P. v. Anderson

Filed 7/11/06 P. v. Anderson CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Janet I. Kintner, Judge. Affirmed.

Eric Anderson appeals from a judgment convicting him of vehicular manslaughter. The sole issue he raises on appeal is that he was deprived of a fair trial because several jurors may have seen him in shackles as he was transported to and from the courtroom. We reject his argument and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 26, 2002, Anderson passed another vehicle on a highway while driving about 80 miles per hour into the oncoming traffic lane without full visibility.^[1] He then drove 60 to 65 miles per hour through a red light at an intersection, causing a multi-vehicle collision. As a result of the collision, one person was injured and another died. A jury convicted Anderson of vehicular manslaughter with a great bodily injury enhancement. Observation of Shackles

During the second day of trial, defense counsel informed the court that Anderson was concerned because he believed two jurors (numbers one and two) may have seen him in chains as he was being transported by the bailiff at lunchtime and at the end of the proceedings the previous day. The trial court offered to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 1.04, which advises the jury to completely disregard any physical restraints that may be placed on the defendant. Defense counsel instead asked that the bailiff wait to remove the defendant from the courtroom until the jurors had left. The court responded that it did not "know how much pressure is on the bailiff to get him back down there," but noted that it "[had not] seen him ever leave right away." The bailiff stated that every effort was made to avoid seeing the jury, and that the "back way" was used for this purpose. However, the bailiff explained that given the layout of the courthouse's hallway, it was at times "almost impossible" to avoid jurors, and he could not guarantee there would be no view of the defendant. The court agreed with the bailiff's assessment regarding the layout of the courthouse, and instructed the bailiff to continue to make efforts to avoid a view by jurors. The court noted that it could not think of any occasion when the defendant left "right away as soon as the jurors" and that the "jurors always leave first." The court stated that if jurors "hang[] around somewhere in the hall," it did not know if observation of the defendant could be avoided.

Several days later, a different juror (number seven) submitted a note stating: "F.Y.I. Yesterday at 2:25 coming back from lunch, I went by the elevators near courtroom 50 and saw the bailiff and said 'hi' and then behind him I saw the defendant in shackles, and I think in different clothes. This observation does not change my thinking about this case and has nothing to do with the facts of the case, but decided that should be your decision." When discussing the juror's note, the court stated that "great pains" had been taken to avoid jurors, including always having the defendant leave after the jurors. However, the court recognized that it was impossible to completely avoid jurors since jurors cannot be kept "from walking around the courthouse." At this point, defense counsel accepted the court's offer to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 1.04, and the instruction was given.^[2]

DISCUSSION

Anderson argues that his constitutional right to a fair trial was violated because the court did not take adequate steps to ensure that the jury would not see him in restraints.

"When a defendant is charged with any crime, and particularly if he is accused of a violent crime, his appearance before the jury in shackles is likely to lead the jurors to infer that he is a violent person disposed to commit crimes of the type alleged." (People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 290.) Accordingly, to avoid this potential for prejudice, the courts have fashioned the rule that "a defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury's presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints." (Id. at pp. 290-291, italics added; People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1216.) However, the courts have long recognized that out-of-court shackling during transportation does not invoke a defendant's right to be free of restraints during trial. (See People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 289; People v. Ross (1967) 67 Cal.2d 64, 72, revd. on other grounds Ross v. California (1968) 391 U.S. 470.) Moreover, a brief view of a defendant in shackles inside or outside the courtroom by one or more jurors is generally not considered to be prejudicial error. (People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 287, fn. 2; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 988-989; People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1084-1085; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 674.) A brief view of a shackled defendant does not constitute "protracted viewing of [a defendant] in . . . extensive chains" that might cause prejudice. (People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 989; see People v. Jackson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1830.)

As recognized in the above-cited cases, when evaluating whether shackles might prejudice a juror's assessment of a defendant, there is a marked difference between a brief view of a defendant in shackles during transportation in an open environment to or from a courtroom, and a prolonged view of a defendant shackled in the confined, relatively secure space of a courtroom during trial. The former suggests a routine safety procedure, whereas the latter suggests a higher level of danger associated with the defendant. Anderson does not raise, nor would the law support, a contention that the trial court was required to consider whether there was a manifest need before requiring shackling during transportation to and from the courtroom. Physical restraints during transportation are recognized as necessary for security purposes, and the trial court was under no duty to make further inquiry on this point. (See People v. Ross, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 72.) Further, once the court was alerted that exposure might have occurred, the court responded appropriately by instructing the bailiff to continue to try to minimize visual contact with jurors and by offering to admonish the jury to disregard any observation of restraints. There was no abuse of discretion.

Anderson argues the court should have ensured that he entered and left the courtroom before and after the jurors. Based on the court's explicit statements, the record shows that he did leave the courtroom after the jurors. Further, given the bailiff's statements that every effort was made to avoid meeting jurors, we presume attempts were made to bring him to the courtroom before the jurors' scheduled arrival time. Because the jurors were not sequestered and given the layout of the courthouse, some overlap may have been unavoidable, as apparently occurred here. The fact that some exposure did occur while Anderson was being transported outside the courtroom is the type of juror observation that is readily recognized as nonprejudicial under any standard of review.^[3]

Anderson also delineates several other measures that he asserts should have been used to prevent observation, including using a courtroom with a holding cell that did not require transportation through a public hallway, instructing the jurors to congregate only in areas of the courthouse that were not on his transportation route, or using a nonvisible restraint such as a stun belt to shackle him. Given the nonprejudicial nature of a brief observation of shackles during transportation, Anderson has not presented any persuasive argument supporting the need for such extraordinary measures in his case.

We presume the jurors followed the court's instruction to disregard any observation of shackles. (See People v. Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 351, 375.) The minimal observation of Anderson in restraints while he was en route through the courthouse did not deprive him of a fair trial.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

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^[1] The highway had one lane for each direction of traffic.

^[2] The jury was told: "The fact that physical restraints have been placed on the defendant, if that is the case, must not be considered by you for any purpose. They are not evidence of guilt, and must not be considered by you as any evidence that he is more likely to be guilty than not guilty. You must not speculate as to why these restraints have been used. In determining the issues in this case, disregard this matter entirely."

^[3] Anderson argues that error should be reviewed under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard for federal constitutional error, whereas the People argue that the reasonable probability of a different outcome standard for state law error applies. Although the California Supreme Court has not yet decided the issue, at least one appellate court has concluded the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard applies when a trial court abuses its discretion in shackling a defendant during trial and the jury sees the restraints for a substantial length of time, whereas the reasonable probability standard applies if the jury does not see, or only briefly sees, the shackles. (People v. Jackson, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1827-1830; see People v. Mar, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1225, fn. 7; People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 296, fn. 15.) Under the analysis in Jackson, the reasonable probability standard applies to the circumstances here, involving brief exposure of a properly-shackled defendant. In any event, we would reach the same conclusion under the more stringent federal constitutional error standard.