Filed 4/11/17 Pirahanchi v. Woodcrest Hills Homeowners Assn. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



FARRAH PIRAHANCHI,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

WOODCREST HILLS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,

Defendant and Respondent. D067366



(Super. Ct. No. 37-2013-00050997-
CL-UD-CTL)




APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Judith F. Hayes, Judge. Affirmed; motion for sanctions granted.

Farrah Pirahanchi, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Epsten Grinnell & Howell, Anne L. Rauch and Trinette S. Sachrison for Defendant and Respondent.
Farrah Pirahanchi and her mother filed a lawsuit five years after the mother's home was sold in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. They sought to regain the mother's ownership of the property and/or recover damages for the loss of the home. The court sustained defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. Representing herself on appeal, Pirahanchi challenges the judgment as to one of the defendants, Woodcrest Hills Homeowners Association (Association), which purchased the property at a second foreclosure sale. Pirahanchi raises a multitude of contentions, none of which have any merit. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
We also grant the Association's motion for sanctions on appeal. Sanctions are warranted based on Pirahanchi's actions designed to mislead this court and the superior court regarding the appellate record; her serious appellate rule violations; and her filing an objectively meritless appeal. We impose sanctions of $1,000 payable to this court and $5,000 payable to the Association reflecting a portion of its attorney fees incurred in investigating and briefing issues pertaining to Pirahanchi's deceptive conduct.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarize the record based on the properly pleaded factual allegations and matters subject to judicial notice. (See Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924.) We assume the truth of Pirahanchi's allegations except for claims contradicted by a judicially noticeable fact. (See Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 751 (Scott).) In this section, we summarize only the information before the trial court when it ruled on the Association's demurrer.
In 2003, Pirahanchi's mother, Monireh Bozorgi, purchased property (Property) in a common interest development managed by the Association. Soon after, Bozorgi borrowed funds secured by a deed of trust on the Property. Bozorgi and Pirahanchi then lived at the Property, and Bozorgi made substantial repayments on this loan.
Several years later, in May 2006, a second deed of trust was recorded on the Property. This document stated Bozorgi had borrowed $70,000 from a lender (Emvest Mortgage Fund II, LLC (Emvest)), secured by the deed of trust (the Emvest deed of trust). Although the Emvest deed of trust contains the notarized signatures of Bozorgi and Pirahanchi, they allege they never signed this document and their signatures were forged. They also claim Emvest had been sued by the Securities and Exchange Commission for alleged investor fraud.
In June 2006, Emvest assigned the Emvest deed of trust to Robert and Elizabeth Haynes. The assignment document was recorded on June 20, 2006.
In November 2007, the Hayneses recorded a notice of default on the Property, stating that Bozorgi had failed to make required payments on the Emvest note. The notice stated Bozorgi could obtain more information by contacting the trustee at a specified address and phone number.
In 2008, Bozorgi retained attorney Nathan Fransen to bring a lawsuit against Emvest to clear Bozorgi's title to the Property. In March 2008, Fransen filed a federal action in which Bozorgi sued Emvest for allegedly violating federal and state statutes in the secured loan transaction. In the complaint, Bozorgi acknowledged she had "signed a mortgage with Emvest: a five year interest only note for $70,000 at 15% interest with closing costs of $11,586.31." But she claimed she had rescinded the loan under the Truth in Lending Act. (See 15 U.S.C. § 1635.) This lawsuit was later dismissed for failure to prosecute.
When Bozorgi failed to pay amounts due on the Emvest note, the Hayneses recorded a notice of a foreclosure sale. In May 2008, a foreclosure sale was held, and the Hayneses purchased the property at the sale. The trustee's deed upon sale was recorded on May 29, 2008. Bozorgi and Pirahanchi alleged they "were shocked" by the foreclosure sale, but there is no information showing they took any steps to challenge the sale.
Despite the ownership change, the Hayneses did not initially take possession of the Property. Bozorgi and Pirahanchi continued to live at the Property, and Bozorgi allegedly continued to "pay [the homeowner] dues and otherwise abide by [the Association's] CC&Rs."
In about 2012, the Association stopped accepting Bozorgi's payment of the monthly homeowners' dues, and began assessing late charges and other costs and fees. In April 2012, the Association recorded a notice of delinquent assessment against the Property, stating that $3,361.64 was due and owing. Bozorgi and Pirahanchi (who were not record owners) were not provided notice that this document had been recorded.
On June 25, 2012, Bozorgi and/or Pirahanchi recorded a grant deed in which Bozorgi purported to grant title of the Property to herself (the 2012 Bozorgi Grant Deed). On the same date it was recorded, Pirahanchi signed the document, as "[a]ttorney in fact" for Bozorgi. At the time Bozorgi and Pirahanchi were aware Bozorgi was not the record owner of the Property. The document contained an attachment that stated in part:
"I, Monireh Bozorgi, the living woman created in the image of God, with indefeasible title to my land and lawful owner of the landed estate known as MONIREH BOZORGI and it's real property and interest, under the seal Monireh Bozorgi, or it's derivation am recorded as the grantee on the Grant Deed for the real estate described on the attached public record of said deed. It is my freewill act and deed, to execute this acknowledgement of my acceptance of the deed and lawful ownership of the property under the terms of the deed. I ask that the record on file in the office of register of deeds be updated to show my acceptance of the deed as lawful owner of the real estate [at the specified address]. All my other real property and interest issued for this real estate, and its gain is to be immediately returned to me. What's mine is mine, what's yours is yours. I accept the oaths of all public officers and bind them to it, as well as bestow my sovereign immunity on them while administering my lawful orders. This public record under the seal of a competent court is guaranteed full faith and credit per Article 4 Section 1 of your Constitution. Any officer of the public who does not immediately carry out these lawful orders acknowledges warring with the constitution, and committing treason. So let it be written, so let it be done. Done under my hand and seal of my freewill act and deed. Today is the 22th day in the year of our Lord and Savior 2012, King of kings and Lord of lords forever and ever."

In August 2012, the Association recorded a notice of default on the Property, stating that $4,610.75 in assessments and other charges were due and owing. At the time, the record owners were the Hayneses.
On January 25, 2013, the Association recorded a notice of trustee's sale, stating a nonjudicial foreclosure sale would be held on February 22, 2013 to recover $9,741.25, reflecting the past due assessments plus interest and other charges. At the time, the record owners were the Hayneses.
On February 22, 2013, the foreclosure sale was held and the Association purchased the property. The same day, Bozorgi filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief hoping "to save her family's home" (despite that she had not owned the Property since 2008). A notice of the bankruptcy stay was served on the Association that same day.
Several months later, the Association moved for relief from the bankruptcy stay and, on May 13, 2013, the bankruptcy court granted the Association's unopposed motion for relief from the stay.
The Association then filed an unlawful detainer action against Bozorgi. The Association later filed an amended unlawful detainer complaint to include Bozorgi and Pirahanchi.
In August 2013, Bozorgi and Pirahanchi (represented by counsel) filed a lawsuit against the Association, alleging: wrongful foreclosure; negligence; elder abuse (on behalf of Bozorgi only); unfair business practices and other statutory violations; declaratory relief to prevent the Association from evicting Bozorgi and Pirahanchi; and declaratory relief and quiet title to establish that Bozorgi "is the owner in fee simple" of the Property. The essence of plaintiffs' claims against the Association was: (1) the 2006 Emvest deed of trust was invalid or void because plaintiffs had never borrowed money from Emvest and their signatures on the Emvest deed of trust were forged; (2) the Hayneses' ownership claims were therefore invalid or void because the Hayneses claimed their ownership interest through the foreclosure of the void Emvest deed of trust; and (3) the Association's ownership claims were also invalid or void because the Association claimed an ownership interest through the Hayneses, who allegedly never held a valid ownership interest in the Property. Plaintiffs also alleged the Association violated bankruptcy stay laws by conducting the February 2013 foreclosure sale with notice of Bozorgi's bankruptcy stay, and the Association acted wrongfully after 2012 by refusing to accept their homeowner association dues and not providing them with adequate statutory notice of the defaults and foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs made the latter allegations despite that they were not record owners of the Property at the time of these events. Plaintiffs additionally claimed the Association engaged in abusive acts towards Bozorgi, who is elderly and allegedly disabled.
On December 6, 2013, the superior court consolidated the unlimited civil action with the unlawful detainer action.
The Association then filed a demurrer to plaintiffs' complaint in the unlimited civil action. As the primary ground for the demurrer, the Association argued the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations because the factual predicate underlying each claim is plaintiffs' challenge to the validity of the 2006 Emvest deed of trust and the 2008 foreclosure sale, both of which occurred more than five years before the complaint was filed. The Association also argued plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to support a viable claim on the negligence, elder abuse, unfair business practices, and quiet title causes of action. The Association requested the court to take judicial notice of the recorded documents on the Property and the various court records, including Bozorgi's admission in her 2008 federal lawsuit that she had signed the Emvest deed of trust in 2006.
In opposition, Bozorgi and Pirahanchi argued their causes of action were timely. They alternatively urged the court to apply the equitable tolling doctrine based on facts showing Bozorgi "is an elderly woman who does not speak English," and that her prior attorneys and others have not explained the relevant facts to her. Plaintiffs also opposed the Association's judicial notice request, asserting they dispute "all or nearly all of the facts" contained in the proffered recorded documents and court documents.
On March 14, 2014, the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, and granted the Association's judicial notice request. The court found the complaint was barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The court also noted that plaintiffs had expressly acknowledged the Emvest $70,000 secured debt in prior pleadings and they "cannot escape their prior judicial admissions." The court declined to provide plaintiffs an opportunity to amend their complaint, stating plaintiffs had not requested leave to amend and there is no reasonable basis to find an amendment would cure the defects. The court stated the complaint was dismissed and directed defendants to submit a judgment of dismissal.
Before a judgment was submitted, Pirahanchi and Bozorgi (representing themselves) filed a lengthy motion for reconsideration of the court's demurrer ruling. Plaintiffs contended they were the victims of fraud because Bozorgi was on title at the time of the 2013 foreclosure sale, but did not receive notice of the sale and were not permitted to pay homeowner association dues. In support, they cited to the recorded 2012 Bozorgi Grant Deed in which Bozorgi purported to transfer title of the Property to herself (despite that she did not have an ownership interest at the time). They also asserted that Bozorgi is "an elderly wom[a]n [who is] 75 and 1/2," who was taken advantage of by numerous individuals.
Bozorgi and Pirahanchi each submitted identical supporting declarations, which included their statements that the "[t]itle report shows clearly Defendant Bozorgi was on the title of her property when [the Association's] attorney foreclosed on the [Property]," relying on the 2012 Bozorgi Grant Deed. Bozorgi and Pirahanchi also accused the Association and its attorney of forging documents and other fraudulent acts. They attached more than 100 pages of claimed supporting documents.
While their reconsideration motion was pending, plaintiffs removed the matter to the federal court, alleging "complete diversity" because they are citizens of Iran and the Association is a California entity. Shortly after, in September 2014, the federal district court granted Association's remand motion, finding the removal was untimely and noting that Bozorgi and Pirahanchi "now state they are also United States citizens" and live in the United States, and therefore there "is no diversity of citizenship, and hence no subject matter jurisdiction." (Italics added.) The court also found Bozorgi and Pirahanchi " 'lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal[,]' " and therefore granted the Association's request for attorney fees incurred in objecting to the removal.
After the remand, the court denied plaintiffs' reconsideration motion, finding they "presented no new or different facts, circumstances or law that requires the Court to reconsider its ruling sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend."
In late October 2014, a trial was held on the Association's unlawful detainer action. Bozorgi and Pirahanchi were represented by counsel. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court found the three-day notice was sufficient to trigger the unlawful detainer action and that Pirahanchi's testimony was not credible. The court entered judgment in the Association's favor, awarding possession of the Property to the Association and ordering a "Writ of Possession to issue forthwith."
Shortly after, on November 12, the court entered a final judgment of dismissal on Bozorgi and Pirahanchi's complaint against the Association. The Association served notice of entry of judgment on December 3, 2014. Pirahanchi (but not Bozorgi) filed a notice of appeal from this judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Timeliness of Appeal
The Association moved to dismiss this appeal based on its assertion the appeal is untimely because Pirahanchi filed the notice of appeal on January 20, 2015, long after the court's minute order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend (March 14, 2014).
The final judgment dismissing plaintiffs' unlimited civil complaint was filed on November 12, 2014, and notice of entry of judgment was served on December 3, 2014. The Association concedes the notice of appeal was timely from this judgment. But the Association argues this judgment was a nullity because the court's March 2014 minute order sustaining the demurrer was an appealable order and thus triggered the statutory appeal time. (See Laraway v. Pasadena Unified School Dist. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 579, 583; see also Spinner v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp. (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 679, 685.)
We agree that a minute order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend can be a final judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 581d.) But this rule governs only if the minute order is signed. (Ibid.; see Brehm v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1233-1234.) An unsigned minute order is not an appealable judgment. (Powell v. County of Orange (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1573, 1577-1579.) The minute order here was not signed, and the order included the trial court's statement that defendants should prepare a final judgment to be signed by the court. The Association's later actions reflect it understood and expected a final judgment would follow the court's minute order.
Under these circumstances, the unsigned minute order was not an appealable judgment and therefore the appeal from the November 2014 final judgment was timely.
II. Demurrer
A. Demurrer Review Standards
A demurrer tests the sufficiency of a pleading as a matter of law. It is therefore "error for the trial court to sustain a demurrer if the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory . . . ." (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 247.) We apply the de novo review standard in considering whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Saterbak v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 808, 813.) We affirm if the record shows no viable cause of action "whether or not the defendants asserted the proper ground in the trial court." (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 880, fn. 10; accord, Kennedy v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 799, 808; Hogen v. Valley Hospital (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 119, 127.)
In reviewing the record, "we assume the truth of all facts properly pleaded in the complaint and its exhibits or attachments, as well as those facts that may fairly be implied or inferred from the express allegations." (Cobb v. O'Connell (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 91, 95.) We also consider facts that are the proper subject of judicial notice. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) Judicially noticeable facts will be accepted as true and will be given precedence over any contrary allegations in the pleadings. (Ibid.; see Scott, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 751-752; Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400; City of Chula Vista v. County of San Diego (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1713, 1719.) Allegations contrary to the law or to a fact of which judicial notice may be taken are "treated as a nullity." (Fundin v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 951, 955.) "The complaint should be read as containing the judicially noticeable facts, 'even when the pleading contains an express allegation to the contrary.' " (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 877.)
When "a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, [we] must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that the complaint could have been amended to cure the defect; if so, [we] will conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the plaintiff leave to amend. . . . The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that it could have amended the complaint to cure the defect." (Berg & Berg Enterprises, LLC v. Boyle (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1035.)
B. Analysis
The only appellant before us is Pirahanchi, Bozorgi's daughter. Bozorgi's name is not identified on the notice of appeal and Bozorgi has not appeared in this action. Although Pirahanchi purports to assert arguments on behalf of her mother, Pirahanchi is not an attorney and she represents herself in this action. An individual who is not a licensed attorney cannot represent others in legal proceedings, including a parent, child, or other relative. (Drake v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830-1831.)
As against the Association, Pirahanchi alleged: (1) wrongful foreclosure; (2) negligence; (3) unfair business practices and violations of various consumer statutes; (4) declaratory relief to prevent the Association from evicting Bozorgi and Pirahanchi; and (5) declaratory relief and quiet title to establish that Bozorgi "is the owner in fee simple" of the Property. The complaint also contained an elder abuse cause of action, but this claim was not made on behalf of Pirahanchi (who does not claim to be a person protected by the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.).
Each of Pirahanchi's causes of action is premised on her claim the Association harmed or interfered with Bozorgi's ownership interest in the Property. Specifically, Pirahanchi alleged the Association engaged in wrongful conduct when it (1) foreclosed on Bozorgi's Property based on an invalid ownership interest obtained through the allegedly void Emvest deed of trust; (2) foreclosed on Bozorgi's Property without providing adequate statutory notice to Bozorgi; (3) refused to accept Bozorgi's payment of homeowner association dues after 2012; and (4) violated Bozorgi's bankruptcy stay when it conducted the February 2013 foreclosure sale. It is undisputed that Pirahanchi (the sole appellant before us) never owned the Property or any portion of the Property. Pirahanchi thus has no standing to assert these claims. Her claims against the Association are without any colorable legal or factual basis.
Moreover, the recorded documents of which the court properly took judicial notice establish Bozorgi had no legal basis to recover against the Association on the pleaded causes of action. The recorded documents show Bozorgi did not own the Property after the Hayneses purchased the Property at the 2008 foreclosure sale. Thus, with respect to the Association's 2013 foreclosure, Bozorgi had no right to notice, pay homeowners' dues to cure the default, or obtain a stay of the foreclosure sale by filing a bankruptcy petition. Pirahanchi argues the Emvest deed of trust was a forged document and thus all later transactions were void. However, this allegation is directly contradicted by Bozorgi's admission in her 2008 federal lawsuit that she signed the Emvest deed of trust. A party is bound by an admission in his or her pleadings, and the admission "negates any attempt to contradict" the prior pleading. (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 193-194 (Bucur); see Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 218; Setliff v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1534.)
Pirahanchi's reliance on the 2012 Bozorgi Grant Deed is misplaced. In this document, Bozorgi purported to deed the Property to herself. However, the recorded documents show that at the time Bozorgi had no interest in the Property. Thus, the 2012 Bozorgi Grant Deed is facially invalid.
Pirahanchi also relies on a document purporting to show the Hayneses quitclaimed the Property back to Bozorgi in May 2012. This document was never submitted in the trial court proceedings, and for the reasons detailed in Discussion section III, we strike the document from the record and strike Pirahanchi's related references to this document and arguments in reliance on this document.
On the record before us, Pirahanchi did not state a viable cause of action against the Association because she never owned the Property. Further, to the extent Pirahanchi claims (or could claim) interference with a possessory interest, any such interest would have been derivative of Bozorgi's ownership rights, and the undisputed facts show Bozorgi had no ownership rights in the Property after 2008.
In light of these conclusions, we do not reach the Association's alternate arguments for upholding the court's demurrer ruling, including its statute of limitations and collateral estoppel defenses.
C. Amendment
We have considered each of Pirahanchi's claimed grounds for amending the complaint, and find the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pirahanchi leave to file an amended pleading. (See Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) There is nothing in the record or Pirahanchi's appellate briefs showing Pirahanchi could add facts to her pleading that would support a viable cause of action.
III. Association's Motion to Strike Second Supplemental Clerk's Transcript
A. Relevant Facts
On July 22, 2016, several months after the six-volume clerk's transcript had been certified by the superior court clerk and filed in the Court of Appeal, Pirahanchi filed a motion in the superior court requesting "augmentation" of the record with documents she said had been omitted from the certified transcript. In the motion (entitled "Notice of Omissions"), Pirahanchi stated "under penalty of perjury" that she had filed the proposed "augmented items" with the superior court on May 30, 2014 (as part of her reconsideration motion), but the documents were "missing" from the certified clerk's transcript. In her supporting memorandum, she said the proffered documents had been "presented to the Superior Court" and that the documents "were all a part of the record." Pirahanchi attached approximately 136 pages of the claimed "missing" documents and requested that the court include them in a supplemental clerk's transcript.
Four days later, on July 26, 2016, a deputy clerk certified these additional documents "to be a full, true and correct Clerks' Transcript on appeal." A supplemental clerk's transcript containing these documents was then filed with this court (hereafter referred to as the "Second Supplemental Clerk's Transcript").
One of the documents contained in the Second Supplemental Clerk's Transcript was a document entitled "QUITCLAIM DEED," stating the Hayneses quitclaimed the Property to Bozorgi on May 2, 2012 (before the February 2013 foreclosure sale of the Property). This document contains: (1) what looks like the signatures of Robert and Elizabeth Haynes; (2) a recorder's office file stamp; and (3) a notary signature and stamp. The recording stamp is identical (including the identical date) to the recording stamp on the 2012 Bozorgi Grant Deed in which Bozorgi purported to transfer the Property to herself.
This Quitclaim Deed document was central to Pirahanchi's arguments in her opening appellate brief. She cited to the document numerous times in support of her contention that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer because Bozorgi was the "rightful title holder[ ] and owner[ ] of the [P]roperty when [the Association] foreclosed on the . . . [P]roperty" in February 2013 and that the Hayneses "were not on the title" at that time.
The Association countered by moving to strike the Second Supplemental Clerk's Transcript and all references to documents contained in this transcript, including the purported Quitclaim Deed. The Association asserted that some of the documents in the Second Supplemental Clerk's Transcript were already part of the original clerk's transcript, but most of the documents had never been filed in the superior court proceedings. The Association's counsel provided supporting evidence (including the Register of Actions, and certified copies of the documents attached to plaintiffs' reconsideration motion that had been allegedly "omitted" from the record), and a detailed chart identifying the new materials contained in the Second Supplemental Clerk's Transcript.
In its motion to strike, the Association focused particular attention on the Quitclaim Deed. First, it presented evidence that this document had never been filed in the superior court proceedings, and plaintiffs had never before argued the Hayneses had retransferred the Property to Bozorgi. Second, the Association presented evidence that the Quitclaim Deed was a falsified document. This evidence included the declarations of Robert and Elizabeth Haynes, both of whom said they had never seen or signed the Quitclaim Deed. The Hayneses said it appeared that someone had taken their signatures from another document "and pasted them into this document . . . ." The Association also submitted the declaration of the identified notary (Kanwal Jeet Singh), who stated: "I have been provided a copy of the [Quitclaim Deed] claimed to have been notarized by me on May 2, 2002. . . . I have never seen this document before today. The signature purporting to be mine near the notary seal on the document is not my signature. . . . I did not notarize this document." The Association also submitted its trial counsel's declaration, who stated he "never saw this document while I was handling the trial court proceedings or the foreclosure proceedings on behalf of the Association."
In response to this motion, Pirahanchi did not deny the Association's claims that most of the documents (including the Quitclaim Deed) in the Second Supplemental Clerk's Transcript were not part of the superior court record, and she offered no explanation for her contrary representations to the superior court. But she continued to argue the Quitclaim Deed was a valid document, and in her reply brief she repeatedly cited to the Quitclaim Deed in support of her assertion that her mother (Bozorgi) was the owner of the Property at the time of the February 2013 foreclosure sale. Pirahanchi also made various accusations against the Association's attorney and property manager, stating these individuals were engaging in a "scam"; "play[ing] with the lives of a disabled elderly women and small children . . ."; and "deceiving the court and defaming" Pirahanchi "with lies."
B. Analysis
We grant the Association's motion to strike the Second Supplemental Clerk's Transcript, including the Quitclaim Deed and all references to that document in Pirahanchi's appellate briefs and motion papers. California Rules of Court, rule 8.155(b) sets forth a procedure to include items from the superior court record that were inadvertently omitted from the Clerk's Transcript. Because the documents included in the Second Supplemental Clerk's Transcript were either already included in the original Clerk's Transcript, or were never part of the superior court file, the documents were not a proper subject of a rule 8.155(b) motion. This supplemental transcript is not properly before this court.
If Pirahanchi had wanted to augment the record with items that were not in the superior court file, she was required to file a motion to augment with this court under rule 8.155(a). If she had filed a motion to augment, we would have denied the motion. A motion to augment can be used to add a document to the appellate record only if the document was "filed or lodged in the case in [the] superior court." (Rule 8.155(a)(1)(A); see Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 (Vons Companies); Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 123-124.) Although this rule may be inapplicable in certain "exceptional circumstances" (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405), there are no such circumstances here.
In granting the Association's motion to strike, we do not make a final factual determination on the Association's claims the Quitclaim Deed is a forged document. Because the undisputed evidence shows the Quitclaim Deed was not before the trial court, we strike the document on this ground alone. (Vons Companies, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 444, fn. 3 ["Augmentation does not function to supplement the record with materials not before the trial court."].) Although the Association has asserted persuasive arguments challenging the authenticity of this document, Pirahanchi has denied these claims. Thus, the resolution of this particular issue is best resolved at an evidentiary hearing in an appropriate factfinding forum.
V. Motion for Sanctions
A. Background
The Association moved for sanctions for Pirahanchi's filing a frivolous appeal and committing unreasonable violations of the appellate rules. The Association relied primarily on (1) Pirahanchi's motion to correct the alleged omissions in the record (in which Pirahanchi affirmatively misrepresented the contents of the superior court record); (2) the evidence showing the Quitclaim Deed is a falsified document; (3) Pirahanchi's reliance on the Quitclaim Deed to suggest the court erred in sustaining the demurrer; and (4) Bozorgi's litigation history, which has included several lawsuits challenging the enforcement of security interests on the Property and many bankruptcy petitions.
The Association's counsel provided a supporting declaration detailing the substantial time and effort necessary to investigate and determine the deficiencies of the Second Supplemental Clerk's Transcript and to rebut Pirahanchi's reliance on the newly submitted documents. In the declaration, the Association's counsel identified the attorney fees incurred in responding to Pirahanchi's appeal, and provided a summary of the tasks performed and fees charged in connection with each of these tasks.
We gave Pirahanchi the opportunity to file an opposition to the motion. (Rule 8.276(c).) After many continuances, Pirahanchi filed a consolidated response to the Association's various appellate motions. In the response, Pirahanchi denied the purported Quitclaim Deed was a falsified document, but she did not dispute that this document (and various other proffered documents in the Second Supplemental Clerk's Transcript) had not been part of the record below, nor did she attempt to justify the inclusion of these documents in the appellate record. Pirahanchi instead continued to assert that the Quitclaim Deed is valid, and devoted much of her responsive briefing to accusing the Association of fraudulent conduct, and making personal attacks on the character of the Association's attorney and property manager.
After reviewing the parties' briefs, we notified Pirahanchi that this court would consider the Association's sanctions motion at the oral argument on the merits issues. (Rule 8.276(c), (e).) At the oral argument, we provided Pirahanchi an opportunity to respond to the Association's sanctions request.
B. Analysis
Code of Civil Procedure section 907 authorizes a monetary sanctions award on appeal "[w]hen it appears to the reviewing court that the appeal was frivolous or taken solely for delay." Rule 8.276 permits a reviewing court to additionally impose sanctions for (1) "Including in the record any matter not reasonably material to the appeal's determination"; (2) "Filing a frivolous motion"; or (3) "Committing any other unreasonable violation of [the] rules." (Rule 8.276(a)(2), (3), (4).)
Even when these grounds for monetary sanctions exist, appellate courts rarely invoke this power. (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650-651 (Flaherty).) Parties and attorneys must be provided with broad latitude to assert arguments to stretch or test the law. (Ibid.; see Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428, 448.) Additionally, although self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as are attorneys, we consider a litigant's inexperience with the legal system when we rule on a sanctions motion. We recognize appellate rules can be complex, and do not sanction self-represented parties for inadvertent, inconsequential, or isolated rule violations.
But Pirahanchi's conduct in this case crosses the line—both in the number of rule violations and the egregiousness of the conduct. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, sanctions are clearly warranted here.
Most important, the undisputed record shows Pirahanchi purposefully attempted to create a false appellate record. The facts show Pirahanchi understood the documents she presented to the superior court were not part of the superior court record, but she nonetheless sought their inclusion into the appellate record by misrepresenting that they had been part of her reconsideration motion filed in May 2014. Based on her statements made in the superior court motion and the substantive arguments in her appellate briefs, it appears Pirahanchi engaged in this conduct primarily to place before this court the purported Quitclaim Deed, and sought to accomplish this by hiding this document within a voluminous set of attached documents that she falsely stated had been before the trial court. Although we do not decide here whether the purported Quitclaim Deed is authentic, the deception used to include this document in a clerk's transcript and then to rely on this document to falsely support her appellate arguments reflects utmost bad faith. The fact that an appellate record is limited to the documents presented in trial court proceedings is fundamental to our appellate system. (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 743; Oldenkott v. American Electric, Inc. (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 198, 207; see also Lady v. Barrett (1941) 43 Cal.App.2d 685, 686.) Pirahanchi's conduct seeking to covertly undermine this rule is unacceptable. Her actions are an affront to the integrity of the judicial process.
Second, Pirahanchi's appeal is objectively frivolous and subjectively filed in bad faith. An appeal is frivolous if it "indisputably has no merit," meaning that "any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit." (Flaherty, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 650; accord, Kleveland v. Siegel & Wolensky, LLP (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 534, 556 (Kleveland).) Although a party is not necessarily charged with the knowledge that is imputed to an attorney under this objective prong of the frivolous appeal analysis (Kabbe v. Miller (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 93, 98), sanctions may be appropriate against a self-represented litigant if "the lack of merit . . . is readily apparent" (Bistawros v. Greenberg (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 189, 193). It would be readily apparent to any reasonable person (attorney or layperson) that Pirahanchi, who was not a property owner when the Property was sold at the foreclosure sale, had no standing to challenge the sale. The fact that Pirahanchi subjectively understood this concept is reflected in her central focus in her appellate briefs on her unsupported claim that Bozorgi was an owner at the time of the foreclosure sale by virtue of the Quitclaim Deed. Pirahanchi's claims are an additional step away from a meritorious claim, as she seeks to recover for a lost ownership interest despite her admission that she never owned the Property.
The record also supports a strong inference that Pirahanchi pursued this appeal solely for purposes of harassment. Pirahanchi's briefs consist primarily of information and assertions irrelevant to the issues before us. Pirahanchi's conduct in continuing to rely on the Quitclaim Deed, even after the Association presented irrefutable evidence that this document was not part of the record below, confirms her continued knowing deception. Pirahanchi's filing of the federal court removal petition also shows she has engaged in bad faith conduct in the past, including by concealing that she is a United States citizen when seeking to establish diversity jurisdiction.
Finally, Pirahanchi's appellate briefs violate numerous appellate rules that are fundamental to this court's fair processing of an appeal. For example, the factual assertions in Pirahanchi's brief are not supported by record citations and include facts outside the appellate record. Additionally, she did not develop her arguments, or explain a relevant legal or factual basis for any of the claimed errors. These deficiencies are material and substantial. (See rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C); City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239.)
C. Sanctions Amount
In determining an appropriate sanctions amount, we may consider all relevant factors, including the respondent's appellate attorney fees; the nature of the judgment against the appellant; the degree of objective frivolousness; and the need to discourage similar conduct in the future. (Bucur, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 194-195; Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17, 33-34.) Additionally, courts consider the extent to which the party's conduct has imposed an unnecessary burden on the court system. (Bucur, at p. 195.) When an appellant files a frivolous appeal and/or engages in abusive conduct in prosecuting an appeal, the " ' " ' "appellate system and the taxpayers of this state are damaged by what amounts to a waste of this court's time and resources," ' " ' " and thus sanctions may include an amount to compensate the state "for the expense of processing, reviewing and deciding [the] appeal." (Ibid.; accord, Kleveland, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at pp. 559-560; In re Marriage of Gong & Kwong (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 510, 520.)
In her declaration, the Association's counsel presented evidence that her total fees for responding to this appeal were $51,149.50, including at least $10,000 to respond to the issues raised by the Second Supplemental Clerk's Transcript and other record issues. Viewing the Association's counsel's declaration and all other relevant factors, including the need to deter Pirahanchi's continuing deceptive conduct and serious rule violations, we impose sanctions of $5,000 payable to the Association and $1,000 payable to this court.
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed. Appellant to bear respondent's costs on appeal. Sanctions awarded against appellant Pirahanchi in the amount of $5,000 payable to respondent, and $1,000 payable to the clerk of the court no later than 30 days after the remittitur is filed. The clerk of this court is directed to deposit this sum in the general fund.


HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:




MCCONNELL, P. J.




NARES, J.