Ulllman v. Hollywood
Mort. Investors
Filed 11/6/13 Ulllman v. Hollywood Dell First Mort. Investors CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
JEFFREY ULLMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
HOLLYWOOD DELL FIRST MORTGAGE INVESTORS, LP et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
B246603
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC442576)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior
Court of
County, Victor E. Chavez, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Leonard,
Dicker & Schreiber, Richard C. Leonard, and Steven A. Schuman for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Songstad
Randall Coffee & Humphrey, L. Allan Songstad, Jr., and Linda D. Pasin for
Defendants and Respondents.
Following
a bench trial on plaintiff and appellant Jeffrey Ullman’s complaint for
conveyance, the superior court entered judgment for defendants and respondents
Hollywood Dell First Mortgage Investors, LP (Hollywood Dell), and Carl Lindros
as “Trustee of the Carl Lindros IRAâ€
defendants). In this appeal from the
judgment, Ullman contends the trial court erred in denying declaratory relief
and dismissing the fraudulent conveyance claim.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the dismissal of the fraudulent
transfer claim, but modify the judgment to reflect that the dismissal is with
prejudice. The judgment, as modified, is
affirmed.
In a
prior action, Ullman sued his former business partner, Rebecca Richards, for
dissolution of partnership and other claims. (Ullman
v. Richards (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2009, No. BC392003).) After obtaining a $1.2 million judgment
against Rebecca, Ullman recorded an abstract of judgment on April 10, 2009.
husband, Rob Richards, was not a party to that action,
to the interests of both spouses in all community real property located in this
county.
title="">[4]
In
the present action, Ullman seeks declaratory
relief to establish that as to Rob’s former 25 percent community property
interest (Rob’s interest) in certain real properties (properties),
first and second deeds of trust, even though they were recorded first in 2008. Although Ullman concedes that his judgment
lien, which was recorded in 2009, is subject to the deeds of trust with regard to
Rebecca’s 75 percent interest in the properties, he argues that as to Rob’s
interest, the usual rule of priority based on the date of recording does not
apply. Ullman asserts that because of an
error (which we will explain) that occurred when Hollywood Dell’s loan was
issued, neither Hollywood Dell’s first deed of trust nor Lindros’s second deed
of trust attached to Rob’s interest and, therefore, Ullman’s judgment lien was
the first and only lien that attached to Rob’s interest.
Because
the properties were sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale over three years
ago, it is unclear what, if any, relief may be obtained by Ullman at this late
date. In any event, in the following sections
we discuss (1) the significant dates and events, (2) Ullman’s and (3) defendants’
contentions at trial, (4) the trial court’s ruling, (5) Ullman’s motion to
set aside that ruling, and (6) the judgment for defendants.
I. Significant Dates and Events
In 2007,
Rebecca and Rob acquired the subject properties as joint tenants. Later that year, Rebecca and Rob granted Ullman,
Rebecca’s business partner, a 50 percent interest in the properties, which
Rebecca intended to renovate.
In
2008, Rebecca sought to refinance the properties with a new lender, Hollywood
Dell. Hollywood Dell agreed to make a $4.1
million loan secured by a first deed of trust to the property, provided certain
conditions were met. The conditions, as
specified in the instructions to First American Title Company (FATCO or escrow
company), required FATCO to: (1) prepare
and record “Quit Claim Deeds duly executed by Rob Richards, husband of Rebecca L. Richards, and
(2) obtain a lender’s title insurance policy; and (3) prepare and record a $4.1
million first deed of trust to the properties signed by “Rebecca L. Richards, a married woman as her sole and separate property.â€
In partial
satisfaction of the loan requirements, (1) Ullman transferred his interest in
the properties to Rebecca,
name="_ftnref6" title="">[6] and (2) First American Title Insurance Company
(FATICO or title insurance company) issued a lender’s title insurance policy that
guaranteed and insured that Rebecca had clear title and was the sole owner of
the properties.
However,
due to an error by the escrow company, the $4.1 million loan was issued to
Rebecca, as sole borrower, without the required quitclaim deeds from Rob. Hollywood Dell’s first deed of trust, which
Rebecca had signed as “Rebecca L. Richards, a married woman as her sole and
separate property,†was recorded on
April 30, 2008.
In
August 2008, Rebecca obtained a $450,000 loan from Lindros, which was secured
by a second deed of trust that was recorded on September 5, 2008. FATICO issued a lender’s title insurance
policy that guaranteed and insured that Rebecca had clear title and was the
sole owner of the properties.
On
March 24, 2009, Ullman obtained a $1.2 million judgment against Rebecca in the
partnership action. On April 10, 2009,
Ullman recorded the abstract of judgment.
By
April 2009, Rebecca had defaulted on the loans from Hollywood Dell and Lindros.
On April 30, 2009, Hollywood Dell began
nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings against the properties.
During
the foreclosure process, it came to light that the escrow company had failed to
obtain and record the required quitclaim deeds from Rob. Because the title insurance company had
guaranteed that Rebecca was the sole owner of the properties, Hollywood Dell
and Lindros sued the title insurance company for breach of contract and breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. (Hollywood Dell First Mortgage Investors, L.P. et al. v. First American
Title Insurance Company et al. (Super. Ct. Santa Barbara County, 2010, No.
BC1338788) (title insurance action).) They
alleged in their complaint that because Rebecca “was and is not the only record
title holder,†they did not have a “true security interest in the propert[ies]â€
and could “not possibly foreclose on the propert[ies].â€
In
June 2009, Rob filed a bankruptcy action.
In May 2010, the bankruptcy court filed an order “abandoning any
interest Rob may have had in the Properties.†On May 20, 2010, Rob executed the grant deeds
that transferred his interest in the properties to Rebecca.
On
July 28, 2010, Ullman filed the present action against Hollywood Dell and
Lindros for declaratory relief (seeking to establish the seniority of his
judgment lien as to Rob’s interest in the properties) and fraudulent conveyance
(seeking to set aside the May 2010 transfer of Rob’s interest in the properties
to Rebecca).
In
August 2010, Hollywood Dell and Lindros settled the title insurance action. In the settlement, Hollywood Dell and Lindros
received $850,000 plus a defense and indemnity in this action. The settlement agreement stated in relevant
part that the $850,000 payment “includes payment for losses incurred by
Hollywood Dell and Lindros IRA for being unable to foreclose their respective
deeds of trust against the Subject Properties through approximately mid October
2010, when it is anticipated that the new foreclosure sale date will be
scheduled on the $4.1 million deed of trust.â€
On
October 28, 2010, Hollywood Dell acquired the properties by making a $2.5
million credit bid at the trustee’s foreclosure sale.
On
November 6, 2012, the superior court conducted a one-day bench trial on
Ullman’s complaint in this action for declaratory relief and fraudulent
conveyance. In addition to the above
facts, which were presented primarily by joint stipulation, the trial court
heard Rob’s testimony that: (1) he had
no beneficial interest in the properties and “had absolutely no participation
in the real estate whatsoeverâ€; (2) he had no objections to the loans taken by
Rebecca; (3) when Rebecca obtained the loans from Hollywood Dell and Lindros,
he believed he “had signed quitclaims on everything and the properties were the
sole property of Rebecca Richards as an individualâ€; (4) it was his “intent to
be off of all the deedsâ€; and (5) he did not learn he was still on title to the
properties until “after Mr. Ullman initiated all this litigation.â€
II. Ullman’s Contentions
At
trial, Ullman contended that he was entitled to declaratory relief based on two
theories. First, because Rob still had
an interest in the properties when Rebecca signed the deeds of trust, Rebecca’s
signature alone was insufficient to encumber Rob’s interest. (Fam. Code, § 1102.)
in 2009, his lien attached to Rob’s interest in the properties, and remained
affixed to Rob’s interest when it was transferred to Rebecca in May 2010. (Code Civ. Proc., § 697.390.)
Ullman
also argued he was entitled to declaratory relief under the doctrine of
judicial estoppel. Ullman contended defendants
were bound by their concession in the title insurance action that, due to the
existence of Rob’s interest in the properties, they did not have a “true
security interest in the propert[ies]†and could “not possibly foreclose on the
propert[ies].â€
Alternatively,
Ullman contended the May 2010 transfer of Rob’s interest to Rebecca should be set
aside as a fraudulent conveyance. Ullman argued that “because Rob Richards was
in bankruptcy at the time of the transfer, was admittedly insolvent, and
received no consideration for the transfer, Rob’s transfer to Rebecca was a
fraudulent conveyance and Plaintiff has the right to set it aside.â€
III. Defendants’ Contentions
Relief
In
opposition to Ullman’s claim for declaratory relief, defendants argued their
deeds of trust were senior to the judgment lien for two main reasons.
First,
they argued that Rebecca was authorized to encumber Rob’s interest, but in any
event, an unauthorized encumbrance of community property is not void, but
merely voidable at the request of the other spouse or his or her
representative. Because Rob was aware of
and had acquiesced to the deeds of trust, the trustee’s sale was valid as to
Rob’s interest in the properties. (Citing
Clar v. Cacciola (1987) 193
Cal.App.3d 1032, 1036-1037 (Clar);
289, 300, fn. 6.)
Second,
defendants argued that Ullman was barred, under the doctrine of judicial
estoppel, from taking unfair advantage of the escrow company’s error in failing
to obtain and record Rob’s quitclaim deed before the $4.1 million loan was
issued. Defendants contended that as
Rebecca’s business partner with respect to the properties, Ullman was privy to
the lender’s requirement that all other interests must be cleared from title
before the $4.1 million loan would issue.
And because Ullman had transferred his own interest to Rebecca in
accordance with the lender’s instructions, he should be charged with the
knowledge that Hollywood Dell would not have issued the loan based on the
signature of only one spouse if it had known of the escrow company’s error in
failing to obtain and record Rob’s quitclaim deed.
Conveyance
Defendants
argued the transfer of Rob’s interest in the properties to Rebecca should not
be set aside as fraudulent for the following reasons. First, the claim must fail because of Ullman’s
failure to join Rebecca, a necessary party.
In a claim for fraudulent transfer, the transferee is a necessary party who
must be given an opportunity to defend the transfer. (Citing Diamond
Heights Village Assn., Inc. v. Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp. (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 290, 304-305.)
Second,
the transfer did not place Rob’s interest beyond Ullman’s reach. If, as Ullman contends, his judgment lien was
the senior lien, the transferred interest remained subject to that lien. (Citing Code Civ. Proc., § 697.390 [the
transferred interest remains subject to any lien against the property].)
Third,
nothing of value is conveyed by the transfer of real property that is fully
encumbered by a valid lien. The
properties, which were fully encumbered by the deeds of trust, had no equity. Accordingly, the transfer of Rob’s interest was
not fraudulent because nothing of value was conveyed through the transfer.
Court’s November 15, 2012 Ruling
After
taking the matter under submission, the superior court issued its November 15,
2012 ruling in favor of Hollywood Dell and Lindros. The court stated in relevant part: “As to the first cause of action for
Declaratory Relief, plaintiff seeks a determination that the Abstract of
Judgment is senior to the liens, if any, of Lindros and Hollywood Dell as to
Rob’s 25% interest in the property.
[¶] The first cause of action for
Declaratory Relief is based upon allegations that as of April 18, 2008, title
for the properties was in the name of [Rebecca] as to 75% and [Rob] as to the
remaining 25%. Plaintiff’s claim of a
superior lien fails in that defendants’ deeds of trust encumbered 100% of the
property. Plaintiff is not entitled to
declaratory relief.â€
In rejecting
Ullman’s fraudulent conveyance claim, the court stated in relevant part: “As to the second cause of action for
Fraudulent Conveyance, plaintiff moves for an order setting aside the transfer
of Rob’s 25% interest in the property, and instead directing that the sheriff
sell those interests at public auction, with the proceeds to be applied to the
judgment. [¶] The second cause of action for Fraudulent
Conveyance fails in that [Ullman] dismissed the transferee to the alleged
fraudulent transfer. At trial, [Rob] testified
that while he might be on title to the properties prior to defendant making the
loans, he claimed no beneficial interest in the property and was under the
impression the property belonged to [Rebecca].
[Rob] attempted to remove himself from the title and executed quitclaim
deeds to [Rebecca]. His belief was that
he was thus removed from title to the property.
[Rob] never claimed an interest in the property. It was his belief that it belonged to [Rebecca]. [¶]
Here, the alleged fraudulent transferee to the May 2011 transfer was [Rebecca]. Therefore, she is a necessary party to
[Ullman’s] second cause of action for fraudulent conveyance; she is an
indispensable party to Plaintiff’s second cause of action. [Rebecca’s] rights would be necessarily
affected by any judgment setting aside the May 2011 transfer because any such
judgment sets aside a conveyance of real
property to her. [Ullman] dismissed [Rebecca]
from this action on February 23, 2011.
Therefore, because [Ullman] has failed to include all necessary,
indispensable parties, namely [Rebecca], [Ullman’s] second cause of action for
fraudulent conveyance fails as a matter of
law.â€
V. Ullman’s Motion to Set Aside the
November 15, 2012 Ruling
Ullman
moved to set aside the November 15, 2012 ruling as legally incorrect. Ullman requested a ruling on his claim for judicial
estoppel, arguing that defendants were bound by their position in the title
insurance action that they did not have a valid lien as a result of Rob’s
interest in the properties. Ullman also requested
a ruling on his claim that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 697.340,
subdivision (b), his judgment lien was the first lien to attach to Rob’s interest
in the properties and, under section 697.390, remained attached to any interest
transferred from Rob to Rebecca.
As to
the fraudulent conveyance claim, Ullman requested findings that: (1) Rebecca was not an indispensable
party because she no longer owned the properties and, therefore, her rights
would not be negatively impacted by any judgment in this case; (2) Hollywood
Dell and Lindros “failed to meet their burden of proof with respect to [Rebecca’s]
roleâ€; and (3) Hollywood Dell and Lindros “failed to raise the issue of [Rebecca’s]
role as a ‘necessary’ party prior to trial and have thus waived it.â€
VI. Judgment for Hollywood Dell and Lindros
After
the trial court denied Ullman’s motion to set aside its ruling, it entered
judgment for defendants on December 6, 2012. The judgment stated in relevant part: “Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants
and against Plaintiff on the First Cause of Action for Declaratory relief
alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Defendants’ deeds of trust are prior to and senior to the abstract of judgment
recorded by Plaintiff.†“The Second
Cause of Action for Fraudulent Conveyance is dismissed without prejudice as the
claim failed to include an indispensable party, i.e., Rebecca Richards.†This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I.
Ullman
contends the trial court failed to issue a statement of decision that explained: (1) why Rebecca was a necessary party given
that she no longer owned the properties; and (2) why defendants were not bound
under the doctrine of judicial estoppel by their position in the title
insurance action that they did not have a valid lien because of Rob’s interest in
the properties. Ullman contends the
trial court “completely ignored†these issues in its “statement of decision,†and
that the “failure to rule [on the issue of judicial estoppel] constitutes
reversible error per se, unless this
Court of Appeal finds that as a matter of law, the trial court had no choice
but to reject judicial estoppel.â€
Defendants,
on the other hand, argue that no statement of decision was required. Where, as here, the trial is completed in a
day or less, a request for a statement of decision must be made before the
matter is submitted for decision. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 632.)
name="_ftnref9" title="">[9] Ullman’s motion to set aside the November 15,
2012 ruling was not a timely request for a statement of decision because it was
not made before the matter was submitted.
We
conclude defendants are correct that Ullman did not timely request a statement
of decision and, thus, no statement of decision was required. Because a statement of decision was not
required, the trial court had no obligation to provide the requested
explanations.
“When
no statement of decision is requested and issued, we imply all findings
necessary to support the judgment. (In
re Marriage of Cohn (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 923, 928.)†(Cahill
v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956.) In the absence of specific findings in favor of a losing
plaintiff, the appellate court will presume the trial court found the plaintiff’s
evidence was insufficient to carry the burden of proof. Code of Civil Procedure section 634,
fails to provide a statement of decision, does not apply here.
II. Ullman’s Judgment Lien Is Subject to the Deeds of Trust
In rejecting
Ullman’s claim for declaratory relief, the trial court stated that “Defendants’
deeds of trust are prior to and senior to the abstract of judgment recorded by
Plaintiff.†Ullman contends this ruling was
erroneous as a matter of law for two reasons, both of which involve the escrow
company’s error in failing to obtain and record Rob’s quitclaim deed before the
$4.1 million loan was issued in Rebecca’s name alone:
(1) Because of the escrow company’s error, Rob
still had an interest in the property and therefore Rebecca’s signature alone
was insufficient to encumber Rob’s interest.
(Fam. Code, § 1102.) Accordingly,
Ullman’s judgment lien was the first lien that attached to Rob’s interest and
remained attached to that interest when it was transferred to Rebecca in May
2012.
(2) Defendants, having argued in the title
insurance action that foreclosure was impossible due to the escrow company’s
failure to obtain and record Rob’s quitclaim deed, were bound by that position
under the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
We
conclude both contentions lack merit.
Standing to Challenge Rebecca’s Authority to Encumber Rob’s Interest
By
failing to obtain Rob’s quitclaim deed, the escrow company failed to eliminate
the possibility that Rob could object under Family Code section 1102 to
Rebecca’s authority to encumber his interest.
“The cases interpreting [former Civil Code] section 5127[, now found in
Family Code section 1102,] and its statutory predecessors have held that
unauthorized gifts, sales or encumbrances of community property are not void,
but voidable, and this only at the instance of the other spouse or his or her
personal representative. (Harris
(1962) 57 Cal.2d 367, 369-370; Head v.
Crawford (1984) 156
Cal.App.3d 11, 17-18; Andrade Development Co. v. Martin (1982)
138 Cal.App.3d 330, 333-335 and fn. 2 (Andrade);
Mitchell v. American Reserve Ins. Co. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 220, 223 (
(1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 869, 876-877; Horton v. Horton (1953) 115
Cal.App.2d 360, 364.)†(
Rob,
the only person with standing to object to Rebecca’s authority under Family
Code section 1102, failed to do so.
1102 was not intended to protect creditors such as Ullman, who had no standing to object that
Rebecca was unauthorized to encumber Rob’s interest. Family Code section
1102 “was designed to protect a spouse from the unauthorized alienation or
encumbering of marital property by the other spouse; it has never been
interpreted in such a way as to provide a means whereby a third party creditor
of the married couple may challenge and void instruments signed by only one of
the spouses.†(Clar, supra, 193 Cal.App.3d
at p. 1037.)
name="_ftnref12" title="">[12]
of Trust Under the Theory of Equitable Estoppel
We also conclude that because Ullman
had constructive if not actual knowledge that Hollywood Dell was relying on 100
percent of the properties as security for the $4.1 million loan, his judgment
lien is subject to the deeds of trust under the theory of equitable estoppel. (See 5 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate
(3d ed. 2009) § 11:59 [“A title or lien of a subsequent party is subject to
prior unrecorded interests in the property of which he has actual knowledge or
notice, even though he or she records the deed or security instrument
first.â€].) Ullman held a 50 percent
interest in the properties that he transferred to Rebecca to facilitate the
loan from Hollywood Dell. As Rebecca’s
business partner, Ullman was privy to the loan requirements and knew or reasonably
should have known the loan was contingent on the escrow company’s receipt and
recording of Rob’s quitclaim deed.
The evidence is overwhelming that,
but for the unforeseen errors by the escrow and title companies, Rob’s
quitclaim deed would have been recorded before the close of escrow, such that
the deeds of trust would have indisputably attached to Rebecca’s 100 percent
interest in the properties. It was only
through inadvertence that Rob’s quitclaim deed went unrecorded, which created
the discrepancy that Ullman relies upon to invalidate the deeds of trust as to
Rob’s interest.
C. Defendants Did Not Take Inconsistent
Positions
Ullman
argues that under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, defendants are bound by their
position in the title insurance action that, because of Rob’s interest in the
properties, foreclosure was impossible. We
conclude the contention lacks merit.
“Judicial
estoppel, sometimes referred to as the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistent
positions, ‘“prevents a party from ‘asserting a position in a legal proceeding
that is contrary to a position previously taken in the same or some earlier
proceeding.Չۉ۪ (Daar & Newman v.
VRL International (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 482, 490-491 (Daar & Newman).)
The dual purposes for applying this
doctrine are ‘“‘to maintain the integrity of the judicial system and to protect
parties from opponents’ unfair strategies.’â€â€™ (Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th
974, 986.) Judicial estoppel ‘is
intended to prevent litigants from “‘“‘playing “fast and loose with the courts.â€â€™â€â€™
[Citation.]†[Citation.] It is an “‘extraordinary remed[y] to be
invoked when a party’s inconsistent behavior will otherwise result in a
miscarriage of justice.Չۉ۪ (Daar
& Newman, supra, at pp. 490-491.)†(Levin
v. Ligon (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1468.) The trial court’s ruling on the judicial
estoppel claim is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (Ibid.)
We
conclude the positions taken by defendants in the present action and the prior
title insurance action were not inconsistent.
The language used by defendants in the prior action must be viewed in
light of the existing circumstances. After
defendants discovered the escrow company’s failure to obtain and record Rob’s
quitclaim deed, they sued the title insurance company for breach of contract
because, contrary to the provisions of the policy, Rebecca’s title was vulnerable
to a possible objection by Rob under Family Code section 1102 that she was
unauthorized to encumber his interest. But
after Rob’s grant deeds were recorded, Hollywood Dell proceeded with the
foreclosure proceedings and acquired the properties at the October 2010 trustee’s
sale. By the time this action was tried,
defendants were no longer at risk of an objection under Family Code section
1102, because Rob had transferred his interest to Rebecca and waived any
objection to the foreclosure sale.
Given
the changed circumstances from August 2009, when the title insurance action was
filed, to November 2012, when this case was tried, it was well within the trial
court’s discretion to reject Ullman’s judicial estoppel claim. Justice would not have been served by forcing
defendants to argue that foreclosure was impossible when, in fact, the
properties had been sold at the October 2010 foreclosure sale. Ullman has failed to establish an abuse of
discretion.
III. The Fraudulent Transfer Claim Is Moot
Ullman challenges the trial court’s dismissal of the
fraudulent conveyance claim without prejudice based on the failure to join an
indispensible party. In light of our
determination that Ullman’s judgment lien is subject to the deeds of trust
under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the validity of the May 2010 transfer
is a moot issue. Because the claim is
moot, the judgment is modified to indicate that the dismissal is with
prejudice.
The
judgment is modified to indicate that the dismissal of the fraudulent transfer
claim is a dismissal with prejudice. As
modified, the judgment is affirmed.
Defendants are entitled to their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
SUZUKAWA,
J.
We concur:
EPSTEIN, P.
J.
WILLHITE,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] We note that Lindros answered the complaint as “Carl
Lindros, Trustee of the Lindros Family Trust dated December 17, 1982.â€
title="">[2] “Except
as otherwise provided by statute, a judgment lien on real property is created
under this section by recording an abstract of a money judgment with the county
recorder.†(Code Civ. Proc., § 697.310,
subd. (a).)
“Except as provided in Section
704.950: [¶]
judgment lien on real property attaches to all interests in real property in
the county where the lien is created (whether present or future, vested or
contingent, legal or equitable) that are subject to enforcement of the money
judgment against the judgment debtor pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with
Section 695.010) of Chapter 1 at the time the lien was created, but does not
reach rental payments, a leasehold estate with an unexpired term of less than
two years, the interest of a beneficiary under a trust, or real property that
is subject to an attachment lien in favor of the creditor and was transferred
before judgment. [¶]
If any interest in real property in the county on which a judgment lien could
be created under subdivision (a) is acquired after the judgment lien was
created, the judgment lien attaches to such interest at the time it is
acquired.†(Code Civ. Proc., § 697.340.)
