Sharma v. Pardue
Filed 7/6/06 Sharma v. Pardue CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
| LILAVATI SHARMA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. A. MICHAEL PARDUE, Defendant and Respondent. | B178955 (Consolidated w/B179689 and B180236) (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BD373416) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Aviva K. Bobb, Judge. Affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
Marguerite M. Buckley for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Marjorie G. Fuller, Marjorie G. Fuller; Nachshin & Weston and Joseph Langlois for Defendant and Respondent.
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The marriage between appellant Lilavati Sharma and respondent A. Michael Pardue ended with a judgment of dissolution and spousal support on August 27, 2003. Sharma's first motion to set aside the judgment was denied on February 23, 2004. We affirmed the order denying the motion to set aside the judgment in a nonpublished opinion filed October 24, 2005.[1] Sharma now appeals from postjudgment orders of the trial court. We affirm the orders in case Nos. B179689 and 178955 and dismiss the appeal in case No. B180236.[2]
DISCUSSION
I
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF SHARMA'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE AND VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF DISSOLUTION UNDER FAMILY CODE SECTION 2100 AND IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS OF $4,000 (B179689)
Sharma argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to set aside and vacate the judgment of dissolution pursuant to Family Code section 2100 et. seq (section 2100), and by imposing sanctions. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate under section 2100, because the motion was based upon the same grounds rejected by the trial court when Sharma made an earlier motion to vacate and set aside the stipulated judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473 (section 473). This court affirmed the trial court's earlier order denying Sharma's motion to vacate and set aside the judgment pursuant to section 473. We therefore hold that relief on appeal is precluded under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and law of the case. We also hold the $4,000 sanction was justified based upon Sharma's bad faith in pursuing arguments previously rejected by the trial court.
Sharma's motion to vacate and set aside the judgment pursuant to section 2100 was denied by the trial court on November 17, 2004. The arguments in support of the motion were that Sharma's prior counsel had been negligent, Sharma entered into the settlement based upon a mistaken belief as to the law and facts, and Pardue did not file accurate and complete disclosure forms. In addition to denying the section 2100 motion, the trial court imposed sanctions against Sharma in the amount of $4,000 pursuant to Family Code section 271.
Sharma's motion to vacate and set aside the judgment pursuant to section 473 was denied by the trial court on February 23, 2004. The section 473 motion was based on the alleged negligence of Sharma's attorney, Sharma's mistaken understanding of the authority of the trial court to retain jurisdiction over spousal support, and Pardue's alleged filing of an inaccurate or incomplete disclosure statement.[3]
The trial court correctly ruled that Sharma's motion to set aside the judgment under section 2100 relied upon the same arguments considered and rejected by the court in February 2004, and that relitigating the motion was improper.
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