In re Manuel G.

Filed 8/29/06 In re Manuel G. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Rudolph A. Diaz, Judge. Affirmed.

Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________

Manuel G. was declared a ward of the juvenile court after the court sustained a petition alleging he had resisted, obstructed and delayed a peace officer. On appeal Manuel G. contends there is insufficient evidence he had the requisite understanding of wrongfulness necessary to find a child under the age of 14 capable of committing a criminal offense. (Pen. Code, § 26.) We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

On May 10, 2005 Sidney Davis, a campus security aide, found Manuel G., then 12 years 3 months old, in the lobby of the Carver Middle School 10 minutes after the tardy bell rang. Davis asked Manuel G. why he was not in class; Manuel G. did not respond. Five to 10 minutes later Los Angeles School Police Officer Tae Lee arrived to provide backup for Davis and saw Manuel G. walking out of the school. Lee called out to Manuel G. to “get back here,” but Manuel G. continued to walk away. Although Manuel G. turned several times to look at Lee, he did not stop walking. Lee ran to catch up to Manuel G. and asked him where he was going. Manuel G. replied he was going home because he was scared. Lee told Manuel G. he needed to return to school and could talk about being scared once there. Manuel G. said nothing and again started to walk away.

At this point Officer Lee placed his hand on Manuel G.’s shoulder; Manuel G. pulled away. Lee then grabbed Manuel G.’s wrist to put handcuffs on him; Manuel G. twisted himself free. Lee seized one of Manuel G.’s arms and was able to place a handcuff on his wrist, but Manuel G. struggled to prevent Lee from restraining his other arm and refused to comply with Lee’s commands to cooperate. Lee pulled Manuel G. to the ground and again demanded that Manuel G. give him his second arm to handcuff. Manuel G. finally obeyed when Lee said he would call other officers to help if necessary.

When Officer Lee and Manuel G. returned to the school, Lee advised Manuel G. of his right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney, and, if indigent, to appointed counsel. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602].) Lee asked Manuel G. if he understood his rights; Manuel G. replied, “yes.” Lee then interviewed Manuel G. to determine if he understood the wrongfulness of his actions. Using a questionnaire (described by Lee as “the Gladys R. questionnaire”), Lee asked Manuel G. if he knew the difference between right and wrong. Manuel G. responded affirmatively and, when prompted by Lee, gave examples. Manuel G. said using drugs was wrong and going to school was right. He also said, if a person did something wrong, for example, using drugs, he would be arrested. Lee asked Manuel G. if it is wrong to “ditch school”; Manuel G. said, “yes.” Lee then wrote on the questionnaire Manuel G. had committed the offense of “ditching school.”

On September 16, 2005 the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging Manuel G. had resisted, obstructed and delayed a peace officer. (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1).) Davis and Lee both testified at the adjudication hearing on October 4, 2005. After the People rested, counsel for Manuel G. moved to dismiss the petition under In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, arguing the People had failed to meet their burden of proving Manuel G. understood the wrongfulness of the charged conduct at the time it was committed as required by Penal Code section 26. The court denied the motion, explaining, “I’m looking at all the circumstances that was presented as evidence, and I think the minor does understand right from wrong and understood the wrongfulness of his resistance to the police officer and resistance to accept the authority of the police officer, as well. I mean I think that’s pretty clear.”

After his motion was denied, Manuel G. rested without testifying on his own behalf or presenting any other defense. The court found true the allegation Manuel G. had resisted a peace officer, sustained the petition and declared Manuel G. a ward of the juvenile court.[1] At disposition the court ordered Manuel G. to be suitably placed under the supervision of the probation department and declared a maximum term of confinement of one year.

Discussion

1. Standard of Review

The same standard of appellate review is applicable in considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding as in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction. (In re Cheri T. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1404; In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820; In re Jose R. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 269, 275.) In either case we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence -- that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value -- to support the conclusions of the trier of fact. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206; People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314; Rocco M., at p. 820.) “This standard of review applies with equal force to claims that the evidence does not support the determination that a juvenile understood the wrongfulness of his conduct.” (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298.)

2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding of Knowledge of Wrongfulness

a. Governing law

Children under the age of 14 are deemed incapable of committing crimes unless there is clear proof they knew the wrongfulness of their conduct at the time it was committed. (Pen. Code, § 26.)[2] Accordingly, to declare a child a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 based on a criminal offense committed when the child was under 14, the court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, the child knew the wrongfulness of his or her act. (In re Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 867; In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 232.)

Knowledge of wrongfulness may not be inferred from the offense itself, but the court may consider the circumstances of the crime, including preparation, commission and concealment. (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 900; In re Jerry M., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.) The child’s age and experience is also a significant factor in assessing his or her knowledge of wrongfulness: The closer a child is to the age of 14, the more likely it is that he or she appreciates the wrongfulness of his or her acts. (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378; In re Cindy E. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 393, 399; In re Nirran W. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1161.)

b. Substantial evidence supports the finding Manuel G. knew the wrongfulness of his actions at the time he committed the crime

Substantial evidence supports the finding Manuel G. was aware of the wrongfulness of his actions in resisting, obstructing or delaying Officer Lee. (See In re Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 867.) Manuel G.’s responses to Lee’s questioning establish both a general understanding of the difference between right and wrong and the specific knowledge that one consequence of doing something wrong (like using drugs) was being arrested. From these responses the juvenile court could reasonably infer Manuel G. knew resisting arrest or obstructing a police officer who was attempting to place him under arrest was wrong. That inference is strongly reinforced by Manuel G.’s age, 12 years 3 months at the time of the offense: “[A] minor’s age is a basic and important consideration [citation], and, as recognized by the common law, it is only reasonable to expect that generally the older a child gets and the closer [he] approaches the age of 14, the more likely it is that [he] appreciates the wrongfulness of [his acts].’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 378.)

The circumstances of the offense also support the juvenile court’s determination. Manuel G. turned and answered Officer Lee, who was dressed in his school police officer uniform, when Lee called out to him, demonstrating Manuel G. understood Lee was a person of authority and it was appropriate to respond to his directives. Manuel G.’s eventual submission when Lee threatened to call other officers for assistance also suggests Manuel G. was aware his actions were wrong and he should comply with Lee’s commands.

In re Michael B. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 443, upon which Manuel G. relies, does not support his contention the People’s evidence of his capacity is insufficient. In Michael B. the only evidence presented on the issue of appreciation of wrongfulness was that the child had said “yes” when asked by a police officer if he knew the difference between right and wrong. (Id. at p. 446.) The Court of Appeal held this one word answer fell far short of the “clear proof” demanded by Penal Code section 26. (Michael B., at p. 446.) Significantly, Michael B. was only nine years old at the time he committed the offense at issue (“no more than a third-grade pupil”); and the circumstances of his crime (breaking into an unoccupied automobile) did not furnish any additional proof he understood the wrongfulness of his actions. (Ibid.) Similarly unhelpful to Manuel G. is In re Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d 855, which involved a 12-year-old child with the mental and social capacity of a seven year old. (Id. at p. 867.) Unlike both Michael B. and Gladys R., 12-year-old Manuel G. possessed the requisite age and experience to understand the wrongfulness of his act.

In sum, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding Manuel G. knew the wrongfulness of his actions at the time the offense was committed.

Disposition

The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

PERLUSS, P. J.

We concur:

JOHNSON, J. WOODS, J.

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[1] On October 3, 2005 the District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 601 alleging Manuel G. was habitually truant, habitually refused to obey orders and directives of school authorities and failed to respond to services provided by the District Attorney’s mediation program. The juvenile court dismissed the section 601 petition with prejudice in the interests of justice.

[2] Penal Code section 26 provides in part: “All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes:

. . . Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness.”