>In re Steven
C.

> 

> 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed
11/19/13  In re Steven C. CA5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 
>

In re STEVEN C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,   Plaintiff and Respondent,                           v.   STEVEN C.,   Defendant and Appellant.	F066148   (Super. Ct. No. 09CEJ600276-3)     >OPINION

 

            APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Fresno
County.  Gary Hoff, Judge.

            Mitchell
Law Group and Michael E. Mitchell for Defendant and Appellant.

            Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Robert K. Gezi and Ryan B.
McCarroll, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

            Following a
contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found that appellant, Steven
C., a minor, committed two counts of battery
(Pen. Code,href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"
title="">^[1] § 242; counts 4, 6) and individual counts
of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd.
(a)(4); count 1), second degree robbery (§§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c); count
2) and grand theft (§ 487; count 3).  The
court also found true an enhancement allegation that appellant, in committing
the count 1 assault, personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim,
within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a) (section
12022.7(a)).  Following the subsequent
disposition hearing, the court ordered appellant committed to the href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
Division of Juvenile Facilities and set his maximum term of physical
confinement at nine years four months.

            On appeal,
appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the true
finding on the great bodily injury enhancement allegation and his adjudications
of robbery and grand theft.  We affirm.

FACTShref="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">^[2]>

>Prior
to the Attack

            At
approximately 9:50 p.m. on June 5, 2012, Amanda Ardemagni, age 20, and her
close friend Andrew Pope, age 21, met at a park in Fresno to talk about a
personal problem that was upsetting Ardemagni. 
After some discussion, Pope suggested they take a drive, Ardemagni
agreed, and the two began walking to Pope’s car, at which point they heard
people behind them.  Pope and Ardemagni
turned around and saw a group of four male youths, including appellant and
Dominic F. (Dominic).

            Ardemagni
testified Pope asked, “are you guys good,” and Dominic replied, “yeah, nigga,
we good.  What the fuck are you doing[?]”
 Ardemagni turned and began walking to
her car, and Pope indicated to the four youths he wanted to avoid “trouble” and
that he and Ardemagni were leaving.  Pope
then turned around and continued walking in the direction of the cars.  The youths followed and, according to
Ardemagni, “[made] comments like come here, baby, we’ll show you a good time ....” 

            Ardemagni
and Pope continued walking to their cars. 
Pope again turned around and again asked “are you guys good[?].”  Dominic responded, “we faded, nigga, we
faded.”  Pope again told the four that he
and Ardemagni were leaving.

>The
Attack – Pope’s Testimony

At that point, as Pope was turning
away, someone—Pope could not tell who—struck him somewhere in the area of the
left side of his neck.  Pope turned to
Ardemagni, told her to run, and put his arms up to protect his face, at which
point he “was being hit again.”  He could
not tell who was hitting him or how many people were hitting him.  There were “a lot of fists being thrown” and
he was “being hit a lot” on his neck and head.  At some point, “[his] body just got tired … and
[he] fell” to the ground.  While he was
on the ground his “neck and head continued to get hit.”  He had his eyes closed, but it felt like he
was getting “hit” with shoes and that “multiple people” were hitting him.  He heard someone say, “Take his fucking phone
and his wallet” and he felt “hands shuffling [sic] on [his] pants to get things out of [his] pockets.”  He was struck “a lot” while he was on the
ground.

>The
Attack – Ardemagni’s Testimony

            Immediately
after Pope said a second time that he and Ardemagni were leaving, Dominic
“called [Pope] a punk ass nigga” and pushed him with both hands in the middle
of his back.  Pope told Ardemagni to run,
and immediately thereafter one of the four youths—not appellant or
Dominic—punched Pope in the right temple, causing Pope to stumble, but not fall
to the ground.  At that point, appellant,
Dominic and their two companions “gathered around” Pope.  Ardemagni ran out into the street, and as she
ran she dialed 911.  As she made the 911
call she “vaguely heard them [the assailants] ... talking about finding
[Pope’s] wallet and his phone.”  She
stopped and turned back around, at which point Pope was on the ground, 22 feet
away from where she was when she placed the 911 call.  Pope was not in the “exact same place” he had
been when Ardemagni turned and ran.  She
“didn’t see what happened” in the interval between when she began running and
the time she looked back to see Pope being attacked.  

            Dominic was
punching Pope in the chest and back, kicking him in the back and “rummaging”
through Pope’s back pocket, where his wallet was, and his sweater pockets.  Another assailant—not appellant—was “kicking
and stomping on [Pope’s] head.” 
Appellant was “[k]icking [Pope] as hard as he could,” in the stomach and
his “sides.”  The fourth attacker was “just
kind of kicking … and punching” Pope, “down towards the legs.”  Pope “was kind of rolling around from the
different blows he was getting.”

            The attack
ended when Ardemagni flagged down a passing car, and appellant and his
companions ran off.  From when Pope was
first struck to the point the attack ended, approximately “[one] minute if
that, maybe a little more” elapsed.  Ardemagni
saw appellant kicking Pope for a period of 30 seconds to one minute.  Asked to rank the assailants in terms of “who
was striking [Pope] the most,” Ardemagni placed appellant second.  At the time of the jurisdiction hearing her
memory of what the assailants were wearing was “starting to diminish,” but, she
testified, “I can see them perfectly in my head and everything that happened.”

            Ardemagni
realized Pope’s phone was missing while still at the park shortly after the
attack, when she wanted to call Pope’s father but discovered the phone was not
in Pope’s pocket.  She discovered Pope’s
wallet was missing later at the hospital where Pope was taken following the
attack. 

>Post-Attack
Statements

            Fresno
Police Detective Christopher Lee testified to the following:  He spoke with Pope and Ardemagni 16 days
after the attack, on June 21, 2012.  Ardemagni
stated she heard the attackers say “get his phone and wallet,” but that was
“after the assault,” and she “made no mention” of the attackers going through
Pope’s pockets.  Pope “didn’t make any
mention … that [the attackers] asked for his cell phone or said get his wallet
or go through his pockets or anything of that nature[.]”

            Fresno
Police Officer Eric Sanders testified to the following:  He spoke with Pope at the hospital on the
night of the attack.  Pope stated he had
his cell phone and wallet with him while he was at the park but he did not have
those items with him at the hospital, and he “did not know where it [>sic] went.”  Pope “never told [Sanders] that he heard ...
suspects say get his wallet, get [his] phone, anything of that nature,” and he
“[n]ever said anything about he felt people rummaging through his pockets
taking items from him at the scene[.]” 

>Pope’s
Injuries

            Pope
testified to the following:  At some
point, while he was down on the pavement being beaten, he lost
consciousness.  When he regained
consciousness he was on grass and Ardemagni was holding his head and neck.  He suffered cuts requiring sutures above both
eyebrows; the cuts left scars that were visible at the time of the jurisdiction
hearing in September 2012.  He was
treated in a hospital emergency room the night of the attack and he left the
hospital early the next morning.  The
“brunt [sic]” of his injuries were to
his face, head and neck.  He “was in bed
for two weeks” following the attack, in the week following the attack he
experienced pain he described by quantifying it as eight on a scale of 10, and
he suffered migraine headaches for approximately three weeks.  In addition, both his eyes were swollen
following the attack, and he suffered from blurred vision for two to three
weeks thereafter.

            Ardemagni
testified that when she went to Pope’s assistance after the assailants had
fled, he was unconscious, he had a lump the size of a golf ball above his left
eye, his left eye was swollen shut, there was “a bunch of blood coming from the
right side of his forehead,” and there was “blood all over his face.”

            Fresno
Police Officer Steven Jaquez testified that when he arrived on the scene Pope
was lying on the ground, and he was “in and out of consciousness.”

            Dr. Richard
Goka, a physician, testified to the following: 
He reviewed hospital records, an investigator’s report and photographs
of Pope.  According to the records,
“[Pope’s] injuries were basically lacerations to both eyebrows that require[d]
suturing[,] and multiple abrasions and contusions.”  The bruising was “extensive.”  The two eyebrow lacerations required,
respectively, one and two sutures.  There
was no record of any bleeding except as a result of those lacerations.   Any
laceration to the face can cause profuse bleeding.  Following the attack Pope’s level of
“responsiveness” was “normal.”  Dr. Goka
opined as follows:  the lacerations above
Pope’s eyes were “superficial”; “if [Pope] had loss of consciousness he
probably did have a concussion”; and overall, based on “the fact there were no
permanent residuals,” Pope’s injuries were “[m]ild to moderate.”

DISCUSSION

>A.        Great
Bodily Injury Enhancement.

Section 12022.7(a) provides:  “Any person who personally inflicts great
bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony
or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of
imprisonment in the state prison of three years.” 

As indicated above, appellant
contends the evidence did not support the true finding of the section
12022.7(a) great bodily injury enhancement. 
His argument consists of two parts. 
He argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish (1) the
injuries suffered by Pope constituted “great bodily injury” (§ 12022.7(a)), or
that (2) appellant “personally inflict[ed]” (ibid.) such injury.  We
address these two claims in this order.

>            1.         The evidence was sufficient to
establish Pope suffered “great bodily injury.”

            Appellant
bases his challenge to the great bodily injury element of the section
12022.7(a) enhancement, in turn, on the following claims:  Dr. Goka classified Pope’s injuries as “mild
to moderate” and the lacerations above Pope’s eyes as “superficial”; Pope “did
not suffer from any long term injuries or disfigurement”; he did not suffer any
fractures; and tests performed shortly after the attack indicated his
responsiveness was normal.  This
challenge is without merit.

We first note that Dr. Goka’s
opinion that Pope’s injuries were mild to moderate, which was based on
information in the medical records that Pope suffered no permanent injury, and
appellant’s related claim that Pope did not suffer any “long term injuries or
disfigurement”  provide little support
for appellant’s position.  Section
12022.7, subdivision (f) defines “great bodily injury” as “significant or substantial
physical injury.”  As our Supreme Court
stated in People v. Escobar (1992) 3
Cal.4th 740 (Escobar), “Clearly, [this]
standard contains no specific requirement that the victim suffer ‘permanent,’
‘prolonged’ or ‘protracted’ disfigurement, impairment, or loss of bodily
function.”  (Id. at p. 750; accord, People
v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 64 [injury “need not be so grave” as to
cause victim permanent, prolonged, or protracted bodily damage].)

“It is well settled that the
determination of great bodily injury is essentially a question of fact, not of
law.  â€˜â€œWhether the harm resulting to the
victim ... constitutes great bodily injury is a question of fact for the [trier
of fact].  [Citation.]  If there is sufficient evidence to sustain the
[trier of fact’s] finding of great bodily injury, we are bound to accept it,
even though the circumstances might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary
finding.”’”  (Escobar, supra, 3 Cal.4th
at p. 750.)

While section 12022.7, subdivision (f)
defines great bodily injury as indicated above, another section of the Penal
Code defines “serious bodily injury” as “a serious impairment of physical
condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss
or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring
extensive suturing; and serious disfigurement.”  (§ 243, subd. (f)(4), italics added.)  These two terms have “substantially the same
meaning,”  (People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1375), and are “‘essentially
equivalent elements.’”  (>People v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal.3d
824, 831, disapproved on another ground People
v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89.) 
Here, the juvenile court reasonably could have credited the testimony of
Pope, Ardemagni and Officer Jaquez that Pope lost consciousness.  This evidence alone is sufficient to
establish Pope suffered great bodily injury. 
The other factors cited by appellant—the superficial character of the
lacerations to Pope’s face and the absence of any “disfigurement” or
fractures—establish, at most, that the evidence might be reconciled with a
conclusion contrary to that reached by the court.  As indicated above, however, this is not
sufficient to compel reversal.

Moreover, in addition to the
evidence that Pope lost consciousness, the evidence also showed the
following:  As a result of injuries
sustained in the attack, Pope was confined to bed for two weeks, he was in
severe pain for a week, he suffered blurred vision for three weeks, and he
suffered migraine headaches for approximately three weeks.  Although, as appellant suggests, these
effects of the beating do not rise to the level of permanent injury, they
nonetheless establish that appellant suffered “significant or substantial” (§
12022.7, subd. (f)) injury, and provide further support for the juvenile
court’s finding that Pope suffered “great bodily injury” (§ 12022.7(a)). 

>            2.         The evidence was sufficient to
establish the “personally inflict[ed]” element of the section 12022.7(a)
enhancement.

            Appellant
argues that Pope’s injuries were to the neck and head, and there was no
evidence appellant struck Pope anywhere other than in the stomach and
sides.  Indeed, appellant notes,
Ardemagni’s testimony was particularly clear on this latter point because she
testified she had a good memory of the incident.  Therefore, appellant asserts, the evidence
was insufficient to establish that he “personally inflict[ed]” great bodily
injury on Pope, within the meaning of section 12022.7(a). 

            Appellant
bases this claim on People v. Cole
(1982) 31 Cal.3d 568 (Cole).  In that case, the defendant (during a
burglary and robbery) ordered his accomplice to kill the victim and blocked the
victim’s escape while his accomplice repeatedly struck the victim.   The sentencing court imposed an enhancement
under a prior version of section 12022.7, to which we refer as former section
12022.7, which is identical in all relevant respects to section 12022.7(a).  However, the defendant never himself struck
the victim.  (Cole, at p. 571.)  The
defendant challenged the former section 12022.7 enhancement, and >Cole held the “personally inflicts”
statutory language clearly and unambiguously required that the individual
accused of inflicting great bodily injury must be “the person who directly
acted to cause the injury.  The choice of
the word ‘personally’ necessarily excludes those who may have aided or abetted
the actor directly inflicting the injury.”  (Cole,
at p. 572.)

In People v. Corona (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 589 (Corona), the Court of Appeal considered whether >Cole precluded a former section 12022.7
enhancement when the defendant was one of numerous assailants who attacked the
victim, knocked him to the ground and repeatedly hit and kicked him, causing
the victim numerous significant injuries. 
Addressing the true finding on the enhancement allegation, >Corona held there was substantial
evidence to support the finding.  (>Corona, at pp. 591–595.)  Moreover, Corona
concluded the Cole analysis “makes no
sense when applied to a group pummeling.” 
(Corona, at p. 594.)  “[W]hen a defendant participates in a group
beating and when it is not possible to determine which assailant inflicted
which injuries, the defendant may be punished with a great bodily injury
enhancement if his conduct was of a nature that it could have caused the great
bodily injury suffered.”  (>Ibid.)

The holding in Corona was affirmed by our Supreme Court in People v. Modiri (2006) 39 Cal.4th 481 (Modiri).  There, the court
acknowledged that to personally inflict injury, a person must “do so directly
rather than through an intermediary ....” 
(Id. at p. 493.)  However, the court observed that nothing in
the terms “personally” or “inflicts” as used in conjunction with “great bodily
injury” requires the defendant to act alone in causing the victim’s injuries.  (Ibid.)
 Further, “nothing in >Cole precludes a person from receiving
enhanced sentencing treatment where he joins others in actually beating and
harming the victim, and where the precise manner in which he contributes to the
victim’s injuries cannot be measured or ascertained.”  (Id.
at p. 495.)

Appellant argues the reasoning of >Corona and Modiri does not apply to the instant case because, he asserts, here
it can be ascertained how the victim suffered his injuries because the evidence
establishes that appellant was not among the assailants who inflicted those
injuries.  We disagree.  The juvenile court could reasonably believe
it was impossible to determine who caused the injuries.  After one of the assailants punched Pope in
the face, appellant’s group surrounded him, and Ardemagni ran out into the
street, where she dialed 911 and flagged down a passing car.  When she turned back to view the attack, Pope
was not in precisely the same spot where the attack began.  The evidence thus suggests Ardemagni was not
always in a position to see precisely who did what during the incident.  Moreover, Ardemagni testified Pope was
“rolling around” as he was being struck, and in describing the blows he
received to the area of his head, Pope testified it felt like “multiple people”
were hitting him.  This evidence renders
it difficult to determine exactly “whose foot could be traced to a particular
kick [and] whose fist could be patterned to a certain blow.”  (Corona,
supra, 213 Cal.App.3d at p. 594.)

Thus, the circumstances in this
case present the type of scenario for which the Corona-Modiri group
pummeling analysis is appropriate. 
Appellant “join[ed] others in actually beating and harming the victim,”
and “the precise manner in which he contribute[d] to the victim’s injuries
cannot be measured or ascertained.”  (>Modiri, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 495.) 
Accordingly, the court did not err in finding appellant personally
inflicted great bodily injury on the victim.

>B.        Adjudication
of Robbery and Grand Theft.

Appellant contends the evidence was
insufficient to support his adjudications of robbery and grand theft.  We disagree.

>            1.         Legal background.

“The elements of robbery are:  (1) a taking (2) of personal property (3) in
the possession of another (4) from her person or immediate presence (5) against
her will (6) accomplished by means of force or fear (7) with an intent to
permanently deprive.” (People v. Prieto
(1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 210, 213, fn. omitted.)  â€œWhere the elements of force or fear are
absent, a taking from the person is grand theft, a lesser included offense of
robbery.” (People v. Jones (1992) 2
Cal.App.4th 867, 869.)

All persons who aid and abet the
commission of a crime are criminally liable as principals.  (§ 31; People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 529 (>Nguyen).)  A person aids and abets the commission of a crime
“‘when he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the
perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or
encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes,
encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime.’”  (People
v. Delgado (2013) 56 Cal.4th 480, 486.)   â€œ[I]f a defendant’s liability for an offense
is predicated upon the theory that he or she aided and abetted the perpetrator,
the defendant’s intent to encourage or facilitate the actions of the
perpetrator ‘must be formed prior to or
during ‘commission’ of that offense.’ [Citation.]”  (People
v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1039.) 
“It is legally and logically impossible to both form the requisite
intent and in fact aid, promote, encourage, or facilitate commission of a crime
after the commission of that crime has ended.” 
(People v. Cooper (1991) 53
Cal.3d 1158, 1164.)

“[A]n aider and abettor need not
share the intent of the principal actor .... 
What is required is that the aider and abettor either share the actor’s
intent or intend to commit, encourage, or facilitate the commission of a crime.  [Citation.] The defendant might act out of
friendship for the perpetrator, dislike for the victim, general meanness, or
just for the thrill of it, but so long as he intentionally encourages or
facilitates the commission of the offense he is guilty as an aider and abettor.  [Citation.]” 
(Nguyen, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 534.)  

The elements of aiding and abetting
may be determined from a variety of factors, including presence at the scene of
the crime, companionship, conduct before and after the offense and flight.  (In re
Juan G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)

“Whether defendant aided and
abetted the crime is a question of fact, and on appeal all conflicts in the
evidence and reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the judgment.”  (People
v. Mitchell (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 325, 329.)

>            2.         Analysis.

            As
indicated above, the following evidence was adduced at the jurisdiction
hearing:  Pope testified that while he
was on the ground being beaten he heard one of his attackers direct the others
to take his (Pope’s) cell phone and wallet and he felt hands trying to remove
things from his pockets.  Ardemagni
testified she heard the attackers talking about taking Pope’s property.  Officer Sanders testified Pope said he had
his cell phone and wallet when he was at the park but no longer had these items
by the time he got to the hospital. 
Ardemagni testified that Dominic, at the time he was beating Pope, was
also going through Pope’s pockets, and that for a period of 30 seconds to one
minute, appellant was kicking Pope with great force.  Ardemagni also testified that after the
attack, Pope’s cell phone and wallet were discovered missing.

            Thus, the
evidence showed that at the time appellant and his companions were beating
Pope, one of the attackers directed the others to steal the victim’s wallet and
cell phone; both items were in his possession when he was at the park but
turned up missing after the attack; and the attackers fled the scene
together.  Under the principles
summarized above, this evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that
appellant knew—either because he told the others to take Pope’s cell phone or
because he heard one of the other attackers do so—that at least one of the
other participants in the attack intended to steal Pope’s wallet and cell
phone; both items were in fact taken by one or more of the attackers; and
appellant, by his actions, assisted in and facilitated the taking.  Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to
establish appellant’s guilt of the robbery and grand theft on an
aiding-and-abetting theory.

            Appellant’s
argument to the contrary, as best we can determine, consists of three
parts.  First, he argues the evidence was
insufficient to establish he committed either robbery or grand theft because
the evidence did not establish that he
intended to take Pope’s property.  This
contention is without merit.  As
demonstrated above, it is not necessary that the People prove appellant
intended to steal in order to establish appellant’s guilt as an aider and
abettor.  Rather, as is also demonstrated
above, the intent element necessary for aider and abettor liability is
established where, as here, the evidence shows the accused intended to, and
did, aid in and/or facilitate the commission of a crime.

            Second, it
appears appellant argues the evidence was insufficient to establish that the
cell phone and wallet were taken at all, by anyone.  It further appears appellant bases this
claim, in part, on his claims there was no evidence appellant took any of
Pope’s property, no evidence appellant or any of his companions demanded Pope’s
property before the attack, no evidence Pope’s property was later found on
appellant’s person, at his residence or among his belongings; and no evidence
that appellant, by word, “motion[],” or “signal[],” encouraged the other
assailants to take Pope’s property.  In
addition, in an attack on the credibility of Ardemagni’s testimony that she saw
Dominic rummaging through Pope’s pockets, he notes that she did not mention
this to Detective Lee when she spoke to him just days after the events giving
rise to the instant offenses. 

            These
factors do no more than militate in favor of a conclusion contrary to that
reached by the juvenile court.  They do
not compel a contrary finding. 
Appellant’s argument, in essence, asks us to reweigh the evidence.  This we will not do.  As indicated above, we resolve conflicts in
the evidence, and the inferences drawn from the evidence, in favor of the
judgment.  Under the principles of
appellate review summarized above, the evidence that Pope’s property was missing
after the attack, coupled with the evidence that one of the attackers was
rummaging through Pope’s pockets during the attack and directing the others to
take Pope’s property, was sufficient to establish that Pope’s cell phone and
wallet were, in fact, taken from him by one of the assailants.

            Finally,
appellant argues that even if the evidence was sufficient to establish the
taking element of both grand theft and robbery, the “evidence clearly
establishes that any intent to steal ... occurred after the assault took place.” 
(Italics added.)  The taking of
Pope’s property, appellant asserts, “appeared to be ... an afterthought.”

Appellant acknowledges, as he must,
that Pope testified that while the attack
was ongoing, one of the attackers exhorted the others to take Pope’s wallet
and cell phone and Ardemagni heard the assailants talking about taking Pope’s
property, and that such evidence militates in favor of the conclusion that the
intent to commit theft and robbery was formed before the assault was concluded.  He argues, however, that the testimony of
Pope and Ardemagni on these points is not credible for the following
reasons:  Given the conditions existing
at the time—it was night, Ardemagni was calling 911 and she was 22 feet
away—“[i]t  seems unlikely [that
Ardemagni] was in a position to see whether the assault was completed when the
statement was made regarding taking Mr. Pope’s property”; Detective Lee
testified that Ardemagni told him the statement regarding the taking of Pope’s
property was made after the assault had concluded, that Ardemagni did mention
the assailants going through Pope’s pockets, and that Pope did not mention the
assailants going though his pockets or saying anything about taking his
property; and Officer Sanders testified that Pope made no mention to him about
the assailants going through his pockets and saying anything about taking his
property.

            Appellant’s
argument on this point also fails because, we reiterate, we resolve all
conflicts in the evidence, and the inferences from the evidence, in favor of
the judgment.  The juvenile court
reasonably could have credited the testimony of Ardemagni and Pope regarding
the statements and actions of the attackers during the attack, testimony which
supports the conclusion that the intent to take Pope’s property was formed
before the assault was concluded.  Thus,
for the reasons set forth above, substantial evidence supports appellant’s
robbery and grand theft adjudications.

DISPOSITION

            The
judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                                            _____________________

LEVY, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

 

 

_____________________

CORNELL, J.

 

 

_____________________

OAKLEY, Pro Tem J.href="#_ftn3"
name="_ftnref3" title="">^*