P. v. Halgas
Filed 9/4/13 P. v. Halgas CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
HAROLD DAVID HALGAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
D062221
(Super. Ct.
No. SCD226992)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, David M. Szumowski, Judge. Affirmed.
Laurel M.
Nelson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Susan
Miller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Harold
David Halgas appeals a sentencing order after entry of a negotiated guilty
plea. He contends he is entitled to
conduct credits under Penal Code section 4019
for the 10 days he spent in a nonpenal residential substance abuse treatment
program as a court-ordered condition of probation. We conclude that the issuance of conduct
credits for nonpenal residential substance abuse treatment is not statutorily
authorized by section 4019 and, under the circumstances presented here, is not
required by equal protection. Therefore,
we affirm.
FACTS
In June
2010, Halgas pleaded guilty to assault with force likely to cause great bodily
subd. (a)(1).) He was sentenced to three
years in prison, suspended, and ordered to serve 180 days in jail. Halgas was confined in county jail for 90
days and released on probation.
Halgas had
chronic alcohol problems and did not consistently report to his probation
officer. He was jailed for eight days in
September and October 2010 and for six days in December 2010.
At a
revocation hearing held on December
16, 2010, the court required Halgas to waive the 104 days of
section 4019 conduct credits he had accumulated to that date. The court credited the defendant with 104
days of section 2900.5 custody credits and reinstated probation. The December 16 minute order states,
"Defendant waives all past, present and future [Penal Code section] 4019[,
subdivisions] (b)(1)[ and ](c)(1) credits." The report of waiver of future conduct credits was repeated in subsequent probation reports
and minute orders.
Halgas
continued to violate the terms and conditions of his probation. In 2011, he was confined in county jail from
February to May, and again in June and July.
At a revocation hearing held in February 2011, Halgas asked for commitment
to the Serial Inebriate Program (SIP), a residential drug treatment program
funded by the City and County of San
Diego.
the SIP program representative or to the probation department when a bed became
available in that program. Halgas was
released in May 2011, after serving 106 days in jail. He did not enter SIP.
At a
probation revocation hearing held on June 22, Halgas said that he was not
accepted at SIP because of his record.
probation on the condition Halgas complete a residential treatment program of
at least six months duration. Halgas
remained in county jail until July 25,
2011, when he entered the Tradition One residential drug treatment
program (Tradition One). He left
Tradition One on August 4 (after 10 days) and failed to report to
probation. Later that month, he was
cited for offenses related to public drinking.
Halgas was committed to county jail from September 2011 to January 2012
and again from April to May 2012.
In April
2012, the court revoked Halgas's probation.
In May, the court sentenced him to two years in prison and awarded him
394 custody credits. The court found
that Halgas previously waived his section 4019 conduct credits, but would
receive them from "today forward."
Halgas
filed a notice of appeal in June 2012.
In January 2013, he filed a motion in the trial court to correct the
award of section 4019 credits, explaining his waiver of conduct credits on December 16, 2010, was for credits
earned to that date and not thereafter.
Halgas asked for conduct credits for the following days: December
11 to 16, 2010, February 12 to May 28, 2011, June 16 to July 25, 2011, September
28, 2011 to January 10,
2012, and April 19 to June
7, 2012. He did not include
in his request the days he spent in Tradition One (July 26 to Aug. 4, 2011). On January
10, 2013, the court granted Halgas's request for a credit
adjustment, adding 278 days to the credits awarded on May 17, 2012.
DISCUSSION
A
Contentions on Appeal
Halgas
contends he is entitled to conduct credits
for the time he spent at Treatment One as a court-ordered condition of
probation. He acknowledges, and the
record shows, that the trial court credited him with custody credits for the time he spent at that facility.
language of section 4019 does not authorize the award of conduct credits for time spent in a nonpenal residential
treatment facility such as Tradition
One. Halgas argues, however, that when
section 4019 is read together with section 2900.5, the statutory framework
requires the award of conduct credits
for the time he spent at Tradition One.
Alternatively, Halgas argues if he is not statutorily entitled to
section 4019 conduct credits, principles of equal protection mandate the award
of such credits.
Because the
issues raised concern questions of statutory interpretation and constitutional
law, our review is de novo. (
1149, 1176; People v. Superior Court (
411.)
B
Legal Framework for Custody and Conduct Credits
Section
2900.5 governs the award of custody credits.
It provides that in all felony and misdemeanor convictions, when the
defendant has been in custody, including but not limited to, any time spent in
a jail, camp, work furlough facility, halfway house, rehabilitation facility, hospital, prison, juvenile detention
facility or similar residential institution, all days of custody of the
defendant, including days served as a condition of probation in compliance with
a court order, credited to the period of confinement under section 4019, and
days served in home detention, shall be credited to the defendant's term of
imprisonment or credited to any fine on a proportional basis. (Id., subd. (a).)
Section
4019 governs the award of work and behavior credits (collectively referred to
as conduct credits). (People v. Dieck
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 934, 939, fn. 3; Payton
v. Superior Court (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1189, fn. 1.) A prisoner may earn conduct credits when he
or she "is confined in or committed to a county jail, industrial farm, or
road camp, or any city jail, industrial farm, or road camp" by performing
additional labor and maintaining good behavior.
(§ 4019, subds. (a), (b) & (c); People
v. Kennedy (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 385, 395.) Section 4019 does not authorize the award of
conduct credits for time spent in nonpenal institutions. (People
v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, 502-503; People v. Moore (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 783, 785 (
nonpenal institutions is not authorized]; People
v. Mobley (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 320, 323 (Mobley) [good time/work time credit is not statutorily authorized
for confinement in a residential facility]; People
v. Palazuelos (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 962, 966 (Palazuelos) [§ 4019 applies only to time in custody in specified
places]; People v. Downey (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 899, 920 (Downey)
[defendant is not statutorily entitled to conduct credit for time served as a
condition of probation in a nonpenal rehabilitation program].)
Halgas
argues that section 2900.5 directs the court to award a defendant conduct
credits for time spent in a nonpenal residential treatment facility. Although his argument is not entirely clear,
Halgas appears to claim he is entitled to an award of conduct credits for the time he spent at Tradition One by virtue of
the language in section 2900.5 that directs the court to award custody credits
for time spent in a "rehabilitation facility," "including days
served as a condition of probation in compliance with a court order,
pursuant to Section 4019, and days served in home detention . . .
." (§ 2900.5, subd. (a), italics
added.)
Halgas
reads the clause "credited to the period of confinement pursuant to Section
4019" as mandating an award of conduct
credits for any time spent in a rehabilitation facility. (§ 2900.5, subd. (a).) His reading is contrary to well-established
principles of statutory construction.
The first step in construing a
statute is to scrutinize the words of the statute, giving them a plain and
commonsense meaning. (Garcia v.
McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 476.)
If the language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the
statute governs. (Day v. City of Fontana (2001) 25 Cal.4th 268, 272.) By its plain terms, section 2900.5,
subdivision (a) directs the court to credit "all days of
her jail term, including those credited to the period of confinement under
section 4019. (§ 2900.5, subd. (a),
italics added.) Thus a defendant is
entitled to custody credits for days
confined in the facilities described in section 4019.
To the
extent section 2900.5 is ambiguous, the specific statute controls over a more
general statute that only generically encompasses the same subject. (Songstad
v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1209.) Because a more specific statute controls over
a more general one (Lake v. Reed
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 448, 464), we determine that section 2900.5 does not govern
the award of conduct credits. By the plain terms of section 4019, an award
of conduct credits is limited to prisoners confined in or committed to city or
county jails, industrial farms or road camps.
(§ 4019, subd. (a).) Section 4019
also provides that conduct credits may not be awarded to prisoners who do not
satisfactorily perform labor as assigned by, and/or comply with the reasonable
rules established by, the sheriff, chief of police or superintendent of an
industrial farm or road camp (superintendent).
(§ 4019, subds. (b) & (c).)
Obviously, a sheriff, chief of police or superintendent does not assign
labor or establish rules at a nonpenal rehabilitation
facility. Limiting the award of conduct
credits to prisoners described by section 4019 comports most closely with the
apparent intent of the Legislature and avoids an interpretation that would lead
to absurd consequences. (
The cases
cited by Halgas in support of his argument that the statutory framework
authorizes conduct credits for time spent in nonpenal institutions as a
court-ordered condition of probation do not assist him. People
v. Sylvestry (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 (Sylvestry) concerns the award of custody credits under section
2900.5, not conduct credits under section 4019.
concerns an award of conduct credits for confinement in a custodial substance
abuse treatment facility on equal protection grounds. The reviewing court there expressly held that
the defendant was not statutorily entitled to conduct credits under section
4019. (Downey, supra,
Having
determined that Halgas is not statutorily entitled to section 4019 conduct
credits for the 10 days he spent at Tradition One, we now address the question
whether principles of equal protection mandate the award of conduct credit for
Halgas's confinement in a nonpenal residential treatment program.
D
Equal Protection
Halgas
raises two equal protection arguments.
First, Halgas challenges the Legislative classification in section 4019
awarding conduct credits to persons confined in state-run rehabilitation
facilities but denying conduct credits to persons confined in nonpenal
rehabilitation facilities. Second,
Halgas contends he is similarly situated to a defendant committed to a
state-run residential treatment program but did not receive like
treatment. Specifically, Halgas asserts
that had he been confined in a state-run residential treatment program, he would
have received conduct credits and would have served less custodial time. (See Mobley,
supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p.
323.) We first address Halgas's
challenge to the constitutionality of the statutory scheme.
The
Legislature may make reasonable classifications of persons, provided the classifications
are made with a legitimate goal to be accomplished. (People v. Spears (1995) 40
Cal.App.4th 1683, 1687.) " 'As both
the United States Supreme Court and the [California Supreme Court] have
explained on many occasions, "[i]n areas of social and economic policy, a
statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor
infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against [an] equal
protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classifications." ' "
(Kasler v. Lockyer (2000) 23
Cal.4th 472, 481-482.) In addition,
" 'under the rational relationship test, the state may recognize that
different categories or classes of persons within a larger classification may
pose varying degrees of risk of harm, and properly may limit a regulation to
those classes of persons as to whom the need for regulation is thought to be
more crucial or imperative.' " (
validity of the statute. (
787.)
Section
4019 authorizes conduct credits for prisoners confined in or committed to a
city or county jail, industrial farm or road camp, but does not authorize such
credits for time spent in custody in nonpenal institutions, such as
rehabilitation facilities or similar residential institutions. (Palazuelos,
supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at p.
964.) Conduct credits may be denied if
the prisoner refuses to satisfactorily perform labor as assigned by, or has not
complied with reasonable rules and regulations established by, the sheriff,
chief of police or superintendent of an industrial farm or road crew. (§ 4019, subds. (b) & (c).)
This
statutory classification does not violate equal protection. (Moore,
supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 787;
Cal.App.3d 882, 884 (Broad).) The purpose of granting conduct credits to
prisoners receiving substance abuse treatment is to promote good behavior and
work ethic during the period of incarceration.
In contrast, the purpose of court-ordered substance abuse treatment as a
condition of probation is to restore the defendant's mental and physical health
and avoid incarceration. Nonpenal
treatment facilities are not structured to determine whether a person merits
the award of conduct credits under the Penal Code. "The concept of giving or taking away
time credits might interfere with principles central to operation of the
rehabilitation program. Denial of
credits involves administrative requirements which the facility may not be
equipped to meet. Further, the rationale
for affording such credits is absent:
the threat of removal from the program is alone sufficient to deter
misbehavior, without holding out the possibility of conduct credits for that
purpose." (Broad, at p. 884.) In
addition, the Legislature could reasonably determine that those receiving
substance abuse treatment in nonpenal facilities as a condition of probation
have their own incentives for good behavior, including fulfilling the terms of
their probation and avoiding imprisonment in a county or state facility. (Moore,
at p. 787.) Thus there is a reasonably conceivable state
of facts that provides a rational basis for the classifications sufficient to
withstand an equal protection challenge.
(Kasler v. Lockyer,
We next
address Halgas's argument that he was denied equal protection because he was
similarly situated to a defendant who was confined in a state-run residential
treatment program but did not receive like treatment.
Equal
protection recognizes the proposition that persons similarly situated with
respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment. (Moore,
supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 786;
303.) "The first prerequisite to a
meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state
has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner." (In re
Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530; Cooley
v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 253; People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821, 836.) The initial inquiry is not whether persons
are similarly situated for all purposes, but whether they are similarly
situated for purposes of the challenged law.
(Cooley, at p. 253
Halgas has
not shown that he is similarly situated to a defendant who was placed in a
state-run residential treatment program.
Halgas was not incarcerated. His
circumstances are not comparable to the defendant in Mobley, who could not afford to post bail. In that case, equal protection required the
granting of conduct credits to avoid discrimination based on financial
status. (Moore, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 786, citing Broad, supra, 165
Cal.App.3d at p. 884.) Likewise, Halgas
is not similarly situated to the defendant in Downey, who was remanded to the custody of the county sheriff for
housing while he was attending a custodial treatment program. (Downey,
Although Halgas was confined in a residential treatment facility, he was
not in a prison drug program or a treatment program at the county jail. (Id.
at p. 908.)
Finally,
although Halgas may serve a longer sentence than he would have had he been
accepted at SIP, sentencing disparities happen for any number of reasons. As long as there is no showing that a
defendant has been singled out deliberately for enhanced sentencing on the
basis of some invidious criterion, the defendant cannot show an equal protection
violation. (Cf. Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 568-570; see
U.S. 114, 125 [defendant has no constitutional right to choose the penalty
scheme under which he will be sentenced].)
Here, Halgas was granted probation and could have avoided serving time
in prison had he remained at Treatment One and complied with the program
requirements. He does not allege the
denial of his placement at SIP was motivated by improper considerations. Accordingly, his equal protection claim
fails.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
McDONALD, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
Unless otherwise indicated,
further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
(See
as of Aug. 30, 2013.
