Camerina T. v. Super. Ct.

Filed 7/14/06 Camerina T. v. Super. Ct. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE COURT^*

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ review. Stephen J. Kane, Judge.

Camerina T., in pro. per., for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Dennis A. Marshall, County Counsel, and William G. Smith, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party In Interest.

-ooOoo-

Petitioner, in pro. per., seeks an extraordinary writ (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 38-38.1) to vacate the orders of the juvenile court denying her reunification services and setting a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing^[1] as to her two daughters E. and A. We will deny the petition.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

In May 2005, then six-year-old E. and two-month-old A. were removed from the custody of petitioner and A.'s father Victor after A. was admitted to the hospital with two acute fractures of the right forearm. Upon further examination, the attending physician diagnosed additional fractures of the left rib and both legs in various stages of healing and concluded that A. suffered multiple instances of inflicted trauma. Neither petitioner nor Victor could provide a reasonable explanation for the fractures.

The Fresno County Department of Children and Family Services (department) filed a dependency petition on the children's behalf pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (e) (severe physical abuse), alleging as to each parent that they either inflicted the injuries or knowingly allowed the injuries to occur. Petitioner and Victor denied the allegations at a contested jurisdictional hearing. Nevertheless, the juvenile court sustained the allegations and ordered the parents to complete psychological evaluations and bonding studies. At some point during this timeframe, petitioner and Victor separated.

In October 2005, the same clinical psychologist conducted both the bonding studies and the psychological evaluations. The psychologist concluded that petitioner is strongly bonded to her daughters and that she exhibits excellent parenting skills. Further, based on petitioner's psychological evaluation, the psychologist concluded petitioner's prognosis for successful reunification was good because petitioner had no history of child welfare intervention, violent behavior as an adult or drug and alcohol abuse and she demonstrated an ability to change. Further, the psychologist concluded that, based on petitioner's strong bond with the children, it would be detrimental to the children not to offer her reunification services.

In its dispositional report, the department recommended the court deny petitioner and Victor reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(5) (subdivision (b)(5)). The department further recommended the court deny petitioner reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) (subdivision (b)(6)). The department also reported the children were in foster care and doing well and that maternal relatives were being assessed for placement.

Petitioner contested the department's recommended disposition and the matter was tried at a contested hearing on April 25, 2006. The psychologist, testifying on petitioner's behalf, stated that petitioner could successfully complete reunification services, that services would likely prevent reabuse and that it would be detrimental to the children not to provide petitioner reunification services. When asked how much weight she gave to the fact that petitioner either abused A. or allowed her abuse, the psychologist stated that she was less concerned about petitioner's role in A.'s abuse than her own clinical findings that petitioner did not fit the typical profile of an abusive parent. The psychologist went so far as to state that she would not necessarily conclude that returning the children to petitioner's custody would be detrimental to them even if someone observed petitioner grab A.'s arm and break it given the strong weight of the clinical evidence.

The juvenile court, after taking the matter under submission, denied petitioner and Victor reunification services as recommended by the department. In so doing, the court rejected the psychologist's testimony. The court also found there was no evidence petitioner would not reabuse her children and that it would be in the children's best interest to provide petitioner reunification services. This petition ensued.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner argues the juvenile court, in denying her reunification services, failed to consider that she has no history of violence or child welfare intervention and that denying her services would negatively impact her children. She further claims the juvenile court failed to consider her willingness to complete services, her strong bond with her daughters and the psychologist's opinion that she is a good candidate for reunification services and that services are likely to prevent reabuse. The court's failure to consider this evidence, she argues, resulted in error. We disagree.

According to the appellate record, the juvenile court considered all of the above evidence. The court simply weighed more heavily evidence that petitioner caused or allowed A. to suffer multiple severe physical injuries and continued to deny it. Such is the purview of the juvenile court since, as the trier of fact, it is the sole arbiter of issues of fact, weight and credibility. (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329.)

Further, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's denial of services under subdivision (b)(5) which provides:

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