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In re L.B.

In re L.B.
07:25:2006

In re L.B.




Filed 7/24/06 In re L.B. CA3




NOT TO BE PUBLISHED


California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT


(Tehama)


----












In re L.B. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.



C051313



TEHAMA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,


Plaintiff and Respondent,


v.


ANGELA B.,


Defendant and Appellant.




(Super. Ct. Nos. J10083, J10084, J10085)




Angela B., mother of the minors, appeals in propria persona from orders terminating her parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395.)[1] We construe appellant's briefs to challenge the juvenile court's failure to find an exception to the statutory preference for adoption and to seek review of orders occurring prior to the selection and implementation hearing. We affirm.


FACTS


In August 2003 the Tehama County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed petitions to remove the three minors, L.B., age seven, F.C., age five, and S.C., age three, from appellant's custody. The petitions alleged there was ongoing domestic violence witnessed by the minors between appellant and her boyfriend, who is the father of the two younger minors; that the boyfriend sexually molested L.B.; and that appellant knew about the molestation but did not protect L.B. The court detained the minors, sustained the petition, and ordered appellant to participate in family reunification services.


The six-month review report stated that appellant was fully compliant with her service plan and regularly attended visits with the minors. The report raised questions about appellant's ability to benefit from services and parent her children. The court ordered further services.


In the 12-month review report, DSS stated that appellant continued to visit regularly and was continuing to participate in home-based services, although she missed some therapy sessions and only sporadically attended job training. The minors began visiting appellant in her home and on weekends. Although appellant had complied with the plan to a great degree, DSS still had concerns about her ability to parent despite being provided extensive services. The court ordered an additional six months of services.


According to the 18-month review report, the minors were making progress in therapy, although L.B. still felt that appellant could not keep her safe. A psychological evaluation concluded appellant had short and long term memory impairment, deficits in functioning, and an inability to integrate and generalize the information and training she had received. In visits, L.B.'s animosity toward appellant was evident. The overall assessment of DSS was that appellant showed no progress or growth and no ability to change her parenting in the areas that presented the greatest risk to the minors, and recommended termination of services. An addendum noted that appellant tried but was simply unable to parent her children. Psychological testing disclosed appellant had borderline intellectual function and impaired insight and judgment. The court terminated reunification services in June 2005.


The report for the selection and implementation hearing stated the minors were adoptable and the current caretaker, with whom the minors had been placed for over a year, was interested in adopting them. Appellant had visited regularly, but visits were increasingly disruptive and stressful for the minors. L.B.'s therapist reported that the minor was unable to tolerate visits with appellant. A supplemental report stated that F.C. experienced extreme distress after visits, throwing tantrums and telling his therapist that seeing appellant upset him.


At the selection and implementation hearing, appellant testified that she knew how to care for the minors and that visits went well. The court found insufficient evidence to support a finding that section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) applied and terminated parental rights, selecting adoption as the permanent plan.


DISCUSSION


I


Much of appellant's brief is devoted to arguing that since she participated fully in all of the services required by the reunification plan, the minors should have been returned to her care.


This appeal is from orders made at the section 366.26 hearing terminating parental rights. The only issues for the court to decide at that hearing are which permanent plan is most appropriate for the minors and whether, if termination of parental rights and adoption is selected, there is any exception to the preference for adoption. (§ 366.26, subds. (b) and (c).) Return of the minor to the parent is not at issue.


The last hearing in which return was at issue was the 18-month review hearing at which the court terminated services and set the section 366.26 hearing. If appellant wished to review those orders or argue further for return of the minors, she was required to file a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 38. She did not do so, and review of the juvenile court's orders denying return of the minors is foreclosed. (§ 366.26, subd. (l); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 38, 38.1; In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 412-413; see also In re Daniel K. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 661, 667; John F. v. Superior Court (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 400, 404-405.)


II


We construe the remainder of appellant's brief as arguing that the court erred in terminating her parental rights because the minors would benefit from continued contact with her.


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Description Appeal in propria persona from orders terminating parental rights.
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