner Gerald Anthony Rhaburn. Gary Windom, Public Defender and Richard V. Myers, Deputy Public Defender, for Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Grover Trask, District Attorney, and Elise J. Farrell, Deputy District Attorney, for Real Parties in Interest.
In these cases we are asked to determine whether a public defender whose office has previously represented a witness for the prosecution is subject to automatic (or virtually automatic) disqualification for conflict of interest. Although we cannot establish a bright-line rule, we do hold that disqualification is not mandatory whenever the situation arises; further, that disqualification in one of the two cases before us was clearly improper.
The facts of the two cases are similar, although not identical.
Petitioner Rhaburn was arrested on October 8, 2003. After the usual proceedings and several continuances, a trial date of May 16, 2005, was set. The case continued to trail into July, and on July 7, the prosecutor filed a trial brief that included a request that the public defender's office be disqualified because that office had represented witness Cary Barnett, Sr. in a criminal proceeding in 1996. Although the brief was not very illuminating, at the hearing held that date the prosecutor explained that Cary had originally been charged with a crime of moral turpitude--to wit, misdemeanor spousal abuse under Penal Code section 273.5[1]--but had eventually been convicted only of disturbing the peace. (§ 415.) The prosecutor correctly pointed out that the conviction, as a misdemeanor, could not be used to impeach Cary, Sr. (Cf. Evid. Code, § 788, on impeachment by felony convictions.) However, he reasoned that the underlying conduct could be used for impeachment if it involved â€