P. v. Ayala
Filed 6/19/13
P. v. Ayala CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
ANGEL PENA AYALA,
Defendant and
Appellant.
2d Crim. No.
B239548
(Super. Ct. No.
YA077814)
(Los Angeles
County)
Angel Pena Ayala appeals
from the judgment following his conviction for
§ 209.5, subd. (a)),
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kidnapping to commit another crime (§ 209, subd. (b)(1)), five counts of
carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a)), burglary (§ 459), escape by force
(§ 4532, subd. (b)(2)), and dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd.
(b)(1)). He was sentenced to prison for
137 years eight months to life. Ayala
contends the trial court erred by failing to order a second
substantial change in circumstances. We
affirm.
FACTS
Ayala committed a series
of offenses during the months of March and April 2010. In March 2010, Ayala met Dennis Watanabe
through a Craig's List personal advertisement.
On March 27, 2010, Watanabe brought Ayala to Watanabe's apartment. Ayala pulled a gun. After tying Watanabe up, Ayala took various
items of Watanabe's personal property from the apartment.
On March 31, 2010, after
meeting Jimmy Wong through a Craig's List advertisement, Ayala and Wong went to
Wong's apartment. Ayala drew a gun, tied
Wong up, and took various items of Wong's personal property. He then forced Wong into Ayala's car and went
to an ATM where he forced Wong to withdraw cash. Ayala took the cash.
On April 13, 2010, Jose
Limon was in his apartment with a female friend. Ayala was waiting outside. The female friend took out a gun and let
Ayala into the apartment. Ayala tied
Limon up and took various items of Limon's personal property. He also threatened to kill Limon and his
family if Limon reported the crime to the police. Ayala left the apartment and drove away in
Limon's truck. Ayala was arrested and
charged later in April 2010.
COMPETENCY PROCEEDINGS
Trial was set for May
11, 2011. On that date, Ayala made a
motion to be relieved of appointed counsel.
During the hearing on that motion, Ayala made some strange statements
and his counsel expressed a doubt as to his competence. Pursuant to section 1368, the trial court
declared a doubt as to Ayala's sanity and adjourned the proceedings.
The trial court
appointed two mental health experts to examine Ayala and reviewed their written
reports prior to a July 15, 2011, competency hearing. In a May 23, 2010, report, psychiatrist
Kaushal Sharma concluded that Ayala was malingering. He stated that Ayala "is an antisocially
motivated sociopath" whose presentation during an interview "shows
that he is trying to pretend to be mentally incompetent to stand trial"
through bizarre statements. Dr. Sharma
concluded that Ayala "is aware of his present legal predicament and can
rationally cooperate with his attorney as he was able to rationally cooperate
with me." In a May 31, 2011,
report, psychiatrist Kristen Ochoa stated that Ayala met the criteria for a
bipolar type, and concluded that he was not competent to stand trial. She believed that Ayala's delusional beliefs
were genuine.
Because of the
conflicting reports of Doctors Sharma and Ochoa, the trial court appointed a
third psychiatrist, Dr. Sanjay Sahgal, to evaluate Ayala. Dr. Sahgal concluded that Ayala was
malingering. He opined that Ayala met
the criteria for an antisocial personality disorder, had a substance abuse
problem, suicidal behavior and mood instability, but that he was fabricating
other psychotic symptoms.
After the July 15, 2011,
hearing, the trial court found that Ayala had failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating incompetence and, therefore, was competent to stand trial. During the ensuing September 2011 trial,
Ayala told the trial court that he did not want to attend his own trial any
longer, and did not care about the consequences. His counsel expressed concern that Ayala's
mental condition had deteriorated. The
following day, defense counsel stated that, although Ayala had cooperated with
and participated in the cross-examination of one victim the day before, he was
not cooperating with counsel in the examination of another victim a day
later.
The trial court stated
that Ayala was lucid, understood conversations with the court, and followed the
court's direction. In addition, the
court and counsel conferred with psychologist Cynthia Reston-Parham who had
interviewed Ayala that morning. Dr.
Reston-Parham believed Ayala's increased agitation was caused by stopping his
medications, but concluded that he understood and was assisting his counsel. The trial court stated that a change from one
day to the next was consistent with malingering, and found no substantial
evidence of a material change in Ayala's mental health. The court ruled that Ayala remained competent
to stand trial. Trial resumed.
Ayala filed a timely
appeal of the judgment following his conviction on all charged offenses.
DISCUSSION
Ayala contends the trial
court violated his due process rights by not ordering a second mental
competency hearing based on a substantial deterioration of his mental condition
during trial. We disagree.
Due process prohibits
trial of a criminal defendant who is mentally incompetent. (People
v. Ary (2011) 51 Cal.4th 510, 517.)
"A defendant is deemed competent to stand trial only if he
'"has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding"' and '"has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."'" (Ibid.,
quoting in part Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402.)
is presented with evidence that raises a reasonable doubt about a defendant's
mental competence to stand trial, federal due process principles require that
trial proceedings be suspended and a hearing be held to determine the
defendant's competence.
[Citations.] Only upon a determination
that the defendant is mentally competent may the matter proceed to
trial." (Ary, at p. 517.)
1367 through 1369 reflect these constitutional requirements. Section 1368, subdivision (a), requires a
trial court to suspend criminal proceedings at any time prior to judgment if
the court reasonably doubts the mental competence of the defendant. Section 1369
the defendant's mental competence, and allows the defense and prosecution to
present evidence to either support or counter a claim of the defendant's mental
incompetence to stand trial.
mentally competent "unless it is proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant is mentally
incompetent." (§ 1369,
subd. (f).) Accordingly, the defendant
bears the burden of proving mental incompetence. (People
v. Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 518.)
Where, as in the instant case, a competency hearing has previously been
conducted and the defendant found competent to stand trial, a second competency
hearing is not warranted unless there has been a showing of a "substantial
change of circumstances or new evidence casting a serious doubt on the validity
of the prior finding." (
220.) We
a finding regarding a defendant's competence to stand trial under the
substantial evidence test. (See People
v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 31.)
Here, we
conclude that substantial evidence supported the trial court's denial of a
second competency hearing. The first
competency hearing had been conducted approximately two months earlier and the
only indication of a changed circumstance was Ayala's statement that he did not
want to attend his own trial any longer.
The trial court could reasonably conclude that this expression of
defiance was evidence of further malingering and an escalation of his attempts
to delay or avoid trial rather than a deterioration in his mental
condition. The record shows that Ayala
had cooperated with counsel the day before the event which triggered his
counsel's request for a further hearing.
In addition, two of the three mental health professionals who examined
Ayala prior to the first competency hearing concluded that he was feigning
mental illness. Ayala's request during
trial that he be excused from further attendance is consistent with malingering
and not the result of a deterioration in his mental condition.
Evidence of incompetence may come
from the defendant's demeanor and irrational behavior, but more than mere
bizarre actions or statements is required to raise a doubt regarding a defendant's
competence. (People v. Kroeger
(1964) 61 Cal.2d 236, 243–244; People v. Williams (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d
389, 398.) The standard is whether a
defendant is capable of assisting in his or her own defense, not whether a
defendant defiantly refuses to participate for other reasons. (See People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th
826, 847; People v. Murdoch (2011)
194 Cal.App.4th 230, 236-237.)
Ayala's reliance on
based on evidence that he had a severe mental illness and was competent to
stand trial only if he remained on his medication. (People
v. Murdoch, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 238.) Later at trial, the defendant stopped taking
his medication and, representing himself, defended on the theory that his
assault victim was "not a human," and lacked "shoulder
blades." (Id. at p. 233.) The appellate court
concluded that defendant's deteriorating behavior combined with expert opinion
that his competence depended on medication required the trial court to conduct
a second competency hearing. (Id. at p. 238.) In contrast, here there was no evidence that
medication was required for Ayala's competence and substantial evidence that he
was
malingering
both before and after his competency hearing.
Further, Ayala did not display delusional behavior at trial.
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
PERREN,
J.
We
concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
YEGAN, J.
Alan B. Honeycutt, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Rachel Lederman, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney
General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Rene Judkiewicz, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
All statutory
references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
