P. v. Escalera
Filed 7/25/06 P. v. Escalera CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
| THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAMIE MICHAEL ESCALERA, Defendant and Appellant. | B175315 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. SA046654) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Antonio Barreto, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of William J. Kopeny & Associates and William J. Kopeny for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Johnsen, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Jonathan J. Kline, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant, Jamie Michael Escalara, was charged with the premeditated murder of Donald Luciano, and the attempted premeditated murder of Amber Johnson, with allegations of firearm use enhancements on both counts and an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury on Johnson. Appellant also was charged with carrying a concealed firearm as a convicted felon. The jury convicted him of second degree murder of Luciano and attempted voluntary manslaughter of Johnson, as well as the firearm charge, and found true the three enhancements. Appellant received a sentence of 40 years to life for the murder and the firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53. (Undesignated section references are to that code.) A 10-year sentence for the attempted manslaughter and its enhancements was imposed to run concurrently, and the sentence for carrying a firearm was stayed under Penal Code section 654.
Appellant contends that the prosecution deprived him of due process under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 (Brady) and its progeny, by failing to disclose to the defense during trial that the victim-witness Johnson had recently been convicted of misdemeanor infliction of corporal abuse on a cohabitant (§ 273.5), and that there was a warrant outstanding for her arrest, for failure to appear at a probation hearing. We conclude that this information was not â€
