HAROLD LEE HARVEY vs. STATE OF FLORIDA
Supreme Court of Florida
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HAROLD LEE HARVEY,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[June 15, 2006]
REVISED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Harold Lee Harvey, a prisoner under a sentence of death, appeals an order of the trial court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, ' 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We previously issued an opinion in this case which only addressed the issue of whether counsel was ineffective for conceding Harvey's guilt of first-degree murder. We found counsel was ineffective and remanded the case for a new trial. While rehearing was pending, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari review of this Court's opinion in Nixon v. State, 857 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 2003), which addressed the same issue. The court reversed our decision, Florida v. Nixon, 125 S. Ct. 551 (2004), and held that the proper standard to be applied in cases involving counsel's concession of guilt is the two-pronged test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Therefore, we issue this opinion on rehearing and address all of the issues raised in Harvey's motion for postconviction relief. The opinion issued on July 3, 2003, is withdrawn, and this opinion is substituted in its place. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's denial of rule 3.850 relief.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Harvey was charged with two counts of first-degree murder in the killings of William and Ruby Boyd, which occurred during the course of a robbery at the Boyds' home. After obtaining money from the Boyds, Harvey and Scott Stiteler, the codefendant, discussed what they were going to do with the victims and decided they had to kill them. Harvey shot both victims. Harvey v. State, 529 So. 2d 1083, 1084 (Fla. 1988).
At trial, Harvey was convicted of both counts of first-degree murder. The jury recommended death by a vote of eleven to one on each conviction. The sentencing judge found four aggravating circumstances[1] and as mitigating circumstances found Harvey had a low IQ and poor educational and social skills. Id. at 1088 n.5.
On appeal, we affirmed Harvey's convictions and sentences of death. Id. at 1088. After the governor signed a death warrant on March 29, 1990, Harvey filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this Court along with a request for stay of execution. We issued a stay so that Harvey could seek relief under rule 3.850. Thereafter, Harvey filed a motion for postconviction relief in the trial court. After an evidentiary hearing on one of the claims, the trial judge entered an order denying relief. Harvey appealed the denial of his postconviction motion, raising seventeen claims, and he also filed a supplemental habeas petition raising seven issues. We denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus, but reversed the trial court's summary denial of the postconviction motion as to five issues and remanded to the trial court to determine if Harvey was denied effective assistance of counsel. Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 1995).[2] After an evidentiary hearing on these five issues, the trial court denied postconviction relief in an amended order.
Harvey now appeals the denial of postconviction relief, raising the following claims for review: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of mental mitigation; (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence; (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective for admitting Harvey's guilt during opening statement; (4) whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make several arguments in support of his motion to suppress Harvey's confession;[3] and (5) whether the cumulative effect of trial counsel's other errors constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court's denial of relief.
DISCUSSION
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Guilt Phase
A. Admission of Guilt
Harvey claims that trial counsel was ineffective for admitting guilt without his consent during the guilt phase opening statement. The trial court concluded that counsel's concession of guilt was not a concession of guilt to first-degree murder and thus was not improper. Harvey argues that trial counsel's statements to the jury were the functional equivalent of a guilty plea to both first-degree and second-degree murder, and that this concession of guilt, without Harvey's consent, constituted, per se, ineffective assistance of counsel.[4] The State argues that the trial court properly denied relief because trial counsel did not concede guilt to the crime charged.
Crucial to this issue's resolution is a determination of the appropriate standard of review. We initially reviewed this issue under our earlier decision in Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 2000), which relied on the per se rule of ineffective assistance of counsel discussed in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). However, the United States Supreme Court held in Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004), that a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's concession of guilt to the crime charged, even without the defendant's consent, must be evaluated under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). That is, in order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance. As to the first or performance prong of Strickland, the defendant must establish that â€
