P. v. Williams
Filed 5/17/13 P. v. Williams CA4/1
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
LYMOND WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
D061741
(Super. Ct.
No. SCD237956)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Richard S. Whitney, Judge. Affirmed.
Leonard J.
Klaif, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Christine
Levingston Bergman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury
found Lymond Williams guilty of selling cocaine base and possessing cocaine
base for sale. (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11352, subd.
(a), 11351.5.) Williams later admitted
the truth of allegations regarding a prior drug conviction (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11370.2,
subd. (a)), one prior strike (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i)), and that he had served
six prior prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd (b)). After dismissing the admitted strike in the
furtherance of justice, the court imposed a 12-year sentence.
Williams's
appellate contentions concern the disruptive conduct of his codefendant, Ricky
Brooks, during trial. Williams contends
the court erred by denying his mistrial motions and refusing to instruct the
jury that it could not consider Brooks's disruptive conduct in evaluating
Williams's guilt. We determine there was
no prejudicial error and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In December
2011, San Diego Police Detective Radford Pajita was working as an undercover
officer in the East Village
area of downtown San Diego. Detective Pajita was approached by Brooks,
who was wearing a Santa Claus hat and pushing a shopping cart. Detective Pajita indicated he was looking for
$20 worth of narcotics. Brooks said he
knew where he could obtain the drugs, and Detective Pajita told Brooks he would
give him $5 for facilitating the deal.
After
Brooks and Detective Pajita walked for a few blocks, Williams approached
them. Brooks told Williams they were
looking for "a twenty."
Williams said, " 'Come over here.
I got you, man.' " Detective
Pajita saw Williams walk towards a vehicle and pull a plastic bag out of his pants. Detective Pajita then saw Williams take a
small bindle out of the plastic bag, place the bindle in his mouth, and then
return the plastic bag to his waistline area.
Detective
Pajita then gave Brooks two prerecorded $10 bills. Brooks handed the money to Williams, and
Williams pulled the bindle out of his mouth and gave it to Brooks.
After
Brooks and Detective Pajita walked away, Detective Pajita gave Brooks a
prerecorded $5 bill and Brooks gave Detective Pajita the bindle containing
cocaine base. Detective Pajita gave a
predetermined bust signal to other police officers, and described both
suspects. Police officers received the
description and began following Williams.
They detained and arrested Williams after they saw him drop a bag
containing 13 individually wrapped rocks of cocaine base. Officers found the two prerecorded $10 bills
in Williams's pants pocket.
A joint
trial was held for Williams and Brooks.
Brooks
testified at trial, denying that he took any part in facilitating Detective
Pajita's drug purchase. Brooks said he
did not know Williams and had never seen him before they were both arrested for
the drug sale. Although the prerecorded
$5 was found in his pocket, Brooks said he had found the bill on the
ground.
Williams did
not testify. His counsel argued the
prosecution had not proved its case against Williams. Williams's counsel asserted that the police
officers were biased and challenged the officers' ability to identify Williams
and accurately observe his conduct during and after the drug transaction.
As detailed
below, the court denied Williams's motions for mistrial based on Brooks's
disruptive behavior during trial.
The jury
found both defendants guilty as charged.
DISCUSSION
I. Mistrial
Motions
Williams
contends the trial court erred by denying his mistrial motions based on
disruptive conduct by his codefendant Brooks.
A.
On the
second day of trial, the trial court admonished Brooks outside the presence of
the jury regarding his disruptive behavior during trial. The court indicated this conduct consisted
primarily of making spontaneous comments in front of the jury. The court told Brooks his conduct would not
be tolerated and it was prejudicing his case.
The court said that if Brooks continued the conduct he would be subject
to "severe consequences," including being held in contempt or facing
additional criminal charges.
Williams's
trial counsel said she agreed with the court's comments, and requested a
mistrial and an order severing the cases.
She said that Brooks had made "continual outbursts during the
course of the trial," and this conduct was "reflecting poorly on the
defense . . . team as a whole."
During this discussion, Brooks continued to speak directly to the court
without first discussing these comments with his counsel.
After the
lunch recess, the trial court held a hearing on Brooks's Marsden motion. During the
hearing, the court again spoke at length with Brooks about the need to control
himself during trial. At the end of the
hearing, the court denied Brooks's Marsden
motion.
When the
court was back in session and before bringing in the jury, the court indicated
it would deny Williams's mistrial motion because Williams's rights were not
prejudiced in a manner that would warrant a new trial. Williams's counsel disagreed with the ruling,
noting that Williams and Brooks were charged with being involved in the same
drug transaction and they were sitting near each other during trial. She stated that under those circumstances,
"Mr. Brooks' . . . repeated outbursts, and being repeatedly admonished by
his attorney on the record in front of the jury reflects poorly not only on
him, but I think it reflects poorly on my client as well. [I] think at this point impeding my client's
ability and his right to a fair trial in front of this jury."
The
prosecutor responded that Brooks's improper behavior consisted primarily of
"[g]rumbling under this breath, rolling his eyes, looking up [at] the
ceiling, and doing other gestures with his body," and argued that this
conduct did not rise to the level of misconduct that would substantially
prejudice Williams's rights. The court
agreed and adhered to its ruling, but again strongly admonished Brooks to
refrain from acting in a disruptive and disrespectful manner.
The next
day, while testifying, Brooks became highly agitated when the prosecutor
asserted numerous objections. Brooks
indicated he wanted to tell his story and was frustrated that he was unable to
do so. When the prosecutor would make
objections, Brooks would look annoyed, roll his eyes, sigh loudly, and push
himself away from the microphone.
After
several minutes of this conduct, the court took a break to admonish Brooks,
telling him that "[a]ll you're doing is prejudicing your case and
prejudicing Mr. Williams' case."
The court stated that Brooks was acting disrespectfully to the court,
the jury, his codefendant, counsel and staff.
At that
point, Williams's counsel renewed her "motion for mistrial and
severance." She argued that
Brooks's conduct was "interrupting and impeding and affecting Mr.
Williams' ability to have a fair and impartial jury hear his case and render a
fair and impartial verdict on his behalf that is not being tainted by the codefendant." The court responded: "I'm going to deny the motion for
mistrial, but if it comes up again, I'm going to grant it. I'm not going to tolerate any more outbursts,
and any more problems or misconduct out of [Brooks]."
During the
remainder of the trial, including during Brooks's lengthy cross-examination,
there is no indication that Brooks continued his disruptive behavior.
Williams's
counsel later proposed the following jury instruction: "During the course of the trial, you may
have heard and/or observed Mr. Brooks making comments or gestures. You may not consider Mr. Brooks' conduct in
determining [Williams's] guilt in this case." Brooks's counsel objected, suggesting that a
juror could conclude from the instruction that it was permissible to infer
Brooks's guilt from his disruptive conduct.
The trial court agreed, and declined to give the instruction. The court said the instruction
"isolat[es] one [defendant] against the other," and noted the jury
would be given the standard instruction that it should generally consider only
facts presented as evidence.
The court
later instructed the jury pursuant to the standard instructions,
including: "You must decide what
the facts are in this case. You must use
only the evidence that was presented in this courtroom. Evidence is the sworn testimony of witnesses,
the exhibits admitted into evidence, and anything else I told you to consider
as evidence . . . ."
(See CALCRIM No. 222.) The jury
was also instructed that "[y]ou must disregard anything you saw or heard
when the court was not in session, even if it was done or said by one of the
parties or witnesses."
B
Court Did Not Err in Denying Mistrial Motions
"A
trial court should grant a motion for mistrial 'only when " 'a party's
chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged' " '
[citation], that is, if it is 'apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable
by admonition or instruction' [citation]. 'Whether a particular incident
is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial
court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial
motions.' [Citation.] Accordingly, we review a trial court's ruling
on a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion." (People v.
Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 573; accord, People v. Dement (2011) 53
Cal.4th 1, 39-40.)
The court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Williams's mistrial motions. There is no showing Brooks's conduct
prevented Williams from having a fair trial.
Brooks's disruptive behavior did not concern the issues involved in the
charges (the sale and the possession issues), and thus was not relevant to the
jury's consideration of the evidence as to whether the prosecutor proved its
case against Williams. Brooks's
misconduct involved only his own
inability to control himself and to follow court rules. At most, the jury would favorably compare
Williams with Brooks regarding the ability to act appropriately during the
trial.
In
challenging the court's denial of his mistrial motions, Williams relies
primarily on the court's various references to the potential
"prejudice" to Williams's case from Brooks's conduct. However, the court never stated or suggested
it found that Williams's case was in fact prejudiced. Instead, viewed in context, the court was
attempting to provide strong admonishment to Brooks that his behavior was
unacceptable because it was creating difficulties for everyone in the
courtroom, including the trial judge, the jurors, the prosecutor, both defense
counsel, and codefendant
Williams. Considered in their entirety,
the court's comments do not suggest the court found prejudice to Williams's
case in the sense that he was being denied a fair trial. The court's statements make clear that it
understood the necessary legal grounds for declaring a mistrial, and it found
the circumstances did not satisfy these grounds. The court's decision was amply
supported.
II
Claimed Instructional Error
Williams
alternatively contends the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that it
could not consider Brooks's disruptive conduct in determining Williams's
guilt.
" '
"[A] defendant has a right to an instruction that pinpoints the theory of
the defense. . . ." '
[Citation.] The court, however,
'may properly refuse an instruction
offered by the defendant if it incorrectly states the law, is
[citation], or if it is not supported by substantial evidence [citation].' [Citation.]" (People v. Bivert (2011) 52 Cal.4th
96, 120.)
Williams's
proposed instruction was argumentative because it allowed the jury to draw
inferences favorable to Williams while isolating Brooks. As stated by the trial court, the instruction
would tell the jury not to hold Brooks's conduct against Williams while
permitting the jury to use the conduct against Brooks. It improperly isolated one defendant against
the other.
Moreover,
the court's refusal to give the instruction was not prejudicial. The evidence overwhelmingly pointed to
Williams as the seller. Detective Pajita
testified that he directly observed Williams giving the bindle to Brooks. Another police officer testified he saw
Williams drop the other bindles shortly after the drug transaction. The undisputed evidence also showed the
prerecorded money was found on Williams's person. On this evidentiary record, it is not
reasonably probable that an instruction telling the jury to disregard Brooks's
in-court behavior would have changed the outcome of the trial.
Additionally,
there is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have penalized Williams based
on his codefendant's conduct at trial.
Because the disruptive conduct did not concern the charges against
Williams, the evidence was irrelevant to the case. The jury was instructed that the prosecution
must prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury must consider
only the evidence presented by sworn testimony in deciding the charges and
disregard anything they saw or heard when the court was not in session, even if
committed by one of the parties.
Further,
during closing arguments Williams's counsel reminded the jury that it could not
consider Brooks's conduct in deciding whether the prosecutor proved its case
against Williams, stating:
"[O]bviously this is a codefendant case. We have [Williams] and Mr. Brooks. I want you to also be able to keep in your
mind these are different people, and they're being charged with different
crimes. [The prosecutor] has to prove up
all of the elements separately for both these two people. And, also, I think [Brooks's trial counsel]
characterized Mr. Brooks as animated conduct at some point. And, also, don't let that affect your
decision on [Williams], okay?"
Williams's
counsel was referring to the portion of Brooks's counsel's argument wherein she
noted that Brooks became frustrated and angry when the prosecutor made numerous
objections during his testimony because it prevented him from telling his side
of the story. Brooks's counsel said,
"I'm thinking, I would have come undone a lot sooner than that. He's trying his best to explain what
happened. And every time he said
because, it was an objection. Well,
that's a block as you're trying to express yourself." Counsel also said that there was required
decorum in court, but sometimes frustrations "get the better of us."
Based on
our review of the entire record, we are satisfied Williams had a fair trial,
and an instruction concerning Brooks's in-court conduct would not have changed
the outcome of the trial.
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.
