Huffman v.
Filed 11/12/13 Huffman v. California CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
DANIEL G. HUFFMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Defendant and Respondent.
D063025
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2012-00091220-
CU-CR-CTL)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Judith F. Hayes, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Okorie
Okorocha for the Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney
General, Jonathan L. Wolff and Michelle Des Jardins, Assistant Attorneys
General, Vickie P. Whitney and John Paul Walters, Deputy Attorneys General, for
the Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff
and appellant Daniel G. Huffman, a former inmate at R.J. Donovan Correctional
Facility (Facility), appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court
sustained without leave to amend the demurrer of the State of California (the State)
to Huffman's first amended complaint.
Huffman had sued the State and several "John Doe" correctional
officers, alleging in part that he was beaten by the officers and other inmates
while housed at Facility, and that the State was vicariously liable for the
acts of the individual defendants. In
part, the trial court ruled the State was immune from liability under
Government Code
title="">[1]
sections 844.6 and 845.6. On appeal,
Huffman contends he could have stated facts sufficient to establish vicarious
liability against the State and thus the trial court abused its discretion by
sustaining the State's demurrer without leave to amend. He further contends the trial court erred by
dismissing sua sponte his "Doe" defendants.
We conclude
the trial court correctly sustained without leave to amend the State's demurrer
to the causes of action alleged in Huffman's first amended complaint because
his allegations place his case within the immunity from liability afforded the
State under section 844.6, subdivision (a)(2).
However, we hold Huffman has shown he should have been granted leave to
amend to allege a violation of section 845.6. We further conclude the court erred by
dismissing the action as to the Doe defendants.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand with directions set
forth below.
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In setting
out the background facts, we accept as true the properly pleaded and material
allegations of Huffman's first amended complaint. (
From March
2008 to November 2011, Huffman was incarcerated at Facility and housed in a
gymnasium within the general population main line. While there, it was known he suffered from
anxiety disorder and bipolar disease, and was severely depressed and sick. Despite these conditions, he was placed on
the top bunk of a three-tiered bunk. Huffman was supposed to be under
checked.
On April 15, 2010, a decision was made
to take Huffman off his medications. He
was told he would have to wait to see a doctor.
On May 1, 2010, at
approximately 2:00 a.m., Huffman was
beaten by correctional officers and other inmates and suffered massive brain
trauma and other neck injuries. That
day, Huffman's mother received a call stating that her son had been hurt and
was on his way to the hospital, and that she should get there immediately. When she arrived, the hospital ombudsman told
her the incident had occurred at 2:00 a.m.
and that Huffman had initially been taken to a hospital that could not treat
him due to the extent of his injuries. He also told her Huffman had been in surgery
since 4:00 a.m., and that he had
severe brain injuries. Huffman was
stabilized and transferred to Scripps
Mercy Hospital Trauma
Center in San
Diego. He
underwent surgery for over nine hours and was on complete life support for over
five weeks, and on partial life support from mid-June 2010 to approximately
September 2010.
Huffman had
a very large right temporal hematoma, several areas in his brain were bleeding,
and his neck was fractured in several places.
He came to the hospital emaciated and with pneumonia complicated by methicillin-resistant
staphylococcus aureus 10. As a result of
his injuries, Huffman has been incapacitated.
Huffman obtained relief from his late filing of a state tort claim, and
also filed an application for his mother to be guardian ad litem on his behalf.
Huffman eventually
filed suit in superior court, and in July 2012 filed a first amended complaint
against the State and "John Doe" correctional officer Nos. 1 through
7, asserting causes of action for negligence, assault, battery by a peace
officer, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and disability
discrimination in violation of Civil Code section 52, subdivision (a) (the
Unruh Civil Rights Act; see Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (a)). As for his claim of negligence, Huffman
alleges the individual defendants owed him a duty to take reasonable measures
to ensure his safety and security while in their custody, including properly
classifying him so that he was in protective custody, and also breached a duty
to him by "allowing [him] to be severely injured from an alleged fall from
a gymnasium bunk bed . . . ." In his
cause of action for assault, Huffman alleges the individual defendants acted
with intent to cause "harmful contact" and "touched . . . [him]
in an harmful manner" without his consent.
In his claim of battery by a peace officer, Huffman alleges the
individual defendants intentionally touched him and "used unreasonable
force . . . for no legitimate law enforcement purpose" without his
consent. Huffman alleges that the
individual defendants' assault and battery was outrageous and an "abuse of
a position of authority" and that they knew he was vulnerable to emotional
distress and that their conduct would likely result in such distress. Finally, in his cause of action for violation
of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Huffman alleges the individual defendants "discriminated
against [him] by refusing to accommodate his injuries and resulting disability
that was either the result of their negligence in allowing [him] to fall from a
higher bunk when he was supposed to be in protective custody, or as a result of
a violent assault upon him resulting in massive head and neck injuries." As to each cause of action, he alleges the
individual defendants were all acting within the course and scope of their
employment with the State and that the State was vicariously liable for their
tortious acts.
The State
demurred to Huffman's first amended complaint on grounds it failed to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. It argued it was statutorily immune from
liability under sections 844.6, subdivision (a)(2) and 845.6 for all of Huffman's
causes of action, including those alleging injury to him as a prison inmate or
failure to furnish medical care, and Huffman had not alleged any facts showing those
statutory immunities did not apply. The
State asked the court to disregard Huffman's contention in his first amended
complaint that the State was "vicariously liable" for the acts of the
individual Doe defendants. As for
Huffman's disability discrimination cause of action, the State argued the claim
was brought under the Unruh Civil Rights Act to which the broad statutory
immunities likewise applied. It argued
the section 845.6 exception, which imposes liability on a public entity if the
employee "knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of
immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon"
it, did not apply to Huffman's claims because he did not allege facts
establishing he had a serious and obvious medical condition requiring immediate
care.
The trial
court sustained the State's demurrer without leave to amend. Citing Government Code sections 844.6 and
845.6, as well as Civil Code section 52 and Wright
v. State (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 659, it ruled Huffman did not cure the defects
in his original complaint, and that the State was immune from liability. The court's September 28, 2012 minute order,
which the court signed, states, "The Court orders the entire action
dismissed without prejudice."
On October
3, 2012, Huffman and his guardian ad litem moved to clarify the court's order.
for the acts of its employees if the employees were not themselves immune, he
asserted the court's order was vague in that it did not provide an explanation
as to (a) why the complaint did not properly state liability against the State
and (b) why the defect could not be corrected with leave to amend. The State opposed the motion in part stating
it was premature: that the State had not yet filed a proposed order and the
final order had not been filed or issued.
It also argued plaintiffs had waived their challenge to the order by
submitting to the tentative ruling, thus acquiescing to or contributing to any
error, and that the court's order was nevertheless clear and complete.
On October
31, 2012, Huffman filed his notice of
appeal.
title="">[3] The next day, Huffman moved for
reconsideration and asked to vacate the court's September 2012 order to the
extent it had dismissed the Doe defendants.
On November
13, 2012, the trial court denied Huffman's motion for clarification. As for Huffman's reconsideration motion, the
court disregarded the motion on grounds it was not calendared and was untimely
filed and served.
On December
5, 2012, the court entered a judgment of dismissal of the action against the
State. The judgment states: "The demurrer of defendant State of
California was fully briefed, and presented for oral argument on September 28,
2012, at which time the court adopted the tentative ruling and sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend.
Plaintiff was served with notice of the ruling on the demurrer on
October 2, 2012. The court issued an
order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend as to defendant State of
California on October 30, 2012.
Defendant State of California is entitled to dismissal of the first
amended complaint with prejudice. [¶] IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's first amended
complaint against defendant State of California is dismissed with prejudice,
and that plaintiff take nothing from this defendant."
DISCUSSION
I. The State's
Demurrer
A.
"On
appeal
after sustaining a
demurrer without leave
to amend, . . . [w]e
give the complaint
a reasonable interpretation,
reading it as
a whole and
all material facts
properly pleaded, but
do not assume
the truth of
law." (
865.) We review the complaint de novo and
determine whether the pleading alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of
action. (McCall v. PacifiCare of
Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415.) When a demurrer is sustained without leave to
amend, "we decide whether there is a
defect can be
cured by amendment:
if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse." (City of
Dinuba, at p. 865.) A plaintiff may seek leave to amend for the
first time on appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 472c, subd. (a);
42 Cal.4th 730, 746; San Diego City Firefighters, Local 145, v. Board of
Administration etc. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 594, 606.) If the judgment is correct on any ground
stated in the demurrer, we will affirm it regardless of the trial court's
stated reasons. (San Diego City
Firefighters, at p. 605;
Cal.App.4th 305, 312.)
B.
With Respect to Injuries Incurred by Huffman
We need not
determine whether Huffman's allegations of negligence, assault and battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, or violation of the Unruh Civil
Rights Act state a cause of action. Where
the issue of governmental immunity is dispositive as to those causes of action,
as is the case here, we may for expediency resolve that question first and
assume that the first amended complaint adequately states those causes of
action. (See Kisbey v. State of California (1984) 36 Cal.3d 415, 418, fn. 3;
& Power (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 1, 7.)
Section 815
provides that "[a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such
injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public
employee or any other person," "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
statute." (§ 815, subd.
(a).) Subdivision (b) of section 815
states "[t]he liability of a public entity established by this part . . .
is subject to any immunity of the public entity provided by statute . . . ." Public entity tort liability is "exclusively
statutory" under section 815. (
Dist., supra, 53 Cal.4th at p.
868; see San Mateo Union High School
District v. County of San Mateo (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 418, 427.) Under these laws, "direct tort liability
of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be
liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general
tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714." (Eastburn
v. Regional Fire Protection Authority (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183; see
also Miklosy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2008)
44 Cal.4th 876, 899 ["section 815 abolishes common law tort liability for
public entities"].) Thus, " '[s]overeign
immunity is the rule in California; governmental liability is limited to
exceptions specifically set forth by statute.' " (Castaneda
v. Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th
1051, 1069-1070 (Castaneda), quoting Cochran
v. Herzog Engraving Co. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 405, 409.)
Section
815.2 subjects public entities to "liability, based on respondeat superior
principles, for the misconduct of their employees that occurred in the scope of
their employment." (
Cal.4th 1112, 1127; Lawson v. Superior
Court (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1388.)
at p. 1383.)
Sections
844 through 846 contain provisions applicable to correctional facilities. As pertinent here,
exceptions, public entities are not liable for "an injury to any prisoner"
unless liability is imposed by statute.
public employee from liability for injury proximately caused by the
employee's negligent or wrongful act or omission. (§ 844.6, subd. (d).) Under it, a public entity may, but is not
required, to pay any judgment or settlement against a public employee; however,
it "shall pay" a judgment or settlement based on a medical
malpractice claim against specified public employees.
Section
845.6 grants public entities and public employees immunity from liability for "injury
proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical
care for a prisoner in his custody . . . ." (§ 845.6.
statute imposes liability on a public employee, and also the public entity
where the employee is acting in the scope of employment, "if the employee
knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical
care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care." (Ibid.) "The first clause of section 845.6
establishes the immunity generally of both the public entity and its employees
from liability 'for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to
furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody.' . . . The
second phrase creates a limited public-entity liability when: (1) the public employee 'knows or has reason
to know [of the] need,' (2) of 'immediate medical care,' and (3) 'fails
to take reasonable action to summon such medical care.' " (Castaneda,
supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1070.)
By his
arguments, Huffman concedes section 844.6 immunity applies to the State. His sole contention is that he can state
facts demonstrating he falls within the exceptions
to the rule, including the section 845.6 exception for failure to summon
medical care.
title="">[8] He argues:
"Appellant believes that the severity of his injuries were due to a
deliberate indifference to his medical needs by Respondent correctional officers,
allowing him to 'bleed out[,'] and only when he was close to death did medical
care arrive. Because of this failure to
immediately summon the prison medical facilities, Appellant's injuries were
more severe. These facts, while not
adequately stated in the amended complaint, absolutely could have been stated,
and Respondent would then be subject to vicarious liability for the wrongful
action of the now Doe Defendants. As
such, the trial court abused its' [sic]
demurrer without leave to amend and then dismissing the case."
The factual
allegations of Huffman's first amended complaint demonstrate, and neither party
disputes, that during the events described in the complaint, Huffman was a "prisoner"
as that term is defined under the Tort Claims Act. (§ 844; Lawson
v. Superior Court, supra, 180
Cal.App.4th at p. 1384 [" ' "prisoner" includes an inmate of a
prison, jail, or penal or correctional facility' "].) And, each of Huffman's causes of action for
negligence, assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
violation of Civil Code section 52, seeks damages for Huffman's personal
injuries. As we have explained, Government
Code section 844.6 confers immunity on the State from liability for such injuries. Based on Government Code section 844.6
immunity, the trial court properly sustained the State's demurrer to the
above-referenced causes of action without leave to amend.
C.
He Can State a Cause of Action Under Section 845.6 for Failure to Take
Reasonable Action to Summon Medical Care
" 'In
view of the fact that tort causes of action against public entities are now
based on statute, the general rule that statutory causes of action must be
pleaded with particularity is applicable.
Every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be
pleaded.' " (Richardson-Tunnell v. School Ins. Program for Employees (SIPE) (2007)
157 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1061, quoting Susman
v. City of Los Angeles (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 809.) We assess whether Huffman has pleaded, or if
there is a reasonable possibility he can plead, specific and essential facts
sufficient to support a statutory cause of action under section 845.6.
In
to authorize a cause of action against a public entity for its employees'
failure to summon immediate medical care only, not for certain employee's
malpractice in providing that care. The
1963 Law Revision Commission comments to section 845.6 clarify, 'This section
limits the duty to provide medical care for prisoners to cases where there is
actual or constructive knowledge that the prisoner is in need of immediate
medical care. The standards of medical
care to be provided to prisoners involve basic governmental policy
that should not be subject to review in tort suits for damages.' [Citation.]
Thus, section 845.6 creates out of the general immunity a limited cause
of action against a public entity for its employees' failure to summon
immediate medical care only. [Citation.]
The statute does not create liability of the public entity for
malpractice in furnishing or obtaining that medical care. [Citations.]
Nor does the statute make the State ' "vicariously liable for the
employees. [Citation.] Although the State is
to pay the judgment assessed against its employees for medical malpractice
committed against a prisoner, the State is immune from suit directly." ' " (Castaneda,
supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1070-1071.)
We conclude
there is a reasonable possibility Huffman can plead specific facts sufficient
to impose liability against the State under this statute. As we have explained above, to state a cause
of action against the State under section 845.6, Huffman must allege a public employee,
acting within the scope of employment, knew or had reason to know the need for
it. Huffman alleged he was beaten by correctional
officers and other inmates, and his allegations about his ensuing injuries and
hospitalization suggest he suffered a serious and obvious trauma requiring
immediate medical care. On appeal,
Huffman explains he can plead that the time frame within which the officers summoned
medical care for him was not reasonable; that after his beating they let him "bleed
out" and did not take reasonable steps to summon medical care quickly
enough given the severe nature of his injuries.
These facts and arguments suggest a reasonable possibility that Huffman
can state a cause of action against the State under section 845.6.
We are not
persuaded by the State's arguments to the contrary. It argues Huffman never attempted to state
such a cause of action in his first amended complaint, which does not contain
any allegations regarding the failure to summon medical care. It points out Huffman alleges that the correctional
officers did in fact summon medical care, which resulted in him being, in the
State's words, "quickly transported from the prison to an outside
hospital." It essentially argues
that there can be no liability under section 845.6—that the officers' actions were
reasonable as a matter of law—based on Huffman's allegations that he was
transported, treated, stabilized and placed in surgery within two hours of the
beating. Citing Watson v. State of California (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 836, the State
characterizes Huffman's burden as having to plead the prison guard knows or has
reason to know of the need "of immediate
medical care and . . . fails to summon such
care."
It is
irrelevant that Huffman did not attempt to plead a statutory cause of action
under section 845.6, as our task on review of the sustaining of a demurrer is
to decide whether he can state any cause
of action. "On demurrer . . . , the
question is whether the facts alleged in the complaint might support any
explicitly articulated in the document."
(Lee v. Bank of America (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 197, 216.) Having
assessed that question, we are not prepared to say that allegations that
Huffman was in surgery within two hours after his beating show that the correctional
officers took reasonable action to summon medical care, obviating liability
under section 845.6 as a matter of law. Further, the State's characterization of
section 845.6 liability reads the reasonableness element out of the statute; it
ignores the statutory language stating that the employee must fail to
care, a question that Castaneda recognizes
is one of fact for the jury. (
of the need for immediate health care and the reasonableness of his or her
actions in summoning care are factual questions for the jury], citing
Cal.App.2d 302, 307.) Here, Huffman has
shown he can allege correctional officers waited to summon medical care while
they watched him "bleed out" and he suffered "massive brain
trauma" as a result.
We also
reject the State's argument that under Castaneda,
are in the purview of negligence and malpractice, which fall outside the
immunity exception conferred by section 845.6.
Castaneda does not stand for
that proposition. Castaneda involved a judgment following a jury trial, in which the
jury found the State had violated section 845.6 by failing to take reasonable
action to summon medical care for a prisoner.
(Castaneda,
holding that the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict did
not amount to a failure to summon medical care.
(Id. at p. 1074.) It was undisputed that the prisoner, who was in
pain and had a lesion, was examined by a doctor on intake and referred to a
urologist, and then three weeks later for a biopsy. (Id.
at p. 1058.) The biopsy referral was denied because the
prisoner was being transferred to his permanent placement the next day where he
would be screened and his referral would be handled. (Ibid.) The prisoner was then examined by a nurse
practitioner and scheduled to go to a urology clinic but he was released to
federal authorities in March 2006, days before his appointment. (Id.
at p. 1059.) After his release from
federal custody in February 2007, the prisoner was diagnosed with cancer. (Ibid.)
On appeal,
the Court of Appeal agreed the evidence established the State's immunity by
virtue of the prisoner's examination on intake by the physician and also by the
nurse practitioner who both assessed him, included cancer as part of a
differential diagnosis, and referred him for further treatment. (Castaneda,
supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p.
1072.) According to the court, the
failure of the employees to provide further treatment, ensure further
diagnosis, or monitor him for follow up went
to the reasonableness of the medical care, it was not a failure to summon
medical care. (Id. at p. 1072.) Further, the
denial of the prisoner's biopsy involved the exercise of medical judgment, and
was not subject to a tort suit for damages.
(Id. at pp. 1072-1073.) All of the omissions fell under the rubric of
obtaining or providing medical care, for which actions the State was
immune. (Id. at p. 1073.) The Court
of Appeal held that, "[o]nce summoned, the quality of medical care is a
matter of medical policy and practice, imposing on medical practitioners a duty
to exercise that degree of diligence, care, and skill possessed by other
members of the profession, but it is not a violation of the employee's
obligation to summon medical care under section 845.6." (Id.
at p. 1074.)
In sum, we
conclude Huffman has shown he should be granted leave to amend a statutory
cause of action against the State for violation of section 845.6.
II. The
Trial Court Erred by Dismissing the Doe Defendants
The trial
court's September 28, 2012 minute order, because it was signed, was an effective
judgment of dismissal of the entire action.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 581d ["All dismissals ordered by the
court shall be in the form of a written order signed by the court and filed in
the action and those orders when so filed shall constitute judgments and be
effective for all purposes, and the clerk shall note those judgments in the
register of actions in the case"]; Brehm
v. 21st Century Ins. County. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1233-1234 &
fn. 5; cf. Powell v. County of Orange
(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1577-1579 [unsigned minute order dismissing
complaint was not effective as a judgment].)
Huffman contends the trial court abused its discretion by sua sponte
dismissing his action against the Doe defendants, which denied him an
adjudication on the merits. He points
out the individual defendants were not subject to the State's demurrer and
could be identified with discovery, permitting amendment of the first amended
complaint.
The State
concedes the trial court might have erred by dismissing the Doe
defendants. It argues, however, that
Huffman waived the right to challenge the court's dismissal by submitting to
the court's tentative ruling sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend,
failing to raise the status of the Doe defendants in his clarification motion,
and failing to otherwise challenge the dismissal order before filing his notice
of appeal.
The State's
waiver arguments are unavailing. It fails
to recognize that after Huffman filed his notice of appeal, which was properly
taken from the appealable September 28, 2012 judgment, all proceedings were
stayed and the trial court was divested of subject matter jurisdiction to take
any further action in the case. (See
35 Cal.4th 180, 189, 196-197; Macaluso v.
Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1047; Young v. Tri-City Healthcare Dist. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 35,
41.) Thus, the trial court could not
have given Huffman relief even had he properly and timely moved for it.
It is of no
moment that the parties did not raise the subject matter jurisdiction issue
either below or in their briefs on appeal.
Subject matter jurisdiction " 'either exists or does not exist' ";
it "cannot be conferred by stipulation, consent, waiver or estoppel." (In re
A.C. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 854, 860.)
The trial court erred by dismissing Huffman's complaint against the
individual defendants, as the State's demurrer did not address the causes of
action against them.
DISPOSITION
We reverse
the judgment of dismissal as to the State of California and the Doe
defendants and remand the matter to the superior court with directions
to enter an order sustaining without leave to amend the State of California's
demurrer as to Daniel G. Huffman's causes of action against the State only for
negligence, assault, battery by a peace officer, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and granting
Huffman leave to amend to allege a cause of action under Government Code section
845.6. The action shall proceed
as against the Doe defendants. The parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
NARES, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Statutory references are to the Government Code unless
otherwise specified.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] After completion of briefing in this matter, the State moved
to augment the record on appeal to include Huffman's clarification motion and
reply, as well as his motion for reconsideration filed on November 1, 2012, the
trial court's November 13, 2012 minute order, and the trial court's December 5,
2012 judgment of dismissal. The first
two documents are already within the augmented clerk's transcript filed in
March 2013 after this court granted Huffman's unopposed motion to augment the
record. We grant the State's unopposed
request as to the remaining documents, which are part of the superior court
file in this case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A) [on the
motion of any party, the reviewing court
may augment the record to include any document filed
or lodged in the case in superior court].)
