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In re C.S. CA5

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In re C.S. CA5
By
06:22:2017

Filed 4/26/17 In re C.S. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re C.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
C.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
F073890
(Super. Ct. No. JW135556-00)
OPINION
THE COURT*
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. William D.
Palmer, Judge.
Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Kari
Ricci Mueller, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Franson, Acting P.J., Smith, J. and Meehan, J.
2
Appellant C.S., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s order setting the amount
of restitution owed under Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 730.6. Appellant
contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining the proper amount of
restitution. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the juvenile court’s restitution
order and remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Following the filing and amendment of a juvenile wardship petition under
section 602, appellant admitted to committing a petty theft in Bakersfield, California.
The petition alleged appellant stole an iPhone 6. As part of the disposition, the court
ordered appellant to pay restitution for the phone in an amount to be determined by the
probation department.
In the course of determining restitution, the probation department received a
receipt from the victim’s mother purporting to show a replacement cost for the phone
through Verizon Wireless of $596.74. The cost of the phone, exclusive of taxes, was
$549.99. Based on this receipt and conversations with the victim’s mother, the probation
department set the amount of restitution at $549.99. Appellant contested this amount and
requested a hearing pursuant to People v. Cervantes (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 353
(Cervantes).
The juvenile court held the contested Cervantes hearing on April 14, 2016. At that
hearing, the victim’s mother testified regarding the losses suffered due to the theft of the
phone. The victim’s mother explained that after the theft, she bought her son “a new
phone because he didn’t have a phone. And I needed a way to get a hold of him.” This
purchase occurred, “[i]mmediately after” the theft, because the victim’s mother wanted
him “to have a phone at all times.”

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise
noted.
3
The victim also testified. He stated the phone was in “very good condition” when
it was stolen, with “very few scratches on the back of it, but nothing major.” He did not
recall stating that the phone had a noticeable scratch in the middle of the screen, but
conceded he might have been incorrect. The victim stated he had probably had the
phone, which appellant stole in September 2015, since the beginning of that year.
The police recovered the victim’s phone when arresting appellant and returned the
phone to the victim. The victim then sold the phone for $100. The People conceded any
restitution order would need to credit appellant for the $100 obtained in the sale of the
returned phone.
After taking testimony and hearing argument on the value of the phone, the court
asked a question and, receiving no answer, entered its ruling as follows:
“THE COURT: Anybody have any idea what the depreciated life of
the phone is? [¶] No. [¶] The phone is clearly in its depreciated damaged
state[,] whether it was as a result of some of the way it is being held or
otherwise[,] it was worth $100 at that point. It was not a new phone. And I
don’t think, when I last ventured into the civil arena doing small claims
appeals, last month, that you are entitled to the replacement value. You are
entitled to the actual value of the phone. [¶] Arbitrarily, I will place that at
$450.00, less $100. I’m going to order restitution in the amount of $350.”
This appeal timely followed.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Under section 730.6, the Legislature has enacted its desire “that a victim of
conduct for which a minor is found to be a person described in Section 602 who incurs an
economic loss as a result of the minor’s conduct shall receive restitution directly from
that minor.” (§ 730.6, subd. (a)(1).) As such, upon “being found to be a person
described in Section 602, the court … shall order the minor to pay … [r]estitution to the
victim or victims, if any, in accordance with subdivision (h).” (§ 730.6, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
Relevant here, the amount of restitution shall include “[f]ull or partial payment for the
4
value of stolen or damaged property. The value of stolen or damaged property shall be
the replacement cost of like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property when
repair is possible.” (§ 730.6, subd. (h)(1)(A).)
“Generally speaking, restitution awards are vested in the trial court’s discretion
and will be disturbed on appeal only where an abuse of discretion appears. [Citation.]
Like most generalizations, however, this one can lead to errors if not applied with
circumspection. No court has discretion to make an order not authorized by law, or to
find facts for which there is not substantial evidence. A reviewing court will generally
examine an issue of law independently of a lower tribunal’s ruling. [Citation.] Its
determination on an issue of fact is reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.
[Citation.] The standard of review therefore depends on the nature of the question
presented.” (In re K.F. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 655, 661.) “ ‘If the circumstances
reasonably justify the [trial court’s] findings,’ the judgment may not be overturned when
the circumstances might also reasonably support a contrary finding. [Citation.] We do
not reweigh or reinterpret the evidence; rather, we determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to support the inference drawn by the trier of fact.” (People v. Baker (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 463, 469.)
The Juvenile Court Abused Its Discretion
In this instance, both sides agree the trial court abused its discretion in entering its
restitution order. Appellant argues the evidence could only support one conclusion, that
the phone was only worth $100 when taken, meaning any greater restitution award results
in a windfall to the victim. The People argue the evidence supported a restitution award
of $596.74 and that the juvenile court abused its discretion because it arbitrarily selected
a value for the phone. We agree an abuse of discretion occurred.
While it is true that the juvenile court had wide discretion in setting the restitution
amount, that discretion was not unlimited. The evidence admitted in this matter showed
two potential values for the court to apply in determining the value of the stolen phone.
5
If the court agreed that it was reasonable to replace the phone immediately, to ensure the
victim and his family could communicate as needed, the potential need for compatibility
with the victim’s cell phone plan and the stated need for immediate replacement could
support a finding the replacement value was $549.99.
2
While appellant argues the actual
value of the phone was no longer this high due to alleged damage, the statute clearly
contemplates an award of “replacement cost” which can account for factors in excess of
the actual market value of the property. (See People v. Tabb (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th
1142, 1154 [noting victim’s statement as to original cost was sufficient evidence of
replacement cost for purposes of restitution award].) Here, that value could include the
family’s stated need to have constant telephone access to the victim and its resulting
effect on the cost to replace the phone immediately, as demonstrated in the receipt
offered and related testimony. Alternatively, if the court rejected these reasons for
immediate replacement, the demonstrated value of the phone when resold on the open
market was $100, a figure the court could reasonably adopt because the sale price of the
item in the open market is a reasonable, although imperfect, approximation of its actual
replacement cost.
The court’s mid-range selection of $450, however, lacked support. Although the
court received evidence showing a decreased value of the phone due to potential damage
and depreciation, there was no credible evidence upon which the court could determine
the proper value of those offsets. While the court’s use of the word “arbitrarily” when
selecting its figure is no talisman demonstrating error, the lack of any connection between
the final restitution order entered and the evidence presented to the court does
demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Absent additional evidence regarding replacement
value, or an indication the award served a purpose greater than just replacing the phone,

2 Although the receipt introduced showed a higher number, the probation
department only requested restitution in the amount of $549.99 and the victim’s mother
agreed, “that is okay if that is the number that they came up with.”
6
the juvenile court could not simply adopt the $450 figure and, thus, its award of $350
constituted an abuse of its discretion.3
(See Luis M. v Superior Court (2014) 59 Cal.4th
300, 305 [“An order of direct victim restitution acts to make the victim whole,
rehabilitate the minor, and deter future delinquent behavior .…”].)
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.

3 On appeal, the People allege the trial court abused its discretion by offsetting the
replacement value of the phone by the $100 received by appellant upon its sale. We note
the People conceded this offset in the original proceedings and did not file a separate
notice on appeal, likely binding them to this position on remand. Regardless, we see no
error in ensuring the victim does not receive a windfall by applying an offset in the
unique circumstances of this case. (People v. Thygesen (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 988, 995
[“As to a victim, the purpose of the restitution statute is to make that victim whole, not to
give a windfall.”].) It would indeed constitute a windfall for appellant to be paid for the
replacement cost of the phone and to receive the phone itself at the conclusion of the
proceedings.




Description Appellant C.S., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court’s order setting the amount
of restitution owed under Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 730.6. Appellant
contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in determining the proper amount of
restitution. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the juvenile court’s restitution
order and remand for further proceedings.
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