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J.P. v. Super. Ct.

J.P. v. Super. Ct.
09:13:2013





J




 

 

 

 

 

J.P. v. Super. >Ct.>

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 9/4/13  J.P. v. Super. Ct. CA4/2

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF >CALIFORNIA>

 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION TWO

 

 

 
>






J.P.,

 

            Petitioner,

 

v.

 

THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF SAN BERNARDINO
COUNTY,

 

            Respondent;

 

SAN BERNARDINO
COUNTY CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

 

            Real
Party in Interest.

 


 

 

            E059060

 

            (Super.Ct.No.
J247367)

 

            OPINION

 


 

            ORIGINAL
PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary
writ.
 Christopher Marshall,
Judge.  Dismissed.

            Dennis
Moore for Petitioner.

            No
appearance for Respondent.

            Jean-Rene
Basle, County Counsel and Jamila Bayati, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party
in Interest.

            The
petitioner J.P. is the mother (mother) of A.D., born in April 2009.  Mother challenges the juvenile court’s orders
of  June 26, 2013, finding true the allegation that she caused
the death of A.D.’s 14-month-old brother through abuse or neglect (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (f))href="#_ftn1"
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] and denying her href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">reunification services for the same
reason (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(4)).  As a
matter of judicial economy, we decline
to address the merits of mother’s petition because she does not challenge a
number of allegations that were also found true.  Further, even if we were to resolve this
petition in mother’s favor, it would not realistically provide any tangible
benefit to her with regard to this or future child welfare proceedings.  This is because the appalling nature of the
unchallenged findings that she abused and neglected A.D.’s brother would
prevent any such benefit from accruing to mother, even were we to reverse the
finding that this abuse and neglect caused the toddler’s death.  Therefore we dismiss the writ petition.

>Facts
and Procedure

            Previous
Dependency and First Sibling Death


A.D. was
previously a dependent of the court from 2010 to 2012.  The circumstances of the first dependency are
as follows.  In June 2010, href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">San Bernardino County Children and Family
Services (CFS) received a referral alleging that A.D.’s three-year-old half
brother C.P. was being physically abused and neglected.  Specifically, the referral alleged that
mother’s boyfriend, who fathered A.D. and mother’s two subsequent children, but
not C.P., had smacked C.P. in the chest and caused him to hit his head on a table
and suffer a large gash to his head.  At
that time, one-year-old A.D. and his one-month-old sister were living in the
home and were considered at-risk.  CFS
had trouble locating and interviewing mother and A.D.’s father, apparently
because they moved residences.

CFS made contact
with mother and A.D.’s father in July 2010, after paramedics were called to the
home.  A.D.’s infant sister was found
unconscious and unresponsive in her bed, with blood coming from her nose and
mouth.  She was later pronounced
dead.  The infant had three healing href="http://www.sandiegohealthdirectory.com/">rib fractures.  The parents claimed the infant died from
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome.  The
official cause of death listed in the autopsy report was “undetermined.”  At that point, A.D. and C.P. were removed
from the home and a dependency case ensued, based on C.P.’s head injury.  A.D. was placed with a relative and the
parents received reunification services. 
C.P. was placed with his father and did not return to the home.  A.D.’s father was convicted of abusing C.P.

            In
October 2011, CFS was called by hospital staff when T.P.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] was born to mother testing positive for
marijuana.  T.P. was in respiratory
distress and spent 12 days in the neonatal intensive care unit.  T.P. was eventually sent home with the
parents and an apnea monitor, despite the open dependency case on A.D.  No dependency case was opened for T.P. 

In March 2012,
A.D. was returned home on family maintenance, and his dependency was dismissed
in October 2012.

            Current
Dependency and Second Sibling Death


            On
December 17, 2012, CFS was
notified that paramedics had been called to the home that three-year-old A.D.
and mother shared with A.D.’s father and T.P. 
T.P., who was 14 months old, was found dead on the bathroom floor.  Paramedics noted that by the time they
arrived, T.P. was “ice cold to the touch,” and rigor mortis had set in.  T.P. had bruising around his abdomen, neck
and genitals, and appeared to be extremely malnourished.  It was later determined that T.P. weighed
only 12 pounds.  Paramedics and law enforcement personnel told
the responding social worker that the toddler must have “suffered a great deal
prior to his death.”  The first
responders had difficulty navigating around the house because every room was
filled with clutter and debris, and the home was littered with dog feces and
rotting food.  Three large Pit Bull dogs
lived inside the home, which smelled overpoweringly of urine.  Mother acknowledged that the dogs are
aggressive and would bite.

            On
December 20, 2012, CFS
filed a section 300 petition regarding A.D. 
The detention hearing was held on December 21, 2012. 
The contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing was held over five
days in May and June 2013.  Both parents
testified, as did the doctor who performed the autopsy on T.P. and another
doctor who is an expert in the area of child abuse.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the
juvenile court declared A.D. a dependent child, ordered no reunification
services and no visitation and set a section 366.26 hearing for October 24, 2013.  This writ proceeding followed.  On August
5, 2013, counsel for A.D.’s father filed a “no issues” letter brief
with this court.

>Discussion


            Mother
argues the juvenile court erred when it found true the allegation that she
caused the death of A.D.’s sibling T.P. under section 300, subdivision (f), and
denied her reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4)
because she had caused the death of A.D.’s sibling.  Specifically, mother argues substantial
evidence does not support the conclusion that the injuries to T.P. and the
emaciated state of his body were the cause of his death.

            Real
party in interest CFS argues this court need not address the merits of mother’s
petition because mother does not challenge the other bases for finding
jurisdiction, i.e., the allegations found true under section 300, subdivisions
(a), (b) and (j), respectively serious physical harm, failure to protect and
abuse of sibling.  Neither does mother
challenge the three other bases for denying reunification services under
section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(3), (6) and (12), respectively re-abuse after
having been returned home from a previous dependency, severe sexual abuse or
severe physical abuse, and conviction of a violent felony.

            Mother
urges this court to review the merits of her petition because an adverse
finding that she caused the death of A.D.’s sibling by abuse or neglect could
prejudice her in future child dependency proceedings, both with any future
children mother may have and in case mother chooses to file a motion in the
current case under section 388 to modify the court’s orders for no visitation
and no reunification, based on changed circumstances.  Mother sums up the practical effect of this
court failing to address the merits of mother’s petition as “The Trial Court’s
findings and rulings in this case can always be used to never allow Mother to
parent another child again.”  As
discussed below, this statement is equally true of the abuse of sibling (subd.
(j)) basis for jurisdiction that mother does not challenge, and so any
resolution of this petition in mother’s favor would have no tangible effect on
mother’s legal status.

            The
focus of dependency proceedings is to protect minor children.  (In re
I.A.
(2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1491.) 
To acquire jurisdiction over a child, a juvenile court need only find
that the conduct of either parent has triggered any of the ten subdivisions of
section 300, (a) through (j).  (>Ibid.) 
Because of this, “an appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary
support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has
been found to be supported by the evidence.” 
(Ibid.)  Although mother asks this court to exercise
its discretion to review her substantial evidence claims because it could in
theory have an effect on any subsequent child welfare proceedings for future
children, or on a posited section 388 petition in this proceeding, we decline
to do so.  We arrive at this decision
because we do not see what practical effect even a reversal of the subdivision
(f)—death of sibling—finding would have on mother and A.D.  “An important requirement for justiciability
is the availability of ‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy
that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal
status.”  (Id. at p. 1490.)  As CFS
points out, even if we were to undo the “subdivision (f)” finding that mother
caused the death of A.D.’s younger brother by abuse and/or neglect, mother
would still be left with the “subdivision (j)” finding that:

While in the care and custody of the
child’s mother . . . the child’s younger
brother . . . sustained the following
injuries . . . :

 

a.      
 Severe bruising
around his abdomen, limbs, genital area and neck.

b.     
  Extreme
malnourishment.

c.     
  A distended abdomen.

d.     
  Skeletal upper
and lower extremities.

 

Therefore, this placed the
child . . . at risk of serious physical harm.

 

            In
other words, even if mother could persuade this court that the expert testimony
about the above state of T.P.’s body did not establish a causal link to the
toddler’s death, we just cannot see how success in this petition would have a
“practical, tangible effect” on mother’s legal status.  In any future child welfare proceedings, the
record will still reflect that mother caused or allowed A.D.’s brother to
suffer from these horrific injuries and conditions.  As a practical matter the details of the “j”
finding alone preclude the realistic possibility that child welfare officials
or any juvenile court would ever, in her own words “allow Mother to parent
another child again.”  Resolving this
petition in mother’s favor would not change that, and so as a matter of
judicial economy we decline to address the petition’s merits.

>Disposition


            The
petition is dismissed.

            NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAMIREZ                             

                                                P. J.

 

We concur:

 

McKINSTER                        

                                             J.

 

RICHLI                                  

                                             J.





id=ftn1>

href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" title="">[1]  All section references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

id=ftn2>

href="#_ftnref2"
name="_ftn2" title="">            [2]  CFS identifies this child as “T.D.” in its
responsive brief, but we follow the record and call him “T.P.”








Description The petitioner J.P. is the mother (mother) of A.D., born in April 2009. Mother challenges the juvenile court’s orders of June 26, 2013, finding true the allegation that she caused the death of A.D.’s 14-month-old brother through abuse or neglect (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (f))[1] and denying her reunification services for the same reason (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(4)). As a matter of judicial economy, we decline to address the merits of mother’s petition because she does not challenge a number of allegations that were also found true. Further, even if we were to resolve this petition in mother’s favor, it would not realistically provide any tangible benefit to her with regard to this or future child welfare proceedings. This is because the appalling nature of the unchallenged findings that she abused and neglected A.D.’s brother would prevent any such benefit from accruing to mother, even were we to reverse the finding that this abuse and neglect caused the toddler’s death. Therefore we dismiss the writ petition.
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