Fear Not Law Articles: PEOPLE v. ROGERS PART-II

PEOPLE v. ROGERS

Filed 8/21/06

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, )

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )

) S005502

v. )

)

DAVID KEITH ROGERS, )

) Kern County

Defendant and Appellant. ) Super. Ct. No. 33477

_______________________________________ )

Continue from Part I â€¦â€¦.

A trial court's decision whether or not to hold a competence hearing is entitled to deference, because the court has the opportunity to observe the defendant during trial. (See People v. Danielson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 727; see also Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 181.) The failure to declare a doubt and conduct a hearing when there is substantial evidence of incompetence, however, requires reversal of the judgment of conviction. (Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 181; Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 384-386; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 711.)

Defendant contends there was substantial evidence of his incompetence before the trial court. Defendant first points to testimony, received both during the preliminary hearing and later during the guilt phase, indicating that defendant was depressed and suicidal in jail and had been placed on a suicide watch. Dr. Bird testified defendant scored extremely high on psychological tests designed to assess suicide risk. Dr. Glaser and Dr. Franz agreed defendant was an extreme suicide risk. Although the risk was most elevated immediately following defendant's arrest, the summer before trial defendant had hoarded razor blades and strips of cloth in his jail cell. Dr. Franz testified the suicide risk continued up until the time of trial.

Actual suicide attempts or suicidal ideation, in combination with other factors, may constitute substantial evidence raising a bona fide doubt regarding a defendant's competence to stand trial. (See Drope v. Missouri, supra, 420 U.S. at pp. 166-167, 179-180; Moore v. United States (9th Cir. 1972) 464 F.2d 663, 665-666; see also Pate v. Robinson, supra, 383 U.S. at p. 381.) Nonetheless, in contrast to the cases cited above, here defendant's suicidal tendencies did not constitute substantial evidence of incompetence, for they were not accompanied by bizarre behavior, the testimony of a mental health professional regarding competence, or any other indications of an inability to understand the proceedings or to assist counsel. (Cf. People v. Ramos, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 509 [defendant's hoarding of medication in apparent preparation for a suicide attempt did not give rise to a doubt regarding his competence to stand trial].)

Defendant points out that his counsel moved to suppress his tape-recorded confession on the ground defendant was not â€

Description	Testimony that defendant suffered from some degree of disassociation and had used PCP, did not compel trial court to order competency hearing sua sponte. Where there was no testimony that any dissociative disorder affected his ability to assist counsel or to understand trial proceedings and there was no testimony that his drug use was extensive. Joinder of two murder counts was not grossly unfair where identity of perpetrator of one murder was disputed and evidence regarding other murder was relevant to that issue. There were numerous characteristics common to the two murders and there was little likelihood that evidence of one crime would improperly induce the jury to convict defendant of the other. Evidence that defendant, a deputy sheriff, had been fired based on a complaint by a prostitute but later reinstated was properly admitted at trial for killing another prostitute. Since it tended to show that defendant may have killed victim to prevent her from complaining and possibility having him terminated again. Defendant's testimony--that when victim was walking toward him with her finger pointed at him, he felt threatened and afraid and shot her out of a need for protection--taken in combination with mental health experts' testimony that the killing was a result of defendant's association of victim with his abusive stepmother and "fear of not surviving himself" did not infer that defendant believed he was in imminent fear that victim--an unarmed teenage prostitute--would kill him or cause him great bodily injury. The court was not required to give sua sponte instruction on imperfect self-defense. Where prosecution's case regarding the identity of killer of second victim rested principally on defendant's possession of the murder weapon and his admitted killing of first victim a year earlier under similar circumstances.
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