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THOMPSON, v. LOS ANGELES

THOMPSON, v. LOS ANGELES
08:25:2006

THOMPSON, v. LOS ANGELES




Filed 8/22/06




CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION




IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA





SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT





DIVISION TWO












CHAD ALLAN THOMPSON, as Special Administrator, etc.,


Plaintiff and Appellant,


v.


COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,


Defendants and Respondents.



B174594


(Los Angeles County


Super. Ct. No. BC047544)



APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Helen I. Bendix, Judge. Affirmed.


Robert Mann and Donald W. Cook for Plaintiff and Appellant.


Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, David D. Lawrence, Paul B. Beach and Jin S. Choi, for Defendants and Respondents.


* * * * * *


Plaintiff and appellant Chad Allan Thompson, as Special Administrator, etc.[1] appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants and respondents the County of Los Angeles (County), Jerry Harper, Edward Baker, Robert Devot and Daniel Burt following a jury trial on appellant's cause of action for liability under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code (section 1983). Appellant contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the definition of deadly force, that it abused its discretion in excluding two reports concerning the conduct of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and the use of dogs in law enforcement, and that it erred in dismissing his third cause of action for liability under Civil Code section 52.1, subdivision (b).


We affirm.


FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND


Appellant's Arrest and Injuries.


On February 8, 1991, appellant tried to steal two cars. The first attempt failed when the owner pulled the coil wire, killing the engine, and the second attempt failed when the owner telephoned for help. Shortly thereafter, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Deputy Patrick Cleary responded to an attempted robbery and car theft call at a 7–Eleven store in Downey. When he arrived at the store, he saw appellant run through a nearby alley and then climb over a block wall. Once Deputy Cleary had positioned himself at one end of the alley and some neighborhood youth at the other end to contain appellant, he called for backup.


Sheriff's Deputy Ken Lawrence, a dog handler, and Sergeant Robert Devot were among those who responded to Deputy Cleary's call. They learned that appellant was a carjacking suspect on parole and that he had a prior weapons-related offense, but they did not receive any information to establish that he was armed or had injured anyone at this particular time. The deputies announced via both car loudspeakers and a helicopter that a dog would be deployed. At that point, appellant was under a car in a carport, hiding from the police. Approximately 15 minutes after the announcement--and 30 to 40 minutes after appellant had climbed over the block wall--the deputies began using a search dog.


The dog made its way to the carport where appellant had been hiding for 30 minutes, and Deputy Lawrence deployed the dog into that area attached to a 60-foot leash. When the dog first barked at appellant, he did not move. A few moments later, appellant heard a voice, the dog stopped barking and lights shone on the carport area. Appellant heard a voice over a loudspeaker directing him to come out from under the car with his hands in the open. As he started to comply, the dog bit appellant's leg. Appellant screamed â€





Description Where plaintiff sued police officers for injuries sustained when officers used police dog to find plaintiff who was injured by dog and by officers when they were trying to stop plaintiff from fighting with dog. Trial court correctly refused to instruct jury on definition of deadly force, instead instructing jury on definition of unreasonable force. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding general report made by retired judge on procedures involving excessive use of force as hearsay and excluding police summaries regarding injuries caused by police dogs as hearsay and because their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. Cause of action alleging liability under Civil Code Sec. 52.1(b) was properly dismissed where plaintiff had not alleged that sheriff's department's excessive force policies were motivated by a discriminatory animus.
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