In re Eddie B.
Filed 11/4/13 In re Eddie B. CA2/4
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In
re EDDIE B., et al.,
Persons
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B245681
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. CK94951)
LOS
ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
EDUARDO
B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.
William Hook, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
John F. Krattli, County Counsel, James
M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Stephen D. Watson, Senior Associate
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Father, Eduardo B., appeals from a
dependency court order declaring his children dependents of the court under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j).
Father contends there is no
children suffered or are at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm
such that dependency jurisdiction is appropriate. He also contends there is insufficient
evidence to support the dependency court’s order removing the children from his
custody. He challenges the court’s order
requiring him to submit to random drug testing as part of his reunification
plan, and he argues that the visitation plan is inappropriate. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family consists of Mother, Veronica
M., who is married but not to Father; Father, who is also married (to Ms. A.);
and three children, Eddie B. (8 years old at the time), Erika B. (6 years old),
and Nichole B. (4 years old).
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] The family came to the attention of the Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) on July
31, 2012,
when DCFS investigated allegations that Father’s girlfriend, Gabriela V., beat
up Mother in front of the children and that Father physically abused and
threatened Eddie and Erika.
Mother told the caseworker the
allegations were true, stating that a few months previously, Father had hit
Eddie and then threatened to kill everyone after Mother said she would call the
police. Mother stated that on June
22, 2012,
Father and Gabriela came home intoxicated, and Father threatened to have
Gabriela beat up Mother. Gabriela
attacked Mother, so Mother went to the police, who helped her retrieve her
belongings and move out of the house. Mother
obtained a restraining order against Father.
Mother stated that Father was often
intoxicated and that he sold liquor illegally out of a house on the corner that
he owned. She told the caseworker that
Father was associated with a notorious Mexican gang and had threatened to flee
to Mexico with the children. She said Father had court-ordered unmonitored
weekend visits with the children, but they cried about visiting with Father and
did not want to visit him.
Mother’s adult son, Jonathan B.,
played a recording for the caseworker of Eddie crying and saying he did not
want to visit Father. Jonathan stated
that Father sold liquor illegally and also sold narcotics.
The caseworker interviewed the
children privately. Eddie stated that
Mother fed him, helped him with his chores and homework, took him to the park,
and washed their clothes. He told the
caseworker that he was afraid of Father, who owned a machete, a gun, and a
sword. He said that Father spent a lot
of time at the corner house, where there were bad people like Father who drank
all day. He described Father hitting him
with a belt, punching him in the stomach and back, and threatening to cut off
his tongue with a knife. He remembered
the incident when Gabriela hit Mother, stating that Father had been drinking
and that Gabriela beat up Mother.
Erika said that Mother took care of
her. She told the caseworker that she
saw Gabriela pull Mother’s hair and push her to the floor. She said that Mother did not hit her, but
Father had hit her with a belt and called her “motherfucker.†She said that she did not have any marks or
bruises but that she was afraid of Father.
Nichole said that Father pushed her
against the wall and hit her with his open hand when she misbehaved. She said that Father pulled Mother’s hair and
threw her on the bed. She also told the
caseworker that Father hit her and her siblings with a belt, but Eddie stated
that Father did not hit Nichole because she was his favorite.
On July 31,
2012, Officer
Rush and Officer Bartholomy of the Monrovia Police Department accompanied the
caseworker on an unannounced visit to Father.
Officer Bartholomy reported that around the end of June, he responded to
a call from Mother stating that Father was driving past her son Jonathan’s
house. Officer Bartholomy saw Father’s
truck at a gas station near Mother. Gabriela
was sitting in the passenger seat of the truck.
During the interview, Father was “swaying
minimally while standing.†The
caseworker asked if he had been drinking alcohol. Father said no, he was diabetic and not
feeling well. Father admitted that he
occasionally smoked and that he drank three or four beers on the weekends, but
not if his children were visiting. He
denied all the allegations, stating that the children were being manipulated by
Mother. He denied threatening Mother or the
children and stated that Mother hit the children with a belt, but he had never
hit them or called them names. He said
that he had 10 children, seven of whom were now adults, and he had no history
of child abuse.
Father told Officer Bartholomy that he
had a restraining order against
Mother, but the officer told him the restraining orders were against him and
Gabriela. Officer Bartholomy asked
Father why he violated the restraining order, and Father said that he went to
the gas station near Mother’s house to buy cigarettes because they were cheap
there. The caseworker asked Father about
his criminal history, and he stated that he had been arrested 25 years previously
for transporting drugs, but Officer Bartholomy said that Father’s last arrest
was in 2009 for assault with a deadly weapon.
When asked about the incident between
Gabriela and Mother, Father, Gabriela, and Maria R., Paternal Grandmother,
stated that Mother attacked Father by pushing him and that Gabriela verbally
defended him. Mother then attacked
Gabriela. According to Gabriela, Mother
did not want to move out of Father’s home.
A family friend, Shawn Vigil, told the
caseworker that Mother had claimed domestic violence in the past in order to
obtain a residency card. Vigil stated
that Mother had admitted inflicting wounds on herself to support her domestic
violence claim and that Mother did not want to leave Father’s house when the
police helped her move out.
Paternal Grandmother said that she
lived in San Diego and was staying temporarily with her son while she received
medical treatment. Paternal Grandmother
said that she had never seen Father hit Mother but she had seen Mother hit
Father and call him names.
A paternal aunt told the caseworker
that she often traveled and so was not present during the incidents, but she
had heard that Mother was using drugs or alcohol. The paternal aunt repeated the allegation
that Mother had claimed domestic violence in a previous marriage to obtain a
residency card.
Father showed the caseworker and officer
the corner residence where he allegedly sold alcohol illegally, explaining that
his adult children lived there and he rented some rooms to tenants. The caseworker saw alcohol and a large bar
area but no cash register.
The caseworker interviewed Father’s wife,
Ms. A., who stated that Mother had been Father’s lover for 11 years. She stated that Father always treated his
children well and did not abuse alcohol or narcotics. Ms. A. also stated that there was no domestic
violence in her relationship with Father and that Mother married an American in
order to obtain legal residency.
The caseworker consulted Officer
Villalobos of the Monrovia Police Department, who had escorted Mother to retrieve
her belongings from Father’s house after she was assaulted by Gabriela. He stated that Mother appeared frightened and
wanted to get away from Father’s home. He
told the caseworker that the police believed Father was selling alcohol from
the corner house but did not have enough evidence to arrest him.
DCFS filed a
9, 2012,
alleging that the children came within the provisions of section 300,
subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). The
petition alleged that Father physically abused Eddie by striking him with belts
and fists, slapping him, and threatening to cut off his tongue with a knife and
kill him and the family. The petition
also alleged that Mother failed to protect Eddie when she knew he was being
abused by Father.
The petition further alleged that
Father abused Erika by striking her buttocks with belts, pushing her, pulling
her hair and kicking her, and that Mother failed to protect her. The petition alleged that Father struck
Nichole with belts and his hands and that Mother failed to protect her. In addition, the petition alleged that Father
and Mother had a history of engaging in violent altercations in the children’s
presence, and that Father slapped Mother and threatened to kill her and the
children.
been arrested for burglary and Father had been arrested for possession of
marijuana for sale, sale/transport of marijuana, assault with a deadly weapon,
and making a threat with an intent to terrorize.
At the detention hearing, Father
contended that the children were being coached.
The dependency court found that a prima facie showing had been made that
the children were persons described by section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and
(j), and ordered the children detained. The
court ordered that the children have no contact with Gabriela, ordered the
parents to attend a Parents Beyond Conflict program together, and granted both
parents monitored visits, but not together.
In a jurisdiction/disposition report
filed on September 6, 2012, DCFS reported that Eddie was living
with a foster mother, the other two children were with a different foster mother,
and Mother was living at a confidential address. Mother, Father, and the children were
interviewed for the report.
According to the report, Eddie stated
that Father sometimes hit him with a belt and one time punched him in the
stomach. He saw Father hit Erika when
she dropped food on the floor, and he said that Father hit Mother on the head
and back. He stated that Father had a
gun and a big knife and reported that Father threatened to cut off his tongue
when he did not listen to Father. Eddie
reported that Father had an illegal bar in the corner house and drank every
day.
Erika stated that Father spanked them
with a belt and also reported that Father threatened to cut out Eddie’s tongue
with a knife. She said that Father “punishes
us forever in the night†and that Mother did not hit them. According to Erika, Mother and Father yelled
at each other but did not hit each other, although she did report that Father
hit Mother once.
Nichole stated that Father spanked her
with a belt and hit her siblings with a belt.
Mother stated that in May 2012, she
heard a banging noise and heard Eddie call for her. She went to Eddie’s room and saw him kneeling
on the floor and Father standing over him making a fist. Mother stood in front of Father and told him
to get away or she would call the police. Father left the room. Eddie told Mother that Father punched him in
the stomach. Father returned to the room, threw Mother
against the wall, and pulled her up by the hair.
Mother said that Father did not hit
her often, but he had threatened to kill her and the children if she called the
police. She suspected him of using
cocaine because she saw him and Gabriela at the corner house with a mirror,
white powder, and a rolled up dollar bill.
She also had seen mirrors and straws in their bedroom, and she suspected
that he used drugs because sometimes he would not sleep for several days.
Father denied ever hitting the
children or Mother and accused Mother of coaching the children to make those
statements. He said that he had four
children with his first wife and raised his second wife’s children and had
never been accused of domestic violence or physical abuse. He stated Mother left, taking the children’s
passports and his cars, because she had a lover. Father said that he drank occasionally but
did not get drunk. He reported that
after Mother moved in with him, she often would leave at night and not return
until the following morning and then sleep all day.
The foster parents reported that
Mother and Father had been appropriate during their visits.
The caseworker concluded that Mother’s
and Eddie’s statements had been inconsistent and that it was not clear if Eddie
was telling the truth or if he had been coached. The caseworker also stated that there was no
clear evidence to support the allegations of Father’s substance abuse, noting
that Father’s on-demand drug test was negative and that he was willing to
consent to drug tests. Although it was
unclear if there was abuse in the home, there was family conflict that was affecting
the children. The report recommended
that the children remain in foster care and that Mother and Father be provided
with reunification services and monitored visits.
In last minute information for the
court, a dependency investigator reported that Yvette B., Father’s adult
daughter, stated that she had never seen Father hit her younger siblings and
that she had never been abused by Father.
Yvette stated that Father was diabetic and so did not drink. She suspected that Mother used drugs because
Mother would stay out all night and then sleep all day.
In October 2012, the children were
ordered released to Mother pending the adjudication/disposition hearing.
At the November 2012 adjudication
hearing, Father asked that the petition be dismissed. At DCFS’ request, the court dismissed the
substance abuse allegation against Father.
The court acknowledged that there were some inconsistencies in the
statements, but, reasoning that the children had been adamant regarding their
allegations, the court found the allegations to be true. The court declared the children dependents of
the court and ordered them placed in Mother’s home. The court ordered Father to attend a 52-week
batterer intervention program and to submit to weekly random and on-demand drug
and alcohol tests. The court ordered
monitored visits for Father. Father
appeals from the jurisdictional and dispositional findings.
DISCUSSION
Father contends that the evidence is
insufficient to support the court’s assumption of jurisdiction. He further contends that the evidence is
insufficient to support the order removing the children from his custody and
that other reasonable alternatives were available. Father also challenges the order requiring
him to submit to drug tests. Finally, Father
contends that the visitation plan is inappropriate.
I. Jurisdiction
To assert jurisdiction over a minor
the juvenile court must find that he or she falls within one or more of the
categories specified in section 300. (
179, 185 (Veronica G.).) DCFS bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the minor comes under the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction. (Ibid.) “On appeal from an
order making jurisdictional findings, we must uphold the court’s findings
unless, after reviewing the entire record and resolving all conflicts in favor
of the respondent and drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the
judgment, we determine there is no substantial evidence to support the
findings. [Citation.] Substantial evidence is evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value.†(Ibid.)
“‘In dependency proceedings, a trial
court’s determination will not be disturbed unless it exceeds the bounds of
reason. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]â€
(In re E.B. (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 568, 575.) Our focus is on
whether DCFS has proffered substantial evidence that “at the time of the
jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical
harm in the future.†(
1387, 1396.)
The dependency court found
jurisdiction appropriate under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). “Jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision
(a) requires proof that the child suffered or is at substantial risk of suffering
‘serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s
parent or guardian.’†(
713, 716 (Daisy H.).)
Dependency jurisdiction may be
asserted under section 300, subdivision (b) where DCFS establishes that “[t]he
child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer,
serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of
his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or
the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to
adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian
with whom the child has been left, or by the willful or negligent failure of
the parent or guardian to provide the child with adequate food, clothing,
shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent or guardian to
provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental
illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.†(§ 300, subd. (b).) Under section 300, subdivision (j), DCFS must
establish that “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined
in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that
the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.â€
“When a dependency petition alleges
multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency
court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the dependency court’s
finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for
jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial
evidence. In such a case, the reviewing
court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory
grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence. [Citations.]†(In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)
Father contends that the evidence is
insufficient to support the court’s jurisdictional findings because there was
no physical evidence that he abused the children and the statements supporting
the findings were inconsistent. He
points out that he has consistently denied any abuse and that he had no history
of child abuse.
Father further contends that no other
family members reported seeing domestic violence and that the family friend who
was interviewed told the caseworker that Mother admitted inflicting bruises on
herself in order to falsely claim domestic violence. He also relies on the social worker’s conclusion
that Mother’s statements about the physical abuse were inconsistent.
The dependency court considered the
evidence and concluded that jurisdiction was appropriate. The fact that there were witnesses who disputed
the allegations of abuse is not sufficient to defeat jurisdiction. In reviewing the dependency court’s
jurisdictional finding, “[w]e do not reweigh the evidence, nor do we consider
matters of credibility. [Citation.]†(In re
E.H. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 659, 669.)
Instead, “we determine whether evidence that is of reasonable, credible
and solid value supports the dependency court’s findings.†(Ibid.)
We conclude that the statements by the
children and Mother constitute sufficient evidence to support the court’s
jurisdictional finding. Eddie was
interviewed for the initial detention report and again while he was in foster
care, and both times he stated that Father hit him with a belt and once punched
him in the stomach. Mother also
described the incident in which Father punched Eddie in the stomach. Eddie also was consistent in his statements
that Father called him bad words and threatened to cut off his tongue with a
knife.
Erika also was interviewed twice, and
she consistently stated that Father hit her with a belt and once pulled her
hair and pushed her onto the bed. Eddie
also described seeing Father pull Erika’s hair and push her onto the bed, and
Mother stated that Erika had told her about this incident. In the initial interview, Eddie and Erika
told the caseworker that they were afraid of Father. In the second interview, Erika told the
caseworker that she was afraid of Father but not of Mother.
In both interviews, Nichole stated
that Father hit her and her siblings with a belt. She also stated that Father pushed her
against the wall.
Although there were some
inconsistencies in Mother’s and Eddie’s statements, the dependency court took
those inconsistencies into consideration in making its decision. The court reasoned that, despite the
inconsistencies, the children were “adamant in their standing by the information
they’ve provided.†Resolving all
conflicts in favor of the respondent and drawing all reasonable inferences in
support of the judgment (Veronica G.,
supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at p. 185), we
conclude that the court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence.
The lack of physical evidence of abuse
is not sufficient to defeat jurisdiction.
“The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to
assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child. [Citations.]
The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child presently
needs the court’s protection.
[Citations.]†(
165-166.)
Father contends that the lack of
physical evidence of abuse renders this case similar to Daisy H. But in
evidence of abuse, there was also no allegation of abuse or statements from the
mother or children describing abuse.
Instead, the dependency petition alleged that the father abused the
mother and that this placed the children at risk of physical and emotional
harm. (See Daisy H., supra, 192
Cal.App.4th at pp. 715-716 [describing the allegations in the petition].) In fact, DCFS acknowledged that the father “‘has
not been abusive towards the children and has not made threats to hurt the
children . . . .’†(Id. at p. 716.) Thus, “[t]here
was no evidence that Father ever intentionally harmed any of his children or
that the children were at risk of intentional harm.†(Ibid.) By contrast, in the instant case, there was evidence
that Father intentionally harmed the children.
II.
Father’s second contention is that
there was insufficient evidence to support the dependency court’s decision to
remove the children from his custody and that there were reasonable
alternatives to removal. He relies on
section 361, which addresses the court’s authority to remove a child. Under section 361, subdivision (c), a child
may not be taken from the custody of the parent unless the court finds clear
and convincing evidence of one of several circumstances. The court’s “jurisdictional findings are
prima facie evidence the child cannot safely remain in the home. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).)†(In re
Hailey T. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 139, 146 (Hailey T.).)
“‘Clear and convincing evidence
requires a high probability, such that the evidence is so clear as to leave no
substantial doubt.’ [Citation.]†(Hailey
T., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p.
146.) “‘“‘The sufficiency of evidence to
establish a given fact, where the law requires proof of the fact to be clear
and convincing, is primarily a question for the trial court to determine, and
if there is substantial evidence to support its conclusion, the determination
is not open to review on appeal.’ [Citations.]â€
[Citation.] Thus, on appeal from a judgment required to be
based upon clear and convincing evidence, “the clear and convincing test
disappears . . . [and] the usual rule of conflicting evidence is applied,
giving full effect to the respondent’s evidence, however slight, and
disregarding the appellant’s evidence, however strong.†[Citation.]’â€
(In re Mark L. (2001) 94
Cal.App.4th 573, 580-581 (Mark L.).)
The dependency court relied on section
361, subdivision (c)(1), finding by clear and convincing evidence that
remaining in the home of Father would pose “a substantial danger to the
physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being†of
the children, and that there were “no reasonable means other than removal to
protect the children.†(§ 361,
subd. (c)(1).)
DCFS points out, however, that Father
was a noncustodial parent. Thus, the
court should have proceeded under section 361.2, not section 361. Under section 361.2, the court is required to
“consider whether placement with the noncustodial parent would be ‘detrimental
to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.’ A detriment evaluation requires that the
court weigh all relevant factors to determine if the child will suffer net
harm. [Citation.]†(In re
Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1425.)
The court’s decision is reviewed for substantial evidence. (Id.
at p. 1424.) This standard is less
onerous than that of section 361, which requires a finding not of mere
detriment, but of substantial danger.
Here, relying on section 361, the
court found by clear and convincing evidence that remaining in the home of
Father would pose a substantial danger to the children’s well-being. That finding subsumes a finding of detriment,
and thus the court’s error in relying on section 361 was harmless. Further, for reasons already stated,
substantial evidence supports that finding.
Father relies on Hailey T. There, the
juvenile court removed the child from the home even though there was no evidence
in the record that the child “was ever a victim of abuse in the parents’ home,
or that she suffered any harm as a result of the abuse that the court found
with respect to [the sibling].†(
In addition, the record contained “abundant evidence that [the parents]
were good parents who enjoyed a healthy relationship. There was no evidence of ongoing physical
domestic violence between the parents; indeed there was no evidence of
the parents during their nine-year marriage.
Neither parent had substance abuse problems, and there was no evidence
that either suffered from mental health conditions, developmental delays or
other social issues that often are at the root of dependency cases and might
place children at continuing risk in the home.â€
(Ibid.)
Unlike Hailey T., here the record contains substantial evidence that the
children removed from Father’s custody were abused by Father. Also unlike Hailey T., there was evidence here of ongoing
T., supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p.
147.) Thus, Hailey T. does not support Father’s argument.
III. Reunification
Plan
Father challenges the court order that
he participate in weekly random drug testing, arguing that the allegation of
substance abuse did not support the court’s jurisdiction finding. At DCFS’s request, the dependency court
dismissed the allegation in the petition that Father had a history of alcohol
and cocaine abuse. Nonetheless, the
court ordered weekly drug tests for Father.
“At the dispositional hearing, the
juvenile court must order child welfare services for the minor and the minor’s
parents to facilitate reunification of the family. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 1456(f)(1).) The court has
broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s
interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accord with this
discretion. [Citations.] We cannot reverse the court’s determination
in this regard absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citation.]â€
(In re Christopher H. (1996)
50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1006.)
Father contends that his case is
similar to In re Sergio C. (1999) 70
Cal.App.4th 957, in which the court found the evidence insufficient to sustain
the dependency court’s drug testing order.
In Sergio C., however, unlike
the instant case, the appellate court found and DCFS conceded that there was
insufficient evidence to support the order sustaining the section 300 petition
in the first place. (
DCFS that the father used drugs, but he denied he had ever used or sold drugs. Thus, the only evidence that the father used
drugs was “the unsworn and uncorroborated allegation of an admitted drug addict
[the mother] who has abandoned her children.â€
(Ibid.) The court reversed the drug testing order,
stating that where “the custodial parent has flatly denied all involvement with
drugs and has otherwise cooperated fully with all of the court’s orders, there
must be some investigation by DCFS to
warrant the kind of invasive order that was made here.†(Ibid.)
Unlike the father in
parent, and the petition was sustained against him. Also unlike Sergio C., there was evidence here of alcohol and drug abuse other than
a vague, unsupported allegation from Mother.
For example, at the first visit to Father’s house, the caseworker and
officer noticed that Father was “swaying.â€
Eddie reported that Father drank every day. Officer Villalobos corroborated Mother’s
allegation that Father was selling alcohol illegally from the corner residence. Further, Mother had given the police specific
information about seeing a mirror, white powder, and a rolled up dollar bill at
Father’s corner house, as well as mirrors and straws in the bedroom. DCFS’ investigation also revealed that Father
had been arrested for possession of marijuana for sale and sale/transport of
marijuana. Thus, the order that Father
undergo drug testing was supported by evidence in the record.
Father also relies on
177, in which the court considered whether the juvenile court properly required
the nonoffending parent to attend a parenting class. In Jasmin
C., the mother was ordered to attend a parenting class even though she “was
nonoffending under the petition[,] . . . did not abuse her children, fail to
protect them, or engage in any other inappropriate behavior.†(Id.
at p. 181.) Unlike Jasmin C., in the present case, Father is an offending parent, and
there is evidence in the record of alcohol and drug abuse.
Father contends that the drug testing
order will not help resolve the conditions that led to the dependency. However, the event that precipitated DCFS’
investigation was the incident in which Father allegedly came home intoxicated
and threatened to have Gabriela beat up Mother.
We conclude that the dependency court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering Father to submit to drug testing.
IV. Visitation
Plan
Father contends that the visitation
plan inappropriately restricts his visits with his children and will impede his
reunification with his children.
“When a finding that reunification
services were adequate is challenged on appeal, we review it for substantial
evidence. [Citation.] ‘“In juvenile cases, as in other areas of the
law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess the sufficiency of the
evidence begins and ends with a determination as to whether or not there is any
substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted, which will support the
conclusion of the trier of fact.â€â€˜
[Citation.] Even if there is no
substantial conflict in the evidence, we must nevertheless draw all legitimate
inferences in support of the findings of the juvenile court.†(In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th
962, 971.)
“Visitation between a dependent child
and his or her parents is an essential component of a reunification plan, even
if actual physical custody is not the outcome of the proceedings. [Citation.]
Visitation ‘shall be as frequent as possible, consistent with the
well-being of the child.’ (§ 362.1,
subd. (a)(1)(A).) However, ‘[n]o
visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.’ (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).) It is ordinarily improper to deny visitation
absent a showing of detriment.
[Citations.]†(
580.)
Father’s challenge to the visitation
order is based on the same arguments he raises throughout: that he “had no history of involvement in the
child welfare system, no history of child abuse, and had cooperated with the
department throughout the process.†He
again argues that the evidence does not support the dependency court’s findings that he abused the children at all
or that they would be in danger if placed with him. We have reviewed the record and found that
the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders are supported by
substantial evidence.
The jurisdictional and dispositional
orders are affirmed.
WILLHITE,
Acting P. J.
We
concur:
MANELLA,
J.
SUZUKAWA,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All further
statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Mother is not a
party to this appeal.
