In re Adriana G.



















Filed 3/8/17 In re Adriana G. CA4/3







NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.




IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re ADRIANA G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ADRIANA G.,

Defendant and Appellant.



G052379

(Super. Ct. No. DL049672-002)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
AND DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING; NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT


THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on February 15, 2017, be modified as follows:

1. On page 12, second full paragraph, delete the first two sentences so the paragraph reads:

“Further, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the detective’s questions were asked in a particularly aggressive or accusatory manner. More importantly, the brief interview took place outside, in front of Adriana’s own home, while she was in the presence of her mother. In sum, this is simply not the type of compulsive interrogation situation that the Miranda warnings were designed to alleviate.”
2. On page 12, delete footnote 4, which will require the renumbering of all subsequent footnotes.

This modification does not change the judgment.

The petition for rehearing is DENIED.



MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:



BEDSWORTH, ACTING P.J.



THOMPSON, J.

Filed 2/15/17 In re Adriana G. CA4/3 (unmodified version)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re ADRIANA G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ADRIANA G.,

Defendant and Appellant.



G052379

(Super. Ct. No. DL049672-002)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Lewis W. Clapp, Judge. Affirmed with directions.
Elizabeth Garfinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Scott C. Taylor, Kristen Chenelia and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Minor Adriana G. (Adriana) and seven of her friends participated in a “beer run” at a convenience store. As some of Adriana’s accomplices were leaving the store with the beer, they engaged in a physical confrontation with two of the store’s clerks. The entire episode was captured on a surveillance video. The police later spoke to Adriana on two separate occasions; both times she admitted her involvement in the beer run.She raises three separate issues on appeal.
First, Adrianacontends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile court’s true finding on an “Estes” robbery allegation. (People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23 (Estes) [a theft coupled with defendant’s use of “force or fear” during the escape].)We disagree. The video aloneconstitutes sufficient evidence Adriana was an accomplice to an Estes robbery.
Second, Adriana contendsthat the juvenile court improperly admitted her statements to the police in violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 467 (Miranda). We disagree. The first time Adrianaspoke to the police she was not in custody or its functional equivalent. In the second encounter Adrianawaived her rightsand there is no evidence the police engaged in a deliberate two-step process to circumvent Miranda. (Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600, 608 (Seibert).) In any event, aMiranda violation would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the video evidence of Adriana’s involvement in the robbery.
Finally, Adriana contends the juvenile court improperly amended the juvenile petition at the close of the People’s case and thereby violated her right to due process. We disagree. The court simply amended the pleading to reflect the correct date.
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 28, 2014, just after midnight, Adriana and three other girls entered a convenience store in Buena Park at about the same time. Two clerks were on duty, Balwinder Singh and Megan Singh.[1]As Adrianaand another girl engaged with Balwinder at the checkout counter, the other two girls went to the cooler, each grabbing an 18-pack of beer.
Balwinder saw the two girls with the beer heading toward the front door, so he left the counter area and attempted to block their exit at the front door. As one of the girls, Carla, was attempting to leave the store with the beer, Balwinder grabbed her armand attempted to pull her back inthe store through the front door as she tried to pull away. The other clerk, Megan, assistedBalwinder by grabbing Carla’s other arm. As this was occurring, Adrianapassed by Carla and left the store, apparently taking the beerCarlahad been carrying.
AsCarla continued to struggle with Balwinder and Megan, severalboys who were just outside of the front door attempted to pull her outside. During the scuffle, Meganwas pushed into a pile of shopping baskets. After a few moments, Carla broke free. As the group fled, one of the boys briefly stopped and told Balwinder that they were gang members and “we will kill you.” Balwinder did not chase after the group because he felt threatened.
Buena Park Police Detective Art Pegg viewed the beer run on the store’s surveillance video and eventually identified Adriana. Pegg and two other detectives went to 15-year-old Adriana’s hometo interview her. After getting her mother’s permission, Pegg spoke to Adriana in the patio area in front of her home while her mother was present. Pegg told Adriana that she was not under arrest.[2] She was not placed in handcuffs. Pegg asked Adriana about the theft. Adriana said the group of people she was with decided they needed some more alcohol to drink and decided to do the beer run. Adriana“declined to take the beer herself but agreed to act as a distraction”and occupy the clerk. The interview lasted about 15 minutes. Pegg left without arresting Adriana.
Two or three weeks later, Pegg and the same two detectives returned to Adriana’s home. Pegg toldAdriana and her mother that he was placing Adriana under arrest, although he did not puther in handcuffs. Pegg read Adriana her Miranda rights and confirmed that she understood them. Adrianaagreed to talk about the beer run and largely repeated her earlier statements. Adrianaadded that after leaving the store, she and the group went to a nearby school and drank the beer. Pegg released Adrianaback to her mother and explained to both of them that a petition would be filed.
The People filed ajuvenile petition alleging Adrianacommitted two felonies: second degree robbery and conspiracy to commit shoplifting. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 182, subd. (a)(1), 459.5, subd. (a).)[3]At trial, at the close of the People’s case, Adriana moved to dismiss the petition because it alleged the wrong date. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 701.1.)The court denied the motion and agreed to amend the petition by interlineation to reflect the correct date. At the close of the trial, the court found both allegations true and reduced the conspiracy offense to a misdemeanor.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficient Evidence to Support the Robbery Allegation
“‘In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1249.) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence. (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) We may reverse for lack of substantial evidence only if “‘upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].’” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) A defendant who does not use force or fear in the initial taking of the property may nonetheless be guilty of robbery if he uses force or fear to retain the property, carry it away, or escape. (See Estes, supra,147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 27–28.)Robberies in which force or fear is not used until after the perpetrator has already taken the loot “are commonly referred to as ‘Estesrobberies.’” (Miller v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 216, 223.)
Here, Adrianaand a group of her friends participated in a beer run at a convenience store. Adriana assisted in the theft by distracting the clerk at the counter while some of her friendsgrabbed the beer. However, as one of the perpetrators was leaving the store with the beer, two storeclerks attempted to stop herand she struggled to get away. Several other members of the group then joined in the scuffle; one of them threatened one of the store clerks before running away. There is a surveillance videothatdocuments the entire episode. Thus, there was sufficient evidence Adrianaparticipated in an Estes type robbery.
Nevertheless, Adrianamakes several interrelated arguments within her sufficiency of the evidence claim regarding the robbery. They can essentially be reduced to the following: 1) the “immediate presence” element was not met; 2) the “force or fear” element was not met; and 3) she is not liable as an accomplice. We shall address each contention in turn.

1. The “Immediate Presence” Element
Adriana argues: “Because the stolen beer was not in the [store clerks’] immediate presence while they were pulling Carla, the elements of robbery were not satisfied.”She is mistaken.
Under the robbery statute, property is within the “immediate presence” of a victim if, but for the perpetrator’s force or fear, the victim couldhave retained possession of it. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 507.) “The zone of immediate presence includes the area ‘within which the victim could reasonably be expected to exercise some physical control over his property.’” (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 440, quoting People v. Bauer (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 632, 642.) All on-duty employees have constructive possession of their employer’s property and are considered victims under the robbery statute. (People v. Bradford (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1349-1350.)
There is no single “‘temporal point’” at which all the elements of robbery must come together. (See People v. Hodges (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 531, 540 (Hodges).) Under the “escape rule,” a robbery is a continuing offense; it does not end until the perpetrator has reached a place of relative safety. (People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 994-996.) “[T]he crime of robbery begins with the commission of any of the defined elements and is completed when all of the remaining elements have been committed. It is a continuing offense that concludes not just when all the elements have been satisfied but when the robber reaches a place of relative safety.” (People v. Carrasco (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1059.) “A perpetrator has reached a place of temporary safety with the property if he or she has successfully escaped from the scene, is no longer being pursued, and has unchallenged possession of the property.” (CALCRIM No. 1603.)
Here, the robbery began when Adriana and one of her accomplices distracted the store clerk at the counter. Two other members of Adriana’s group then grabbed the beer. This “taking” of “property” was from the constructive “possession” of the store’s clerks and occurred within the zone of their “immediate presence.” Then, when confronted by the clerks at the front door, some of Adriana’s group began using “force and fear”—both a physical struggle and a threat—to effectuate their escape with the stolen beer. Indeed, all of the elements of this classic Estes type robbery are observable on a video, which lasts about a minute.
We need not engage in a frame-by-frame parsing of the videoto determine where the beer itself was located during the physical encounter at the front door (as Adrianaurges us to do). This sort of temporal analysis is unnecessary because all of the group members had not yet reached a point of temporary safety; therefore, the robbery was still in progress. The precise timing of eachelement of the robberyis wholly irrelevant.
At oral argument, Adriana’s counsel urged us to consider a hypothetical:“A person leaves a store without paying for goods, drops the goods when confronted by a security guard, and flees; the guard gives chase and at some point during the pursuit, the person uses force to resist the pursuing guard’s attempt to detain him. Under this hypothetical, the escape rule, concerning the duration of the offense, is not in play because no robbery was committed,there being no evidence that the person intended to deprive the owner of the property at the time force was used.” (Hodges, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 543, fn. 4.) But under the facts of this case, unlike the hypothetical, no member of Adriana’s group at any point relinquished their possession of the stolen beer back to the merchant. Instead, the beer was handed off from one accomplice to another. As the deputy attorney general appropriately responded during oral argument, accomplices to an Estes robbery cannot escape liability by treating the stolen merchandise as a “hot potato” being passed from one accomplice to another.
Thus, we find sufficient evidence to support the “immediate presence” element of the robbery offense.

2. The “Force and Fear” Element
Adrianaargues: “To the extent minor’s pulling Carla free from the clerks’ grasp could be considered force, it was reasonable self-defense and not unlawful force used to accomplish a taking.” (Original capitalization and boldfacing omitted.)She is mistaken.
The crucial element of a robbery is the force or fear applied to the victim. (People v. Smith (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1492.) The terms “‘force’” and “‘fear,’” have no technical meaningpeculiar to the law. (People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 640.) “[T]he degree of force is immaterial.” (People v. Garcia (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365, fn. 3) “The requisite fearneed not be the result of an express threat or the use of a weapon.” (People v. Morehead (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 765, 775.)
“A merchant may detain a person for a reasonable time for the purpose of conducting an investigation . . . whenever the merchant has probable cause to believe the person to be detained is attempting to unlawfully take or has unlawfully taken merchandise . . . .” (§ 490.5, subd. (f)(1).) “In making the detention a merchant . . . may use a reasonable amount of nondeadly force necessary to protect himself or herself and to prevent escape of the person detained or the loss of tangible or intangible property.” (§ 490.5, subd. (f)(2).)When merchants detain suspected shoplifters, they are effectively making a citizen’s arrest. (§ 834.) As such, a detained person is “‘obliged not to resist, and has no right of self-defense against such force.’” (People v. Adams (2009)176 Cal.App.4th 946, 952–953.) “Self-defense is not, of course, a recognized defense to a charge of robbery.” (People v. Costa (1963) 218 Cal.App.2d 310, 316.)
Here, as agents of the merchant, the store clerks were legally justified in their attempt to detain Carla or any member of the group involved in the beer run because the theft was occurring in real time in their immediate presence. The clerksattempted to detain Carla by holding on to her, which wasa reasonable amount of force under the circumstances. Although Carla waslegally obliged to submit to the detention, she attempted to get away with the beer. Carla and other members of Adriana’s group then used both force and fear (pushing one clerkand threatening another) to effectuate their escape. The degree of force is immaterial. Further, self-defense is not a valid defenseto a robbery charge.
Thus, we find sufficient evidence to support the “force or fear” element of the robbery offense.

3. Accomplice Liability
Adriana concedes there is sufficient evidence she participated in the beer run and she is liableas an accomplice, but only for the theft. She contends there is “insufficient evidence to support robbery as a natural and probable consequence of the theft.” We disagree.
Generally, a defendant may be convicted of a crime either as a perpetrator or as an aider and abettor. (§ 31.) “If the defendant himself commits the offense, he is guilty as a direct perpetrator. If he assists another, he is guilty as an aider and abettor.” (People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.) An aider and abettor is a person who “‘knowingly and with criminal intent aids, promotes, encourages, or instigates by act or advice’” a perpetrator of a crime. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560-561.)“For purposes of determining aider and abettor liability, the commission of a robbery continues until all acts constituting the offense have ceased.” (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.)
An aider and abettor’s liability extends not only to crimes that were directly aided and abetted (“target” offenses), but also to any more serious crimes that were reasonably foreseeable (“nontarget” offenses). (People v. Laster (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1463.) Indirect aider and abettor liability for nontarget offenses is known as the “‘natural and probable consequences’” doctrine. (People v. Montes (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055.) Further, in a conspiracy, each coconspirator is liable for the acts of any of the others that are a reasonable and probable consequence of the conspiracy. (In re Hardy (2007) 41 Cal.4th 977, 1025-1026.)
An objective test is used in determining whether a particular criminal act was a natural and probable consequence of another criminal act. (People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 531.) “Consequently, the issue does not turn on the defendant’s subjective state of mind, but depends upon whether, under all of the circumstances presented, a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have or should have known that the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act aided and abetted by the defendant.” (Ibid.) “A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.” (CALCRIM No. 402.)
Here, Adriana concedes that she participated in the beer run. Also, the court found true the allegation that she conspired to commit the crime of shoplifting. We find that Adriana reasonably should have knownthat as a consequence of the beer run (a.k.a. shoplifting) the store’s clerks were likely to try to intervene and that her accomplices were likely to use either force or fear to get out of the store with the beer. That is, the robbery was a natural and probable consequence of the shoplifting. While it is also probable that Adrianadid not knowthat the foreseeable actions of her group constitute an Estesrobbery under California law, it is axiomatic that ignorance of the law is no excuse. (See 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Defenses, § 44, Ignorance of Law Is No Defense, p. 474.)
Thus, we find sufficient evidence to sustain Adriana’sliability as an accomplice to the robbery.



B. Adriana’s Statements to the Police
“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .” (U.S. Const., 5th Amend., italics added.) “The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony. Failure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion.” (Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 306-307.) “Consequently, unwarned statements that are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda.” (Id. at p. 307.)
Adriana contends that the juvenile court erred by admitting her initial statements to the police because they were made without Miranda warnings during an interrogationthat was custodial. She also contends that her post-Miranda statements in the second interview were the result of a deliberate two-step process designed by the police officers to deliberately evade Miranda. We disagree.

1. The First Interview
An appellate court’s determination of whether an accused was in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of fact and law. (See People v.Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th 889, 894-895.) While mixed questions of fact and law that implicate constitutional rights are subject to independent, de novo, review, the reviewing court must, nevertheless apply a deferential standard of review (substantial evidence under California law) to the trial court’s factual findings. (Ibid.) “Although the circumstances of each case must certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is ‘in custody’ for purposes of receiving of Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125.)
The custody determination depends on an examination of all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261, 270-271(J.D.B.) [declining to determine specific relevant circumstances].) “Although no one factor is controlling, the following circumstances should be considered: ‘(1) [W]hether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the officer, including the nature of questioning.’ [Citation.] Additional factors are whether the suspect agreed to the interview and was informed he or she could terminate the questioning, whether police informed the person he or she was considered a witness or suspect, whether there were restrictions on the suspect’s freedom of movement during the interview, and whether police officers dominated and controlled the interrogation or were ‘aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory,’ whether they pressured the suspect, and whether the suspect was arrested at the conclusion of the interview. [Citation.]” (People v. Pilster(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403-1404.) In addition, a juvenile suspect’s age is a relevant factor, “so long as [it] was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.” (J.D.B., supra,564 U.S. at p. 277.)
In this case, the juvenile court analyzed the totality of circumstances and found Adriana was not subject to a custodial interrogation.We agree. The interview took place outside. Adriana was not in handcuffs. Adriana was told that she was not under arrest. Objectively, this situation simply does not resemble a formal arrest or its functional equivalent.
While it is true that Adriana was just 15 years old and in the presence of three police detectives, the juvenile court found it significant that Adriana had previously had prior contacts with law enforcement.[4] We defer to that factual finding. Further, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the detective’s questions were asked in a particularly aggressive or accusatory manner. More importantly, the brief interview took place outside, in front of Adriana’s own home, while she was in the presence of her mother. In sum, this issimply not the type of compulsive interrogation situationthat the Miranda warnings were designed to alleviate.

2. The Seibert Claim
Police officers cannot employ a deliberate two-step interview process intentionally designed to weaken the protections of Miranda. (Seibert, supra,542 U.S. at p. 608.) In Seibert, officers arrested the defendant and took her to the police station. Without Miranda warnings, the police questioned the defendant for 30 to 40 minutes, during which time she made incriminating statements. (Id. at pp. 604-605.) After a 20-minute break, the officers read the defendant her Miranda rights and obtained a written waiver. (Id. at p. 605.) The officers then asked her essentially the same questions to again extract the same incriminating admissions she had previously made. (Ibid.) At the suppression hearing, the officer “testified that he made a ‘conscious decision’ to withhold Miranda warnings, thus resorting to an interrogation technique he had been taught: question first, then give the warnings, and then repeat the question ‘until I get the answer that she’s already provided once.’” (Id.at pp. 605-606.)
Where there is no evidence that the police deliberately used atwo-step process to circumvent Miranda, the Seibert holding does not apply. (See In re Kenneth S. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 54, 66 [“Unlike in Seibert,here there was no evidence of any protocol used in eliciting respondent’s confession”].) Further, a trial court’s conclusion that interrogating officers did not deliberately use a two-step process to circumvent Mirandais a factual finding subject to the substantial evidence standard of review. (People v. Camino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1372 [“the trial court’s determination of deliberateness is a factual finding entitled to deference”].)
In this case, the juvenile court made no express factual finding on the issue, but Adrianahad repeatedly challenged the admissibility of her statements under Seibert. Therefore, we presume the court found there was no deliberate use of a two-step interrogation process.(See Evid.Code, § 402, subd. (c).)[5]This implied factual finding is supported by substantial evidence. Unlike the officer in Seibert, Detective Pegg never stated that he deliberately engaged in such behavior.
Further, the sequence of eventshardly resembles Seibert, where the police arrested the defendant, secured a confession without Miranda warnings, and then—after a brief pause—repeated the interrogation under the pretense of Miranda. Here, Pegg did not arrest Adriana during the first interview, nor was she subject to a custodial interrogation (as previously discussed). And although Adriana admitted her involvement in the beer run during the first interview, Pegg did not quickly follow that up with Miranda warnings. Instead, Pegg returned two or three weeks later.
In sum, there is simply noevidence (either direct orindirect) that the police deliberately used a two-step interrogation techniquein order to circumvent Adriana’s constitutional protections under Miranda.

3. Harmless Error
“No judgment shall be set aside . . . on the ground of . . . improper admission or rejection of evidence . . . unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) The applicable standard for erroneous admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda is whether the reviewing court finds the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23-24.) That is, the issue is whether there is a reasonable possibility the challenged evidence might have contributed to the conviction. (Id. at p. 23.)
In this case, even if we were to assume the juvenile court improperly admitted Adriana’s statementsin violation of Miranda, we agree with the People that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As we have already discussed with respect to the robbery count, all of the elements of the offense are plainly visible on the surveillance video, including Adriana’s participation as an accomplice. (§ 211.)
As far as the conspiracy count, the juvenile court found true that Adriana conspired to commit the crime of shoplifting. (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 459.5, subd. (a).) A conspiracy requires proof that a defendant and another person had the specific intent to agree or conspire to commit an offense, as well as the specific intent to commit the elements of that offense, together with proof of the commission of an overt act by one or more of the parties to such agreement in furtherance of the conspiracy. (People v. Johnson (2013) 57 Cal.4th 250, 257-258.) “[S]hoplifting is defined as entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).”(§ 459.5, subd. (a).)[6]
Here, the surveillance video also establishes proof beyond a reasonable doubt Adrianaconspired with her group to commit the crime of shoplifting. She is seen entering a convenience store with her accomplices. It is plainly a commercial establishment that is open for business. Adrianais then seen distracting the clerk at the counter while two of her accomplices each grab an 18-pack of beer and begin to head out the door. Accordingly, there is direct evidence of overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit shoplifting. Further, thesurveillance video constitutes convincing circumstantial evidence—even in the absence of Adriana’s admissions—of her specific intent: thatshe had previously agreedwith her accomplices to commit the crime of shoplifting.
Thus, even if we were to assume the juvenile court improperly admitted Adriana’s statements in violation of Miranda, that error would have been harmless.

C. The Amendment of the Petition
The petition filed by the People incorrectly alleged that both the robbery and the conspiracy counts occurred “[o]n or about October 03, 2014.” It was undisputed that both offenses were alleged to have actually occurred on July 28, 2014. At the close of the People’s case, the juvenile court amended the petition by interlineation to reflect the correct date of the robbery count, but it failed to amend the date of the conspiracy count.
Adrianacontends that the amendment of the robbery count violated her right to due process, and the failure to amend the conspiracy count means there was insufficientevidence to prove the offense. We reject both claims.
In juvenile delinquency matters, petitions may be amended in the same manner as other civil proceedings. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 678.) “No variance between the allegation in a pleading and the proof is to be deemed material, unless it has actually misled the adverse party to his prejudice in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 469.) “Where the variance is not material . . . the court may direct the fact to be found according to the evidence, or may order an immediate amendment . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 470.)
“The precise time at which the offense was committed need not be stated in the accusatory pleading, but it may be alleged to have been committed at any time before the finding or filing thereof, except where the time is a material ingredient in the offense.” (§ 955.) A juvenile court has the discretionto amend the pleadings at any stage of the trialso as to make such pleadings conform to proof; this discretion will not be interfered with on appeal except in cases of manifest abuse. (Unruh v. Smith (1954) 123 Cal.App.2d 431, 437.)
Specifically, a juvenile court has the discretion to amenda petition to correct the factual allegations supporting the offense when the nature of the charge remains unchanged. (In re Man J. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 475 (In re Man).) In In re Man, the petition alleged that the minor maliciously damaged four vehicles, all belonging to one victim. At the close of trial, the court amended the petition to conform to proof: that the vehicles belonged to different individuals. (Id. at p. 478.) The Court of Appeal affirmed and held that the amendment did not deny the minor due process. (Id. at p. 481.) The court found that: “At all times the minor was on notice as to the charges and the allegations against which he would have to defend.” (Id. at pp. 479-480.)
Here, the juvenile court determined that its amendment to reflect the correct date was “in the nature of an In re Man amendment in the sense that what we’re doing is, we’re not charging a new offense, but we’re just changing a factual allegation in support of the offense that is charged.” We agree with the court’s analysis and find noabuse of discretion.[7]Indeed, at trial Adriana candidly admitted to the court that the amendment would not change the nature of the charges. Further, Adriana has not established prejudice given that there was no disagreement as to the date of the beer run, she was identified in the surveillance video, and she admitted her involvement to the police.
As far as the conspiracy count, the date is not an element of the offense, so the court’s failure to amend that portion of the petition is inconsequential, at least so far as Adriana’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. However, out ofan abundance of caution, we will order the juvenile court to correct its records to accurately reflect the date of both offenses.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The juvenile court is directed to correct its records to reflect that both of the offensesoccurred on July 28, 2014.



MOORE, J.

WE CONCUR:



BEDSWORTH, P. J.



THOMPSON, J.




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[1] We will refer to these two gentlemen by theirfirstnames for purposes of clarity; no disrespect is intended.

[2] The prosecutor asked Pegg: “Had you told [Adriana] she was under arrest at any time?” Pegg responded: “No. I told her just the opposite.” “On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.)
[3] Further undesignated statutory references will be to the Penal Code.
[4] One of the detectives who accompanied Detective Pegg when he interviewed Adriana at her home testified that he had “several” prior contacts with Adriana and had documented those encounters in Field Identification (F.I.) cards.
[5] “A ruling on the admissibility of evidence implies whatever finding of fact is prerequisite thereto; a separate or formal finding is unnecessary unless required by statute.” (Evid. Code, § 402, subd. (c).)
[6] The shoplifting statute became effective on November 5, 2014. Here, the date of the crime occurred on July 28, 2014, before the effective date of section 459.5. We asked the parties for supplemental briefing on the issue of whether this discrepancy implicates the ex post facto clauses of the state or federal constitutions. We agree with them that it does not. (People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 755 [ex post facto clauses of state and federal constitutions not implicated where there is no increase in punishment].)
[7] Adriana’s reliance on In re Robert G. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 437 (In re Robert G.) is misplaced. In In re Robert G., the Supreme Court disapproved of the juvenile court’s amendment to the petition because—unlike In re Man—the amendment charged a new offense. The amendment in In re Robert G.charged a lesser offense that was not necessarily included in the greater offense.(Id. at pp. 440-441.)