Filed 3/29/17 In re William B. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



In re WILLIAM B., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM B.,

Defendant and Appellant.
D070020


(Super. Ct. No. J236331)

APPEAL from a judgment and orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Melinda Lasater and Robert J. Trentacosta, Judges. Affirmed.
Law Office of Johanna S. Schiavoni and Johanna S. Schiavoni, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Lynne G. McGinnis, Jennifer B. Truong and Mary Strickland, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This appeal arises out of a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 juvenile delinquency proceeding in which the four-count amended wardship petition (petition), filed in February 2016, alleged that William B. (William) (1) willfully and unlawfully resisted, delayed and obstructed a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 148, subdivision (a)(1) (hereafter Penal Code section 148(a)(1)), a misdemeanor (count 1); (2) was a person under the age of 21 years who unlawfully drove a vehicle while having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.01 percent or greater in violation of Vehicle Code section 23136, subdivision (a), an infraction (count 2); (3) unlawfully drove a motor vehicle upon a highway without holding a valid driver's license in violation of Vehicle Code section 12500, subdivision (a), a misdemeanor (count 3); and (4) was unlawfully in a public place while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in such a condition that he was unable to exercise care for his own safety and the safety of others in violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (f), a misdemeanor (count 4).
On February 11, 2016, following a contested adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt count 1 (willfully and unlawfully resisting, delaying and obstructing a peace officer), count 2 (being a person under the age of 21 years and having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.01 percent or greater), and count 3 (unlawfully driving a motor vehicle upon a highway without holding a valid driver's license). The court dismissed count 4 (unlawfully being in a public place under the influence of intoxicating liquor) based on insufficiency of the evidence.
At the dispositional hearing on March 7, 2016, the court declared William a ward of the court and placed his care, custody and control under the supervision of the probation officer. Following recommendations by the probation officer in the probation report, the court (1) imposed a $60 fine, citing Welfare and Institutions Code Section 730.5; (2) imposed a $770 fine for "driving under the influence," but suspended payment of $440 of that $770 fine "on the condition [William] successfully complete[] the Youthful Visitation Program"; and (3) ordered that William "submit to a search of any electronic device, such as a computer, electronic notepad, or cell phone, at any time without a warrant by any law enforcement officer, including a probation officer." The court also imposed other conditions of probation not at issue in this appeal. William's timely appeal followed in mid-March 2016.
In his appellant's opening brief, William raised four principal claims. First, he claimed the juvenile court's true finding on the count 1 allegation that he willfully resisted, delayed or obstructed a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 148(a)(1) must be reversed because there is "no evidence" that "he was aware, or should have been aware, that he was being pursued by a police officer attempting to perform his duties."
Second, he claimed the $60 fine must be reversed, and the matter remanded for resentencing, because the court's "failure to recite the complete statutory bases supporting the $60 fine was legal error under People v. Hartley [(2016)] 248 Cal.App.4th [620 (Hartley)]."
Third, he claimed the $770 fine the court imposed for "driving under the influence" should be stricken because (1) the court's failure to "specify any statutory basis for the fine . . . renders it legally unauthorized under Hartley, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th [620]"; and (2) "[t]here is no statutory authority to impose a fine on a minor for an offense for which he was not charged and for which no true finding was made," and in this case he "was not charged with, nor was there any true finding, on a charge of 'driving under the influence.'"
Fourth, he claimed the probation condition requiring him to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices (hereafter referred to as the electronics search condition) must be stricken because (1) it is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), abrogated by Proposition 8 on another ground as explained in People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 290-292; and (2) it is constitutionally overbroad.
While this appeal was pending, the Attorney General filed a letter brief with this court asserting that William's challenges to the $60 and $770 fines, and his challenge to the electronics search condition, are all moot because in October 2016 the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and William's probation, and vacated the fines.
In his written response, William agrees with the Attorney General that his challenges to the $60 and $770 fines are moot. However, he asserts that his challenge to the electronics search condition is not moot, and that, even if he is no longer subject to the electronics search condition, this court should decide the issue on the merits.
For reasons we shall explain, we affirm the court's true finding on the count 1 allegation that William willfully resisted, delayed or obstructed a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 148(a)(1). We also conclude that William's challenges to the $60 fine, the $770 fine, and the electronics search condition should be dismissed as moot.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the afternoon on September 3, 2014, San Diego County Sheriff's Deputy Nicholas Danza was on patrol in full uniform, driving a black and white marked sheriff's vehicle. He was driving southbound on South Santa Fe Avenue in Chula Vista when a maroon Ford Explorer, traveling in the opposite direction, made an erratic turn in front of him and almost crashed into the front of his patrol car. The Explorer turned westbound into the driveway of a shopping center. Deputy Danza knew the driveway continued westbound through the shopping center and exited onto Postal Way, which runs parallel to South Santa Fe Avenue. Unable to follow the Explorer, Deputy Danza continued southbound then turned right on Santa Fe Place and right again on Postal Way to locate the Explorer.
When Deputy Danza turned right from Santa Fe Place onto Postal Way, he almost immediately saw the Explorer driving towards him on Postal Way. Traveling toward Deputy Danza at what he testified was a "high rate of speed," the Explorer turned to its left into a shopping center driveway on the east side of Postal Way, went around a building, and came out on Santa Fe Place. Believing that the Explorer was going to come out on Santa Fe Place, Deputy Danza made a U-turn on Postal Way, drove back, and then turned left onto Santa Fe Place. Deputy Danza testified that after the Explorer turned left onto Santa Fe Place, it then turned left again from Santa Fe Place into a shopping center and parked in front of a restaurant. Deputy Danza also testified that "as [he] turned left onto Santa Fe Place, [he] saw the [Explorer] on [his] left-hand side, and [he] saw the two individuals fleeing from the vehicle." Deputy Danza further testified that after he saw the two individuals fleeing from the Explorer, he drove into the shopping center.
Deputy Danza conducted a Department of Motor Vehicles records check to determine whether the Explorer was stolen. He also used the radio to request a cover unit to help him search the area. Based on information a witness then gave him, Deputy Danza believed William and the second individual were hiding in a laundromat. Deputy Danza called for additional units to help set up a perimeter. After the units arrived and a police perimeter was set up, Deputy Danza entered the laundromat through the front door. He saw William and the second individual he had seen run from the Explorer with William. Deputy Danza testified that as soon as he identified them, he yelled, "Sheriff's Department. Stop." William ran out the back door of the laundromat, and the second individual ran towards Deputy Danza. Another deputy, who was outside the back door, apprehended William. Deputy Danza estimated that four to five minutes had passed from the time he first encountered William on the road to the time he confronted William inside the laundromat.
Deputy Robert Adler obtained two preliminary alcohol screening samples from William after he was arrested. The first sample showed William had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.034 percent at 5:36 p.m., and the second showed he had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.035 percent at 5:38 p.m. Deputy Adler, who had received training in the investigation of driving-under-the-influence cases, opined that William was under the influence of alcohol.
DISCUSSION
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE (COUNT 1)
William first contends the court's true finding on the count 1 allegation that he willfully resisted, delayed or obstructed Deputy Danza in violation of Penal Code section 148(a)(1) must be reversed because there is "no evidence" that "he was aware, or should have been aware, that he was being pursued by a police officer attempting to perform his duties." We reject this contention because substantial evidence supports the court's true finding as to count 1.
A. Background
At the close of evidence during the adjudication hearing, defense counsel moved to dismiss count 1 on the ground the People had failed to meet their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that William willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed Deputy Danza. The court found the evidence concerning events from the time William exited the Explorer to the time he was arrested was sufficient to support a true finding as to count 1. Specifically, the court stated:
"[M]y recall of the testimony was that the officer saw two people get out of the vehicle that he was following, one from the driver's side, one from the passenger's side, and then saw them leave into the laundromat, and that's how he knew to go into the laundromat, and that's how his partner circumstantially knew to go to the back [of the laundromat]."

The court then found "there [was] sufficient circumstantial evidence to show that [William] knew that he was being pursued by the officers at that point as he fle[d] the vehicle." The court explained that "you don't get out of the vehicle and run into the laundromat unless you're fleeing from the officers. And so then when [William] gets into the laundromat and [Deputy Danza] walks in and [William] goes out the back door, that is a continuation of that same sequence." Finding that the prosecution had established the count 1 offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the court noted that "it's the whole sequence of events, having to do from the point in time that they stopped the car, meaning [William], and he was the driver, got out of the car, just left it, and went in."
B. Applicable Legal Principles
1. Elements of Penal Code section 148(a)(1)
There are three legal elements of a violation of Penal Code section 148(a)(1), which is a misdemeanor: "'"(1) the defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) [the defendant did so] when the officer was engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (3) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties."'" (Yount v. City of Sacramento (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885, 894-895 (Yount), italics added.)
2. Standard of review
When assessing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review, under which we view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence─that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value─such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578 (Johnson); see Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.) "The same standard of review applies to cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence." (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396 (Maury).)
"We presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reasonably deduced from the evidence." (People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60 (Albillar).)
We do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206 (Ochoa); People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314 (Jones).) "Resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact." (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) Thus, "[c]onflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment." (Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 403.) "If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding." (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 60.)
"If the defendant fails to present us with all the relevant evidence, or fails to present that evidence in the light most favorable to the People, then he cannot carry his burden of showing the evidence was insufficient because support for the [trier of fact's] verdict may lie in the evidence he ignores." (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1574.)
C. Analysis
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, as we must (Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 578), we conclude William has not carried his burden of showing the evidence is insufficient to sustain the court's true finding on the allegation that he willfully resisted, delayed or obstructed Deputy Danza. William challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the third element of a violation of section 148(a)(1), which required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that William knew or reasonably should have known that Deputy Danza was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties. (See Yount, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 894-895.)
We conclude the prosecution presented substantial evidence from which the juvenile court could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that when William exited the Explorer as Deputy Danza was pursuing him in his patrol car, and when William exited the laundromat out the back door when Deputy Danza entered the laundromat, William knew or reasonably should have known that Deputy Danza was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties who was trying to detain him. William acknowledges "[t]here is no question that [he first] spotted Deputy Danza when their paths crossed on Santa Fe Avenue, nor is there any question that [he] had a guilty conscience because (a) he had been drinking, (b) he had taken his father's car without permission, and (c) he did not have a valid driver's license."
Indeed, as discussed more fully in the factual background, the evidence shows Deputy Danza was on patrol in the middle of the afternoon on the day in question, dressed in full uniform and driving southbound on South Santa Fe Avenue in a marked black and white sheriff's vehicle, when the Ford Explorer William was driving toward Deputy Danza in the opposite direction on that same street made an erratic turn in front of Deputy Danza and almost crashed into the front of his patrol car. After erratically turning left, William drove the Explorer straight into the driveway of a shopping center.
William acknowledges that a "reasonable inference" from this evidence of his first encounter with Deputy Danza is that he "panicked and took pre-emptive evasive action to flee the area." Substantial evidence supports this reasonable inference. Deputy Danza testified that when the Explorer turned erratically into the shopping center driveway after almost hitting his patrol car, he knew that the driveway continued westbound through the shopping center and exited onto Postal Way. Deputy Danza's testimony shows that because he was unable to follow the Explorer, he continued driving southbound on South Santa Fe Avenue, turned right onto Santa Fe Place, and then turned right again onto northbound Postal Way to locate the Explorer. Almost immediately after he turned onto Postal Way, Deputy Danza saw the Explorer driving towards him on Postal Way at a high speed. Deputy Danza observed as William then turned to his (William's) left and drove into a shopping center driveway on the east side of Postal Way. Believing that the Explorer was going to come back out onto Santa Fe Place, Deputy Danza made a U-turn on Postal Way, drove back, and then turned left onto Santa Fe Place.
Deputy Danza testified that after the Explorer exited that shopping area and turned left onto Santa Fe Place, it then turned left again from Santa Fe Place into another shopping area and parked in front of a restaurant. Deputy Danza also testified that as he (Deputy Danza) turned left onto Santa Fe Place, he "saw the [Explorer] on his left-hand side, and [he] saw the two individuals [(William and Jesse Z.)] fleeing from the vehicle." The prosecutor asked Deputy Danza what made him describe the way the individuals emerged from the Explorer as "fleeing." Deputy Danza replied that "[t]hey jumped out of the vehicle very quickly and ran around the front of the café."
Deputy Danza further testified that after he saw the two individuals fleeing from the Explorer, he too drove into the shopping center. Based on information he received from a witness, Deputy Danza believed William and the second individual were hiding in a nearby laundromat. After arranging for a police perimeter around the building, Deputy Danza entered the laundromat through the front door. Deputy Danza's direct examination testimony shows that as soon as he entered the laundromat and saw the two people he had observed running from the Explorer, he yelled, "Sheriff's Department. Stop." On cross-examination, he testified that he did not specifically recall whether he said that. He also testified, however, that "[i]t would be my practice to identify myself and tell the individual I'm trying to detain to stop." William, who was at the back of the laundromat about 20 feet away from Deputy Danza, immediately ran out of the laundromat through the back door when Deputy Danza entered, and Jesse Z. ran towards the front of the laundromat. William was arrested as soon as he ran outside.
From the foregoing substantial evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that William knew or reasonably should have known that Deputy Danza was a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of his duties and was trying to detain him. Although Deputy Danza acknowledged on cross-examination during the February 2016 adjudication hearing that he could not specifically recall whether he identified himself and commanded William to stop, any discrepancy between Deputy Danza's direct examination testimony and cross-examination testimony on this point goes to his credibility and the weight of his testimony. The evidence showing that William's companion, Jesse Z., moved toward Deputy Danza while William moved away from Deputy Danza as he exited through back door also goes to the weight of the evidence. We do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1206; Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 314.) Conflicts in the evidence and even testimony that is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment. (Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 403.) We note Deputy Danza's testimony that he drove a marked black and white sheriff's vehicle with lights on the top, and he was dressed in his full gang enforcement team uniform, which consisted of a "black polo shirt with a green tactical vest that has a cloth sheriff's patch and the sheriff's patch on the back."
For all of the foregoing reasons, we are persuaded that, even without evidence that Deputy Danza verbally identified himself as a sheriff's deputy and commanded William to stop, the remaining substantial evidence was sufficient to satisfy the prosecution's burden of proof with respect to the third element of the Penal Code section 148(a)(1) violation alleged in the petition. Accordingly, because William does not contest that the other two elements are satisfied, we affirm the court's true finding on the count 1 allegation that William willfully resisted, delayed or obstructed Deputy Danza.
II. CHALLENGES TO THE $60 AND $770 FINES, AND TO
THE ELECTRONICS SEARCH CONDITION

In his appellant's opening brief, William challenged the $60 fine, the $770 fine, and the electronics search condition of his probation, all of which the juvenile court imposed at the dispositional hearing. Specifically, he argued the $60 fine must be reversed and the matter remanded for resentencing with respect to this fine because the court's failure to recite the complete statutory bases supporting the $60 fine was legal error under People v. Hartley, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th 620. William also argued the $770 fine the court imposed for "driving under the influence" should be stricken because (1) the court's failure to "specify any statutory basis for the fine . . . render[ed] it legally unauthorized" under Hartley, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th 620, and (2) "[t]here [was] no statutory authority to impose a fine on a minor for an offense for which he was not charged and for which no true finding was made," and in this case he "was not charged with, nor was there any true finding, on a charge of 'driving under the influence.'" William also claimed the electronics search condition must be stricken because it is (1) unreasonable under Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d 481, and (2) constitutionally overbroad. We conclude William's challenges to both of the fines and the electronics search condition should be dismissed as moot.
A. Background
In mid-March 2017, while this appeal was pending, the Attorney General filed a letter brief with this court asserting that William's challenges to the $60 and $770 fines, and his challenge to the electronics search condition, are all moot because William violated his probation, and "[o]n October 11, 2016, the juvenile court terminated [his] probation and struck the court and DUI fines." We granted the Attorney General's concurrent request to augment the appellate record to include a copy of the juvenile court's minute order dated October 11, 2016 (hereafter the October 2016 minute order) , which states in part: "THE COURT ORDERS: [¶] Jurisdiction is terminated. [¶] THE COURT STRIKES ANY COURT AND DUI FINES. [¶] . . . [¶] ALL PRIOR ORDERS NOT IN CONFLICT REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT."
Agreeing with the Attorney General that his challenges to the $60 and $770 fines are moot, William (who is now an adult) states in his written response to the Attorney General's letter brief that the juvenile court's October 2016 minute order "vacate[d] those pending fines." However, William asserts that his challenge to the electronics search condition is not moot because the October 2016 minute order states that "all prior orders not in conflict remain in full force and effect" (capitalization omitted), it "does not otherwise address the electronics search condition," and thus it "does not expressly remove the electronics search condition from governing [William's] conduct now or in the future (unlike with the fines, which were expressly vacated)."
William alternatively asserts that, even if he is no longer subject to the electronics search condition, this court should decide the issue under the exception to the mootness doctrine that an appellate court may decide a technically moot issue if it is "an issue of broad public interest that i[s] likely to recur and yet tends to evade review."
B. Analysis
We conclude William's challenges to the $60 fine and the $770 fine should be dismissed as moot because, as the parties acknowledge, the juvenile court's October 2016 minute order establishes that the juvenile court vacated those fines when it terminated its jurisdiction while this appeal was pending.
We further conclude William's challenge to the electronics search condition of his juvenile probation also should be dismissed as moot because the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction while this appeal was pending, and it thereby terminated both William's juvenile probation and that court's authority to enforce the electronics search condition.
William asserts, however, that, even if he is no longer subject to the electronics search condition, this court should decide the issue under the exception to the mootness doctrine allowing an appellate court to decide a technically moot issue if it is "an issue of broad public interest that i[s] likely to recur and yet tends to evade review." He further asserts that "it appears that the juvenile court has made [the] electronics search condition a standard part of its orders" and, thus, "the [electronics search] condition will continue [to] be imposed and the issue of its validity should be resolved."
This court has the inherent discretionary authority to reach the merits of William's challenge to the electronics search condition even though it is technically moot. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 879; In re N.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 53, 58-59). However, we decline to do so. William's assertion that this issue "tends to evade review" is unavailing. The California Supreme Court has granted review in a number of cases presenting the question of the validity of an electronics search condition of juvenile probation that requires a delinquent minor to submit to electronic searches. (In re Mark C. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 520, review granted Apr. 13, 2016, S232849; In re Alejandro R. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 556, review granted Mar. 9, 2016, S232240; In re Patrick F. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 104, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S231428; In re Ricardo P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923.)
DISPOSITION
The court's true finding on the count 1 allegation that William B. willfully resisted, delayed or obstructed a peace officer in violation of Penal Code section 148(a)(1), is affirmed. William's challenges to the $60 fine, the $770 fine, and the electronics search condition of his now-terminated juvenile probation are dismissed as moot.



NARES, J.

WE CONCUR:



McCONNELL, P. J.



HALLER, J.