Filed 8/6/13 P. v. Coney
CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
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as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
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purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM
CONEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
In re
WILLIAM CONEY,
on Habeas Corpus.
B240197
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. BA375285)
B240678, B243237
APPEAL from the judgment of the Superior
Court of
County. Jose J.
Sandoval, Judge. Affirmed in part,
conditionally reversed and remanded in part.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petitions for writ of habeas corpus. Petitions denied.
Katharine Eileen Greenebaum, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
William Coney, in pro. per., for Petitioner.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis and
Connie H. Kan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * * * * * * * * *
Defendant William
Coney was charged by amended information with the
& Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)), and with various prior conviction
allegations (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), § 667.5, subd. (b),
§ 1203, subd. (e)(4); Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2, subd. (a)).
allegations. He was granted in pro. per.
status on January 7, 2011,
and the trial court appointed standby counsel.
However, several days after trial started, and after numerous outbursts
by defendant, his in pro. per. status was revoked and standby counsel conducted
the remainder of the trial. Defendant
was convicted by the jury, and following a bench trial on his priors, the trial
court found he suffered two strike convictions, and had served a prison
term. At sentencing, the court struck
the prior strike allegations and sentenced defendant to seven years in county
jail, under the Realignment Act of 2011 (Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011-2012,
ch. 12, § 1 et seq.).
On
appeal, defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his request for
discovery, and wrongfully revoked his in pro. per. status. Defendant contends any outbursts that led to
the revocation of his right to self-representation
were justified by his understandable frustration with a number of the trial
court’s rulings. Defendant has also
filed two habeas petitions (case Nos. B240678 & B243237), contending the
trial court wrongfully denied a number of his motions, he received ineffective
assistance of counsel, and the Sheriff’s department deprived him of access to
the law library and resources needed for his defense.
We
agree the trial court erred in denying Pitchess
discovery and, therefore, conditionally reverse and remand the case for the
limited purpose of conducting an in camera review and assessing prejudice in
the event that responsive documents are found.
In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. We also find defendant’s habeas petitions
have failed to make the required prima facie showing, and therefore we
summarily deny them.
BACKGROUND
Before defendant’s Faretta
waiver and election to represent himself, his attorney made a pretrial motion
for discovery of the personnel
records of Los Angeles Police Department Officers Mejia, and Valencia, and of Detectives Miller, Baley and Reyes. The trial court denied the motion.
After defendant
executed a Faretta waiver and the
court granted his request to represent himself, defendant made a number of
motions. He moved to suppress the
evidence against him, on the basis police submitted false reports and planted
evidence. That motion was denied. Next, defendant requested a ruling on a
motion for severance which had been filed by his attorney. The motion was denied. When defendant asked why the motion was
denied, the trial court responded, “I don’t believe you’ve given sufficient
basis to grant the severance.†When
defendant asked about oral argument, the trial court responded, “I don’t need
any oral argument.â€
There appeared
to be some confusion about whether defendant had waived time for trial. On January 31, 2011, the trial court
indicated defendant had not waived time for trial, and set trial for February
1, 2011. However, on February 1, 2011,
the trial court found good cause to continue the trial so codefendant Mays
could obtain some lab results. On
February 22, 2011, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his
speedy trial rights. The trial court denied
the motion, finding “defendant has waived time . . . .†Defendant argued he had not waived time. (The court may have misspoken, as it
does not appear defendant waived time, but rather the court continued trial
after finding good cause for a continuance.) On February
28, 2011, defendant again sought dismissal for violation of his speedy trial
rights. That motion was denied, and the
trial court found good cause for another continuance.
Defendant also
filed a motion for disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure sections
170.3 and 170.6, a motion for ancillary funds for his defense, and two motions
to dismiss for Brady
for his defense. The court denied the
section 170.6 motion as untimely, and issued a written order striking the
statement of disqualification under section 170.3 for failing to state
sufficient facts. At a later hearing,
defendant stated he had not received the trial court’s response to his
statement of disqualification under section 170.3. However, the trial court correctly noted it
had ruled on it, and ordered the clerk to provide defendant with a copy of the
order. As for defendant’s
“the People have addressed the Brady
issue.â€
On August 25, 2010, Officers Mejia and Valencia were watching the area
near the intersection of 6th Street and Gladys Avenue in Los Angeles for drug
activity, working as part of an undercover task force. Officer Mejia, using binoculars, saw
codefendant Rufus Mays talking to Jose Ortiz-Pena.
walked across the street to a gray truck, where Mays reached into his pocket
and withdrew a “rock-like†solid resembling cocaine base, and handed it to
Ortiz-Pena. Ortiz-Pena then drove away
in the truck.
Officer Mejia radioed other task
force members, gave them a description of Mays and Ortiz-Pena, and ordered they
be detained. Officers Munoz and Marshall
stopped Ortiz-Pena as he was driving away.
When Officer Marshall asked Ortiz-Pena if he had any drugs, he
responded, “Yeah.†Officer Marshall
searched Ortiz-Pena, and found an off-white solid resembling cocaine base in
his pocket.
As Detectives Miller and Baley
responded to 6th Street and Gladys Avenue, they saw Mays walking along 6th
Street. They could not stop to detain
him, so Officer Mejia drove to the area, and saw Mays hand defendant some
money. Mays and defendant were on the
corner of 6th Street and Stanford Avenue.
Defendant, who was sitting on the curb, grabbed a cup that was on the
sidewalk, removed some off-white solids from a bindle that was in the cup, and
handed them to Mays. Defendant put the
bindle back in the cup and put the cup back on the sidewalk.
Officers Gramillo and Alvarado, and
Detective Reyes, responded to Officer Mejia’s radio call and approached Mays as
he was walking away from defendant.
Detective Reyes saw Mays toss some off-white solids onto the sidewalk as
the officers walked up to him. Detective
Reyes retrieved the discarded substance and placed it in a Ziploc bag. Officer Gramillo tried to handcuff Mays, but
Mays was uncooperative. Officer Gramillo
told Mays to be still, but Mays did not comply and reached for his side. Officer Gramillo struck him in the torso and
conducted a patdown search. She found a
glass pipe in his pocket.
Officer Mejia told Detectives Miller
and Baley to detain defendant. As they
approached him, defendant tried to conceal the paper cup between his legs. Detective Miller searched defendant and
recovered the cup. It contained a
plastic bindle with a substance resembling cocaine base. Detective Miller also found two $10 bills,
six $1 bills, and a glass pipe, in defendant’s pocket.
Criminalist Buffy Miller testified
the substances recovered by police were cocaine base.
John Green, a forensic expert,
testified for the defense. Green
testified he was unable to recover any usable fingerprints from the paper cup
found on defendant, or from the glass pipe found on Mays. He also attempted to lift prints from the
glass pipe and bindle recovered from defendant, but was unable to do so.
Anne La Jeunesse, a private
investigator for the defense, also testified.
She investigated whether there were any video cameras near the crime
scene, and served subpoenas on the SRO Housing Authority to obtain surveillance
tapes from the La Jolla Hotel and the Ellis Hotel, which are located on the
corner of 6th Street and Stanford Avenue.
She never received any videos in response to the subpoenas.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court erroneously denied his
Pitchess motion and wrongfully
revoked his in pro. per. status. We
agree the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for
declaration in support of the motion established good cause for discovery of
complaints of the
fabrication of probable cause, false report writing, false arrest, perjury and
evidence planting. We find,
however, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking defendant’s
self-representation, due to his inappropriate and disruptive behavior. Lastly, we find defendant has not made a
sufficient prima facie showing in support of his habeas petitions, and
accordingly, we summarily deny them.
Motion
A party seeking discovery from a peace officer’s personnel records
through a Pitchess motion must comply with Evidence Code sections 1043
through 1047. “[T]he Pitchess
motion must describe ‘the type of records or information sought’ (Evid. Code,
§ 1043, subd. (b)(2)) and include ‘[a]ffidavits showing good cause for the
discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth the materiality thereof to the
subject matter involved in the pending litigation and stating upon reasonable
belief that the governmental agency identified has the records or information
from the records’ (id., subd. (b)(3)).â€
(People v. Mooc
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226.)
The affidavits may be on information and belief and need not be based on
personal knowledge, but the information sought must be identified with
sufficient specificity to preclude the possibility of a defendant simply
fishing for helpful information. (City
of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74,
85-86.)
To establish good cause, the affidavits must “provide a ‘specific
factual scenario’ establishing a ‘plausible factual foundation’†for the moving
party’s allegation of police misconduct.
(City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146.) The factual allegations must be specific, factual, and
unambiguous. (Id. at pp. 1147-1148.) Plausibility is satisfied if a defendant
“demonstrate[s] that the scenario of alleged officer misconduct could or might
have occurredâ€; the allegations need not be “reasonably probable or apparently
credible.†(Warrick v. Superior Court
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1016, 1025-1026 (Warrick).) Moreover,
“[t]he trial court does not determine whether a defendant’s version of events,
with or without corroborating collateral evidence, is persuasive -- a
task . . . tantamount to determining whether the defendant
is probably innocent or probably guilty.â€
(Id. at p. 1026.) “A showing of good cause is measured by
‘relatively relaxed standards’ that serve to ‘insure the production’ for trial
court review of ‘all potentially relevant documents.’ [Citation.]â€
(Id. at p. 1016.)
A motion for discovery of
peace officer personnel records is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. A review of the lower
court’s ruling is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. (City
of San Jose v. Superior Court, supra,
67 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.)
Defendant’s motion sought the discovery of complaints
in the personnel records of Los
Angeles Police Officers Mejia, and Valencia, and Detectives Miller, Baley and
Reyes, related to “acts of violation of constitutional rights, fabrication of
charges, fabrication of evidence, fabrication of reasonable suspicion and/or
probable cause, false arrest, perjury, dishonesty, writing of false police
reports, writing of false police reports to cover up the use of excessive
force, planting of evidence, false or misleading internal reports including but
not limited to false overtime or medical reports, and any other evidence of
misconduct amounting to moral turpitude within the meaning of
284.â€
The attorney declaration in support of the Pitchess motion recited the following facts: “Officer Mejia prepared a report and
testified at a preliminary hearing that on August 25, 2010, at approximately
1600 hours, he was a passenger in a vehicle with Officer Valencia driving. Upon entering the crosswalk of Sixth and
Stanford, they both saw defendant Coney sitting on the southwest corner on the
sidewalk. While Officer Valencia was in
the driver seat, Officer Mejia looked pas[t] the driver’s side window and
observed defendant Mays giving defendant Coney a single bill in exchange for an
off white sold resembling cocaine that he retrieved from a plastic bindle inside
of a paper cup. As Officer Miller
approached defendant Coney, he saw him grab the cup and place it in between his
legs. Officers Baley and Reyes detained
defendant Coney while Officer Miller retrieved the cup. After retrieving the cup, Officer Miller saw
a clear plastic bindle containing numerous off white solids or nickel pieces
resembling cocaine base.â€
Counsel’s declaration further stated:
“Upon information and belief, the defense alleges that Officer Mejia
wrote a false report, made a false arrest, committed perjury by testifying
falsely, fabricated probable cause, conspired with Officer Miller, Officer
Valencia, Officer Baley and Officer Reyes to fabricate probable cause to clear
the streets of transients. Defendant
Coney was sitting on the sidewalk in the heat when a male approached him, gave
him some change, and asked him for a cigarette.
Defendant Coney took the change from that person and gave that person a
cigarette that he had behind his ears.
Defendant Coney did not have any narcotics on his person or in a cup
next to him and did not hand that person any white solids resembling rock
cocaine. Officer Miller planted the
paper cup with the nickel sized cocaine inside the cup. Officers Baley and Reyes watched as Officer
Miller planted the cup on defendant Coney, but will be siding with Officer
Miller’s version that it was not planted when Officer Miller did indeed plant
the evidence on defendant Coney.
Officers Valencia, Mejia, Miller, Baley, and Reyes fabricated the
probable cause and evidence against Defendant Coney. While defendant Coney was sitting at the
sidewalk and prior to the officers approaching him, several individuals walked
by and near him. Furthermore, the
defense alleges that Officer Baley lied when he stated there were no additional
witnesses other than the two LAPD officers that saw the use of force against
defendant Mays. The defense alleges that
there were approximately twenty witnesses, some of whom were recording the
beating with their cell phones.â€
The police report appended to the motion set forth additional facts
consistent with the officers’ testimony at trial as summarized above. The report also stated Detective Baley had
canvassed the area, and was unable to locate any witnesses to Officer
Gramillo’s use of force.
The prosecution conceded the Pitchess
motion established good cause as to Officer Mejia for “false reporting†but
contended that as to the other officers and alleged misconduct, “the
Defendant’s declaration is nothing but a denial of the allegations of the
arrest report [without] any alternative specific factual scenario of the other
officers’ misconduct.â€
The trial court denied the motion, finding “it does not appear to me to
be a plausible . . . alternative scenario that this large group of officers
would have conspired to concoct the probable cause in this case.â€
Respondent
contends the trial court did not abuse its discretion, relying on
of 11 police officers who allegedly conspired to frame him for selling
drugs. The defendant in
him solely because he happened to be in the area where they were working as an
undercover narcotics “buy team,†and when they determined he had a criminal
record, they all conspired to charge him with possession of drugs, recorded
money the police had in their possession from earlier arrests, and fabricated
virtually all the events preceding and following his arrest. The Court of Appeal found the factual basis
for the Pitchess motion was
inconsistent and incomplete, because defendant did not state a nonculpable
explanation for his presence in an area where drugs were being sold, or sufficiently
present a factual basis for being singled out by the police. Defendant simply denied the elements of the
offense charged. Accordingly, the
discretion in denying Pitchess
discovery. (Thompson, supra, at pp. 1317-1318.)
Here, in
contrast to Thompson, defendant
alleged the officers planted evidence on his person. Counsel’s declaration alleged
Detectives Baley and Reyes watched as Detective Miller planted the cup with a
bindle containing drugs on defendant. In addition
to denying the statements in Officer Mejia’s report, defendant offered through
counsel a plausible nonculpable reason for why police singled him out. Counsel stated on information and belief the
officers and detectives were conspiring to clear the streets of
transients. Defendant appeared to be
transient since he was sitting on the sidewalk in the heat, and his sale of a
cigarette could be mistaken for a drug transaction. We are not tasked with determining if this
version of events is persuasive or credible.
(Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 1025-1026.) It is not our job to weigh the evidence, or determine the
true source of the drugs in reviewing a Pitchess
motion. (Warrick, at p. 1026.)
Respondent
contends defendant’s declaration is implausible because he did not seek
discovery relating to Officers Gramillo, Alvarado, Munoz, and Marshall, who
arrested Ortiz-Pena and Mays, and because he did not explain why cigarettes
were not recovered either from him or from Mays. However, Officers Gramillo, Alvarado, Munoz,
and Marshall responded to a call concerning drug activity by Officers Mejia and
Valencia, who witnessed a drug transaction between Ortiz-Pena and Mays, and
Mays and defendant. According to the police report, the transaction
between Ortiz-Pena and Mays did not occur within defendant’s presence, and
Ortiz-Pena was arrested by Officers Munoz and Marshall as he drove away from
the scene. Officers Alvarado and Gramillo were involved in Mays’s arrest,
which also occurred outside of defendant’s presence. Defendant would have
no opportunity to observe whether drugs were planted on Ortiz-Pena, or to know
if the report was false concerning the arrests of Ortiz-Pena and Mays. In short, defendant may have had no reason to
believe Officers Marshall, Munoz, Gramillo and Alvarado were involved in the
alleged conspiracy. Moreover, the police report appended to defendant’s
motion reflects defendant’s transient status, but is silent as to the status of
the other defendants. Defendant’s motion
was plausible without having to explain why no cigarettes were booked into
evidence.
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
search the personnel files of Officers Mejia, and Valencia, and Detectives
Miller, Baley and Reyes for complaints of fabricating evidence, planting
evidence, false report writing, false arrest, and perjury. However, we conclude the Pitchess motion was overbroad as to the other categories of
requested discovery. The declaration failed to
establish good cause for discovery of conduct constituting moral
turpitude. Even though the declaration
called into question the truthfulness of the officers and detectives, the
request for “any other evidence of misconduct amounting to moral turpitude
within the meaning of [Wheeler,
overbroad. While Wheeler generally holds that nonfelony conduct involving moral
turpitude is admissible to impeach a criminal witness, Wheeler did not consider the discovery of such evidence in the
context of the confidentiality afforded to peace officer personnel
records. (Wheeler, at p. 295.) Cases
that have considered the intersection of Wheeler
and Pitchess have concluded
requirement of the Evidence Code, and “only documentation of past officer
misconduct which is similar to the
misconduct alleged by defendant in the pending litigation is relevant and
therefore subject to discovery.†(
Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1021, 1024 [seeking all
abrogate the good cause requirement . . . by permitting fishing
expeditions into the arresting officers’ personnel records in virtually every
criminal caseâ€].)
Defendant also
failed to demonstrate good cause for discovery of “acts of violation of
constitutional rights†and complaints relating “false or misleading internal reports
including but not limited to false overtime or medical reports.†These categories are “completely untethered
either to the factual scenario or to the proposed defenses outlined in defense
counsel’s declaration.†(
error
The remedy for a Pitchess
error is a conditional reversal and remand of the case to the trial court to
conduct an in camera hearing. (
v. Gaines (2009) 46
Cal.4th 172, 180.) If, after reviewing the confidential material
in chambers, it is found the personnel records contain no relevant information,
the court is to reinstate the judgment.
(Id. at p. 181.) If, however, it is found on remand
discoverable information exists and should have been disclosed, the trial court
must order disclosure of that information, allow the defendant an opportunity
to demonstrate prejudice, and order a new trial if there is a reasonable
probability the outcome would have been different had the information been
disclosed. (Ibid.)
2.
Revocation
of In Pro. Per. Status
On January 7, 2011, defendant filed a Faretta waiver, requesting to proceed in pro. per. That request was granted, and defense counsel
was removed and appointed as standby counsel.
Over the course of defendant’s self-representation, he repeatedly
engaged in inappropriate and disruptive conduct. In the interest of brevity, we will confine
our discussion of defendant’s obstreperous behavior to the proceedings during
trial, though examples abound in the various pretrial proceedings. (The discussion below by no means includes
all the examples of defendant’s contumacious behavior we found in the record;
indeed, we have omitted reference to some of the most grievous examples.)
One pretrial example provides the background to explain some of the
problems defendant created unnecessarily at trial. At a March 9, 2011 pretrial hearing to
address evidentiary issues, the court admonished defendant not to mention
Ortiz-Pena during trial (defendant was ordered not to imply to the jury
Ortiz-Pena would provide exculpatory testimony). When defendant persisted (he was apparently
frustrated Ortiz-Pena was unavailable as a witness), and the court again
repeated its order, defendant asked, “Are we looking for the truth or just part
of the truth?†During this exchange,
defendant repeatedly interrupted and talked over the court, despite the court
telling him not to do so.
On March 10, 2011, during jury selection, but out of the presence of the
jury, defendant told the court it made “a misstatement of facts . . . in the
jury instructions . . . .
It was mentioned that there was two co-defendants . . . from my
understanding there’s three.†When the
court reminded defendant “we’ve been through this more times than I care to
remember. In this trial right now there
are two defendants, Mr. Mays and yourself.â€
Defendant asked “that an investigation be done into what happened .
. . .†The court told him, “Sir, we’re
done, okay. Anything else? On the issue regarding the third gentleman,
Mr. Ortiz, we’re done.†Defendant was
argumentative, stating, “We’re not done.
You denied it, but ‑‑â€
After the court stated “we’re moving on,†defendant acquiesced.
Later on March 10, 2011, defendant inquired about the status of some
transcripts he had requested in support of a petition for writ of mandate. He asked to also receive transcripts for
March 9 and 10, 2011, in addition to those the court had already agreed to
order from the reporter. The court
stated, “That would be denied. I
understand your writ ‑‑ and it’s a reasonable argument on whether
or not [the] motion to dismiss should have been granted. I’m perfectly understanding of your basis for
filing that motion, but there’s nothing ‑‑†Defendant interrupted the court, “You’ve
denied every sound motion that I’ve put forth to the court.†When the court tried to respond, defendant
again interrupted, stating “Not only sound motions, but legal, binding ‑‑†When the judge stated, “I understand that’s
your view,†defendant responded, “Are you above the law, Your Honor?†The court then went off the record.
When proceedings resumed the next day, the prosecutor made a record
regarding defendant’s conduct, stating “I know the court has admonished all
counsel to remain professional at all times, however, Mr. Coney made some under
his breath comments to the jury, and I don’t know if it made the record or
not. At one point, and I wrote them down,
he referred to a juror as ‘my man’, he referred to jurors regarding metro bus
as ‘lucky dogs’, he made comments about his vision problems, pain,
mobility. I don’t know if this is to
garner sympathy, but it’s certainly not professional. And his insistence that the DA, or
prosecution, is some kind of special friend of the court is not only
disrespectful to me as an officer of the court, but to the court as well as the
judicial process.†The court then asked
“all counsel to behave themselves in a professional manner.â€
When trial commenced, and defendant was making his opening statement,
the prosecutor lodged numerous objections to defendant’s inappropriate legal
arguments. Defendant, apparently
frustrated with the objections, asked “does the jury understand anything I’m
trying to convey so far?†When the court
admonished defendant to not ask questions of the jury, defendant responded “I
think everything is being thrown out of whack here.†When the court asked him to “move on,â€
defendant responded “I’m just checking signs and symbols to see if there’s
anything the court might need to recognize to make sure I’m in the right
atmosphere to continue.†When the court
reminded defendant he was making his opening statement, defendant responded, “I
thought it was. I’m hoping it is.â€
A short while later, after sustaining an objection to defendant’s
statement that “the crooked vindictive undercover cops . . . . [¶] .
. . [¶]
. . . intended [to rid] certain
areas of blacks,†the court indicated it was time for the noon break, and
informed the jury that defendant’s opening statement would resume after
lunch. Defendant stated, “I think you
see what kind of trial this is about to be.
Might as well get the rope --â€
When his opening statement resumed, defendant stated “there is one other
person important to clearing up some of the quagmire, Jose Ortiz Pena, the
third person who was supposed to be alleged to have been in the company of the
co-defendant here . . . .†The
prosecutor objected, and the objection was sustained.
Later in his opening statement, defendant started to argue the law, and
the prosecutor’s burden of proof, and mention “the Dred Scott case of
1857.†The trial court sustained the
prosecutor’s objection and told defendant, “Let’s move on, we’ve covered this
before Mr. Coney, please.†Defendant
responded, “We didn’t cover this.†The
court said, “Earlier in voir dire. Let’s
move on, sir.†Defendant said, “Well, I
think there was an attempt to ‑‑â€
The court interrupted him and said, “Sir, I’ve ruled. Let’s move on.†Defendant then went on to say, “Why myself
and others seek freedom ‑‑â€
The prosecutor objected, but defendant persisted with his speech,
talking over the court. The court
admonished defendant “if you’re not going to abide by my rules on voir dire or
the general rules ‑‑â€
Defendant interrupted the court, “I don’t see where that breaks the
rules.†The court reminded defendant of
the permissible scope of opening statements.
Defendant next engaged in a very lengthy cross-examination of Officer
Mejia, which spanned three days of the trial.
At one point during his cross-examination, defendant asked Mejia to read
from a Metro bus schedule. In response
to the prosecutor’s objection as to the relevance of the questioning, defendant
protested it was “very important to the defense.†The court excused the jury so the relevance
of the evidence could be ascertained outside their presence, and defendant
blurted out “Somebody don’t want no facts to be brought forth†before the jury
left the room. The trial court warned
defendant to make “no speeches.†As the
court and defendant were discussing the relevance of the bus schedule, and the
prosecutor and court commented there was no foundation for the schedule,
defendant responded, “You’re determined to railroad me any way you can, aren’t
you?†The court assured defendant it was
“not trying to railroad [him] I’m just trying to run this trial consistent . .
. with criminal procedure and the rules of evidence.â€
When defendant later asked Officer Mejia whether he had ever been
“impeached while on the stand,†the prosecutor objected, and the trial court
sustained the objection. When defendant
persisted by asking, “Do you know what impeachment means?†the court reminded
defendant, “I’ve ruled. Let’s move
on.†Defendant continued, stating, “Now,
I’m a layman, but I believe impeachment is when a person has been found lying
on the stand.†The court reminded
defendant to not make any speeches.
Defendant said, “[I’m] trying to get clarification, Your Honor.†When the court reminded defendant, “Sir,
you’re the lawyer here, I’ve ruled,†defendant protested “I’m not the
lawyer.†The court reminded him, “Sir,
you’re representing yourself.†Defendant
told the court, “You’re the lawyer.†He
then asked for clarification on the limits of impeachment. The court responded, “Sir, you decided to
represent yourself. I’m terribly
sorry. I’ve ruled. Move on. . . .†Defendant protested he thought his questions
were proper. The court again restated it
had ruled. Defendant retorted,
“Okay. Cover it up, if you want, but I’m
going to proceed in a different line.â€
The prosecutor moved to strike defendant’s comment, the court ordered it
stricken, and defendant said, “Strike it all.â€
At another point when the court sustained the prosecutor’s objections
during defendant’s cross-examination of Officer Mejia, defendant asked whether
the court and the prosecutor had “the signals worked out?†The court responded, “Sir, I deeply resent
that implication.†Defendant responded,
“You can resent it all your want, it’s true.â€
When the court reminded defendant it was “trying to run this court
consistent with criminal procedure . . . ,†defendant interrupted and asked,
“Consistent with what criminal procedure?
What country?†The court reminded
defendant to not make any speeches, and defendant responded “This is
America. We are under the Constitution,
if I’m not mistaken.†The court
responded, “Sir, that will be enough.â€
Defendant then said, “Okay.
You’re not the one being falsely accused here.â€
When defendant asked why Officer Mejia had not detained codefendant Mays
immediately after witnessing the first drug transaction, both the prosecutor
and Mays’s attorney objected, and the trial court sustained the objections. When the trial court clarified the basis of
the objections for defendant, defendant argued, “So we have ‑‑
Okay. Three district attorneys.†The court admonished defendant to not impugn
the other attorneys’ integrity.
On the third day of defendant’s cross-examination of Officer Mejia,
having endured more disdain, disrespect and disruption than was necessary, the
patient and long-suffering trial court finally terminated defendant’s in pro.
per. privileges.
Defendant contends his right to self-representation was violated when
the trial court revoked his in pro. per. privileges and appointed counsel. According to defendant, his conduct did not
amount to deliberate obstructive behavior that threatened to subvert the trial,
or to compromise the court’s ability to conduct a fair trial. (Faretta,
supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834.) Instead, he contends “[t]he trial court made
several rulings, remarks and mis-statements of fact before the actual trial
began that would have frustrated and disturbed a seasoned lawyer. It is, therefore, understandable that [an in
pro. per.] defendant would have responded in an inappropriate manner, believing
the trial court was not treating him fairly.â€
We disagree.
“[T]he trial
judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages
in serious and obstructionist misconduct.â€
(Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46.)
“The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity
of the courtroom. Neither is it a
license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive
law.†(Ibid.; People v. Watts
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 621, 629 [“[A] defendant requesting the right of
self-representation must possess the ability and willingness ‘to abide by rules
of procedure and courtroom protocol.’â€].)
“[A] trial court must undertake the task of deciding whether a defendant
is and will remain so disruptive, obstreperous, disobedient, disrespectful or
obstructionist in his or her actions or words as to preclude the exercise of
the right to self-representation.†(
735 (Welch).)
On review, we apply the abuse of discretion standard to
the trial court’s decision to terminate a defendant’s right of
self-representation. (
12; Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 735.)
“The trial court possesses much discretion when it comes to terminating
a defendant’s right to self-representation and the exercise of that discretion
‘will not be disturbed in the absence of a strong showing of clear
abuse.’†(Welch, at p. 735.)
Defendant’s persistent misbehavior and abuse of his in
pro. per. status fully supported the trial court’s decision. We find particularly unpersuasive defendant’s
contention that his behavior was warranted by the trial court’s rulings denying
various pretrial motions, not one of which is challenged on the merits on
appeal. Defendant’s claim the trial
court did not warn him his conduct would lead to a revocation of his in pro.
per. status has no merit. The
and initialed, provided: “I understand
that I must not act disrespectfully in court.
I understand that the Judge may terminate my right to act as my own
attorney in the event that I engage in serious misconduct or obstruct the conduct
and progress of the trial.†Moreover,
the trial court endlessly admonished defendant that he had to abide by the
rules and respect the judicial process. Defendant was sufficiently warned yet chose
to disrupt the trial at every opportunity.
Because “a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks to collaterally
attack a presumptively final criminal judgment, the petitioner bears a heavy
burden initially to plead sufficient
grounds for relief, and then later to prove
them.†(People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) “An appellate court receiving such a petition evaluates it by
asking whether, assuming the petition’s factual allegations are true, the
petitioner would be entitled to relief.â€
If so, the required prima facie showing has been made. (Id.
summarily deny the petition. However, if
the allegations of the petition, taken as true, establish a claim for relief, we
will issue an order to show cause why relief should not be granted. (Id.
at p. 475.)
We find petitioner
has not stated a prima facie claim for relief, and therefore summary denial of
the petitions is proper. Defendant
introduced no evidence and alleged no facts outside the appellate record in his
petitions which would warrant relief.
Therefore, the petitions are denied.
The
judgment is conditionally reversed and remanded. The trial court is directed to conduct an in
camera inspection of the personnel records of Officer Mejia, Officer Valencia,
Detective Miller, Detective Baley, and Detective Reyes for complaints of
fabricating evidence, planting evidence, false report writing, false arrest,
and perjury. If the trial court’s inspection on remand reveals
no relevant information, the trial court is directed to reinstate the judgment
of conviction and the sentence. If the
inspection reveals relevant information, the trial court must order disclosure,
allow defendant an opportunity to demonstrate prejudice, and order a new trial
if there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different had
the information been disclosed. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
The petitions for habeas corpus are denied.
GRIMES, J.
WE CONCUR:
BIGELOW, P. J.
FLIER, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] The amended information also charged
codefendant Rufus Mays with one count drug possession (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11350, subd. (a)) and one count drug sales (§ 11352, subd. (a)). Mays and Coney were tried together, and Mays
has not appealed his conviction.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Pitchess
v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).
