Filed 3/30/17 P. v. Mendenhall CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KENNETH GARY MENDENHALL,

Defendant and Appellant.
H042749
(Monterey County
Super. Ct. No. SS141691A)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A jury convicted defendant Kenneth Gary Mendenhall of three counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)); counts 3, 4, and 6), one count of domestic violence (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count 5), two counts of dissuading a witness (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (b)(2); counts 7 and 8), one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); count 9), one count of driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.5, subd. (a); count 11), and four counts of violating a protective order (Pen. Code, § 166, subd. (c)(1); counts 12, 13, 14, and 15). The jury acquitted defendant of two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a); counts 1 and 2). The jury found true an allegation that defendant had a prior conviction for driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23540). The trial court found two prior prison term allegations to be true (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to 13 years in prison. The trial court imposed various fines and fees, including a $25 fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1463.07 and a $55 fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1205, subdivision (d).
Defendant now appeals from the judgment of conviction. On appeal, defendant contends that insufficient evidence supports his conviction for driving with a suspended license, and he argues that the fees imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1463.07 and Penal Code section 1205, subdivision (d) are unauthorized. He also asks this court to review a sealed victim statement to determine whether he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s disclosure of only a redacted version of the statement. As set forth below, we reverse the conviction for driving with a suspended license, strike the challenged fees, and find no prejudice stemming from the redactions to the statement.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A police officer testified that defendant was driving a car on July 1, 2014. The police officer did not provide any testimony regarding the validity of defendant’s driver’s license.
To show that defendant’s driver’s license was suspended, the prosecutor offered a document from the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) titled “Driver Record Information.” That document shows that defendant’s driver’s license was suspended on December 24, 2013. The document designates “excessive blood alcohol level” as the reason for the suspension, and it lists “133532” and “13382” as the “authority section(s).” The document does not provide an end date for the license suspension. The space titled “thru date or term,” which is located next to the space showing the license suspension, is blank.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant contends that we must reverse his conviction for driving with a suspended license because there was insufficient evidence that his driver’s license was suspended at the time he drove. Defendant is correct.
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
The jury convicted defendant of violating Penal Code section 14601.5. That section provides, in pertinent part: “A person shall not drive a motor vehicle at any time when that person’s driving privilege is suspended or revoked pursuant to Section 13353, 13353.1, or 13353.2 and that person has knowledge of the suspension or revocation.” (Veh. Code § 14601.5, subd. (a), italics added.)
Here, there was no evidence that defendant’s driving privilege was suspended or revoked at the time he drove. The prosecutor offered the DMV document titled “Driver Record Information” to prove that defendant’s driver’s license was suspended. That document shows that defendant’s driver’s license was suspended on December 24, 2013. The document, however, does not provide any information regarding the length of the suspension. The space titled “thru date or term,” which is located next to the space showing the license suspension, is blank. Given that the document fails to specify the duration of the license suspension, it is impossible to know if defendant’s driver’s license was still suspended when he drove on July 1, 2014. Indeed, as defendant points out, the Vehicle Code authorizes a four-month license suspension, which means that defendant’s driving privilege could have been reinstated as early as April 24, 2014—over two months before the July 1, 2014 offense date. (See Veh. Code, § 13353.3, subd. (b)(1) [authorizing a license suspension of four months].) In light of the absence of evidence regarding the duration of defendant’s license suspension, we must conclude that there was insufficient evidence that defendant’s driving privilege was suspended or revoked at the time he drove.
The Attorney General contends that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction because the “Driver Record Information” document describes defendant’s license as expired and notes the issuance of an identification card. This argument is not persuasive. The “Driver Record Information” was prepared on May 26, 2015. The fact that defendant had an identification card and an expired license on May 26, 2015 does not show that defendant’s driver’s license was suspended on July 1, 2014.
The Attorney General also contends that there was sufficient evidence because the prosecutor offered records showing defendant’s no contest plea to a violation of Vehicle Code section 23103.5. Those records show that defendant entered the no contest plea on November 26, 2013. The records also show that, as part of his plea, defendant made the following acknowledgement: “I understand that if I plead guilty or no contest to an offense of driving under the influence (Vehicle Code section 23152 or 23153) my driver’s license will be suspended for a period of between 6 months and 4 years. . . .” The Attorney General’s reliance on defendant’s no contest plea and acknowledgement of consequences is unavailing. Defendant’s acknowledgement that his license “could” be suspended for six months to four years due to a Vehicle Code section 23152 or Vehicle Code section 23153 conviction does not show that it was suspended on the date of the stop—defendant pleaded no contest to violating Vehicle Code section 23103.5, not Vehicle Code section 23152 or Vehicle Code section 23153.
In sum, there was insufficient evidence that defendant’s driving privilege was suspended or revoked when he drove on July 1, 2014. We therefore must reverse defendant’s conviction for driving with a suspended license.
II. Fees
A. Background
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to pay the fees “born out on [p]age 26 of the probation report.” Page 26 of the probation report states: “Administrative fees total $80.00 and include (1) $25.00 PC 1463.07 and $55.00 per PC 1205(d).” The minute order for the sentencing hearing shows a $25 fee imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1463.07 and a $55 fee imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1205, subdivision (d). Defendant did not object to these fees.
B. We Must Strike the Fees
Defendant contends that the $25 fee imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1463.07 must be stricken because he remained in jail from the time of his arrest to the time of his sentencing. He contends that the $55 fee imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1205, subdivision (d) must be stricken because that subdivision does not authorize imposition of a fee. The People argue that defendant forfeited his claims because he did not object to the fees in the trial court.
Where a fee is unauthorized, a defendant does not forfeit an appellate challenge to the fee by failing to object. (People v. Crittle (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 368, 371.) A fee is unauthorized if “ ‘it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.’ ” (People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 26.) As explained below, the challenged fees here could not be imposed under any circumstance in this particular case. Defendant therefore did not forfeit his claims by failing to object.
The trial court erred in imposing a $25 fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1463.07. That section provides, in pertinent part: “An administrative screening fee of twenty-five dollars ($25) shall be collected from each person arrested and released on his or her own recognizance upon conviction of any criminal offense related to the arrest other than an infraction.” (Pen. Code, § 1463.07, italics added.) The Attorney General concedes that defendant “was in jail from the time of his arrest and was at no time released on his own recognizance.” We have reviewed the record, and it reveals that defendant was never released from jail on his own recognizance. Because defendant was never released on his own recognizance, the $25 fee imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1463.07 was unauthorized. We therefore strike the $25 fee.
The trial court also erred in imposing a $55 fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1205, subdivision (d). Penal Code section 1205, subdivision (d) does not authorize imposition of a fee. Rather, that subdivision states: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the clerk of the court, or the judge if there is no clerk, from turning these accounts over to another county department or a collecting agency for processing and collection.” (Pen. Code, § 1205, subd. (d).) Because Penal Code section 1205, subdivision (d) does not authorize imposition of any sort of fee, the trial court had no authority to impose a $55 fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1205, subdivision (d). We accordingly must strike the $55 fee.
III. The Redacted Statement
A. Background
On July 7, 2014, an investigator from the district attorney’s office recorded an interview with Rita R., the named victim in counts 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7. During discovery, the prosecutor provided defense counsel with a redacted version of the interview. The prosecutor made the redactions because she was “concerned about the safety” of Rita R. and “other people.”
The trial court listened to the complete interview and reviewed the redacted portions of the interview. The trial court found that the redactions were appropriate. The trial court explained: “[T]he Court does find that the redacted portions are appropriately redacted. I don’t find that there’s anything on those that would be appropriate to lead to relevant evidence in this matter. The portions that are redacted relate to things that are speculative in nature and do not relate to this incident. I think they’re appropriately redacted, and the Court will not require that they be provided to the defense.”
B. We Find No Error
Defendant asks this court to listen to the complete interview and review the redactions to determine whether the redactions “prejudiced the defense.” Citing People v. Hobbs (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, defendant contends that a reviewing court can “examine the sealed record to determine the propriety of the lower court’s decision.”
We have listened to the complete interview and reviewed the redactions. Without disclosing the information in the redactions, we find that the trial court properly determined that defendant did not suffer any prejudice due to the redactions.
DISPOSITION
The conviction for driving with a suspended license (Veh. Code, § 14601.5) is reversed. The judgment is modified in the following respects: 1) the $25 fee imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1463.07 is stricken, and 2) the $55 fee imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1205, subdivision (d) is stricken. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
 


______________________________________
RUSHING, P.J.






WE CONCUR:






____________________________________
PREMO, J.






____________________________________
GROVER, J.










People v. Mendenhall
H042749