In re N.G.








Filed 12/19/11 In re N.G. CA2/8







NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.




IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

In re N.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.	B232429 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CK 59646)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. A.G., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Marguerite Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * *
A.G. (father) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights over his daughter, N.G., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.^[1] Father was incarcerated and absent from the section 366.26 hearing.^[2] While it was error for the hearing to proceed without father, we find the error to be harmless. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. Predisposition Proceedings and Disposition
Mother previously filed an appeal from the juvenile court’s orders assuming jurisdiction over N.G. and removing her from mother’s custody. We filed an unpublished opinion affirming those orders in 2009. (In re N.G. (Dec. 21, 2009, B216082).) Because that opinion sets forth much of the factual and procedural history of this case in detail, we quote at length from the opinion as follows:
“In January 2009, respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a petition on [N.G.’s] behalf under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), alleging that mother had an eight-year history of substance abuse including amphetamine, was a current user of methamphetamine and benzodiazepine, and had a positive screen for benzodiazepine at N.G.’s birth. The petition further alleged that father failed to take action and [N.G.’s] older siblings were prior dependents of the juvenile court due to mother’s drug use.
“Mother had an eight-year history of substance abuse. One of [N.G.’s] older siblings was born positive for methamphetamine in 2005, and mother received voluntary services at that time. When mother failed to comply with the plan, the Department initiated dependency proceedings for [N.G.’s] four siblings. The juvenile court denied mother reunification services with those children when mother’s whereabouts became unknown. The Department’s records reflected that mother had no contact with the older children for the duration of their dependency case. The siblings’ case terminated in 2007 with the juvenile court returning the siblings to father’s sole legal and physical custody.
“When N.G. was born in 2009, mother tested positive for benzodiazepine. Mother told the hospital social worker the positive test was due to pain killers she was given during labor and denied any current use of illegal drugs. However, she admitted to using methamphetamine once early in her pregnancy, which at the time she planned to terminate, and once in October 2008, about three months before [N.G.’s] birth. Mother stated she had not completed any drug treatment programs although she was aware of that requirement in the previous dependency proceeding involving her older children.
“Father was present for N.G.’s birth and was willing to care for the child. Although he admitted to a history of methamphetamine use, he stated he had not used drugs in years despite never having completed a drug treatment program. He told the social worker he was given custody of his older children because he had complied with all of the Department’s requirements in the prior case.^[[3]] Father denied knowledge of mother’s current methamphetamine use, saying that she told him she had stopped and he believed her. Father said he had ended his relationship with mother because her drug use caused the older children’s dependency.
“Father had a long criminal history that dated back to a 1994 conviction of misdemeanor burglary. In 1995, he was convicted of misdemeanor vandalism. In 2000, he was arrested for driving under the influence, and a bench warrant was issued for him a year later. In 2005, he was arrested for taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent. In 2006, he was detained for grand theft auto, arrested for theft and convicted of felony burglary. In 2007, he was convicted of taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent, a felony.
“In 2008, father was detained three times for drug use, and he was convicted of misdemeanor drug use and felony possession. The conviction for possession resulted in an order that father attend drug treatment, an order that father violated in June and August 2008. In September 2008, father was arrested again for drug use and was ordered to complete a six-month, inpatient program. Mother was arrested along with father in September 2008. She was later convicted of misdemeanor receipt of stolen property.
“In December 2008, father failed to appear for his arraignment hearing, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest.
“The detention report the Department prepared for the juvenile court in January 2009 indicated [N.G.’s] toxicology screen had in fact been negative. . . . [¶] At the detention hearing, the juvenile court found father to be [N.G.’s] presumed father. During the hearing, father’s counsel informed the court father was residing in a drug treatment program through the criminal courts. Father was willing to leave the program if [N.G.] were placed with him. Alternatively, father stated he would arrange for his aunt, with whom both parents resided, to care for the child. The court found a prima facie case for detention and set the matter for a jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The court ordered [N.G.] released to father, granting him leave to make a plan for [her] to reside with the aunt until father was released from his inpatient program.
“Within a month, the Department requested that [N.G.] be detained from father. Father was planning to reenter an inpatient treatment program and intended to leave the child with mother, his aunt or another relative. The aunt apparently was not available to care for the baby, and the other relative lived too far away to allow visitation. The Department investigated whether it would be appropriate to place the child with mother, but she was living with her stepmother, who refused to submit to a criminal background check. Also, even though she had agreed to do so, mother had failed to enroll in parenting classes and a drug treatment program. [¶] . . . [¶]
“At the time of the jurisdictional and dispositional report, mother was unemployed and demonstrated no change in life style. The Department recommended family reunification services for mother, but it opposed releasing [N.G.] to mother until she could demonstrate an ability to remain sober from drugs and protect her child from drug exposure or drug abuse.
“The social worker also interviewed father, who was not forthcoming. He denied any current drug use and stated he was not tested for drugs when he was arrested. Father’s probation officer advised the worker that father had been on probation since August 2008 for three convictions: burglary, possession of a controlled substance and being under the influence of a controlled substance. He would remain on probation until July 2011. Due to a directive, the probation officer could not disclose to the social worker whether father was following all his probation conditions or whether he had missed or failed any drug tests.
“In February 2009, the Department filed an amended section 300 petition. The amended petition asserted additional claims under subdivisions (b) and (g), alleging father had a criminal history, including convictions for possession of a controlled substance and being under the influence of a controlled substance, and had a bench warrant outstanding. The Department also reported that mother had not enrolled in classes and programs to which the Department had referred her[,] and father had stated he would be checking into an inpatient recovery program. Accordingly, the Department recommended that [N.G.] be detained from her placement with father.
“At a February 2009 pretrial resolution conference hearing, mother’s counsel asked the juvenile court to release [N.G.] to mother, pointing out the child was detained at birth because of mother’s purported positive test for benzodiazepine, which in fact turned out to be negative. Counsel informed the court father would move out of his aunt’s house, so mother could move in and [N.G.] could continue to live in the home under mother’s care. The court noted that mother never completed a substance abuse program; she admittedly used methamphetamine in October 2008 and did not obtain prenatal care until January 2009. The court therefore denied mother’s request, ‘based upon mother’s lack of responsibility and poor judgment with respect to this unborn child.’ The court instead ordered [N.G.] to remain released to father and ordered the Department to allow father to make a plan for [her] prior to his enrollment in a drug treatment program.
“In March 2009, the Department reported to the juvenile court that the parents had failed to drug test[,] and father’s aunt, whom father had named as his preferred caretaker in his absence, and the other adults in her home had not yet submitted to a live scan. Father also had not been able to enroll in his inpatient program, and the Department could not verify whether father had violated his conditions of probation or remained free from illicit drug use. In the meantime, [N.G.] remained with father. Despite many efforts, the social worker was having difficulties in maintaining contact with the child as father had a pattern of making appointments and breaking them.
“At the jurisdiction hearing in April 2009, the dependency investigator testified and confirmed mother tested negative for benzodiazepine at the time of [N.G.’s] birth. She stated that though mother admitted she had a prior history of drug use, mother had minimized the problem. The investigator learned on the date of the hearing that mother was enrolled in a drug program.
“Mother and father requested that the petition be dismissed. The child’s counsel asked the court not to dismiss the petition but to place the family under informal supervision to monitor their progress.
“The juvenile court found true allegations that mother had a history of substance abuse and was a current user of methamphetamine and benzodiazepine. However, the court struck the reference to mother’s positive drug test because ‘mother didn’t have a positive toxicology test.’ The court also found true the allegation that father had a criminal history but struck the remaining counts against father.
“The amended petition as sustained alleged: ‘[M]other . . . has an eight year history of substance abuse including amphetamine and is a current user of methamphetamine, which renders . . . mother incapable of providing regular care for the child. . . . [M]other used methamphetamine . . . during her pregnancy with the child. The child’s siblings . . . were prior dependents of the Juvenile Court due to . . . mother’s substance abuse. . . . [M]other’s substance abuse endangers the child’s physical and emotional health and safety and creates a detrimental home environment, placing the child at risk of physical and emotional harm and damage.’
“As to father, the sustained amended petition alleged he ‘has a recent criminal history of arrests and convictions that includes possession of a controlled substance and . . . under the influence of a controlled substance. On [August 1, 2008], father was placed on probation and to date has failed to comply with conditions to enroll in an in-patient substance abuse program. On [December 3, 2008], a bench warrant was issued for father in the amount of $50,000 for failing to appear for arraignment. Such criminal history endangers the child’s physical and emotional health and safety and places the child at risk of serious physical harm and emotional damage.’
“The juvenile court indicated that had the parents complied with the court’s order to drug test, it would have granted the request for an informal supervision order. However, the court stated it had ordered mother to test ‘forthwith’ in January 2009 and ‘[t]hat hasn’t happened.’ Mother had tested only once. The court also had allowed father to make an ‘appropriate plan’ for the infant before entering his drug treatment program. The Department made repeated requests for the adults living in the home to live scan, but ‘[t]hat hasn’t happened.’ In addition, father was to have tested and failed to do so a number of times. Such failures, the court said, were ‘indications to this court that informal probation or informal supervision [would not] work.’
“The juvenile court found that mother had a drug history and had used in the last six- to nine-month period. Coupled with mother’s denials, that mother’s single test was for alcohol rather than drugs triggered the court’s concern that mother might be trying to prevent a positive test. The court observed that father had failed to test on repeated occasions. He had repeated issues with drugs, including an August 2008 ‘under the influence’ arrest and more than one drug conviction. He was on probation for drugs and had a warrant outstanding. Moreover, father had failed to make an appropriate plan to care for [N.G.] The juvenile court therefore ordered her removed from father, continued the matter for disposition and ordered the parents present for the next hearing without further notice.
“After the adjudication, the Department was unable to locate the parents and the child to place her in protective custody. A few days later, father got in touch with the social worker and explained he had been unaware the Department was trying to locate him. The Department reported that four warrants were issued for father’s arrest in December 2008.
“The juvenile court again made formal detention findings, ordering [N.G.] detained from father’s custody. [She] was removed and placed in a foster home. [¶] . . . [¶] At the disposition hearing in May 2009, mother’s counsel moved for an order placing the minor with mother. She stated that mother was currently drug testing through her substance abuse program. The juvenile court denied mother’s motion. The court found mother had only participated in her program for a month, and [N.G.] was the fifth child to be detained, the original petition being filed in June 2005. The court found the problem had been longstanding, and it had received no results from on-demand testing.
“The juvenile court therefore declared [N.G.] a dependent. The court ordered reunification services for both parents, with such services to include parent education, drug rehabilitation with random testing and individual counseling. Both parents were ordered to comply with the terms of their probation. Mother was also ordered to participate in an after-care program such as NA or AA (Narcotics Anonymous or Alcoholics Anonymous).” (In re N.G., supra, B216082, fns. omitted.)
2. Postdisposition Proceedings and Termination of Parental Rights
At disposition the court ordered the Department to assess placement with paternal grandmother in Mexico. The Department determined that the home of paternal grandmother and grandfather was not appropriate for placement. Paternal grandfather’s CLETS^[4] results disclosed a 2002 charge for lewd and lascivious acts with a child. Additionally, there were substantiated referrals listing paternal grandfather as a perpetrator of sexual abuse. N.G. remained in the same foster home she had been placed in since April 2009.
According to the Department, N.G. was thriving in her foster home and appeared to be bonded to her caregiver. Paternal grandmother reported to the Department that she was continuing to care for N.G.’s four older siblings.
After the disposition, father was convicted in September 2009 of being under the influence of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance. As a result of these offenses, father had been ordered to participate in an inpatient drug treatment program. Father had not been complying with the disposition case plan. He had enrolled in a drug treatment program and attended 12 group meetings, but he failed to show up for 14 of 15 court-ordered drug tests, though he tested negative on the one test for which he showed up. Father had not been responsive to the social worker’s calls and failed to attend scheduled meetings with the social worker. On January 8, 2010, father left the treatment program in which he was enrolled because he realized it was not a court-approved program. Father had not enrolled in parenting and individual counseling.
Mother gave birth to twins in September 2009 and tested positive at that time for methamphetamines and amphetamines, and she admitted to using methamphetamines during her pregnancy. A dependency petition was filed on behalf of the twins on October 5, 2009. Additionally, like father, mother had not been complying with the disposition case plan. She had enrolled in an outpatient drug treatment program, but she missed six of 14 sessions, and she missed two of four relapse prevention groups. She had been discharged from the program on July 1, 2009, for abandonment of the program. She also failed to show for all 11 court-ordered drug tests. Mother had not been responsive to the social worker’s calls either and failed to attend scheduled meetings with the worker. Like father, mother had not enrolled in parenting or individual counseling.
Both parents had monitored weekly visits with N.G. But the Department felt that both parents demonstrated a lack of insight into their family’s problems and their involvement with the Department. They both reported that they feel Department intervention was not required as to N.G. because neither one had done anything wrong. They demonstrated they were unwilling to take responsibility for their actions and their family’s situation.
The Department recommended that family reunifications services be terminated and that the court calendar a section 366.26 hearing for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan. Further, the Department found N.G. to be adoptable. Both her current caregiver and her maternal aunt indicated an interest in adopting her. The maternal aunt was then serving as the caregiver for N.G.’s younger twin siblings. The Department believed it was in N.G.’s best interest to keep her in her foster home, as she had bonded with her caregiver for the last eight months of placement. The Department was also concerned about the maternal aunt’s ability to care for three children, given their young ages and the medical needs of the twins. The Department investigated several other relatives for placement, including a paternal great aunt and two paternal cousins, but it determined that they were unsuitable.
On January 22, 2010, the court held a six-month review hearing and terminated reunification services to the parents, finding that mother had made no progress toward resolving the issues that led to removal of N.G. and that father had made only minimal progress. The same hearing also served as a disposition hearing for N.G.’s twin siblings. The court ordered that they remain detained from mother and father and in suitable placement, and the court did not order reunification services for them.
The court held a hearing on May 21, 2010, to determine the plan for N.G., but continued it for a further report on two relatives who had expressed an interest in taking N.G. During the reporting period, neither parent had been consistent with their visits to N.G. In November 2009, both parents missed one visit because they failed to set their alarm, and also during that month, father failed to show up for a confirmed visit. They did not visit N.G. for the two weeks during the Christmas and New Year’s Eve holidays in 2009. They missed two weeks of visits in January 2010. During March 2010, the parents visited N.G. five times, though there were still many visits for which they did not show. They could have been visiting her three times a week and were not taking advantage of that schedule, and the Department felt this showed a lack of commitment. N.G.’s foster mother reported that she “doesn’t really know her parents,” although father appeared to have a stronger bond than mother because he tended to be more involved with N.G. during visits. N.G. had three visits with her twin siblings, two in December 2009 and one in March 2010.
The Department reported that N.G. continued to be “highly adoptable” and continued to reside in the same foster home she had been in since April 2009. It further reported that the prospective adoptive mother displayed a genuine love and affection for N.G., and she stated, “[N.G.] is family and I couldn’t imagine her living anywhere else.” The Department observed N.G.’s relationship with her caregiver to be strong, positive, and characteristic of a parent-child relationship. It concluded that adoption was in N.G.’s best interest.
The court held another hearing on September 17, 2010, and again continued the matter to await a supplemental report. During this reporting period, not much had changed. N.G. continued to thrive in her foster home. She had one visit with her twin siblings in July 2010, and she visited with her four older siblings once a month. Mother and father continued to demonstrate a lack of insight into their family’s problems and involvement with the Department. The caregivers for both the twin siblings and N.G.’s four older siblings had requested that they be considered for N.G.’s placement because they felt that N.G. should grow up with family. At the September 17 hearing, the court granted a guardianship over N.G.’s four older siblings to their relative caregivers.
The Department’s November 2010 report prepared for the next hearing indicated that father had not visited N.G. in several months. Mother and father had not maintained consistent contact or communication with N.G. or her twin siblings. They rarely called, and according to their caregivers, the caregivers usually initiated or set up visitation. N.G. had not had any visits during the reporting period with her siblings (either the four older ones or the younger twins). The home study for N.G.’s foster mother had been approved, and the foster mother was “anxiously awaiting” termination of parental rights so she could adopt N.G. At this point, N.G. had been with her foster mother for approximately two years. The matter was again continued at the November 2010 hearing.
Father filed a request to modify court orders on November 1, 2010. Father requested that the court release N.G. and all six of her siblings to him and order family maintenance services, or grant him reunification services with liberal, unmonitored visits. He contended that he had enrolled in a substance abuse program, which he would complete on November 8, and was finishing his GED.^[5] But the social worker did not hear from father after he was supposed to have completed his program on November 8, and he failed to provide the Department with updated contact information. The Department recommended denying father’s request and keeping the children in the current placements. Not only had father failed to visit consistently with N.G., he had visited the four older siblings only once a month and rarely called them, and he rarely visited the twin siblings and never called their caregiver to check on them.
The Department provided yet another updated report in February 2011. Father had been arrested on November 15, 2010, and was released in January 2011. Mother had been arrested on January 22, 2011, for possession of methamphetamines. Mother was taken to the hospital where it was determined that she was 18 weeks pregnant. She had a miscarriage. Neither parent had visited N.G. in several months. The Department recommended that parental rights be terminated and N.G. be placed for adoption.
The court denied father’s request to return the children or provide reunification services on February 1, 2011. On February 25, 2011, the court granted a guardianship to the twins’ relative caregivers. The section 366.26 hearing for N.G. was continued to March 1, 2011, to get the parents transported from custody. On March 1, 2011, mother and father were still in custody and not present. The court continued the matter to March 9 and ordered mother to be transported from county jail. Father’s counsel explained that father had been transferred from county jail to state custody, and she requested a continuance to transport him from state custody. The court denied father’s request. The court noted that “there’s a recent case where the court of appeals said that although parents are entitled to be here, their absence didn’t affect the ruling because their being here wouldn’t have changed the TPR based upon the evidence.” The court stated that, in this matter, “the father’s presence in court would not affect the court’s ultimate determination.”
The matter was continued again on March 9 and March 11, 2011, both times because mother had not been transported from local custody. Father remained in state custody and was not present. On March 14, 2011, mother appeared and the court conducted the section 366.26 hearing. Father was still in custody and not present. N.G.’s counsel requested that the court terminate parental rights and argued that her interest in permanency outweighed any speculative benefit of a continued relationship with her parents. Father’s counsel offered a “general objection” to the termination of parental rights. Mother objected to termination of parental rights and argued the “sibling exception” and the “bond exception” to adoption applied. The court terminated parental rights, found N.G. to be adoptable, and found that no exception to adoption applied. It transferred N.G.’s care, custody, and control to the Department for adoptive planning and placement. Father filed a timely notice of appeal on May 2, 2011.
DISCUSSION
Father argues that the juvenile court erred in conducting the section 366.26 hearing in his absence. We agree that father’s presence at the hearing was required, but the error was harmless and does not require reversal of the order terminating his parental rights.
Section 2625 of the Penal Code, subdivision (d), gives parents in custody the right to be present at dependency hearings relating to their children. The section states in pertinent part: “Upon receipt by the court of a statement from the prisoner or his or her attorney indicating the prisoner’s desire to be present during the court’s proceedings, the court shall issue an order for the temporary removal of the prisoner from the institution, and for the prisoner’s production before the court. No proceeding may be held under . . . Section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and no petition to adjudge the child of a prisoner a dependent child of the court pursuant to subdivision (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (i), or (j) of Section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code may be adjudicated without the physical presence of the prisoner or the prisoner’s attorney, unless the court has before it a knowing waiver of the right of physical presence signed by the prisoner . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 2625, subd. (d).)
In In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 623-624 (Jesusa V.), the California Supreme Court held that Penal Code section 2625, subdivision (d), requires the prisoner’s presence at a dependency adjudication hearing when the prisoner indicates his or her desire to be present. The presence of the prisoner’s attorney will not suffice. (Jesusa V., at pp. 623-624.) The Jesusa V. court further held that the right to be present is a statutory mandate, and denial of that right is not a constitutional due process violation. (Ibid.) Moreover, we should apply the harmless error test when this statutory mandate is disobeyed. (Id. at p. 625.)^[6]
Because father indicated through counsel that he wanted to attend the section 366.26 hearing, his presence was required. Father argues the error was prejudicial because he would have presented substantial evidence that the “beneficial relationship exception” to adoption applied. Additionally, he claims he likely would have presented important testimony about family members who could adopt N.G., demonstrating that it was in her best interest to be adopted by family members rather than a stranger. We disagree. As in Jesusa V., the error did not prejudice father because it is not reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable, had he been present. (Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 625.)
At the section 366.26 hearing, a juvenile court must make one of several possible permanent plans for a minor child. The Legislature prefers the permanent plan of adoption. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1416.) Father’s first argument relies on an exception to adoption in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). This subdivision states the court should not terminate parental rights and order adoption placement when it would be detrimental to the child because the “parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (Ibid.) The bar father had to meet to show the beneficial relationship exception applied is a high one. “[W]e interpret the ‘benefit from continuing the [parent/child] relationship’ exception to mean the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) Severing the parental relationship would have to “deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment.” (Ibid.) Even “frequent and loving contact” with children may not be “sufficient to establish the ‘benefit from a continuing relationship’ contemplated by the statute,” if parents have not occupied a parental role in relation to the children at any time during their lives. (In re Beatrice M., supra, at pp. 1418-1419.)
Here, the Department’s reports indicated that father’s visitation record was anything but regular. He visited inconsistently, did not take advantage of all the visitation time allotted to him, failed to show up for scheduled visits, failed to call N.G.’s foster mother regularly to check on her, and for the last several months leading up to the termination hearing, did not visit at all. N.G.’s foster mother felt that she did not “really know her parents.” The record belies father’s claim that he “had a significant relationship” with N.G. N.G. resided with father when she was initially detained from mother in 2009, but within a month, the Department requested that she be detained from father also, and within four months she was placed with her foster mother. Since April 2009, N.G. has been living with her foster mother, where she has had irregular contact with father. All of this information was in the Department’s reports and before the court. Anything father might have said would not have changed his irregular visitation record and his failure to establish a significant and continuing relationship with N.G. Also, his long history of contact with law enforcement and substance abuse issues belie his claim that N.G. would benefit from a continuing relationship with him. Father claimed to be completing a substance abuse program on November 8, 2010. Still, only a few days later he was arrested. Again, anything father might have said about his parenting abilities would not have changed his criminal record and demonstrated inability to overcome his substance abuse issues.
Father’s second argument is that his testimony would have been significant to whether it was in N.G.’s best interest to be placed with her siblings and adopted by the relatives who had her siblings. But father’s record of visiting N.G.’s siblings was even more irregular than his record of visiting N.G. He rarely visited either the four older siblings or the twins, and he never saw N.G. together with her siblings. He could not have provided any significant testimony on whether N.G. would have benefitted from being with her siblings and relatives, as he had no chance to observe them together. Further, N.G. did not seem to have strong bonds with her siblings and their relative caregivers because she rarely visited with them. Contrary to father’s claim, N.G. is not going to be adopted by a “stranger.” N.G. had been with her foster mother for almost two years by the time of the section 366.26 hearing. By all reports, she had a strong bond with her foster mother, and her foster mother thought of and treated N.G. like a natural child. We do not believe father’s testimony could have demonstrated it was in N.G.’s best interest to remove her from her long-term foster home and place her with relatives she barely knew.

disposition

The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.


FLIER, J.
WE CONCUR:


BIGELOW, P. J.


RUBIN, J.

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