Marriage of Lawson
Filed 8/4/06 Marriage of Lawson CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re the Marriage of JUANA F. and SCOTT L. LAWSON. | |
JUANA F. LAWSON, Respondent, v. SCOTT L. LAWSON, Appellant. | E038587 (Super.Ct.No. IND 082958) OPINION |
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. J. Michael McCoy, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Richard C. Houghton for Appellant.
Warren D. Camp for Respondent.
1. Introduction
After a marriage of 12 years, husband Scott L. Lawson claimed that he was not responsible for spousal support on the ground that his marriage was invalid because of his wife Juana F. Lawson's prior existing marriage. The trial court, however, found that Scott was estopped from challenging the validity of his marriage. On appeal, Scott argues that the trial court erred in finding that Juana's marriage to Gerardo Wade had been annulled properly and that the annulment applied retroactively. Scott also argues that, under the law of Nevada, where the parties were married, the Lawson marriage was void and he was not judicially estopped from challenging the validity of his marriage. Scott alternatively argues that Juana was not entitled to spousal support as a putative spouse.
We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the judgment of nullity of the Wade marriage applied retroactively. Therefore, at the time of the Lawson marriage, Juana was still legally married to her first husband. We nevertheless conclude that the court properly applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel to preclude Scott from claiming that his marriage was invalid based on his prior inconsistent position during an earlier adoption proceeding. Based on this conclusion, we need not address whether Juana qualified as a putative spouse.
We affirm the trial court's orders.
2. Factual and Procedural History
Juana married Gerardo in California in March of 1989. They had one son together. They separated in October of the same year. Juana went to Gary Bishop, whom she believed was an attorney, for help with her divorce. Juana was under the impression that Bishop would be handling her divorce and that the divorce would be final in early 1991. Bishop, who was a paralegal, did not recall any contact with Juana.
Juana met Scott in November of 1991. The two were married in Las Vegas on January 7, 1992. Before they were married, Juana told Scott about her previous marriage but explained that the marriage had been dissolved. Juana and Scott had three children together.
In 2002, Scott filed a petition to adopt Juana's son from the previous marriage.[1] During the adoption proceeding, Juana discovered that her first marriage had not been dissolved. Juana hired Virginia Criste to obtain a judgment of nullity. The judgment of nullity was based on Juana's explanation that she married Gerardo relying on his promise that he would help pay for her education, but he failed to do so. The judgment of nullity was entered on June 18, 2002. In the adoption proceeding, the probation officer noted that the judgment was entered nunc pro tunc to 1991.
In November of 2004, Juana filed a petition for the dissolution of her marriage to Scott and a request for spousal support, child support, and attorney's fees. Scott filed a request for nullity of marriage on the ground of Juana's prior existing marriage. Scott requested that the court bifurcate the issue of the nullity of the marriage and hold an evidentiary hearing on Juana's status as a putative spouse.
The family court initially ordered Scott to pay child support and spousal support. The court, however, vacated the order and returned the matter to the court's calendar. As requested by the court, the parties submitted memorandum on the issues of nullity of marriage and Juana's putative spouse status. Juana argued that the judgment of nullity had the legal effect of canceling the marriage from its inception. Juana alternatively argued that she was a putative spouse because she had an objectively reasonable belief that her prior marriage had been dissolved. Scott argued that Juana's voidable marriage remained valid until it was declared a nullity in 2002. He also argued that the judgment of nullity was based on an inappropriate ground.
After the hearing on these issues, the family court found that the nullity of Juana's marriage to Gerardo reverted back to the date of Juana's marriage to Scott. The court also found that Scott was estopped from challenging the validity of his marriage based on his position during the adoption proceeding. The court denied Scott's request for a separate trial on the issue of the validity of Juana's first marriage. The court then ordered Scott to pay $18,807 per month in spousal support and $20,000 in attorney's fees. The court subsequently granted reconsideration and affirmed its prior orders, but reduced the spousal support amount to $15,375 per month.
3. Wade Marriage
Scott claims the trial court erred in finding that the nullity of the Wade marriage reverted back to the date of the Lawson marriage. Scott specifically questions whether the judgment of nullity was valid and whether it applied retroactively.
We begin our analysis by noting the difference between annulments and divorces. A decree of dissolution terminates a marriage but nonetheless recognizes that the marriage was valid. A decree of nullity, on the other hand, involves a determination that the marriage never was valid because one party's consent was obtained by fraud. (In re Marriage of Goldberg (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 265, 271.) â€